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ABSTRACT	
	
This	is	a	thesis	about	the	main	drivers	of	regulatory	change.	Departing	from	theoretical	
approaches	 focused	 on	 the	 ‘policy	 process’	 –	 such	 as	 the	 Advocacy	 Coalition	
Framework	(ACF)	and	the	Narrative	Policy	Framework	(NPF)	 	–	this	work	 investigates	
the	main	reasons	behind	the	marked	changes	that	occurred	in	the	regulation	of	three	
Brazilian	environmental	policy	areas	between	2005	and	2015.	The	policy	areas	under	
investigation	 are	 Forestry,	 in	 particular	 the	 approval	 of	 a	 new	 Forest	 Code	 in	 2012;	
Access	to	Genetic	Resources	and	Benefit	Sharing,	specifically	the	new	2015	law	on	the	
topic	 (Lei	 13.123/2015);	 and	 Pesticides,	 in	 particular,	 regulatory	 changes	 concerning	
the	registration	and	use	of	new	products.		
In	order	 to	assess	 the	 reasons	 for	 regulatory	change	 in	 these	 three	areas,	 this	 thesis	
qualifies	 the	 latest	 version	 of	 the	 Advocacy	 Coalition	 Framework's	 explanation	 for	
policy	change	as	developed	by	Weible	and	Nohrstedt	 (2013).	The	thesis	explores	 the	
role	of	the	four	causal	factors	advanced	in	the	ACF	–	external	events,	internal	events,	
learning	and	negotiated	agreement	–	and	assesses	them	in	relation	to	the	three	case	
studies.	It	does	so	through	process-tracing	of	each	sector’s	history	and	content	analysis	
of	arguments	proffered	in	National	Congress	debates,	interviews	with	key	actors	and	in	
the	national	media.	
The	 findings	 of	 this	 thesis	 qualify	 the	 ACF	 expectations	 regarding	 policy	 change	 and	
suggest	 that	 events	 external	 and	 internal	 to	 the	 policy	 areas	 analysed	 might	 be	
sufficient	sources	of	regulatory	change.	Negotiated	agreement	and	learning	were	not	
necessary	sources	of	regulatory	change	in	two	of	the	three	cases	investigated.	Among	
the	external	events	identified	as	relevant	for	the	regulatory	changes	are	the	increased	
relevance	 of	 commodity	 production	 and	 export	 between	 2008	 and	 2013	 and	 the	
consequent	 increase	 in	 the	political	 and	economic	power	of	 the	 agribusiness	 sector.	
The	main	 internal	 events	 identified	 point	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
enforcement	of	previously	non-enforced	regulations;	the	limits	of	the	state’s	capacity	
to	 enforce	 previous	 regulations;	 international	 negotiations;	 and	 media	 scandals.	
Finally,	 incentives	 generated	 by	 international	 negotiations	 were	 found	 to	 be	 crucial	
determinants	 of	 negotiated	 agreement	 and	 learning	 between	 coalitions,	 in	 the	 only	
case	in	which	these	occurred	(Access	to	Genetic	Resources	and	Benefit	Sharing).	 	
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PCdoB	 Brazilian	Communist	Party	
PDT	 Democratic	Workers'	Party	
PEC	 Proposal	of	Constitutional	Amendment	
PIS/Pasep	 Social	Integration	Programme	
PL	 Law	Project	
PLP	 Complementary	Law	Project	
PLV	 Conversion	Law	Project	
PMDB		 Brazilian	Democratic	Movement	Party	
PP	 Progressivism	Party	
PPCDam	 Plan	of	Prevention	and	Control	of	Deforestation	in	the	Legal	Amazon	
PPS	 Popular	Socialist	Party	
PSB	 Brazilian	Socialist	Party	
PSDB	 Brazilian	Socio-democratic	Party	
PSOL	 Liberty	and	Socialism	Party	
PT	 Worker's	Party	
PV	 Brazilian	Green	Party	
SBPC	 Brazilian	Society	for	the	Progress	of	Science	
SINDAG	 National	Union	of	Agriculture	Defence	Products	
SINDIVEG	 Syndicate	of	Agricultural	Defence	Products	Industry	
SIVAM	 Amazon	Surveillance	System	
TRIPS	 Trade-Related	Intellectual	Property	Rights	
UFMT	 Federal	University	of	Mato	Grosso	
UN	 United	Nations	
UNEP	 The	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	
UNESCO	 The	United	Nations	Educational,	Scientific	and	Cultural	Organization	
UNESP	 Sao	Paulo	State	University	
Unicamp	 University	of	Campinas	
USP	 University	of	Sao	Paulo	
WWF	 World	Wildlife	Fund	
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CHAPTER	1	-	FRAMING	THE	PROBLEM	
	
	
1.1.	Introduction	
This	 thesis	explores	the	main	drivers	of	changes	 in	environmental	 regulation	
in	 Brazil	 in	 three	 core	 areas	 between	 2005	 and	 2015.	 It	 provides	 support	 to	 claims	
about	 the	 occurrence	 of	 an	 environmental	 ‘roll-back’	 (retrocesso	 ambiental)	 in	
Brazilian	 environmental	 standards	 over	 this	 time	 period	 and	 assesses	 the	 reasons	
underlying	 these	 changes.1	 The	 policy	 areas	 under	 investigation	 are	 forestry,	
specifically	the	approval	of	a	new	Forest	Code	in	2012;	access	to	genetic	resources	and	
benefit	 sharing,	 specifically	 the	 new	 2015	 law	 on	 the	 topic	 (Lei	 13.123/2015);	 and	
pesticides,	 in	 particular	 changes	 concerning	 the	 registration	 of	 new	 products.	The	
three	cases	 selected	 represent	 remarkable	policy	changes	 in	 terms	of	 the	content	of	
standards	and	were	identified	as	the	most	salient	changes	in	each	of	these	areas	over	
the	 time	 period	 investigated.	 The	 assessment	 of	 the	 drivers	 of	 change	 is	 pursued	
through	a	process-tracing	of	each	sector’s	history,	thematic	coding	of	main	arguments	
and	narrative	analysis	of	debates	occurring	in	the	National	Congress,	interviews	and	in	
the	media.	
To	 explore	 the	 factors	 motivating	 these	 changes,	 this	 thesis	 draws	 on	 and	
extends	 the	 Advocacy	 Coalition	 Framework	 (ACF),	 examining,	 in	 particular,	 ACF’s	
claims	 about	 the	 drivers	 of	 policy	 change.	 The	 thesis	 builds	 on	 the	 four	 sources	 of	
policy	 change	 identified	 by	 Weible	 and	 Nohrstedt	 (2013)2	 as	 necessary,	 but	 not	
sufficient,	 sources	 of	 policy	 change:	 external	 events,	 internal	 events,	 learning	 and	
negotiated	 agreement.	 In	 short,	 external	 (i.e.	 systemic)	 events	 refer	 to	 changes	 in	
																																								 																				
1	 The	 occurrence	 of	 an	 environmental	 roll-back	 (‘retrocesso	 ambiental’)	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	
regulation	 has,	 since	 at	 least	 2009,	 become	 almost	 a	 ‘mantra’	 repeated	ad	 nauseum	 by	 the	 national	
media,	 scholars	and	environmental	activists.	As	noticed	by	Lima	&	Garcia	 (2014,	p.	273),	 for	 instance,	
‘after	decades	of	progress,	 in	 the	past	years	Brazilian	Environmental	 Law	began	 to	go	 through	shocks	
and	regulatory	roll-backs,	demonstrating	a	real	tendency	of	diminishing,	adulteration	and	elimination	of	
environmental	 protection	 standards	 previously	 achieved1.’	 The	 debate	 about	 the	 legal	 ‘principle	 of	
environmental	roll-back	prohibition’	(‘Princípio	da	Proibição	do	Retrocesso	Ambiental’)	even	motivated	a	
colloquium	financed	by	the	Higher	Chamber	of	the	National	Congress,	which	occurred	in	2012	with	the	
participation	of	several	environmental	legal	experts.	
2	 The	 ACF’s	 hypothesis	 states	 that	 “significant	 perturbations	 external	 to	 the	 subsystem,	 a	 significant	
perturbation	 internal	 to	 the	 subsystem,	 policy-oriented	 learning,	 negotiated	 agreement	 or	 some	
combination	thereof,	are	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	sources	of	change	in	the	policy	core	attributes	of	a	
governmental	programme”	(Weible	and	Nohrstedt,	2013,	p.133).	
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socioeconomic	 conditions,	 changes	 in	 public	 opinion,	 changes	 in	 the	 systemic	
governing	 coalition	 and	 changes	 in	 other	 policy	 subsystems	 (Sabatier	 and	 Weible,	
2007,	pp.	198–199).	 Internal	events	 are	events	 that	are	directly	 related	 to	 the	policy	
sector	 under	 investigation.	Policy-oriented	 learning	 is	 defined	 as	 “relatively	 enduring	
alternations	of	 thought	or	behavioural	 intentions	 that	 result	 from	experience	and/or	
new	 information	 and	 that	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	 attainment	 or	 revision	 of	 policy	
objectives”	 (Sabatier	 and	 Jenkins-Smith,	 1999,	 p.	 123).3	 Ultimately	 it	 refers	 to	 the	
impact	 experience	 and	 information	 have	 in	 actors’	 thoughts	 and	 behavioural	
intentions.	Finally,	negotiated	agreement	consists	of	“agreements	involving	policy	core	
changes	[that]	are	crafted	among	previously	warring	coalitions”	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	
2007	p.	 205).	 This	 is	 clearly	 the	 source	 of	 policy	 change	 for	which	 there	 is	 the	 least	
research	and	debate	within	the	ACF.		
The	 main	 contributions	 of	 this	 thesis	 are	 fivefold.	 Firstly,	 it	 contributes	 to	
empirical	knowledge	by	investigating	three	cases	of	regulatory	change	in	Brazil	and	by	
providing	 a	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 the	 alleged	 ‘roll	 back’	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	
standards	between	2005	and	2015,	in	relation	to	the	three	cases	chosen.	The	results	of	
the	 analysis	 point	 to	 an	 actual	weakening	 in	 the	 stringency	of	 standards	 in	 terms	of	
environmental	 protection,	 and	 to	 the	 important	 role	 of	 the	 political	 and	 economic	
power	 acquired	 by	 the	 agri-business	 sector,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 a	 legitimising	 narrative	
adopted	by	the	government	in	motivating	these	changes.		
Secondly,	 in	 terms	 of	 theoretical	 contributions,	 it	 considers	 the	 causal	
mechanisms	 linking	 the	 four	above-mentioned	ACF	 factors	 to	policy	 change.	Echoing	
scholars	who	have	argued	 in	 favour	of	 the	 consideration	of	material	 interests	 in	 the	
application	of	the	ACF	(Nohrstedt,	2005;	Nohrstedt,	2010;	Hoberg,	1996;	Hann,	1995;	
Ladi,	 2005;	 Szarka,	 2010;	 Schlager,	 1995),	 this	 thesis	 adds	 the	 role	 of	 changes	 in	
incentives	 (i.e.	 changes	 in	 the	 calculations	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits)	 to	 the	 causal	
pathways	through	which	these	four	sources	of	policy	change	are	said	to	operate.	This	
thesis	 provides,	 therefore,	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 by	 systematically	
incorporating	the	role	of	material	interests	in	the	empirical	application	of	the	ACF.		
																																								 																				
3	 Sabatier	 and	 Jenkins-Smith	 (1988,	 p.	 155)	 find	 that	 the	 first	 condition	 needed	 for	 policy-oriented	
learning	to	occur	is	that	“both	sides	have	sufficient	technical	resources	to	be	able	to	criticize	the	other’s	
causal	model	and	data”.	It	 is,	therefore,	the	“analytical	debate	among	different	coalitions”	that	refines	
actors’	understandings	of	the	seriousness,	causal	relationships	and	consequences	of	the	policy	problem	
on	the	agenda.	
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Third,	 the	 thesis	 analyses	 the	 ACF’s	 hypothesis	 about	 the	 four	 sources	 of	
policy	change	(see	footnote	2)	and	advances	that	negotiated	agreement	and	learning	
might	not	be	necessary	sources	of	policy	change.	It	maintains,	in	addition,	that	internal	
and	external	events	might	be	both	necessary	and	sufficient,	depending	on	the	context.	
In	 this	 way	 the	 thesis	 qualifies	 Weible	 and	 Nohrstedt’s	 (2013)	 claim	 regarding	 the	
necessity	 and	 non-sufficiency	 of	 these	 four	 factors.	 In	 two	of	 the	 three	 case	 studies	
presented,	no	learning	or	negotiated	agreement	could	be	identified	among	coalitions,	
despite	 remarkable	 regulatory/policy	 changes.	 Negotiated	 agreement	 and	 learning,	
when	they	occurred,	were	directly	related	to	contextual	drivers	(internal	and	external	
events).	 They	 were,	 therefore,	 considered	 intermediate	 rather	 than	 independent	
variables.		
Because	learning	and	negotiated	agreement	occurred	in	only	one	of	the	three	
cases,	 the	 fourth	 contribution	 of	 this	 thesis	 consists	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 the	
differences	 between	 cases	 that	might	 have	motivated	 this	 variance.	 In	 other	words,	
the	results	of	the	empirical	analysis	unexpectedly	allowed	for	an	analysis	of	the	drivers	
of	 learning	and	negotiated	agreement	 (which	have,	 in	 this	case,	assumed	the	role	of	
dependent	 variables).	 Finally,	 the	 Brazilian	 case	 proved	 to	 be	 propitious	 for	 the	
analysis	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 contextual	 variables	 (or	 ‘opportunity	 structures’)	 on	 the	
application	 of	 the	 ACF.	 Brazil	 does	 not	 frequently	 provide	 the	 context	 for	 the	
application	of	the	framework	(which	has	been	predominantly	used	for	the	analysis	of	
US	and	Western	European	cases),	and	so	 it	 is	perceived	to	provide	a	challenging	test	
for	the	assumptions	of	the	ACF,	and	great	potential	to	foster	its	development.	
	
Based	 on	 what	 is	 described	 above,	 four	 questions	 were	 formulated	 to	 be	
answered	by	this	thesis:	
	
1.	 Do	 regulatory	 changes	 actually	 point	 to	 a	 ‘roll-back’	 in	 Brazilian	
environmental	standards?	
2.	Are	each	of	the	four	sources	of	policy	change	advanced	by	the	ACF	
(or	 some	 combination	 of	 them)	 sufficient	 motivators	 of	 policy	
change?	
3.	 Are	 the	 four	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	 advanced	 by	 the	 ACF	 (or	
some	combination	of	them)	necessary	motivators	of	policy	change?	
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4.	What	 factors	 favoured	the	occurrence	of	 learning	and	negotiated	
agreement	among	coalitions,	when	they	occurred?	
	
1.2.	Importance	
This	 section	 justifies	 specific	 choices	 made	 in	 the	 research	 design	 of	 this	
thesis.	It	will	answer	four	questions.	First,	why	was	the	Advocacy	Coalition	Framework	
chosen	as	the	main	theoretical	perspective?	Second,	why	is	it	relevant	to	the	of	study	
environmental	 regulations?	 Third,	why	 is	 it	 important	 to	 focus	 on	 Brazil	 and	 on	 the	
specific	 timeframe	 chosen?	 And,	 finally,	 why	 have	 these	 three	 case	 studies	 been	
chosen	for	this	analysis?	
	
1.2.1.	Why	the	Advocacy	Coalition	Framework?	
This	sub-section	intends	to	briefly	present	the	ACF	and	explain	the	reasons	for	
choosing	it	as	the	main	theoretical	lens	for	analysis.	It	starts	by	briefly	presenting	the	
framework	and	proceeds	by	contrasting	the	ACF	with	other	relevant	approaches	in	the	
debates	about	policy	changes	and	by	providing	four	reasons	why	the	ACF	is	considered	
the	most	suitable	framework	for	this	analysis,	despite	its	limitations.			
The	Advocacy	Coalition	Framework	(ACF)	is	an	actor-based	approach	focused	
on	three	main	topics:	coalition	formation	and	behaviour;	 learning;	and	policy	change	
(Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith,	1993;	Sabatier,	1998;	Weible	et	al.,	2009;	Jenkins-Smith	et	
al.,	2014).	It	was	developed	in	the	early	1980s	by	Paul	Sabatier	and	Hank	Jenkins-Smith	
in	 response	 to	 the	 perceived	 limitations	 of	 public	 policy	 research	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	
1980s,	including	the	lack	of	causal	explanations	provided	by	the	prominent	policy	cycle	
or	 ‘stages	heuristic’	approach	(DeLeon,	1999;	Jann	and	Wegrich,	2006).	Furthermore,	
the	necessity	of	expanding	the	understanding	of	policy-making	beyond	governmental	
institutions	(executive,	 judiciary	and	legislative),	 integrating	top-down	and	bottom-up	
approaches	 to	 policy-making,	 and	 the	perceived	need	 to	 give	more	 emphasis	 to	 the	
role	of	scientific	and	technical	information	in	political	debates	also	acted	as	a	stimulus	
to	its	creation	(Jenkins-Smith,	Nohrstedt,	Weible	and	Sabatier,	2014).		
In	addition	to	the	ACF,	several	theoretical	approaches	have	been	used	for	the	
study	 of	 policy	 change	 (and	 stasis).	 Pierson	 (2000),	 for	 instance,	 emphasises	 the	
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importance	 of	 institutional	 ‘Path	 Dependency’	 which	 makes	 institutional	 alterations	
not	 only	 difficult	 but	 also	 unattractive.	 Baumgartner	 and	 Jones	 (1993),	 on	 the	 other	
hand,	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 considering	 longer	 time-frames	 in	 order	 to	 expose	
alternations	 between	 periods	 of	 policy	 stability	 and	 dramatic	 policy	 change.	 Streeck	
and	 Thelen’s	 (2005)	 take	 on	 the	 dynamics	 of	 policy	 change	 puts	 emphasis	 on	 the	
importance	of	processes	of	‘incremental	institutional	changes’,	which	after	some	time	
result	in	drastic	ruptures	with	the	past.	Downs’	‘issue	attention	cycle’	emphasises	the	
role	 of	 the	media	 and	 attention	 spans	 in	 the	 recognition	 and	management	 of	 social	
and	environmental	problems	and	in	policy	change.	Kingdon’s	‘multiple	streams	model’	
contributed	 to	 this	 debate	 by	 describing	 a	 less	 organised	 or	 predictable	 process	 of	
policy	 change	 that	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 convergence	 of	 problem	 perceptions,	
favourable	 political	 contexts	 and	 pre-elaborated	 policy	 solutions	 during	 ‘windows	 of	
opportunity’	 that	 could	 eventually	 lead	 to	 policy	 change.	 Lodge	 and	 Hood’s	 (2002)	
analysis	 of	 ‘forced	 choices’	 emphasises	 the	 role	 of	 media	 frenzies	 in	 forcing	 policy	
makers	 to	 take	 action,	 and	 how	 such	 scandal-led	 impulses	 are	 mediated	 by	
institutional	filters.	Finally,	authors	such	as	Hajer	(1995)	and	Fischer	(2003)	point	to	the	
role	of	normative	values	and	social	meanings	as	essential	drivers	of	policy	change.	Each	
of	 these	 frameworks	emphasises	the	 importance	of	specific	 factors	 for	policy	change	
or	 stasis	 such	 as	 the	 role	 of	 history,	 institutions,	 public	 scandals,	 chance,	 media	
attention	and	normative	values	and	emotions.		
Although	 the	 valuable	 insights	 provided	 by	 each	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	
scholars	have	certainly	contributed	to	the	analysis	pursued	 in	this	 thesis	 (and	also	to	
the	elaboration	of	ACF),	there	are	three	reasons	why	the	ACF	has	been	the	preferred	
theoretical	 approach.	 First,	 following	 a	 ‘policy-focused	 political	 science’	 approach,	
according	to	which	the	increase	in	areas	regulated	by	the	state	or	‘policy	density’	has	
turned	 the	 activity	 of	 interest	 groups	 into	 a	 more	 widespread	 and	 important	
phenomenon	 in	 contemporary	 policy-making,	 individual	 interest	 groups	 are	
considered	a	better	unit	of	 analysis	 than	 institutions,	 votes	or	 the	media	as	a	whole	
(Hacker	and	Pierson,	2014).	Apart	from	Hajer	(1995)	(who	professes	the	importance	of	
‘discourse	 coalitions’),	none	of	 the	 theoretical	 frameworks	mentioned	above	pays	as	
much	attention	as	the	ACF	to	the	role	of	coalitions	of	actors	and	how	their	interactions	
shape	 policy	 change.	 Additionally,	 although	 Hajer	 (1995)	 directly	 addresses	 the	
importance	 of	 coalitions	 in	 policy	 change,	 the	 author	 associates	 coalitions	 with	 the	
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discourses	they	adopt,	which,	 in	 turn,	are	ultimately	based	on	normative	values.	The	
author	 describes	 discourses	 as	 socially	 constructed	 and	 resulting	 mainly	 from	
socialisation	 and	 the	 emotional	 attachment	 of	 actors	 to	 particular	 groups	 and	
ideologies	(driven	by	the	‘logic	of	appropriateness’),	and	interests	as	intersubjectively	
formed	 through	 discourses	 themselves.	 Hajer’s	 theoretical	 framework,	 therefore,	
places	 little	emphasis	on	 the	 role	of	material	 interests	 in	policy	change.	The	ACF,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 allows	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 both	 normative	 values	 and	material	
interests	as	causal	drivers,	more	directly	accommodating	the	kind	of	factors	identified	
as	relevant	in	this	analysis.		
Second,	none	of	the	above-mentioned	theoretical	approaches	is	as	well	suited	
to	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 complex	 relations	 between	 the	 ecological	 and	 the	 human	
environment	 as	 the	 ACF.	 This	 framework	 was	 initially	 developed	 to	 study	
environmental	 and	energy	policy-making	 in	 the	US,	which	makes	 it	 particularly	well-
suited	for	the	study	of	complex	technological-environmental-human	relations	marked	
by	high	political	adversity	(Nohrstedt,	2010,	p.	311).		The	high	level	of	uncertainty	and	
complexity	that	characterises	the	three	case	studies	investigated	in	this	thesis	as	well	
as	the,	at	 least	hypothetical,	potential	 for	scientific	and	technical	 information	to	play	
an	 important	 role	 in	 these	 subsystems	makes	 the	ACF	particularly	useful.	Moreover,	
the	 fact	 that	 environmental	 debates	 are	 usually	 both	 normative	 (in	 the	 sense	 of	
advancing	 values	 and	 beliefs)	 and	 interest-driven	 requires	 a	 theoretical	 framework	
that	 can	 accommodate	 both	 drivers,	 a	 task	 that	 the	 ACF	 can,	 as	 observed	 above,	
accomplish.4		
A	third	advantage	of	the	ACF	concerns	its	focus	on	‘policy	subsystems’.	Policy	
subsystems	 were	 found	 to	 be	 a	 useful	 analytical	 unit	 and	 scale	 for	 the	 intended	
comparison	of	different	sub-areas	of	environmental	policies.	They	allow	analysis	to	be	
focused	 on	 policy	 problems	 and	 not	 on	 the	 agencies	 or	 on	 the	 specific	 government	
institutions	in	which	they	occur,	providing	more	flexibility	and	broadening	the	scope	of	
analysis.5	 It	 also	 allows	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 interdependencies	 and	 overlaps	
between	the	activities	of	many	different	government	sectors	as	well	as	other	private	or	
informal	 institutions.	 The	 approach	 allows,	 therefore,	 for	 a	 very	 comprehensive	
																																								 																				
4	The	possibility	of	applying	the	ACF	to	include	both	interests	and	normative	values	among	its	analytical	
considerations	is	attested,	for	instance,	by	studies	of	wind	power	policies	in	Europe	(Szarka,	2010).		
5	Even	if	the	same	institutions	are	often	investigated,	my	three	case	studies	are	considered	independent	
because	they	refer	to	three	different	policy	problems	and	regulatory	apparatuses.	
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empirical	 observation	 of	 the	 policy	 processes	 and	 relevant	 interest	 groups	 involved,	
moving	 away	 from	 the	 need	 to	 exclude	 potentially	 relevant	 actors	 and	 institutional	
venues.	
	
	
	
1.2.2	Why	Environmental	Regulation?	
There	 are	 two	 reasons	 why	 I	 have	 chosen	 to	 focus	 specifically	 on	
environmental	 regulation.	 First,	 environmental	 regulation	 is	 an	 important	 domain	 in	
itself,	which	combines	national	and	 international	dynamics,	as	well	as	the	values	and	
interests	 of	 practically	 every	 social	 group,	 such	 as	 those	 concerned	 with	 economic	
development,	commodity	exports,	small	farmers,	researchers,	activists	and	the	media.	
Therefore,	 many	 areas	 and	 concerns	 overlap	 in	 environmental	 debates,	 making	 it	
highly	 representative	 of	 broader	 social	 trends.	 Second,	 environmental	 policies	 are	
considered	 an	 ideal	 sector	 for	 the	 further	 development	 of	 the	 ACF	 due	 to	 the	
significant	 scientific	 uncertainties	 that	 commonly	 affect	 it,	 and,	 consequently,	 the	
extensive	 possibilities	 this	 sector	 offers	 for	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 role	 of	 technical	
knowledge	 in	 policy-making	 and	 regulatory	 change.	 This	 is	 evidenced	 by	 the	 very	
common	 use	 of	 this	 framework	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 environmental	 regulations	 and	
policies	worldwide,	 representing	57%	of	 the	 total	number	of	applications	of	 the	ACF	
between	1987	and	2013	(Jenkins-Smith	et	al.,	2014).		
	
1.2.3	Why	Brazil?	
There	were	three	main	motivations	for	the	choice	of	Brazil	as	the	focus	of	this	
analysis.	 The	 first	 relates	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Brazilian	 environmental	 policies	 are	 of	
particular	interest	to	the	international	community	due	to	their	significant	current	and	
future	impact	on	the	worldwide	effectiveness	of	international	environmental	regimes	
(i.e.	 biodiversity,	 climate	 change,	 industrial	 chemical	 pollutants).	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	
important	to	note	that	Brazil	 is	considered	the	most	biodiverse	country	 in	the	world,	
holding	approximately	one	tenth	of	all	species	on	earth	(Lambertini,	2000).	In	terms	of	
cultural	diversity,	Brazil	 is	also	amongst	the	world	leaders.	It	is	home	to	305	different	
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ethnical	 minorities,	 speaking	 around	 274	 different	 languages	 and	 who	 possess	 an	
unimaginable	 amount	 of	 traditional	 knowledge	 (for	 example,	 about	 biodiversity),	
which	is	still	unknown	to	the	rest	of	society	(FUNAI,	2011).		The	regulation	of	access	to	
biodiversity	and	traditional	knowledge	in	Brazil	(one	of	the	case	studies	in	this	thesis)	
is,	consequently,	of	crucial	global	importance.	Additionally,	analysing	the	evolution	of	
the	Brazilian	environmental	 regime	on	access	 to	biodiversity	 and	benefit	 sharing	–	a	
pioneering	 regulatory	 enterprise	 –	 can	 also	 provide	 valuable	 insights	 for	 other	
countries	that	have	not	yet	regulated	the	issue.	
Brazil’s	forestry	policies	are	highly	relevant	to	global	regulatory	regimes	for	a	
number	 of	 reasons.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 Brazil	 features	 the	 second	 largest	
forested	area	within	a	single	country	in	the	world	(being	second	only	to	Russia)	as	well	
as	 the	 world’s	 largest	 area	 of	 remaining	 tropical	 forests	 (Hall,	 2012,	 p.	 04),	 it	 was	
estimated	by	the	Brazilian	Inventory	of	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions	(MCTI,	2009)	that	at	
least	61%	of	Brazilian	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions	result	 from	deforestation	and	
forest	 degradation.	 Moreover,	 according	 to	 the	 most	 recent	 world	 comparative	
statistics,	 in	 2005	 Brazil	 was	 the	 sixth	 largest	 greenhouse	 gas	 emitter	 in	 the	 world	
(WRI,	 2013).	 Therefore,	 Brazilian	 strategies	 for	 tackling	 deforestation	 and	 forest	
degradation	are	crucial	for	the	global	efforts	to	reduce	CO2	emissions	that	define	the	
international	regime	of	climate	change.		
Finally,	 the	 international	 relevance	 of	 studying	 pesticide	 regulation	 in	 Brazil	
goes	beyond	 the	 fact	 that	 since	2009	 the	 country	has	been	 the	 largest	 consumer	of	
pesticides	 in	 the	world.	Not	 only	 does	 Brazil	 consume	 approximately	 one	 fifth	 of	 all	
pesticides	produced	worldwide,	but	its	consumption	is	increasing	exponentially.	While	
the	world	market	 for	 pesticides	has	 grown	by	93%	 from	2002	 to	 2012,	 the	Brazilian	
market	 has	 experienced	 a	 190%	 growth	 rate	 spike	 in	 the	 same	 period	 (ANVISA	 and	
UFPR,	 2012).	 The	 Brazilian	 national	market	 for	 pesticides,	which	was	worth	US$	 7.3	
billion	 in	 2010,	 increased	 to	US$	12.25	billion	 in	 2014,	 an	 increase	of	 approximately	
68%	 in	 four	 years	 (SINDIVEG,	 2014).	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 potential	 impacts	 that	 an	
ineffectively	 regulated	 increase	 of	 such	 magnitude	 might	 have	 for	 global	 ecological	
balance	or	world	health	 (through	 food	 trade,	 for	 example),	 possible	 shortcomings	 in	
pesticide	 regulation	 in	 Brazil	 might	 also	 severely	 undermine	 international	 efforts	 to	
keep	 specific	 hazardous	 chemical	 substances	 under	 control,	 such	 as	 those	
encompassed	 in	 the	Rotterdam	 Convention	 of	 1998,	 which	 regulates	 international	
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trade	 in	 chemicals,	 and	 the	 Stockholm	 Convention	 of	 2001,	 which	 focuses	 on	 the	
production,	use,	trade,	and	disposal	of	persistent	organic	pollutants.	
The	second	reason	is	related	to	the	gaps	in	the	application	of	the	ACF	to	the	
context	 of	 developing	 countries	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 Brazil.	 Although	 the	 ACF	 has	
proved	 useful	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 policy	 changes	 in	 Western	 European	 and	 North	
American	 contexts,	 it	 has	 seldom	 been	 applied	 to	 Latin	 American	 cases.	 Out	 of	 224	
total	empirical	applications	of	the	ACF	that	resulted	in	publications	in	English	up	until	
2014,	only	27	examined	cases	outside	these	two	regions	and	only	one	in	Brazil	(Henry,	
Ingold,	 Nohrstedt	 and	 Weible,	 2014,	 p.	 303).	 The	 particularities	 of	 the	 Brazilian	
context,	namely	the	medium	level	of	consensus	required	for	decisions	to	be	made	and	
the	low	openness	of	the	political	system	(debated	in	further	detail	in	chapter	2,	section	
2.3.5	and	in	chapter	8,	section	8.2.1),	characterise	a	context	in	which	the	importance	
of	interest	calculations	and	power	resources	are	magnified,	providing	an	ideal	context	
for	 the	 analysis	 and	 inclusion	 of	 these	 variables	 in	 the	ACF.6	 Additionally,	 these	 two	
contextual	elements	reduce	the	potential	role	of	participation	of	less	powerful	actors,	
reducing	as	a	consequence	 the	potential	 role	 for	negotiated	agreement	and	 learning	
between	different	coalitions.	There	is,	therefore,	a	significant	gap	in	the	application	of	
ACF	 to	 political	 systems	 with	 these	 types	 of	 characteristics	 and	 vast	 potential	 for	
theory	development	in	the	empirical	application	of	ACF	to	the	Brazilian	context.		
The	 third	motivation	 concerns	 an	 under-studied	 (but	 frequently	mentioned)	
trend	of	environmental	regulatory	change	in	the	country,	which	is	often	referred	to	by	
the	 media,	 academics	 or	 environmental	 activists	 as	 ‘environmental	 roll-back’.	 As	
observed	by	Lima	and	Garcia	(2014,	p.	273),	for	instance,	“after	decades	of	progress,	in	
the	past	years	Brazilian	environmental	law	began	to	suffer	shocks	and	regulatory	roll-
backs,	 demonstrating	 a	 real	 tendency	 towards	 the	 diminishment,	 adulteration	 and	
elimination	of	environmental	protection	standards	previously	achieved”.7	Providing	a	
																																								 																				
6	The	analysis	of	the	characteristics	of	Brazilian	political	system	and	Brazilian	society	and	its	 impact	on	
coalition	behaviours	draws	 inspiration	 from	Sabatier’s	 (2007)	use	Liphart’s	 (1999,	pp.	3–4)	analysis	on	
the	 types	 of	 democracies	 and	 openness	 of	 political	 systems.	 According	 to	 the	 application	 of	 these	
authors’	criteria	to	the	Brazilian	case	it	has	been	concluded	that	Brazil	is	characterised	by	intermediary	
requirements	of	consensus	among	institutions	for	decisions	to	take	place,	and	low	accessibility	to	power	
by	different	interests.	This	is	perceived	to	be	a	scenario	which	magnifies	the	importance	of	interest	and	
power	 based	 explanations	 because	 participation/negotiation	 and	 consensus	 among	 coalitions	 are	
institutionally	 limited.	 This	 analysis	 is	 provided	 in	 the	 concluding	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 (Chapter	 8,	
section	2.a).	
7	 In	 Portuguese:	 “Após	 décadas	 de	 avanços,	 o	 Direito	 Ambiental	 brasileiro	 passou	 a	 sofrer	 abalos	 e	
retrocessos	 normativos	 nos	 últimos	 anos,	 demonstrando	 uma	 verdadeira	 tendência	 de	 diminuição,	
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more	systematic	assessment	of	this	alleged	trend	will	provide	a	much-needed	redress	
of	the	lack	of	study	of	this	issue	by	Brazil-focused	academics.	
Thus,	 Brazilian	 environmental	 policies	 have	 been	 through	 marked	 changes	
during	the	decade	between	2005	and	2015,	but	little	comprehensive	analysis	has	been	
produced	as	to	the	reasons	for	these	changes.	In	addition	to	the	regulatory	changes	in	
the	 three	 areas	 under	 investigation,	 at	 least	 three	 other	 important	 changes	 are	
identified	in	this	thesis,	including	the	proposition	of	a	new	Mining	Code	(PL	37/11, to	
be	voted	on	 in	2016),	which	 intends	to	permit	mining	 in	protected	areas;	changes	 in	
the	 types	 of	 protected	 areas	 preferred	 by	 the	 government	 and	 in	 the	 speed	 of	 the	
creation	of	new	areas	during	Dilma	Rousseff’s	government	(see	Shalynn	et	al.,	2016)8;	
changes	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	 licensing	 of	 large	 construction	 projects	 in	
environmentally	 sensitive	 areas	 (see	 Fearnside,	 2016)	 and	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	
promotion	of	bio-ethanol	 in	the	Brazilian	cerrado	(a	vast	tropical	savannah	ecoregion	
covering	23%	of	the	country),	despite	environmental	concerns	(see	Freitas,	2015).	This	
analysis,	 therefore,	 opens	up	 an	 avenue	 for	 further	 scrutiny	of	 the	broader	 trend	of	
environmental	regulatory	‘roll-back’	in	Brazil.	
	
	
1.2.4	Why	these	Cases	and	Timeframe?	
The	 three	 areas	 selected	 for	 this	 analysis	 were	 chosen	 because	 they	
experienced	marked	 regulatory	 changes	between	2005	and	2015,	which	were	highly	
salient	 according	 to	 National	 Congress	 debates.	 They	 also	 have	 in	 common	 the	 fact	
that	 they	 involve	 significant	 uncertainty	 and	 could	 fundamentally	 benefit	 from	 the	
contribution	of	 scientific	analysis,	making	 them	 ideal	 cases	 for	 the	application	of	 the	
ACF.9	 These	 three	 areas,	 moreover,	 involve	 different	 interest	 groups	 that,	 taken	
together,	 represent	all	or	at	 least	a	very	 representative	 share	of	 the	groups	 that	are	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
descaracterização	 ou	 eliminação	 dos	 padrões	 de	 proteção	 ambiental	 já	 alcançados”	 Lima	 and	 Garcia	
(2014,	p.	273).	
8	 For	 further	 details	 on	 policy	 changes	 in	 protected	 areas’	 policies	 you	 may	 also	 see	 the	 author’s	
conference	paper	available	at:	http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/conference/file/reponse/1434991108.pdf		
9	Among	the	several	possible	choices	of	cases	of	marked	environmental	regulatory	change	that	occurred	
in	Brazil	between	2005	and	2015,	however,	 these	 three	 specific	 cases	were	chosen	due	 to	 the	access	
obtained	 to	 relevant	 actors	 for	 interviews	 during	 fieldwork	 (September	 2014	 –	 January	 2015).	 Other	
areas	considered	 in	the	outline	of	this	research	(such	as	protected	areas	policies)	were	set	aside	after	
fieldwork	 due	 to	 limitations	 of	 the	 empirical	 data	 collected.	 Environmental	 licensing,	 mining,	 and	
protected	 area	 policies	 are,	 however,	 also	 potentially	 good	 candidates	 for	 this	 analysis	 and	 will	 be	
assessed	in	future	research.	
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currently	 active	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	 policy	 debates,	 namely	 agri-business,	
environmentalists,	 bio-industry,	 scientists,	 small	 farmers,	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities,	politicians	of	the	National	Congress	and	of	the	different	Ministries	of	the	
Executive	 Power,	 such	 as	 the	Ministry	 for	 the	 Environment	 (MMA),	 the	Ministry	 of	
Agriculture	 (MAPA),	 the	Ministry	 of	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	 (MDIC),	 the	Ministry	 of	
Science,	Technology	and	Innovations	(MCTI)	and	the	Casa	Civil	(the	executive	office	of	
the	presidency	–	a	governmental	institution	that	oversees	and	coordinates	the	actions	
of	all	these	different	ministries).	
Each	 specific	 change	 in	 standard	within	each	of	 the	areas	was	 chosen,	 in	
turn,	according	to	saliency.	In	the	forestry	case,	debates	about	the	new	“Forest	Code”	
are	 investigated.	This	 law,	which	 regulates	native	vegetation,	was	 first	established	 in	
1934	 and	 altered	 in	 1965	 and	 2001,	 and	 was	 in	 2012	 once	 again	 reformulated.	 As	
demonstrated	 by	 the	 saliency	 analysis	 in	 chapter	 4	 (section	 4.2),	 this	 later	
reformulation	was	by	far	the	most-cited	forestry	issue	in	the	National	Congress	News	
Agency	between	2005	and	2015.	Additionally,	 it	was	mentioned	during	 interviews	as	
one	 of	 the	 most	 serious	 defeats	 for	 environmentalists	 over	 the	 past	 decades	
(interviews	18,	43).		
In	 the	 pesticide	 case,	 the	 regulatory	 changes	 investigated	 are	 Law	
12.873/2013,	which	allowed	unregistered	pesticides	to	be	produced	and	used	in	cases	
of	 phytosanitary	 or	 zoo-sanitary	 emergencies,	 and	Bill	 209/2013,	which	 proposed	 to	
substitute	 the	 tripartite	 registration	 system	 of	 new	 pesticides	 (which	 had	 to	 be	
assessed	by	the	environmental,	health	and	agriculture	ministries)	with	a	new,	unified	
registration	 process	 under	 the	 exclusive	 control	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture.	
Although	 the	 bill	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 approved	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 these	 two	
standards	were	already	among	the	most	salient	issues	in	pesticide	policy	according	to	
the	 analysis	 of	 congress	 debates	 and	 one	 participant	 observation	 in	 a	 governmental	
meeting	about	chemical	security	(see	chapter	5,	section	5.2).		
The	third	regulation	investigated	is	the	new	2015	law	on	access	to	genetic	
resources	and	the	sharing	of	benefits	arising	from	their	utilisation.	The	issue	was	first	
regulated	in	the	country	in	2001,	but	on	the	20thMay,	2015,	a	new	access	and	benefit	
sharing	(ABS)	law	was	published.		The	saliency	analysis	of	this	case	also	revealed	that	it	
generated	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 debate	 and	 animosity	 in	 Brazil’s	 congress	 and	
society	(chapter	6,	section	6.2).	
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The	timeframe	(2005–2015)	was	selected	on	the	basis	of	the	ACF	principle	
that	 no	 process	 of	 policy	 change	 or	 of	 coalition	 dynamics	 can	 be	 analysed	 over	 less	
than	a	decade.	Additionally,	this	time	period	is	characterised	by	a	series	of	changes	in	
other	 environmental	 policies	 (as	 already	 mentioned),	 which	 points	 to	 a	 potentially	
generalisable	trend	of	regulatory	and	policy	change	that	has	not	yet	been	subjected	to	
sufficient	systematic	academic	analysis.		Finally,	the	selection	of	this	time	period	allows	
for	a	clear	observation	of	the	supposed	differences	in	environmental	policies	resulting	
from	 the	 change	 in	 government	 from	 Lula	 da	 Silva	 (2003–2010)	 to	 Dilma	 Rousseff	
(2011–2016),	a	factor	frequently	raised	in	 interviews	and	in	the	literature	as	relevant	
for	 changes	 in	 environmental	 standards	 in	 the	 country	 (interviews	 9,	 42;	 Castro	 and	
Motta,	2015).10	
	
1.3.	Research	Design		
This	is	a	small-n	qualitative	study	based	on	the	comparative	analysis	of	three	
case	 studies,	 featuring	 case-by-case	 analysis	 and	 within-case	 comparison	 based	 on	
historical	process-tracing,	content	and	narrative	analysis.	The	three	cases	selected	are	
of	 highly	 salient	 and	 adversarial	 regulatory	 changes	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	
regulations	 that	 occurred	 between	 2005	 and	 2015.	 Because	 they	 are	 all	 highly	
adversarial	and	involve	high	levels	of	complexity	and	uncertainty	(a	domain	familiar	to	
ACF-based	 analyses),	 they	 characterise	 ‘most-likely	 tests’	 for	 the	 assumptions	 of	 the	
ACF	 regarding	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 four	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	 analysed	
(Nohrstedt,	 2010,	 p.	 311).	 These	 cases	 are	 particularly	 easy	 tests	 for	 policy	 oriented	
learning	 and	negotiated	 agreement	 (most-likely	 cases	 for	 them	 to	occur)	 due	 to	 the	
many	technical	uncertainties	and	risks	associated	with	the	different	policy	alternatives.	
These	were	 however,	 precisely	 the	 two	 variables	 that	 (counter-intuitively)	were	 not	
identified	as	relevant	necessary	sources	of	regulatory	change	in	two	of	the	three	cases	
studied.	 Therefore,	 in	 addition	 to	 ‘most-likely	 tests’	 of	 the	 hypotheses	 of	 the	 ACF,	
																																								 																				
10	The	Minister	of	the	Environment,	Izabella	Teixeira	(2011	–	2016),	and	President	Dilma	Rousseff	(2011	
–	2016)	have	been	noted	in	interviews	and	in	the	literature	as	provoking	a	change	in	the	administrative	
style	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Environment,	 which	 had	 previously	 been	 considered	 a	 ‘governmental	
environmental	 activist’	 but	 after	 their	 mandates	 was	 seen	 as	 acting	 more	 in	 accordance	 with	 other	
ministries	 (such	 as	 agriculture	 and	 government)	 and	 to	 be	 promoting	 systemic	 government	 priorities	
such	as	economic	development.	
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these	cases	can	also	be	characterised	as	‘most-similar	cases’	with	different	outcomes	
in	terms	of	negotiated	agreement	and	policy	oriented	learning	(Mill,	1843).	
	One	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 this	 research	 design,	 therefore,	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 for	
within-case	 comparison.	 Processes	 of	 policy	 change	 are	 compared	 and	 contrasted	
across	 the	 three	 cases	 and	 this	 exercise	 allowed	 for	 the	 identification	 of	 important	
empirical	factors	that	are	not	directly	considered	by	the	framework	but	which	affected	
the	 results	obtained	by	 this	analysis	 (such	as,	 for	example,	 the	distribution	of	power	
among	the	coalitions	in	each	of	the	cases).	This	is	a	particularly	unique	contribution	to	
ACF	research	-	which	is	most	frequently	based	on	the	analysis	of	single	case-studies	–	
and,	therefore,	provides	a	crucial	opportunity	for	theory	development.	
The	case	study	approach,	defined	as	“the	detailed	examination	of	an	aspect	of	
a	historical	episode	to	develop	or	test	historical	explanations	that	may	be	generalizable	
to	other	events”	(George	and	Bennett,	2005,	p.	5),	was	chosen	because	it	can	be	used	
for	 cumulative	 knowledge-building,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	
knowledge.	According	 to	George	and	Bennett	 (2005,	p.9),	 case	studies	are	useful	 for	
theory	development	and	can	incorporate	both	material	and	ideational	variables	across	
a	 large	 spectrum	 of	 epistemological	 traditions.	 Finally,	 case	 studies	 allow	 for	 the	
detailed	examination	of	 causal	mechanisms	and	 for	 the	 inductive	observation	of	any	
unexpected	 intervening	 variables	 in	 the	operation	of	 the	 specific	 causal	mechanisms	
under	 investigation	–	which	may	contribute	to	theory	development.	This	 is	seen	as	a	
particularly	well-suited	strategy	for	applying	new	and	still	 largely	untested	(at	least	in	
the	Brazilian	context)	theoretical	frameworks,	such	as	the	ACF.	
	Theory-oriented	 historical	 process-tracing	 is	 used	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	
causal	 mechanisms	 established	 by	 this	 thesis’s	 revised	 version	 of	 the	 ACF	 –	 i.e.	
between	 the	 independent	 variables	 (internal	events,	 external	events,	policy-oriented	
learning	and	negotiated	agreement)	and	the	dependent	variable	(policy	change)	–	are	
in	 fact	evident	 in	 the	 cases	analysed.	 I	hold	 that	detailed	historical	understanding	of	
social	 phenomena	 and	 their	 assessment,	 based	 on	 theoretical	 expectations,	 can	
contribute	to	the	development	of	the	ACF.	Moreover,	the	low	number	of	case	studies	
and	 detailed	 case-by-case	 analysis	 allow	 for	 in-depth	 assessment,	 while	 comparison	
between	 them	provides	 some	 room	 for	generalisability,	 at	 least	within	 the	narrower	
context	of	Brazilian	environmental	policy.		
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1.4.	Methods	of	Data	Analysis	and	Collection	
This	section	starts	by	describing	the	methods	of	data	analysis	used	and	the	
theoretical	debates	 that	directed	 the	choice	of	methods.	 It	 sequentially	presents	 the	
methods	 through	 which	 empirical	 data	 was	 collected,	 presents	 the	 data	 used,	 and	
assesses	 the	 potential	 limits	 and	 biases	 of	 the	 data	 and	 the	 strategies	 employed	 to	
attenuate	these.		
	
1.4.1.	Methods	of	Data	Analysis	
The	 steps	 followed	 for	 the	 data	 analysis	 are	 summarised	 below,	 in	 the	
order	they	were	pursued,	and	then	explained	in	detail	in	the	paragraphs	that	follow:	
	
1. Country-level	 and	 subsystem	 historical	 process-tracing	 for	 the	
identification	of	relevant	internal	and	external	events.		
2. Identification	of	the	most	salient	subsystem-wide	policy	changes	through	
measurement	of	the	number	of	times	different	issues	were	mentioned	in	
debates	in	the	National	Congress	and	the	media	(content	analysis).	
3. Identification	 of	 the	main	 arguments	 (narratives)	 used	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
most	 salient	 policy	 debates	 through	 thematic	 coding.	 A	 typology	 of	
environmental	policy	discourses	was	used	to	 facilitate	the	codification	of	
narratives.	 This	 typology	 is	 presented	 in	 chapter	 3.	 It	 was	 developed	
through	the	historical	process-tracing	of	the	main	environmental	debates	
in	 the	 country	 since	 the	 1930s	 and	 through	 analysis	 of	 secondary	
literature.	
4. Identification	of	coalitions	and	of	the	actors	within	each	coalition	through	
content	 analysis	 (thematic	 coding	 of	 actors’	 arguments	 and	 arguments’	
mapping).	
5. Analysis	of	the	content	of	final	regulations	and	comparison	with	previous	
regulations	in	order	to	identify	winning	and	losing	coalitions.	
6. Assessment	 of	 the	 relevance	 and	 reasons	 for	 the	 occurrence	 of	 policy-
oriented	 learning	 and	 negotiated	 agreement	 through	 the	 observation	 of	
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specific	criteria	in	debates	(chapter	2	section	3	provides	a	description	and	
justification	of	the	criteria	chosen)	
	
In	 sum,	 the	 methods	 of	 data	 analysis	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	 were,	 firstly,	
process-tracing	of	relevant	internal	and	external	events	(through	secondary	literature	
on	 the	 history	 of	 each	 subsystem	 and	 original	 data	 about	 debates).	 Following	 the	
definitions	of	the	ACF	of	external	events,	the	process-tracing	focused,	for	instance,	in	
the	 analysis	 of	 country-level	 socioeconomic	 indicators	 (i.e.	 imports	 and	 exports,	
economic	 production),	 governing	 coalition	 change	 (i.e.	 the	 composition	 of	 the	
Congress)	and	presidential	campaign	donations.	For	the	analysis	of	internal	events,	on	
the	other	hand,	inputs	from	the	secondary	literature	were	organised	in	order	to	build	a	
historical	overview	of	the	regulatory	regimes	under	investigation,	which	paved	the	way	
for	a	more	detailed	subsequent	analysis	of	the	2005–2015	period.	A	saliency	analysis	
of	the	most	salient	regulatory	changes	occurring	in	the	subsystem	between	2005	and	
2015	 was	 pursued	 by	 counting	 the	 number	 of	 the	 times	 that	 specific	 bills	 were	
mentioned	 in	 publications	 of	 the	 National	 Congress	 News	 Agency	 over	 this	 period.		
After	the	identification	of	the	most	salient	regulatory	changes	(or	proposed	regulatory	
changes)	 in	 each	 case,	 texts	 related	only	 to	debates	 about	 the	most	 salient	 changes	
were	examined	for	the	identification	of	coalitions	and	narratives.11		
The	 identification	 of	 coalitions	 departed	 from	 Sabatier’s	 (1998,	 p.103),	
definition	 of	 ‘advocacy	 coalitions’	 as	 “actors	 from	 various	 governmental	 and	 private	
organizations	who	both	(a)	share	a	set	of	normative	and	causal	beliefs	and	(b)	engage	
in	a	non-trivial	degree	of	co-ordinated	activity	over	time”.	According	to	this	definition,	
the	 two	crucial	aspects	 that	should	allow	for	 the	empirical	 identification	of	advocacy	
coalitions	are	shared	 ‘core	beliefs’	and	a	 ‘non-trivial	degree	of	co-ordinated	activity’.	
‘Belief-systems’	 are	 described	 by	 the	 framework	 according	 to	 a	 tripartite	 and	
hierarchical	 structure	 involving:	 1)	 deep	 core	 beliefs,	 2)	 policy	 core	 beliefs,	 and	 3)	
secondary	aspects	of	beliefs.	Deep	core	beliefs	are	related	to	fundamental	normative	
and	ontological	axioms	held	by	actors,	which	are	close	to	religious	beliefs.	This	 is	the	
highest	 level	 of	 the	 belief	 system	 hierarchy,	 constraining	 both	 policy	 core	 and	
																																								 																				
11	Although	it	might	be	argued	that	analysing	data	only	from	a	national	venue	would	lead	to	the	under-
representation	 of	 international	 contributions	 and	 opinions,	 it	 is	 mantained,	 that	 based	 on	 the	
procedural	 rules	 of	 public	 hearings	 in	 the	National	 Congress	 there	 is	 no	 formalised	 constraint	 for	 the	
presentation	of	international	evidence	in	the	National	Congress.	
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secondary	 aspects	 beliefs.	 Policy	 core	 beliefs	 consist	 in	 policy	 positions	 that	 orient	
basic	strategies	for	achieving	core	values.	Policy	core	beliefs	are	described	by	the	ACF	
literature	as	being	either	normative	or	empirical,	reflecting	‘basic	orientations	or	value	
priorities’	on	the	normative	level	or	empirically	including	the	‘overall	assessment	of	the	
seriousness	of	the	problem,	its	basic	causes,	and	preferred	solutions	for	addressing	it’	
(which	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘policy	 core	 policy	 preferences’)	 (Jenkins-Smith,	 Nohrstedt,	
Weible	 and	 Sabatier,	 2014,	 e-book	 45%).	 This	 level	 of	 belief	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	
fundamental	 ‘glue’	 responsible	 for	holding	coalitions	 together	and	 the	most	efficient	
guide	to	behaviour12.	Finally,	 the	secondary	aspects	of	a	coalition´s	belief	system	are	
associated	 with	 ‘narrower’	 instrumental	 decisions	 such	 as	 decisions	 concerning	
administrative	rules,	budgetary	allocations	or	desirable	regulations	(Sabatier,	1998,	pp.	
103–104).		
In	 initial	 attempts	 to	 empirically	 identify	 coalitions	 according	 to	 the	 theoretical	
guidance	 of	 the	 ACF	 (trying	 to	 assess	 policy	 core	 beliefs	 and	 levels	 of	 non-trivial	
coordination	 among	 actors),	 several	 difficulties	 emerged.	 The	 difficulties	 lay	 in	
assessing	 actors’	 normative	 beliefs	 through	 data	 that	 only	 contained	 actors’	
statements	 in	public	debates	or	 recorded	 interviews	 (corresponding	 to	 the	empirical	
side	 of	 policy	 core	 beliefs	 or	 ‘policy	 core	 policy	 preferences’	 in	 ACF’s	 terms).	 	 The	
difficulties	 were	 also	 related	 to	 the	 limitations	 imposed	 on	 the	 size	 and	 territorial	
scope	 of	 identifiable	 coalitions	 by	 the	 requirement	 of	 a	 ‘non-trivial	 degree’	 of	
coordination	among	actors13.	
First,	 in	what	concerns	 to	 the	utilisation	of	coordination	as	a	criterion	 for	
the	 identification	 of	 coalitions,	 the	 cases	 analysed	 by	 this	 thesis	 expose	 four	
challenges:	 first,	 because	 the	 cases	 refer	 to	 federal	 level	 regulations,	 the	 involved	
actors	 are	 not	 geographically	 proximate	 from	 each	 other	 and,	 therefore,	 have	
substantial	spacial	barriers	for	coordination	(particularly	in	face	of	the	continental	size	
of	 Brazilian	 territory	 and	 severe	 limitations	 of	 transportations	 infra-structure	 that	
affect	 some	 areas	 of	 the	 country).	 Second,	 and	 especially	 regarding	 indigenous	
communities	 and	 small	 NGOs	 the	 lack	 of	 resources	 (internet,	 fuel	 for	 travelling	 to	
																																								 																				
12	The	analysis	of	different	types	of	discourses	in	Brazilian	environmental	policies	provided	in	chapter	3	
refers	to	this	level	of	beliefs.	
13	 	 These	 challenges	 of	ACF’s	 definition	 of	 coalitions	 have	been	previously	 pointed	out	 by	 critics	who	
have	 highlighted	 the	 ACF’s	 concept	 of	 coalitions	 as	 too	 limited	 and	 inflexible	 a	 concept	 to	 be	
operationalised	(e.g.	Hajer,	1995;	Fisher,	2003).	
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distant	 locations,	 availability	 of	 time)	 might	 represent	 considerable	 barriers	 to	
establishing	 ‘non-trivial	 levels’	 of	 coordination	 even	 though	 these	 groups	 might	
sponsor	 similar	 positions	 and	 be	 willing	 to	 coordinate.	 Third,	 the	 lack	 of	 strong	
leaderships	 (counting	 both	 with	 sufficient	 resources	 and	 broad	 geographical	 scope)	
might	be	another	impediment	for	coordination,	which	although	happening	regionally,	
might	not	reach	the	federal	 level	and	involve	all	 interested	actors.	Finally,	the	lack	of	
information	channels	that	affect	less	developed	areas	of	the	country	(which	may	have	
no	 internet,	 for	 example)	might	 contribute	 to	 the	difficulties	of	 establishing	national	
level	coordination	and	leaderships.	
Second,	in	relation	to	the	usage	of	a	set	of	common	‘normative	and	causal	
beliefs’	or	 ‘core	beliefs’	as	the	basis	 for	the	 identification	of	coalitions	the	challenges	
were	 predominantly	 methodological	 and	 refer	 to	 the	 difficulties	 of	 ascertaining	
normative	 beliefs	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 publicly	 stated	 positions.	 It	 is	 proposed,	
therefore,	 that	 the	 identification	of	 coalitions	 should	 continue	 to	be	based	on	policy	
core	 beliefs,	 but	 should	 be	 restricted	 to	 ‘policy	 core	 policy	 preferences’	 or	 strictly	
speaking,	 those	 empirical/causal	 beliefs	 that	 are	 publicly	 stated.	 In	 other	words,	 the	
difficulty	faced	in	the	operationalisation	of	ACF’s	original	definition	of	coalition	is	that	
it	was	not	possible	(or	reasonable)	to	infer	normative	beliefs	from	public	statements.	
As	a	consequence,	because	relying	on	normative	beliefs	as	a	criterion	would	require	a	
more	in	depth	analysis	of	the	beliefs	of	each	of	the	actors	investigated	(with	in	depth	
interviews	 for	 the	 investigation	 of	 their	 underlying	 motivations	 and	 values	 for	
example),	and	because	the	research	design	and	resource	limits	of	this	project	did	not	
allow	 for	 such	 a	 comprehensive	 assessment,	 the	 analysis	 will	 be	 based	 only	 on	 the	
empirical	and	publicly	stated	aspect	of	policy	core	beliefs.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 remark,	 moreover,	 that	 the	 arguments	 that	 constitute	
these	positions	are	perceived	as	dynamic.	They	might	change	over	time	as	a	result	of	
changes	in	strategic	calculations.	Finally,	the	same	actor	might	also	adopt	contradicting	
positions	 in	 different	 settings,	 making	 their	 categorisation	 as	 part	 of	 one,	 single	
coalition	 problematic.	 This	was	 not,	 however,	 perceived	 to	 be	 a	 problem	during	 the	
empirical	 analysis	 as	 actors	 tended	 to	 always	 have	 a	 dominant	 position.	 This	 thesis	
adopts,	 therefore,	 a	 slightly	 revised	 definition	 of	 coalitions,	 which	 are	 here	
conceptualised	as	a	group	of	actors	within	a	specific	policy	domain	(or	subsystem)	who,	
although	not	necessarily	coordinating	or	possessing	the	same	normative	beliefs,	adopts	
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the	 same	 positions	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 policy	 problem.14	 The	 importance	 of	 this	 revised	
definition	of	coalitions	is	fundamental	for	the	successful	application	of	the	ACF	to	the	
Brazilian	 cases	 investigated	by	 this	 thesis	 and	 contributes	 to	 theory	development	by	
emphasising	important	contextual	and	methodological	aspects	that	have	not	yet	been	
considered	in	previous	applications	of	the	framework.	
As	a	consequence	of	this	slightly	different	definition	of	coalitions	(based	on	
‘policy	 core	 policy	 preferences’	 rather	 than	on	normative	beliefs),	 this	 thesis	 applies	
methods	 advanced	 by	 scholars	who	 support	 the	 use	 of	 ‘narratives’	 as	 an	 important	
empirical	element	in	the	study	of	public	policies	(e.g.	Stone,	1989;	Hajer,	1993;	Fischer	
and	 Forester,	 1993;	 Roe,	 1994;	 Jones	 and	 McBeth,	 2010;	 Jones,	 McBeth,	 and	
Shanahan,	2014;	Ney,	2014;	O’Bryan,	Dunlop,	and	Radaelli,	2014;	Jones	and	Radaelli,	
2015).	According	to	the	‘Narrative	Policy	Framework’	(NPF),	a	narrative	is	“a	story	with	
a	 temporal	 sequence	 of	 events	 unfolding	 in	 a	 plot	 that	 is	 populated	 by	 dramatic	
moments,	symbols,	and	archetypal	characters	that	culminates	in	a	moral	to	the	story”	
(Jones	and	McBeth,	2010,	p.	329).	Thus,	a	policy	narrative	contains	four	fundamental	
elements	 that	 can	 be	 identified	 through	 content	 analysis:	 1)	 a	 setting	 –	 or	 basic	
assumptions;	2)	characters	–	who	can	be	specified	as	victims,	heroes	and	villains;	3)	a	
plot	–	advancing	causal	mechanisms	and	the	relationship	between	the	setting	and	the	
characters,	and	4)	a	moral	to	the	story	–	corresponding	to	the	specific	policy	solution,	
goal	 or	 policy	 change	proposal	 being	 advanced	by	 the	 narrative	 (Jones	 and	McBeth,	
2010).	 Because	 narratives	 are	 necessarily	 associated	 with	 specific	 actors,	 narrative	
analysis	was	a	useful	tool	for	categorising	actors	into	coalitions.		
	In	 addition	 to	 making	 coalitions	 more	 easily	 identifiable	 through	 the	
analysis	 of	 public	 statements,	 there	 are	 other	 advantages	 in	 associating	 ACF	
hypotheses	with	NPF	methods.	 Both	 frameworks	 advocate	 a	 pluralist	 perspective	 of	
policy	formulation	and	change,	according	to	which	a	broad	range	of	actors	can	be	part	
of	the	policy	process	and	not	only	traditional	policy-makers.	The	NPF,	however,	allows	
for	 the	 use	 of	 public	 debates	 for	 the	 identification	 of	 relevant	 stakeholders,	 and	
																																								 																				
14	This	definition	of	a	coalition	bears	some	similarity	to	Hajer’s	 (1995,	p.	65)	definition	of	a	 ‘discourse-
coalition’	as	an	“ensemble	of	(1)	a	set	of	story-lines;	(2)	the	authors	who	utter	these	story-lines;	and,	(3)	
the	 practices	 in	 which	 this	 discursive	 activity	 is	 based”.	 The	 two	 definitions	 cannot	 be	 entirely	
juxtaposed,	however,	due	to	the	different	ontological	grounds	from	which	they	depart.	As	opposed	to	
Hajer	 (1995),	who	describes	 story-lines	 as	 socially	 constructed	 and	 resulting	mainly	 from	 socialisation	
and	 the	 emotional	 attachment	 of	 actors	 to	 particular	 groups	 and	 ideologies	 (driven	 by	 a	 ‘logic	 of	
appropriateness’),	 I	 follow	the	assumption	that,	most	of	 the	time,	 the	adoption	of	specific	positions	 is	
based	on	strategic	interests	(cost	and	benefit	instrumental	calculations).		
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eliminates	concerns	that	actors	might	not	express	their	actual	beliefs	in	these	debates	
as	beliefs	are	not	ultimately	 relevant	 for	 the	 identification	of	coalitions.	Additionally,	
the	 use	 of	 narratives	 (which	 are	 mainly	 in	 textual	 form)	 narrows	 the	 universe	 of	
potential	data	sources	and	modes	of	analysis	to	textual	and	content	analysis.		
In	practical	terms,	therefore,	coalitions	were	identified	through	the	coding	
of	 the	main	arguments	related	to	contentious	points	 in	the	debates	and	through	the	
categorisation	 of	 actors	 according	 to	 their	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 these	 contentious	
points.	The	different	arguments	were,	in	turn,	organised	according	to	four	‘interpretive	
schemes’	 or	 ‘discourses’	 historically	 used	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	 debates	 (and	
presented	 in	 chapter	 3)15	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 cross-case	 comparison.	 The	 use	 of	
narrative	 analysis	 in	 association	 with	 a	 pre-defined	 typology	 of	 environmental	
discourses	 is	supported	by	the	NPF.	According	to	Jones	and	McBeth	(2010,	p.	341),16	
for	example,	this	association	helps	to	reduce	the	‘relativity’	of	the	content	expressed	
by	 narratives	 in	 different	 policy	 sub-systems	 and	 facilitates	 cross-case	 comparisons.	
Additionally,	as	suggested	by	 Jones,	McBeth	and	Shanahan	 (2014,	p.	5),	 “NPF	rejects	
the	post-structural	claim	that	narratives	are	completely	relative”	and	suggest	that	any	
analysis	has	to	begin	from	“a	clear	and	concise	operationalisation	of	policy	narratives”.		
Finally,	 the	 assessment	 of	 policy-oriented	 learning	 and	 negotiated	
agreement	 is	 pursued	 through	 content	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 collected.	 The	 former	 is	
assessed	through	the	consideration	of	the	relevance	of	technical	information	in	actors’	
debates	 and	 the	 latter	 is	 considered	 according	 an	 analysis	 of	 specific	 observable	
implications,	which	are	described	in	detail	in	chapter	2,	section	2.3.		
	
1.4.2.	Methods	of	Data	Collection	and	Data	Utilised	
The	methods	of	data	collection	utilised	during	this	analysis	were:	1)	review	
of	 secondary	 literature	 on	 the	 history	 of	 each	 environmental	 regime,	 2)	 semi-
																																								 																				
15	 The	 ideological	 framework	 described	 in	 chapter	 3	 provided	 a	 systematisation	 tool	 in	 a	 way	 that	
allowed	 for	 the	comparison	of	 coalitions	across	 cases.	 It	was	not	meant	 to	 imply	 that	actors	held	 the	
specific	normative	values	associated	with	each	of	the	discourses,	but	simply	that	their	narratives	could	
be	associated	with	these	shared	interpretive	schemes.	
16	According	 to	 the	authors:	 “A	common	assessment	of	narratives	professed	by	post-positivists	 is	 that	
narratives	are	relative	and	thus	immune	to	attempts	at	generalization	and	quantification.	The	NPF,	as	a	
structural	approach	to	narratives,	 rejects	such	a	claim.	Rather,	we	suggest	 that	 to	avoid	the	charge	of	
relativity,	narratives	must	be	anchored	in	generalizable	content	to	limit	variability”.		
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structured	interviews,	3)	review	of	media	publications	and	publications	of	the	National	
Congress	 News	 Agency,	 4)	 attendance	 at	 and	 recording	 of	 public	 hearings	 of	 the	
National	Congress	and	ministerial	open	meetings.		
The	 interviews	 were	 pursued	 with	 policy-makers	 and	 actors	 of	 various	
affiliations	who	 took	part	 in	 debates	 about	 these	 three	 regulatory	 changes,	 in	 Brazil	
and	 London	 between	 September	 2014	 and	 July	 2015.	 In	 total,	 58	 interviews	 were	
conducted	and	57	of	them	were	recorded	over	this	period	(one	of	the	interviews	was	
not	recorded	due	to	the	request	of	the	interviewee).	The	interviewees	were	selected	
based	 on	 snow-ball	 sampling,	 meaning	 that	 each	 interviewee	 was	 asked	 to	
recommend	 others	 that	 could	 contribute	 to	 the	 analysis.	 Relevant	 sections	 of	 the	
interviews	were	transcribed	in	Portuguese	and	translated	into	English	when	necessary	
for	citations.	 In	addition	to	the	data	collected	through	 interviews,	several	documents	
were	collected	online	to	complement	the	analysis.	The	online	archives	of	the	National	
Congress	 News	 Agency	 were	 thoroughly	 searched	 through	 the	 use	 of	 its	 keywords	
search	engine.	Practically	all	articles	published	between	2005	and	2015	that	mention	
the	 regulations	 under	 investigation	 were	 selected,	 read	 and	 content	 analysed.	
Additionally,	the	national	media	and	websites	(such	as	those	of	relevant	NGOs)	were	
searched	 and	 when	 opinion	 articles	 were	 found	 (revealing	 the	 positions	 of	 specific	
actors	active	 in	 the	debate)	 these	were	also	used	to	complement	 the	analysis.	Some	
records	of	government	officials’	declarations	at	public	events	(such	as	Rio+20	or	at	the	
launch	 event	 of	 the	 new	ABS	 law)	were	 also	 transcribed	 and	used	when	 considered	
relevant	 (table	1	below	provides	a	complete	overview	of	all	 the	documents	used	 for	
the	analysis	of	each	case).	Finally,	notes	and	recordings	from	one	public	hearing	of	the	
National	 Congress	 about	 the	 new	 ABS	 law	 (11/11/2014),	 one	 roundtable	 of	 experts	
and	 representatives	 of	 indigenous	 communities	 (04/12/2014	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Brasília),	and	one	meeting	of	 the	National	Commission	of	Chemical	Safety	 (CONASQ)	
(26/11/2014	in	Brasília)	were	also	used	both	to	provide	background	information	and	as	
evidence	of	the	position	of	actors	and	coalitions.	
One	of	the	biases	of	the	sources	obtained	regards	the	higher	occurrence	of	
environmentalist’s	 positions	 in	 public	 debates.	 Argumentation	 and	 public	 awareness	
promotion	was	usually	the	only	strategy	that	environmentalist	groups	had	to	advance	
their	 claims,	 which	 led	 their	 statements	 to	 be	 over-represented	 in	 the	 textual	 data	
collected.	 Business	 and	 economic	 groups,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 often	 did	 not	 have	 to	
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make	their	perspectives	public	in	order	to	influence	the	course	of	regulatory	changes,	
and	 often	 had	 privileged	 forums,	 negotiating	 their	 demands	 behind	 closed	 doors.	
These	 limitations	 were	 addressed	 through	 an	 active	 search	 for	 occasions	 when	 the	
positions	 of	 economic	 or	 business	 groups	 had	 to	 be	 made	 public	 (such	 as	 through	
analysis	 of	 the	 public	 hearings	 of	 the	 Lower	 Chamber,	 where	 all	 groups	 have	 to	 be	
represented)	 and	 through	 the	 interviews	 pursued	 with	 members	 of	 these	 groups.	
Additionally,	even	though	their	arguments	were	not	always	necessarily	made	explicit,	
the	reactions	and	arguments	of	 the	environmentalist	coalitions	were,	when	possible,	
used	as	evidence	of	the	position	of	these	groups.	
	
Table	1	-	Data	used	in	each	case	study	
Forestry	 • 6	opinion	articles	published	in	the	newspaper	Folha	de	Sao	Paulo.	
• One	public	 declaration	by	 the	environmental	Minister	 Izabela	 Teixeira	during	 the	
Rio+20	UN	Conference.	
• 5	semi-structured	interviews	conducted	in	2014;	
• 1,495	 articles	 from	 the	 Lower	 Chamber	 News	 Agency,	 corresponding	 to	 all	 the	
articles	containing	the	expression	‘forest	code’	published	between	2005	and	2015	
on	 the	 Chamber’s	website.	 From	 these	 1,495	 articles,	 207	 articles	were	 selected	
according	 to	 their	 relevance	 (based	on	 their	 titles	and	 summaries)	 for	a	more	 in-
depth	analysis.	
Pesticides	 • 30	 articles	 from	 the	 Lower	 Chamber	 News	 Agency	 –	 selected	 based	 on	 the	
occurrence	 of	 the	 word	 ‘pesticides’	 between	 01/01/2005	 and	 15/07/2015	 (all	
articles	mentioning	 pesticides	 were	 analysed).	 The	 analysis	 was	 focused	 on	 those	
parts	quoting	or	referring	to	the	opinion	of	stakeholders.	
• 31	 articles	 from	 the	 Senate	 News	 Agency	 –	 the	 selection	 criteria	 and	 analysis	
procedures	were	the	same	as	above.		
• 3	semi-structured	interviews	conducted	between	September	2014	and	July	2015	
• 1	interview	with	a	former	member	of	ANVISA	(the	Brazilian	‘National	Health	
Surveillance	Agency’),	available	online	at	the	website	Determinantes	Sociais	da	
Saude:	http://dssbr.org/site/entrevistas/a-regulacao-fiscalizacao-e-normatizacao-
do-uso-de-agrotoxicos-no-brasil/.	
• The	transcription	of	a	public	hearing	organised	by	the	Commission	of	Agriculture	and	
Land	Settlement	Reform	of	the	Senate	on	the	2nd	July,	2015	in	order	to	discuss	the	
process	 of	 pesticide	 registration.	 The	 invited	 speakers	 were:	 Ana	 Maria	 Vekic,	
general	manager	of	toxicology	of	ANVISA;	Júlio	Sérgio	de	Britto,	general	coordinator	
of	 pesticides	 in	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture;	 Márcio	 Freitas,	 general	 manager	 of	
evaluation	and	control	of	chemical	substances	in	the	environmental	agency	IBAMA;	
Reginaldo	Minaré,	of	the	Brazilian	Confederation	of	Agriculture	and	Cattle	Ranching	
(CNA)	and	Silvia	de	Toledo	Fagnani,	executive	vice-president	of	 the	National	Union	
of	 the	 Industries	 of	 Vegetable	 Defence	 Products	 (SINDIVEG).	 Senators	 Ana	 Amelia	
(PP-RS	 -	 President	 of	 the	 Commission),	 Blairo	 Maggi	 (PR-MT),	 Waldemir	 Moka	
(PMDB-MS),	and	Donizete	Nogueira	 (PT-TO)	also	participated	 in	 the	debate,	which	
was	recorded	and	is	fully	available	online	at	the	‘Electronic	Citizenship	Portal’	of	the	
Senate	(http://www12.senado.gov.br/ecidadania/visualizacaoaudiencia?id=4309).		
• Although	not	transcribed	and	coded,	the	author’s	participant	observation	in	the	42nd	
meeting	of	the	National	Commission	of	Chemical	Safety	(CONASQ),	which	occurred	
on	26/11/2014	 in	Brasília,	was	used	as	background	 information	 for	 the	analysis	of	
the	 documents.	Members	 of	 the	 executive	 government,	 research	 institutions	 and	
civil	society	were	present	at	the	meeting	and	one	of	the	topics	on	the	agenda	was	
the	 discussion	 of	 bills	 that	 ‘make	 pesticide	 control	 more	 flexible’,	 particularly	 the	
34	
	
change	in	registration	procedures.	
ABS	
	
	
	
	
	
	
• 13	 semi-structures	 interviews	 conducted	 with	 members	 of	 all	 coalitions	 between	
September	2014	and	January	2015	in	Brazil.	
• 47	articles	published	by	the	Lower	Chamber	News	Agency	found	through	a	keyword	
search	 for	 bill	 ‘7735’	 and	 selected	 based	 on	 their	 relevance	 and	 usefulness	 in	
representing	the	position	of	specific	actors.	
• The	 participation	 and	 transcription	 of	 one	 public	 hearing	 of	 the	 Lower	 Chamber	
(11/11/2014)	when	members	of	society	were	invited	to	debate	the	bill.	
• One	 roundtable	 of	 experts	 and	 indigenous	 communities’	 representatives	 on	
04/12/2014	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Brasília	 titled	 ‘Sustainability	 in	 Indigenous	
Territories’.	
• 6	online	articles	about	the	topic	published	by	the	NGO	Instituto	Socioambiental.		
• 2	public	declarations	 (letters)	 from	civil	 society	 to	President	Dilma	Rousseff	on	 the	
topic.		
• 1	 public	 declaration	 of	 ‘businesses	 for	 the	 conservation	 and	 sustainable	 use	 of	
biodiversity’.	
• 6	newspaper	articles	(everything	that	could	be	found	on	the	topic	in	the	two	largest	
Brazilian	newspapers	Folha	de	São	Paulo	and	Estado	de	São	Paulo).	
• 2	online	articles	addressing	the	position	of	the	Brazilian	Society	for	the	Progress	of	
Science.			
• ‘Veto	 message’	 147	 of	 the	 president,	 published	 on	 of	 20/05/2015	 explaining	 the	
reasons	behind	presidential	vetoes.		
• Public	 declarations	 made	 at	 the	 launch	 event	 of	 the	 new	 law	 on	 20/05/2015	 by	
President	Dilma	Rouseff	and	Minister	Izabela	Teixeira.	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
1.5.	Overview	of	the	Thesis	
This	 thesis	 is	 organised	 as	 follows.	 After	 this	 brief	 introduction	 on	 the	
relevance	 of	 the	 topic,	 research	 design,	 and	 clarification	 of	 the	 methods	 of	 data	
analysis	 and	 collection,	 chapter	 2	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 description	 of	 the	 theoretical	
basis,	implementation	and	observable	implications	of	the	four	sources	of	policy	change	
investigated,	 namely	 external	 events,	 internal	 events,	 learning	 and	 negotiated	
agreement.	Chapter	3	will	present	the	typology	of	Brazilian	environmental	discourses	
that	 was	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 for	 cross-case	 comparability	 of	 the	 types	 of	
arguments	 adopted	 in	 the	 debates	 of	 each	 case	 study.	 The	 first	 three	 chapters	
constitute	the	first	section	of	the	thesis	(section	1).		
Section	 2	 of	 the	 thesis	 presents	 the	 empirical	 research.	 It	 is	 formed	 of	
chapters	 4,	 5	 and	 6,	 which	 present	 the	 three	 case	 studies,	 forestry,	 pesticides,	 and	
access	 to	 genetic	 resources	 and	 benefit	 sharing,	 respectively.	 Each	 of	 the	 empirical	
chapters	 is	 divided	 into	 three	 parts:	 the	 first	 provides	 a	 historical	 overview	 of	
regulation	 in	 the	 subsystem	 and	 the	 most	 salient	 regulatory	 changes	 that	 occurred	
between	 2005	 and	 2015.	 The	 second	 part	 presents	 the	 content	 analysis	 (thematic	
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coding	 of	 arguments	 and	 narrative	 analysis).	 It	 provides	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	main	
active	 coalitions,	 and	 identifies	 their	positions	 in	 the	debate.	 This	 content	analysis	 is	
restricted	to	debates	related	to	those	regulatory	changes	identified	as	most	salient	in	
the	 period	 analysed.	 The	 third	 part	 of	 each	 case	 study	 chapter	 is	 dedicated	 to	 an	
analysis	of	 the	 four	 sources	of	policy	 change	 identified	by	 the	ACF	and	 relies	on	 the	
analytical	strategies	and	observable	 implications	which	will	be	provided	 in	chapter	2.	
One	of	 the	 four	sources	of	policy	change,	namely	external	events,	 is	only	debated	 in	
the	 first	of	 the	empirical	chapters	 (chapter	4),	as	 it	 is	equally	applicable	 to	 the	other	
two	cases.	
Section	3	of	the	thesis	is	formed	of	chapters	7	and	8.	Chapter	7	is	dedicated	
to	the	systematisation	of	the	main	findings	of	section	2	and	a	cross-comparison	of	the	
three	 empirical	 chapters.	 The	 main	 findings	 and	 contributions	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 the	
literature	of	public	policy	and	regulations	as	well	as	to	Brazilian	environmental	policy	
studies	 are	 also	 presented	 in	 chapter	 7.	 Finally,	 the	 conclusion	 re-states	 the	 main	
findings	 and	 draws	 out	 the	 main	 implications	 of	 it	 for	 wider	 debates,	 highlighting,	
lastly,	some	of	the	avenues	this	thesis	opens	for	future	research.	
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CHAPTER	2	-	ANALYTICAL	FRAMEWORK	I:	THE	ADVOCACY	
COALITION	FRAMEWORK	
	
	
2.1.	Introduction	
This	 chapter	 presents	 the	 main	 premises	 of	 the	 Advocacy	 Coalition	
Framework,	 their	evolution	over	 time,	and	how	 this	 thesis	 applies	or	qualifies	 them.	
The	second	part	of	the	chapter	(after	this	introduction)	notes	some	of	the	difficulties	in	
operationalising	 the	 framework	 and	 suggests	 ways	 of	 tackling	 these	 difficulties,	
particularly	regarding	the	identification	of	coalitions	and	the	association	(advanced	by	
the	ACF)	 of	 policy	 changes	with	 belief	 changes.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 qualifies	 some	of	 the	
main	assumptions	of	the	ACF	and	refines	the	framework	to	make	it	more	suitable	for	
interest-based	explanations.	The	third	part	of	the	chapter	revises	the	four	pathways	to	
policy	change	proposed	by	the	ACF	and	specifies	the	observable	outcomes	that	will	be	
investigated	in	this	thesis	in	relation	to	each	of	them.	Part	2.3.5	further	refines	the	ACF	
by	 suggesting	 how	 the	 four	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	 interact.	 It	 also	 considers	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 context,	 in	 particular	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 context	 (or	 opportunity	
structure),	 for	 the	analysis	of	 these	 four	 sources	of	policy	 change,	 and	 suggests	 that	
Brazil	is	characterised	by	medium	degree	of	consensus	required	for	political	decisions	
to	take	place	and	low	openness	of	the	political	system.	
	
2.2.	The	Advocacy	Coalition	Framework	
The	ACF	was	 initially	developed	 in	1988	 in	 a	 seminal	 article	published	by	
Sabatier	and	Jenkins	Smith	(1988),	which	highlighted	six	key	assumptions	and	premises	
upon	which	the	framework	is	built.		
First,	 in	 any	 policy	 debate	 actors	 form	 coalitions.	 Coalitions	 are	 groups	
constituted	of	individuals	or	collective	representatives	from	different	circles,	including	
politicians,	NGOs,	regulatory	agencies,	social	movements,	scholars,	journalists,	private	
companies	or	any	other	active	participants	in	a	debate.	The	ACF	states	that	to	be	part	
of	the	same	coalition,	actors	should	share	a	specific	“belief	system”	and	demonstrate	a	
“non-trivial	degree	of	coordinated	activity	over	time”	(Sabatier,	1988,	p.	139).		
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Second,	policies	 are	 translations	 of	 the	 belief	 systems.	 Therefore,	 “public	
policies	or	programs	can	be	conceptualized	in	the	same	manner	as	belief	systems,	i.e.	
as	 sets	 of	 value	 priorities	 and	 causal	 assumptions	 about	 how	 to	 realize	 them”	
(Sabatier,	1988,	p.	131).		
Third,	 in	 addition	 to	 significant	 perturbations	 external	 to	 the	 subsystem,	
technical	information	(or	‘policy	research’)	is	predicted	by	the	ACF	to	play	a	central	role	
in	the	process	of	policy	change	(Sabatier	1988,	pp.	148–155).		
Fourth,	 the	ACF	establishes	 that	 the	understanding	of	processes	of	policy	
change	and	of	 learning	necessitates	 a	 time	perspective	of	 at	 least	 10	 years	or	more.	
This	 premise	 implies	 a	 recognition	 that	 historical	 contextualisation	 is	 important	
(Sabatier,	1988,	p.	131).	
The	 fifth	 principle	 of	 the	 ACF	 points	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘policy	
subsystems’	as	the	most	appropriate	scale	and	unit	of	policy	change	analysis	(Sabatier,	
1988,	 p.	 131).	 Policy	 subsystems	 are	 defined	 as	 “semi-autonomous	 decision-making	
networks	 of	 policy	 participants	 that	 focus	 on	 a	 particular	 policy	 issue”	 (Weible,	
Pattinson	and	Sabatier,	2010,	p.	523).	These	systems	contain	several	components	that	
interact	 to	 produce	 policy	 results,	 namely,	 physical	 and	 institutional	 characteristics,	
belief	 systems	 and	 political	 resources.	 They	 are	 semi-autonomous	 but	 they	 interact	
and	 are	 nested	 in	 other	 policy	 subsystems.	 Usually,	 each	 policy	 subsystem	
accommodates	between	one	and	four	main	coalitions.		
The	 sixth	 and	 final	 tenet	 of	 the	 ACF	 is	 that	 individuals	 are	 boundedly	
rational.	 Thus,	 although	 they	 are	motivated	 by	 instrumental	 goals	 they	 have	 limited	
capacity	to	process	stimuli	and	are	often	not	certain	on	how	to	achieve	them	(Simon,	
1997;	 Sabatier,	 1988,	p.	143).	Bounded	 rationality	 includes	a	 tendency	 to	 remember	
losses	more	easily	than	gains,	and	makes	individuals	prone	to	a	phenomenon	known	as	
‘devil	 shift’.	 Inversely	 related	 to	 trust,	 devil	 shift	 makes	 individuals	 perceive	 their	
opponents	as	being	more	powerful	and	capable	of	causing	harm	than	they	actually	are	
(Leach	 and	 Sabatier,	 2005;	 Jenkins-Smith,	 Nohrstedt,	 Weible	 and	 Sabatier,	 2014;	
Weible,	Pattinson	and	Sabatier,	2010).	
Over	 the	 years,	 the	 ACF	 has	 been	 adjusted	 but	 continues	 to	 be	 built	 on	
these	six	key	premises,	which	are	at	the	heart	of	this	thesis.	The	latter	three	premises	
described	 above	 (the	 importance	 of	 a	 time	 perspective	 of	 a	 decade	 or	 more,	
considering	 policy	 subsystems	 as	 the	 main	 units	 of	 analysis,	 and	 viewing	 actors	 as	
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boundedly	rational)	are	not	disputed	and	are	wholly	adopted	by	this	thesis.	The	former	
three	premises,	however,	are	adopted	here	in	a	revised	form,	which	stand	in	dialogue	
with,	and	advance,	debates	that	are	at	the	centre	of	more	recent	applications	of	the	
framework.		
The	revision	of	the	assumption	concerning	the	definition	of	coalitions	(the	
first	 premise	 described	 above)	 has	 already	 been	 anticipated	 in	 the	 methodological	
debates	in	chapter	1,	section	1.4.1.	According	to	the	perspective	adopted	here	(which	
is	based	on	the	Narrative	Policy	Framework),	actors	do	not	have	to	display	non-trivial	
degrees	of	coordination	or	shared	normative	belief	systems	in	order	to	form	a	coalition	
but	simply	share	the	same	‘policy	core	policy	preferences’	(or	empirical,	publicly	stated	
positions)	 in	 relation	 to	 specific	 policy	 problems	 (or,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 same	
narratives)	 (Jenkins-Smith,	 Nohrstedt,	 Weible	 and	 Sabatier,	 2014,	 e-book	 45%).	
Directly	related	to	the	revision	of	this	first	premise	is	the	revision	of	the	second,	which	
proposes	that	policies	as	translations	of	beliefs. Although	the	framework	assumes	that	
policies	 “can	 be	 conceptualized	 and	 measured	 hierarchically	 like	 belief	 systems”	
(Jenkins-Smith,	Nohrstedt,	Weible	and	Sabatier,	2014,	e-book	48%)	this	definition	has	
not	been	found	to	be	completely	analytically	operationalisable	in	the	analysis	of	policy	
change	due	to	difficulties	involved	in	assessing	normative	beliefs	with	the	kind	of	data	
collected	 (mainly	public	 statements).	Additionally,	 it	 takes	an	explanatory	variable	of	
the	ACF	(belief	change)	as	a	definition	of	the	response	variable	(policy	change).	Hoberg	
(1996,	 p.	 137)	 notices	 this	 problem	 in	 relation	 to	 learning	 becoming	 a	 synonym	 for	
policy	change,	which	adds	difficulties	to	the	analysis.	Building	upon	this	criticism	of	the	
ACF,	policies	are	not	considered	here	to	be	translations	of	beliefs,	but	refer	simply,	as	
sustained	by	Dye	(1972),	to	choices	made	by	government	to	undertake	some	course	of	
action.	 Policy	 change,	 therefore,	 refers	 to	 a	 change	 compared	 to	 previous	
governmental	courses	of	action,	which	can	be	observed	through	noticeable	changes	in	
the	content	of	policies	or	 regulations.17	Finally,	 in	addition	to	 ‘technical	 information’,	
as	emphasised	by	the	third	premise	described	above,	any	new	source	of	information	is	
considered	here	to	be	relevant	for	policy	change.	These	revisions	are	debated	in	more	
																																								 																				
17	Although	it	might	be	argued	that	changes	in	the	content	of	written	regulations	might	not	necessarily	
lead	to	changes	 in	actual	policy	practices,	 it	 is	maintained	here	that	even	 if	regulatory	changes	do	not	
lead	 to	 changes	 in	 policy	 practices,	 they	 are	 a	 good	 indicator	 of	 the	 predominant	 intentions	 of	 the	
dominant	coalitions	and	of	the	most	likely	direction	of	future	changes	in	policy	practices.		
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detail	 in	chapters	7	and	8,	which	advance	the	main	contributions	of	this	thesis	to	the	
ACF.	
Regarding	 the	 drivers	 of	 policy	 change,	 although	 initial	 versions	 of	 the	
framework	only	considered	the	role	of	events	external	to	the	subsystem	and	of	policy	
learning,	later	versions	highlighted	the	importance	of	including	negotiated	agreement	
and	 internal	subsystem	events	as	an	 important	motivators	of	policy	change	(Sabatier	
and	 Weible,	 2007,	 p.	 204).	 The	 inclusion	 of	 these	 new	 drivers	 was	 in	 response	 to	
criticism	 about	 the	 unsuitability	 of	 the	 ACF	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 corporatist	 European	
regimes	 (as	opposed	 to	 the	 traditionally	 adversarial	American	 reality	 in	which	 it	was	
born)	 and	 to	 the	 perceived	 need	 to	 include	 insights	 from	 the	 ‘focusing	 events’	
literature	 (Kingdon,	 1995;	 Birkland,	 1997,	 1998,	 2004),	 which	 emphasises	 the	
importance	of	subsystem	shocks	and	scandals	in	tipping	the	balance	of	power	among	
coalitions	 (Sabatier	 and	 Weible,	 2007,	 p.	 204).	 The	 resulting	 and	 most	 recent	
hypothesis	of	the	framework	in	relation	to	policy	change	is	the	following:  
	
Significant	 perturbations	 external	 to	 the	 subsystem,	 a	
significant	 perturbation	 internal	 to	 the	 subsystem,	 policy-
oriented	learning,	negotiated	agreement	or	some	combination	
thereof,	are	necessary,	but	not	 sufficient	 sources	of	 change	 in	
the	 policy	 core	 attributes	 of	 a	 governmental	 programme	
(Weible	&	Nohrstedt	2013	p.133).	
	
	
The	 next	 section	 describes	 and	 analyses	 each	 of	 these	 four	 sources	 of	
policy	 change,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 original	 causal	 pathways	 linking	 them	 to	 policy	
change	as	proposed	by	the	ACF,	and	of	the	version	advanced	by	this	thesis,	which	is	a	
slightly	adapted	version	based	on	the	revised	premises	presented	above.	
	
2.3.	Analytic	Parameters	and	Observable	Implications	
This	section	describes	each	of	the	four	sources	of	policy	change	identified	
by	 later	versions	of	 the	ACF.	 It	considers	 the	causal	pathways	through	which	each	of	
these	drivers	 leads	 to	policy	 change	as	proposed	by	 the	 framework,	and	emphasises	
the	 importance	 of	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 coalitions’	 interests	 as	 an	 important	
motivation	 for	 policy	 change.	 It	 relies	 on	 a	 distinction	 between	 sources	 of	 policy	
change	 (explained	 in	 the	 previous	 section),	 causal	 mechanisms	 and	 observable	
outcomes	as	advanced	by	the	ACF	literature.	Causal	mechanisms	are	understood	here	
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to	 refer	 to	 the	 underlying	mechanisms	 through	 which	 change	 takes	 place.	 The	 ACF	
literature	refers	 to	 five	distinct	 types	of	causal	mechanisms	 leading	to	policy	change,	
namely	the	redistribution	of	resources	among	coalitions;	the	mobilisation	by	minority	
coalitions	 to	 exploit	 an	 event;	 heightened	 public	 and	 political	 attention	 to	 an	 issue;	
learning	and	analytical	debate	(Jenkins-Smith,	Nohrstedt,	Weible	and	Sabatier,	2014,	
e-book,	48%).	It	maintains	that	the	observable	outcome	(or	final	result)	of	all	these	five	
phenomena	 is	 a	 process	 of	 change	 in	 policy	 core	beliefs	 –	which	 as	 observed	 in	 the	
previous	 chapter	 is	 constituted	by	both	 a	normative	 aspect	which	 reflects	 the	 ‘basic	
orientations	 or	 value	 priorities’	 and	 an	 empirical	 part,	 characterised	 by	 the	 ‘overall	
assessment	of	the	seriousness	of	the	problem,	its	basic	causes,	and	preferred	solutions	
for	addressing	it’.	Accordingly,	I	maintain	in	this	thesis	that	the	change	in	the	empirical	
aspect	of	core	beliefs	corresponds	to	changes	in	interests	(or	calculations	of	costs	and	
benefits	between	coalitions),	and	that	this	aspect	should	be	given	more	emphasis	as	an	
underemphasised	 observable	 outcome	 of	 the	 ACF	 (Nohrstedt,	 2010,	 p.	 325).	 I	
elaborate	 moreover,	 on	 the	 causal	 mechanisms	 involved	 in	 the	 operation	 of	
negotiated	agreement,	which	 is	 still	 an	under-studied	source	of	policy	change	within	
the	 ACF.	 Below,	 I	 present	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 ACF’s	 sources	 of	 policy	 change,	 causal	
mechanisms	 and	 observable	 outcomes	 (table	 2),	 followed	 by	 my	 slightly	 more	
elaborated	version	(table	3).	Each	of	the	lines	of	these	tables	will	now	be	explained	in	
detail.	
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Table	2	-	Summary	of	ACF’s	sources	of	policy	change,	causal	mechanism	and	observable	outcomes	
Source	of	policy	
change		
Causal	mechanism	 Observable	outcomes	
External	events		
	
Redistribution	 of	 resources	 among	
coalitions	
	
Mobilisation	by	minority	coalitions	to	
exploit	the	event	(‘framing	contests’)	
	
Heightened	 public	 and	 political	
attention	 to	 the	 issue/agenda	
change	
	
Learning	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
	
		
Internal	subsystem	
events	
	
Redistribution	 of	 resources	 among	
coalitions	
	
Mobilisation	by	minority	coalitions	to	
exploit	the	event	(‘framing	contests’)	
	
Heightened	 public	 and	 political	
attention	 to	 the	 issue/	 agenda	
change	
	
Learning	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
	
Learning	 Analytical	 debate	 (consideration	 of	
new	technical	information)	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
Negotiated	
agreement	
	
	
Not	 specified	 –	 the	 framework	 only	
specifies	 the	 factors	 that	 foster	
negotiation,	but	not	how	negotiation	
leads	to	policy	change.	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
Source:	Produced	by	 the	author	based	on	 the	 review	of	 Sabatier,	 1988;	 Sabatier	 and	Weible,	 2007;	
Jenkins-Smith,	Nohrstedt,	Weible	and	Sabatier,	2014;	Nohrstedt	and	Weible,	2010.	
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Table	 3	 -	 Sources	 of	 policy	 change,	 causal	mechanisms	 and	 observable	 outcomes	 proposed	 by	 this	
thesis	
Source	of	policy	
change	
Causal	mechanism	 Observable	outcomes	
External	events		
	
Redistribution	 of	 resources	 among	
coalitions	
	
Mobilisation	by	minority	coalitions	to	
exploit	the	event	(‘framing	contests’)	
	
Heightened	 public	 and	 political	
attention	 to	 the	 issue/agenda	
change	
	
Learning	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
	
		
Internal	
subsystem	
events	
	
Redistribution	 of	 resources	 among	
coalitions	
	
Mobilisation	by	minority	coalitions	to	
exploit	the	event	(‘framing	contests’)	
	
Heightened	 public	 and	 political	
attention	 to	 the	 issue/	 agenda	
change	
	
Learning	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
	
Learning		
Analytical	 debate	 (consideration	 of	
new	technical	information)	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
	
		
Negotiated	
agreement	
	
	
Frequency	with	which	coalitions	seek	
to	 influence	 decisions	 through	
instruments	 that	 are	 not	 based	 on	
personal	 interaction	and	negotiation	
(such	 as	 vetoes,	 amendments	 and	
judicial	actions)	
	
Change	 in	 the	 number	 of	 venues	
used	by	actors	during	the	negotiation	
process.		
	
The	incidence	of	‘devil	shift’	
	
Change	in	policy	core	beliefs	
	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
	
2.3.1.	External	Events	
External	 policy	 events	 or	 factors	 are	 defined	 by	 the	 ACF	 as	 changes	 in	
socioeconomic	 conditions,	 public	 opinion,	 the	 systemic	 governing	 coalition	 or	 other	
policy	subsystems	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	pp.	198–199).	As	opposed	to	‘relatively	
stable	parameters’	(such	as	the	basic	attributes	of	the	problem	area,	the	distribution	of	
natural	 resources,	 fundamental	 sociocultural	 values	 and	 social	 structure,	 and	 basic	
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constitutional	structure),	external	events	commonly	change	over	a	period	of	ten	years,	
making	their	consideration	crucial	for	the	analysis	of	policy	changes	(Jenkins-Smith	et	
al.,	2014).			
The	 literature	 considers	 at	 least	 four	 mechanisms	 or	 causal	 pathways	
through	which	external	events	lead	to	policy	change.	First,	external	events	may	cause	
the	 redistribution	 of	 resources	 among	 coalitions,	 such	 as	 changes	 in	 access	 to	
authority,		financial	resources	or	technical	information	that	make	specific	groups	more	
or	 less	 powerful	 (Sabatier	 and	Weible,	 2007;	 Nohrstedt	 and	Weible,	 2010).	 Second,	
minority	coalitions	might	pursue	a	 ‘skilful	exploitation’	of	particular	events	 (Mintrom	
and	 Vergari,	 1996).	 In	 this	 case,	 policy	 changes	 are	 dependent	 on	 how	 ready	 and	
capable	 minority	 coalitions	 are	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 ‘windows	 of	 opportunity’	 to	
promote	 changes	 (Kingdon,	 1995).	 Third,	 external	 events	may	 lead	 to	 policy	 change	
through	 heightened	 public	 and	 political	 attention	 around	 the	 topic	 (Jenkins-Smith,	
Nohrstedt,	Weible	and	Sabatier,	2014,	e-book,	48%),	which	ultimately	contributes	 to	
the	possibility	of	the	redistribution	of	resources	and	of	skilful	exploitation	of	the	event	
by	minority	coalitions.	Finally,	the	ACF	holds	that	external	events	lead	to	policy	change	
through	learning	(Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith,	1999,	p.	123)18.		
As	observed	in	table	2,	the	observable	outcome	of	the	operation	of	these	
four	mechanisms	is	the	changes	in	policy	core	beliefs.	I	agree	with	this	interpretation	
but	emphasise	the	importance	of	also	considering	changes	in	interests	(calculations	of	
losses	 and	 gains)	 as	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 policy	 core	 beliefs.	 In	 addition	 to	 being	
more	easily	 identifiable	than	the	normative	side	of	core	belief	changes	with	the	data	
obtained	 for	 this	 research,	 the	 importance	 of	 upgrading	 “interests	 as	 a	 separate	
category	 of	motives	 guiding	 coalition	 behaviour”	 (Nohstedt,	 2010,	 p.	 325)	 has	 been	
frequently	emphasised	in	the	ACF	literature	(Nohrstedt,	2005;	Nohrstedt,	2010;	Hoberg,	
1996;	Hann,	1995;	Ladi,	2005;	Szarka,	2010;	Schlager,	1995).		
	
																																								 																				
18	Although	 the	 framework	 treats	 learning	and	external	events	as	 two	distinct	paths	 to	policy	 change,	
the	framework	clearly	states	that	“changes	in	policy	core	aspects	of	a	governmental	program	require	a	
perturbation	 in	non-cognitive	 factors	external	 to	the	subsystem”	(Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith,	1999,	p.	
123).	 Following	 this	 basic	 argument,	 learning	 is	 also	 considered	 here	 as	 a	 possible	 pathway	 through	
which	external	events	lead	to	policy	change.	
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2.3.2.	Internal	Events	
As	mentioned	before,	more	recent	versions	of	the	ACF	have	added	internal	
events	to	the	group	of	relevant	sources	of	policy	change	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	p.	
198).	 These	events	 can	be	of	 various	 types,	 including	 “crises,	policy	 fiascos,	 scandals	
and	 failures”	 (Jenkins-Smith,	 Nohrstedt,	 Weible	 and	 Sabatier,	 2014,	 e-book,	 48%).	
Nohrstedt	and	Weible	(2010,	p.	20)	propose	a	two-dimensional	typology	to	categorise	
internal	 events:	 1)	 policy	 proximity	 and	 2)	 geographical	 proximity	 to	 the	 subsystem	
under	 investigation.	 The	 former	 denotes	 “the	 degree	 that	 policy	 subsystems	 share	
policy	design	components	such	as	a	subsystem’s	statutes,	laws,	and	policies,	including	
the	instruments,	ideas,	and	symbols	therein”,	the	latter	refers	to	the	physical	location	
where	 the	 event	 takes	 place.	 The	main	 idea	 is	 that	 the	 higher	 the	 geographical	 and	
policy	 proximity	 of	 the	 event,	 the	 greater	 the	 likelihood	 of	 policy	 changes	 as	 a	
consequence	of	internal	events.	Nohrstedt	and	Weible	(2010)	do	not,	however,	discard	
the	 idea	 that	more	 distant	 crises	might	 provide	 strong	 impetus	 for	 change	 through	
policy	transfer	and	learning.		
Internal	events	are	said	to	promote	policy	change	through	the	same	causal	
mechanisms	as	external	events	(Jenkins-Smith,	Nohrstedt,	Weible	and	Sabatier,	2014,	
48%)19.	Following	this	logic,	the	main	observable	implication	of	internal	events	would	
also	be	belief	change,	according	to	the	ACF.	They	differ,	nonetheless,	 in	terms	of	the	
way	through	which	they	are	assessed.	While	external	events	refer	to	macro-political,	
economic	and	ideational	changes,	internal	events	will	use	historical	process-tracing	to	
assess	the	specific	events	characterising	the	history	of	the	subsystem	analysed,	such	as	
crises,	media	scandals,	policy	 fiascos	and	 international	regulations	 in	the	same	policy	
area.	
	
2.3.3.	Policy-oriented	Learning	
The	 third	main	 pathway	 to	 policy	 change	 advanced	 by	 the	 ACF	 is	 policy-
oriented	 learning.	 This	 is	 defined	 as	 “relatively	 enduring	 alternations	 of	 thought	 or	
behavioural	 intentions	 that	 result	 from	experience	and/or	new	 information	and	 that	
																																								 																				
19	However,	because	they	more	directly	point	to	failures	in	the	policies	and	behaviours	of	a	subsystem	
(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	p.	205),	the	links	between	internal	events	and	policy	change	might	be	more	
explicit	and	easier	to	trace.	
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are	 concerned	 with	 the	 attainment	 or	 revision	 of	 policy	 objectives”	 (Sabatier	 and	
Jenkins-Smith,	1999,	p.	123).	As	initially	conceived	by	the	ACF,	policy-oriented	learning	
occurs	 when	 beliefs	 about	 the	 causes	 of	 a	 policy	 problem,	 its	 severity,	 and	 the	
potential	 impact	of	proposed	solutions,	change	after	new	 information	and	analysis	 is	
added	to	the	debate.	Sabatier	(1988,	p.	155)	states	that	the	first	condition	for	policy-
oriented	learning	to	occur	is	that	“both	sides	have	sufficient	technical	resources	to	be	
able	to	criticize	the	other’s	causal	model	and	data”.	It	is,	therefore,	through	the	causal	
mechanism	of	 “analytical	 debate	 among	different	 coalitions”	 that	 actors	 refine	 their	
understandings	of	the	seriousness,	causes	and	consequences	of	the	policy	problem	on	
the	agenda	(Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith,	1988,	p.	155).		
Technical/scientific	 information	 has,	 therefore,	 a	 crucial	 ‘enlightenment	
function’	 that	 should	 be	 considered,	 according	 to	 the	 ACF,	 in	 any	 analysis	 of	 policy	
change	through	learning.	Although	the	framework	does	not	claim	that	this	is	a	superior	
form	of	knowledge	or	 the	only	one	that	may	 lead	to	 learning,	 it	states	that	scientific	
and	 technical	 information	 are	 a	 “major	 source”	 of	 influence	 on	 “belief	 systems”	
(Jenkins-Smith	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 e-book	 45%),	 and	 that	 external	 researchers	 (university	
scientists,	 consultants,	 policy	 analysts)	 are	 among	 the	most	 central	 players	 in	 policy	
processes	that	lead	to	policy	change	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	p.	192).	Learning	can	
also	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 new	 insights	 precipitated	 by	 external	 or	 internal	 events,	
which	must	 be	mediated	 by	 analytical	 debate.	 Therefore,	 according	 to	 the	 ACF,	 the	
ultimate	causal	mechanism	through	which	learning	leads	to	policy	change	is	analytical	
debate	and	the	observable	outcome	of	the	impacts	of	analytical	debate	–	similarly	to	
the	other	factors	–	is	belief	change.	
The	 production	 and	 use	 of	 scientific/technical	 information	 in	 ‘analytic	
debates’	 remain,	 therefore,	 crucial	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 policy-oriented	 learning.	
Policy-oriented	learning	will	be	assessed	in	four	ways.	First,	through	the	tracing	of	all	of	
instances	of	the	direct	participation	of	scientists	in	debates	(and	in	arguments)	and	in	
every	 quote	 of	 a	 scientific	 argument	 made	 by	 a	 policy-maker	 or	 other	 coalition	
member.	 Second,	 the	 analysis	 will	 identify	 whether	 scientific	 arguments	 have	
contributed	to	changes	in	the	position	of	coalitions	through	a	temporal	analysis	of	the	
production	of	scientific	evidence	and	any	changes	in	the	narratives	of	different	actors	
and	coalitions.	Third,	scientists’	own	perception	of	their	 level	of	contribution	and	the	
receptivity	 of	 policy-makers	 to	 scientific	 arguments	was	 assessed	 through	 interviews	
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and	other	 declarations.	 Finally,	 in	 cases	 in	which	official	 scientific	 studies	 have	been	
produced,	 the	 impact	of	 these	studies	on	the	final	policy	or	regulatory	decisions	was	
investigated	 through	 comparison	 of	 the	 scientific	 findings	 and	 final	 changes	 to	 the	
policy	or	regulation.	
	
2.3.4.	Negotiated	Agreement	
The	concept	of	‘negotiated	agreement’	is	defined	by	the	ACF	as	“situations	
in	 which	 coalitions	 that	 have	 been	 fighting	 for	 decades	 come	 to	 a	 negotiated	
agreement	representing	a	substantial	change	from	the	status	quo”	or,	in	other	words,	
it	 refers	 to	 “agreements	 involving	 policy	 core	 changes	 [that]	 are	 crafted	 among	
previously	 warring	 coalitions”	 (Sabatier	 and	 Weible,	 2007,	 p.	 205).	 This	 concept	
emerged	 from	a	combination	of	 the	ACF’s	hypotheses	about	policy-oriented	 learning	
and	 inputs	 from	 the	 ‘alternative	 dispute	 resolution’	 literature	 (e.g.	 Bingham,	 1986;	
Carpenter	and	Kennedy,	1988;	O'Leary	and	Bingham,	2003;	Susskind,	McKearnan	and	
Thomas-Larmer,	1999;	Ury,	1993).	 It	was	added	to	the	framework	in	 later	versions	in	
an	attempt	to	tackle	criticisms	that	the	ACF	was	not	suitable	for	the	analysis	of	more	
consensual	 or	 corporatist	 European	 regimes	 (which	 are	 less	 adversarial	 than	 the	US	
system,	 in	 the	 context	 of	which	 the	 ACF	was	 initially	 applied)	 (Sabatier	 and	Weible,	
2007). 
Although	 the	 causal	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 negotiated	 agreement	
results	 in	policy	 change	are	not	 clearly	elucidated	by	any	of	 the	contributions	 to	 the	
framework	 assessed	 during	 this	 literature	 review,	 nine	 elements	 are	 proposed	 by	
Sabatier	and	Weible	(2007,	pp.	206–07)	as	drivers	of	negotiated	agreement.	These	are:	
1)	 a	 hurting	 stalemate	 –	 a	 situation	 in	which	 all	 parties	 agree	 to	 negotiate	 seriously	
because	 they	 see	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	 status	 quo	 as	 unacceptable;	 2)	 broad	
representation	of	all	relevant	stakeholder	groups	during	negotiations;	3)	leadership	by	
neutral	mediators	or	brokers;	4)	consensus	decision	rules	–	related	to	the	inclusion	of	
all	parties	in	the	negotiation	and	the	granting	of	veto	power	to	all	of	them;	5)	funding	
for	negotiations	 from	diverse	coalitions;	6)	commitment	by	actors	–	characterised	by	
continuous	meetings	with	regular	participation;	7)	the	importance	of	empirical	issues,	
i.e.	 the	 seriousness	 of	 a	 problem	and	 its	 causes,	 as	 opposed	 to	 normative	 issues;	 8)	
trust	–	necessary	 for	participants	 to	 listen	carefully	 to	each	other’s	views	and,	9)	 the	
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lack	 of	 alternative	 venues	 for	 negotiation,	 or	 of	 other	 alternative	 courses	 of	 action	
apart	from	negotiation	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	pp.205–06).		
Apart	 from	 the	 observation	 that	 “the	 most	 important	 [element]	 for	
instigating	 negotiations	 between	 coalitions	 is	 a	 hurting	 stalemate”	 (Weible	 and	
Nohrstedt,	2013,	p.132;	Weible	and	Jenkins-Smith,	2016,	p.24)20	no	other	guidance	is	
provided	by	the	framework	for	the	empirical	observation	of	the	mechanisms	through	
which	 negotiated	 agreement	 leads	 to	 policy	 change.	 Thus,	 based	 on	 the	 nine	
motivators	of	negotiated	agreement	provided	by	 the	ACF	and	on	the	availability	and	
nature	of	 the	data	 obtained	during	 field	work,	 this	 thesis	 proposes	 the	use	of	 three	
causal	mechanisms	to	assess	the	impact	of	negotiated	agreement	in	policy	change:		
1) How	often	 coalitions	 seek	 to	 influence	 decisions	 through	 instruments	
that	 are	 not	 based	 on	 personal	 interaction	 and	 negotiation	 (such	 as	
vetoes,	 amendments	 and	 judicial	 actions).	 The	 analysis	 of	 this	
observable	 implication	was	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 higher	
the	frequency	of	recourse	to	these	non-agreement	based	mechanisms,	
the	lower	the	level	of	negotiated	agreement	in	the	case.		
2) The	number	of	venues	used	by	actors	during	 the	negotiation	process.	
The	assumption	here	is	that	the	higher	the	number	of	venues	used	for	
negotiation,	 the	 lower	 the	 level	 of	 negotiated	 agreement.	 The	 logic	
underlying	 this	 assumption	 is	 that	 if	 coalitions	 restrict	negotiations	 to	
specific	institutional	venues	(for	example,	within	the	National	Congress	
or	 within	 specific	 commissions	 within	 the	 National	 Congress)	 and	 do	
not	seek	to	include	other	venues	such	as	courts,	other	agencies	or	the	
media,	 that	 means	 that	 actors	 are	 satisfied	 with	 the	 level	 of	
collaboration	 that	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 that	 environment,	 so	 actors	
consider	it	legitimate	to	continue	with	it	as	the	sole	forum	for	debates	
(Weible,	 Pattinson	 and	 Sabatier,	 2010).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 the	
																																								 																				
20	It	is	interesting	to	note	in	this	regard	that	the	identification	of	a	hurting	stalemate	as	the	main	factor	
leading	to	negotiated	agreement	and	policy	change	bears	close	resemblance	to	explanations	provided	
by	 the	 literature	 on	 ‘deregulation’,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 depletion	 of	 economic	 rents	 puts	 those	
previously	satisfied	with	an	earlier	regulatory	bargain	in	an	unstable	position,	motivating	them	to	seek	
new	ways	of	rearranging	the	regime.	See,	for	example,	Stigler	(1971)	and	Peltzman	(1989).		
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debate	 is	 taken	 to	 courts,	media,	 independent	 agencies	 or	 any	 other	
venue,	it	indicates	less	negotiation	and	more	disagreement.		
3) The	identification	of	personal	attacks	and	offenses	during	debates	was	
also	 considered	 evidence	 of	 reduced	 levels	 of	 negotiated	 agreement.		
This	 implication	was	derived	 from	debates	about	 the	phenomenon	of	
‘devil	 shift’,	 which	 refers	 to	 situations	 in	 which	 “actors	 tend	 to	 view	
opponents	as	being	more	powerful	than	they	actually	are”	(Leach	and	
Sabatier	 2005,	 p.	 494)	 and	 exaggerate	 their	 maliciousness	 (Jenkins-
Smith	et	al.,	2014,	45%;	Sabatier,	Hunter,	and	McLaughlin,	1987).	
2.3.5.	Pathways	to	policy	change	and	the	impact	of	opportunity	structures	
a. Causal	pathways	
	
The	 previous	 independent	 analysis	 of	 each	 of	 the	 four	 sources	 of	 policy	
change	and	their	respective	causal	mechanisms	is	clarifying	in	formal	terms,	but	lacks	a	
more	 realistic	 consideration	 of	 the	 interdependencies	 and	 overlaps	 between	 these	
four	 sources	 of	 policy	 change.	 This	 section	 intends	 to	 provide	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
different	 potential	 causal	 pathways	 of	 policy	 change,	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 of	 the	
different	ways	in	which	these	four	sources	of	policy	change	might	interact	to	produce	
policy	change.	Two	 interdependencies	 that	have	been	discussed	 in	 the	 literature	will	
be	 emphasised.	 First,	 according	 to	 the	 ACF	 learning	 depends	 on	 the	 occurrence	 of	
events	that	alter	non-cognitive	factors	and	motivate	the	production	and	receptivity	of	
actors	 to	 new	 technical	 information	 (Sabatier	 and	 Jenkins-Smith	 1999,	 pp.	 123–24).	
According	 to	 this	 view,	 therefore,	 external	 and	 internal	 events	 precede	 learning.	
Second,	according	to	the	ACF,	negotiated	agreement	accounts	for	policy	change	only	in	
situations	 in	 which	 “in	 the	 absence	 of	 major	 internal	 or	 external	 perturbations	
agreements	 involving	 policy	 core	 changes	 are	 crafted	 among	 previously	 warring	
coalitions”	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	p.	205).	The	concept	of	negotiated	agreement	
was	 developed,	 therefore,	 to	 explain	 situations	 of	 policy	 change	 that	 seem	 to	 arise	
strictly	from	negotiation	between	the	parties	(and	are	not	 influenced	by	events).	The	
dynamic	 reality	 of	 any	 real	 policy	 subsystem	 is,	 however,	 so	 distant	 from	 this	 static	
assumption	that	finding	an	instance	in	which	negotiated	agreement	can	be	genuinely	
isolated	and	securely	pointed	out	as	‘the’	pathway	to	policy	change	becomes	unlikely	–	
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a	difficulty	that	has	been	noted	by	Weible	and	Jenkins-Smith	themselves	(Weible	and	
Jenkins-Smith,	 2016).	 This	 analysis	 suggests,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 that	 negotiated	
agreement	should	be	brought	back	to	the	‘real	world’	of	policies,	and	integrated	into	
broader	ACF	causal	pathways	in	a	way	that	not	only	includes	it	but	also	advances	the	
types	 of	 relationships	 that	 are	 to	 be	 expected	 between	 this	 and	 the	 other	 three	
sources	of	policy	change.	I	argue	therefore,	based	on	the	empirical	findings	of	the	ABS	
case,	 that	 in	 the	same	way	 that	 learning	depends	on	external	and	 internal	events	 to	
change	core	aspects	of	a	policy,	negotiated	agreement	depends	on	learning	(see	figure	
1,	 causal	 pathway	 3).	 This	 proposition	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 original	 contribution	 of	 the	
empirical	analysis	of	this	thesis	to	the	theoretical	development	of	the	ACF.	
The	importance	of	learning	in	the	causal	pathway	that	leads	to	negotiated	
agreement	 has	 also	 been	 emphasised	 by	 other	 authors	 who	 argue	 that	 negotiated	
agreement	 “can	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 policy-oriented	 learning”	
(Mauersberger,	 2014,	 p.	 58).	 This	 thesis	 departs	 from	 this	 assertion,	 however,	
investigating	 learning	 and	 negotiated	 agreement	 as	 separate	 phenomena.	 It	 does	
acknowledge,	 nonetheless,	 that	 negotiated	 agreement	 requires	 learning	 among	
coalition	 actors	 in	 order	 to	 occur.	 Learning	 is,	 therefore,	 considered	 here	 an	
intermediate	variable	that	 leads	to	negotiated	agreement	(see	figure	1,	below,	which	
summarises	the	relationship	between	the	four	sources	of	policy	change).		
Although	 negotiated	 agreement	 is	 empirically	 found	 by	 this	 analysis	 to	
require	 learning	 between	 coalitions	 in	 order	 to	 take	 place,	 an	 interpretation	 of	 ACF	
literature	points	to	the	hypothesis	that	learning	does	not	necessarily	entails	negotiated	
agreement.	This	latter	situation	was	represented	by	line	2	of	figure	1	(below).	In	these	
cases,	 learning	 might	 lead	 to	 policy	 change	 without	 implying	 the	 necessity	 of	
negotiations,	simply	by	redistributing	resources	and	progressively	altering	the	cost	and	
benefit	calculations	of	different	courses	of	action.	However,	because	none	of	the	case-
studies	 analysed	 in	 this	 thesis	 provided	 an	 example	 in	which	 only	 learning	 occurred	
(without	 negotiated	 agreement),	 this	 specific	 pathway	 of	 policy	 change	 is	 not	
empirically	assessed	by	this	thesis.	
Line	1	corresponds	to	situations	in	which	external	and	internal	events	alter	
incentives	(costs	and	benefits)	and	redistribute	resources	to	effect	policy	change	even	
without	 learning	or	negotiated	agreement	taking	place.	These	are	situations	 in	which	
power	resources	(such	as	political	power	or	public	opinion	support)	are	concentrated	
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in	 one	 of	 the	 coalitions	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 cognitive	 debate	 is	 minimal	 and	
unnecessary	 in	 the	process	of	policy	change.	Both	 internal	and	external	events	were	
considered	 in	 tandem	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 extent	 of	 their	 impact	 because	 the	 empirical	
material	 did	 not	 provide	 us	 with	 situations	 in	 which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 analytically	
separate	both.		
Line	3	 refers	 to	situations	 in	which	a	hurting	stalemate	occurs,	 leading	 to	
negotiated	 agreement.	 The	 definition	 of	 a	 hurting	 stalemate	 was	 inspired	 by	 the	
collaborative	 governance	 literature	 (e.g.	 Ansell	 and	 Gash,	 2008;	 Emerson,	 Nabatchi,	
and	Balogh,	2011;	Hudson,	Hardy,	Henwood	and	Wistow,	1999;	Thomson	and	Perry,	
2006;	Wood	and	Gray,	1991)	and	consists	of	three	criteria:		
	
1. Consequential	 incentives	 –	 situations	 that	 present	 issues	 as	
salient	to	participants	and	the	timing	and	pressure	for	their	solution	as	ripe.	
2. Interdependence	among	actors.		
3. Uncertainty.		
	
The	 resulting	 causal	 pathways	 arising	 from	 the	 interpretations,	
systematisation	and	elaborations	of	the	ACF	literature	provided	in	this	section	are	the	
following:	
	
	
Figure	1	-	The	relationship	between	different	sources	of	policy	change	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
	
b. Opportunity	Structures	
	
The	characteristics	of	the	events,	subsystems	(in	particular,	the	distribution	
of	power	among	the	actors	involved)	and	the	overall	context	of	the	country	(which	also	
impacts	the	distribution	of	power	among	actors)	are	important	factors	in	determining	
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which	of	these	three	paths	of	policy	change	will	occur.	Regarding	the	characteristics	of	
the	 context	 in	 determining	which	of	 the	 pathways	will	manifest,	 the	ACF	provides	 a	
relevant	debate	about	the	‘opportunity	structures’	of	different	countries	(Sabatier	and	
Weible,	2007,	p.	200).	Defined	as	“relatively	enduring	 features	of	a	polity	 that	affect	
the	 resources	 and	 constraints	 of	 subsystem	 actors”,	 opportunity	 structures	 are	
country-specific	 institutional	 features	 that	 affect	 the	 resources	 and	 behaviour	 of	
coalitions.	 Sabatier	 and	Weible	 (2007)	 borrow	 two	 types	 of	 variables	 from	 Lijphart’s	
(1999)	work	to	describe	what	affects	coalitions’	resources	and	behaviour.	These	are:	
1) The	degree	of	consensus	needed	for	major	policy	change.	
2) The	openness	of	the	political	system.		
	
The	 first	 criterion	 relates	 to	 the	 majoritarianism	 versus	 consensus	
dimension,	used	by	 Lijphart	 (2009,	pp.	1–2)	 to	 categorise	 types	of	democracies.	 This	
criterion	holds	that	democracies	can	be	placed	somewhere	on	a	continuum	between	
adversarial	majoritarian	democracies	–	 in	which	 simple	majorities	 tend	 to	win	–	and	
‘negotiation’	or	consensus	democracies	–	 in	which	negotiation	and	bargaining	matter	
more	 and	 the	 central	 goals	 tend	 to	 be	 that	 decisions	 are	 as	 inclusive	 as	 possible.	
Typical	 examples	 of	 the	 first	 are	 the	UK	 and	New	 Zealand,	while	 the	 second	 type	 is	
represented	by	countries	such	as	Switzerland,	Austria	and	the	Netherlands.		
The	 second	 criterion	 identified	 by	 Sabatier	 and	Weible	 (2007,	 p.	 200)	 is	
openness	of	the	political	system,	and	is	associated	with	the	notion	of	the	‘diffusion	of	
power’	 described	 by	 Lijphart	 (1999,	 p.	 5).	 Following	 this	 notion,	 countries	might	 be	
differentiated	 according	 to	whether	 responsibility	 for	 outcomes	 is	 seen	 as	 collective	
and	 jointly	 shared	 by	 all	 institutions,	 or	 whether	 it	 seen	 as	 divided	 between	 them.	
Countries	such	as	the	US,	which	features	rigid	separation	of	powers,	several	decision-
making	venues	organised	in	federal	units,	in	addition	to	a	strong	culture	of	accessibility	
to	these	venues,	represent	the	most	open	type	of	political	system	–	in	which	power	is	
extremely	 diffuse.	 In	 contrast,	 countries	 in	 which	 decisions	 are	 restricted	 to	 central	
government	 authorities,	 which	 do	 not	 share	 responsibility	 with	 other	 units	 or	
institutions	 (usually	 unitary	 and	 corporatist	 systems),	 or	 which	 have	 a	 more	
paternalistic	 culture	 with	 less	 popular	 involvement	 in	 decisions	 (such	 as	 Brazil)	
exemplify	a	less	open	type	of	political	system.	
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As	 a	 result,	 Sabatier	 and	 Weible	 (2007,	 p.	 201)	 propose	 that	 when	 countries	 have	
limited	needs	in	terms	of	consensus	(i.e.	are	majoritarian),	but	open	political	systems	
(diffuse	 power),	 they	 characterise	 ‘pluralist	 systems’.	 In	 these	 systems,	 many	 can	
participate	in	political	decision-making	but	their	participation	requires	super-majorities	
to	have	any	 impact.	 ‘Corporatist’	structures,	on	the	other	hand,	are	described	by	the	
authors	 as	 having	 high	 requirements	 in	 terms	 of	 consensus,	 but	 as	 being	 relatively	
closed	to	participation	(i.e.	power	is	concentrated).	Westminster	systems,	in	turn—are	
described	as	having	low	requirements	for	both	consensus	and	participation.	Decisions	
tend	to	be	highly	centralised	in	this	latter	type	of	system.	They	are	not	as	centralised,	
however,	 as	 many	 developing	 countries,	 which	 are	 characterised	 as	 ‘authoritarian	
executive’	 regimes.	 Table	 1,	 below,	 reproduces	 Sabatier	 and	Weible’s	 (2007,	 p.	 201)	
categorisation:	
	
Table	4	-	Typology	of	coalition	opportunity	structures	
Openness	of	
Political	System	
Degree	of	Consensus	Needed	for	Major	Policy	Change	
High	 Medium	 Low	
High	 Pluralist	 Pluralist	 	
Medium	 Recent	Corporatist	 Westminster	 	
Low	 Traditional	Corporatist	 	
Authoritarian	
executive	
Source:	Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	p.	201	
	
The	characteristics	of	Brazilian	political	system	and	Brazilian	society	shall,	in	
turn,	be	considered	as	 they	directly	 impact	 the	opportunity	structure	of	coalitions	 to	
exploit	 internal	 and	 external	 events.	 An	 analysis	 of	 the	 dimensions21	 advanced	 by	
																																								 																				
21	Lijphart	(1999,	p.	3-4)	provides	ten	crucial	dimensions	for	the	analysis	of	democracies,	which	are	
divided	in	two	categories,	those	related	to	executive-parties’	organisation	and	those	associated	with	
federal-unitary	characteristics.	These	10	dimensions	are	fully	reproduced	below:	
Executives-parties	dimension		
‘1.	Concentration	of	executive	power	in	single-party	majority	cabinets	versus	executive	power-sharing	in	
broad	multiparty	coalitions.		
2.	Executive-legislative	relationships	in	which	the	executive	is	dominant	versus	executive-legislative	
balance	of	power.		
3.	Two-party	versus	multiparty	systems.		
4.	Majoritarian	and	disproportional	electoral	systems	versus	proportional	representation.		
5.	Pluralist	interest	group	systems	with	free-for-all	competition	among	groups	versus	coordinated	and	
“corporatist”	interest	group	systems	aimed	at	compromise	and	concertation.’	
	
	Federal-unitary	dimension		
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Lijphart	 (1999	 p.	 3-4)	 for	 the	 characterization	 of	 democracies	 as	 consensual	 or	
majoritarian	indicates	that	Brazil	cannot	be	easily	categorised	neither	as	a	majoritarian	
nor	as	a	consensual	democracy.	Brazil	is	a	presidential,	federalist	country,	with	a	clear	
separation	 of	 powers	 between	 the	 legislative,	 the	 executive	 and	 the	 judiciary.	 This	
should,	 according	 to	 Lijphart	 (1999),	 imply	 in	 high	 levels	 of	 consensus	 requirements	
due	to	the	need	of	agreement	between	the	different	powers,	and	the	different	states	
of	the	federation.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	Brazil	counts	with	several	formal	and	
informal	‘majoritarian’	mechanisms	to	promote	governability	and	avoid	gridlock	which	
concentrate	power	 in	 the	president.	Among	 these	mechanisms	 are	 the	possibility	 of	
issuing	 ‘provisional	 decrees’	 (executive	 laws,	 with	 immediate	 effect);	 ‘urgency	
petitions’	–	the	capacity	of	the	executive	power	to	impose	the	prioritisation	of	certain	
issues	 in	 the	 voting	 process	 of	 the	 Congress,	 extensive	 executive	 budgetary	 powers	
(Pereira	&	Orellana,	2009	p.	58),	the	power	to	veto	bills	in	part	or	in	whole,		and	also	
extensive	 possibilities	 of	 political	 appointments,	 a	 practice	 according	 to	 which	
ministerial	positions	are	allocated	to	diverse	parties	in	order	to	assure	political	support	
of	 the	Congress	 to	 the	executive	power.	On	an	 informal	 (and	often	 illegal)	 level,	 the	
mobilisation	of	resources	to	bargain	the	support	of	the	legislative	power	has	also	been	
extensively	 used	 by	 the	 executive	 power,	 as	 attested	 by	 recent	 corruption	 scandals	
such	as	 the	Mensalão	 (in	2004)	and	 the	Petrolão	 (in	2014),	both	 related	 to	 the	 illicit	
remittance	of	public	money	from	the	executive	power	to	law	makers	in	exchange	for	
political	 support.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 executive	 tends	 to	 have	 extensive	 powers,	
which	although	not	turning	the	Brazilian	system	in	an	‘authoritarian	executive22’	(due	
to	 the	division	of	powers	and	 federal	system),	places	 it,	at	 least	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	
consensus	variable	spectrum	(table	5).		
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
‘1.	Unitary	and	centralized	government	versus	federal	and	decentralized	government.	
2.	Concentration	of	legislative	power	in	a	unicameral	legislature	versus	division	of	legislative	power	
between	two	equally	strong	but	differently	constituted	houses.		
3.	Flexible	constitutions	that	can	be	amended	by	simple	majorities	versus	rigid	constitutions	that	can	be	
changed	only	by	extraordinary	majorities.		
4.	Systems	in	which	legislatures	have	the	final	word	on	the	constitutionality	of	their	own	legislation	
versus	systems	in	which	laws	are	subject	to	a	judicial	review	of	their	constitutionality	by	supreme	or	
constitutional	courts.		
5.	Central	banks	that	are	dependent	on	the	executive	versus	independent	central	banks.’	(Liphart	1999	
p.	3-4)	
22	As	the	recent	case	of	removal	of	President	Dilma	Rouseff,	in	May	2016,	from	office	by	and	
impeachment	trial	coordinated	by	the	Congress	may	attest.	
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Second,	in	what	concerns	to	the	openness	of	the	Brazilian	political	system,	
although	 Brazil	 has	 a	 high	 number	 of	 decision	 venues	 due	 to	 the	 division	 of	 power	
between	separate	institutions	and	the	federal	system,	the	accessibility	of	these	venues	
to	 different	 groups	 is	 considerably	 low.	 Characterised	 by	 a	 deep-seated	 history	 of	
clientelism	and	patronage	according	to	which	personal	 favours	have	been	exchanged	
by	 political	 support	 and	 benefits	 (Nunes,	 1997)	 for	 centuries,	 current	 political	
strategies	 are	 still	 largely	 driven	 by	 the	 capacity	 of	 politicians	 to	 use	 log-rolling	 and	
appointment	tools	(Valença,	2000).	In	this	plutocratic	context,	access,	voice	and	actual	
interference	within	political	 institutions	 tend	to	be	relatively	 limited	and	conditioned	
to	 personal	 connections.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 the	 opportunity	 structure	 provided	 by	
Brazil	 is	 characterised	 here	 as	 presenting	 low	 levels	 of	 political	 openness.	 Table	 5	
demonstrates	the	position	of	Brazil	within	Sabatier	and	Weible’s	(2007)	categorisation	
of	opportunity	structures.	
	
Table	5	-	Summary	of	Brazilian	opportunity	structure	
Openness	of	
political	system	
Degree	of	consensus	needed	for	major	policy	change	
High	 Medium	 Low	
High	 Pluralist	 Pluralist	 	
Medium	 Recent	corporatist	 Westminster	 	
Low	 Traditional	corporatist	 Brazil	 Authoritarian	
Executive	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	with	inspiration	from	Sabatier	and	Weible	(2007	p.	201)	
	
Accordingly,	 this	 opportunity	 structure	 analysis	 will	 be	 used	 to	 put	 this	
thesis’	results	in	context	when	drawing	implications	from	the	empirical	analysis.		
2.4.	Conclusion	
As	 maintained	 by	 this	 chapter,	 at	 least	 three	main	 analytical	 issues	 will	 be	
addressed	 by	 this	 thesis.	 First,	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 will	 engage	 with	 Weible	 and	
Nohrstedt’s	 (2013)	 hypothesis	 regarding	 the	 necessity,	 but	 insufficiency,	 of	 the	 four	
sources	of	policy	change.	In	this	process	the	observable	implications	of	each	of	the	four	
factors	 will	 be	 analysed,	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 the	 causal	 pathways	 will	 be	
assessed,	and	the	empirical	validity	of	the	theoretically-derived	relationships	between	
the	four	 factors	 (figure	1)	will	be	tested	(when	allowed	by	the	case-studies).	Second,	
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the	analysis	will	emphasise	changes	in	interests	as	part	of	what	constitute	changes	in	
policy	 core	 beliefs.	 This	 effort	 directly	 contributes	 to	 the	 development	 of	 the	
framework	 and	 to	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 a	more	 explicit	 incorporation	 of	 interest-
based	explanations	 in	the	formulation	of	the	ACF	(Nohrstedt,	2005;	Nohrstedt,	2010;	
Hoberg,	1996;	Hann,	1995;	Ladi,	2005;	Szarka,	2010;	Schlager,	1995).	Third,	the	specific	
characteristics	 of	 the	 events	 and	 subsystems	 that	 are	 conducive	 to	 learning	 and	
negotiated	agreement	will	 be	 scrutinised,	 aiming	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	debate	on	 the	
reasons	for	the	occurrence	of	different	paths	to	policy	change.	Finally,	this	analysis	will	
consider	the	empirical	impact	of	the	‘opportunity	structures’	of	Brazil	in	policy	change	
through	a	comparison	of	the	results	obtained	in	the	three	cases,	thereby	contributing	
to	the	use	of	the	ACF	in	the	Brazilian	context.	
	
	
	
														
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
56	
	
	
CHAPTER	3	-	ANALYTICAL	FRAMEWORK	II:	BRAZILIAN	
ENVIRONMENTAL	DISCOURSES	
	
	
3.1.	Introduction	
The	ACF	hypothesises	 that	“actors	within	an	advocacy	coalition	will	 show	
substantial	 consensus	on	 issues	pertaining	 to	 the	policy	 core	 [beliefs]”	 (Sabatier	 and	
Jenkins-Smith	 1999,	 p.	 124).	 This	 chapter	 will	 develop	 a	 framework	 of	 policy	 core	
beliefs	or	 interpretive	schemes	that	appear	 in	Brazilian	environmental	policy	debates	
past	and	present.	This	will	allow	for	the	 later	categorisation	of	arguments	and	actors	
according	to	specific	 interpretive	schemes	facilitating	cross-case	comparison	 in	terms	
of	coalitions.	I	do	not	assume,	however,	that	the	narratives	(or	discourses)	adopted	by	
actors	is	necessarily	a	manifestation	of	their	core	beliefs.	It	is	acknowledged	here	that	
discourses	may	 be	 used	 strategically	 and	might	 be	 both	 a	 consequence	 of	 cost	 and	
benefit	calculations,	or	be	strategically	used	to	redistribute	resources	among	coalitions	
(i.e.	enhancing	the	legitimacy	of	specific	positions).		
This	 framework	was	developed	 through	a	 theoretically-guided	analysis	 of	
the	history	of	Brazilian	environmental	debates.	The	four	discourses	are	considered	to	
be	 exhaustive	 and	 mutually-exclusive	 narratives	 adopted	 by	 actors	 across	 different	
environmental	 debates.	 The	 framework	 was	 developed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 theoretical	
inputs	from	Cultural	Theory23	(Douglas	and	Wildavsky,	1982;	Hood,	1998;	Hoppe,	2002;	
Verweij	 et	 al.,	 2006),	 a	 ‘checklist’	 	 of	 items	 for	 the	 analysis	 and	 scrutiny	 of	
environmental	 discourses	 developed	 by	 Dryzek	 (2013,	 p.	 20),	 and	 by	 the	 Narrative	
Policy	 Framework	 (Jones	 and	 McBeth,	 2010)24.	 These	 theoretical	 guidelines	 (what	
																																								 																				
23	Other	authors	have	already	begun	to	apply	Cultural	Theory	to	the	analysis	of	coalition	formation	(see,	
for	example,	Ripberg,	Jenkins-Smith	and	Herron,	2011)	and	this	approach	is	considered	to	be	part	of	the	
future	research	agenda	of	the	ACF	(Jenkins-Smith	et	al.,	2014).		 	
24	The	necessity	of	identifying	a	framework	of	recurrent	interpretive	schemes	(or	discourses)	arises	from	
the	considerations	of	previous	scholars	concerning	the	difficulties	of	generalisation,	quantification	and	
cross-case	 comparison	 entailed	 in	 the	 unguided	 (or	 exclusively	 inductive)	 identification	 of	 narratives.	
According	 to	 Jones	 and	 McBeth	 (2010,	 p.	 341),	 this	 method	 might	 lead	 to	 a	 situation	 of	 excessive	
relativity	 in	which	 so	many	 different	 views	 are	 identified	 among	 actors	 that	 they	 become	useless	 for	
cross-case	 comparison.	 They,	 therefore,	 emphasise	 the	 importance	of	 anchoring	 analyses	 of	 different	
views	in	generalisable	content	in	order	to	avoid	the	problem	of	excessive	relativity,	a	recommendation	
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should	be	looked	for	in	the	identification	and	analysis	of	discourses)	are	applied	in	the	
analysis	of	secondary	 literature	on	the	history	of	Brazilian	environmental	movements	
and	perspectives,	 and	of	primary	data	gathered	during	 fieldwork	 (such	as	 interviews	
and	analysis	of	National	Congress	and	media	debates)	for	the	identification	of	the	four	
discourses.		
Whilst	 the	 discursive	 framework	 was	 developed	 specifically	 for	 this	
analysis,	 it	 is	based	on	 four	main	 secondary	 sources:	 first,	on	Hochstetler	and	Keck’s	
(2007)	 seminal	 analysis	 of	 the	 three	 distinct	 waves	 or	 defining	 periods	 of	 Brazilian	
environmental	movements.	Second,	on	studies	of	the	new	ideological	orientation	and	
the	 redefinition	of	Brazilian	economic	policies	after	 the	election	of	President	 Lula	da	
Silva,	 from	 the	 Worker’s	 Party	 in	 2003	 (i.e.	 Bresser-Pereira,	 2009;	 Panizza,	 2013;	
Trubek,	 2014;	 Trubek	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Third,	 on	 analysis	 of	 the	 history	 and	 political	
importance	of	 the	 ‘extractivist	movement’	of	Amazonian	rubber	tappers	 for	Brazilian	
environmental	policies	and	 laws	(e.g.	Santilli,	2005;	 Inoue	and	Franchini,	2014;	 Inoue	
and	Lima,	2007;	Hochstetler	and	Keck,	2007).	 Finally,	 insights	provided	by	Dryzek	on	
environmental	discourses	 in	general	were	adapted	 to	 the	Brazilian	context.	With	 the	
exception	of	one	of	 the	discourses	 (‘administrative	economic	 rationalism’,	which	 is	a	
mix	of	two	different	discourses	described	by	Dryzek),	the	labels	and	characteristics	of	
the	discourses	were	entirely	drawn	from	the	literature.		
This	 thesis	 provides	 an	original	 contribution	by	 systematising	 the	 insights	
from	 these	 different	 sources	 into	 one	 unified	 theoretical	 framework,	 as	 well	 as	 by	
providing	 a	 more	 in-depth	 characterisation	 of	 each	 of	 these	 views	 in	 context.	 The	
framework	 has	 two	 advantages.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 it	 constitutes	 a	 potentially	 useful	
contribution	 to	other	analyses	of	Brazilian	environmental	politics	as	 these	categories	
can	 be	 easily	 applied	 to	 any	 area	 of	 Brazilian	 environmental	 debates.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	because	they	have	been	developed	according	to	the	history	and	analysis	of	the	
Brazilian	 context,	 they	might	 not	 be	 as	well	 suited	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 other	 contexts	
(even	 though	 the	 insights	 derived	 from	 Dryzek’s	 checklist	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	
environmental	discourses	are	easily	transferable).	It	is	argued,	as	a	consequence,	that	
this	 framework	 provides	 an	 adequate	 balance	 between	 parsimony	 and	 detailed,	 in	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
which	 is	 followed	 here.	 The	 use	 of	 narrative	 analysis	 (via	 the	 pre-defined	 typology	 of	 environmental	
discourses	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter)	 is,	 therefore,	 not	 only	 compatible	with,	 but	 expands	 on,	 recent	
additions	to	the	ACF.		
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depth,	contextual	analysis.	 It	 takes	 into	consideration	the	 important	role	of	domestic	
processes25	 in	the	definition	of	Brazilian	environmental	perspectives	but	still	provides	
categories	that	are	generalisable,	at	least	within	Brazilian	environmental	debates.		
This	chapter	proceeds	as	 follows.	After	this	brief	 introduction,	section	3.2	
presents	 the	 theoretical	 base	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 different	 Brazilian	 environmental	
discourses.	 It	 explains	 Dryzek’s	 (2013)	 framework	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 environmental	
discourses	and	the	adaptations	undertaken	for	its	use	in	this	thesis.	Section	3	identifies	
the	 four	 environmental	 discourses	 predominant	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	 debates	
according	 to	 the	data	on	Brazilian	 environmental	 debates	 obtained	 for	 this	 research	
and	secondary	 literature.	 It	describes	 the	main	characteristics	and	history	of	each	of	
the	four	discourses	according	to	the	features	of	environmental	discourses	highlighted	
by	Dryzek,	cultural	theory	and	the	Narrative	Policy	Framework.	The	four	discourses	are	
preservationism,	 socio-environmentalism,	 administrative	 economic	 rationalism	 and	
neo-developmentalism.	Together	 they	offer	an	exhaustive	and	mutually	exclusive	 list	
of	 the	main	 interpretive	 schemes	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	 debates	 between	 2005	
and	 2015.	 Section	 3.4	 concludes	 by	 reinstating	 the	 relevance	 of	 this	 discursive	
framework	 for	 the	analysis	of	 coalitions	and	of	 the	ACF’s	hypotheses	about	coalition	
formation	and	policy	change.	
	
3.2.	A	framework	of	Brazilian	Environmental	Discourses	
A	 discourse	 is	 “a	 shared	 way	 of	 apprehending	 the	 world.	 Embedded	 in	
language,	it	enables	those	who	subscribe	to	it	to	interpret	bits	of	information	and	put	
them	into	coherent	stories	or	accounts”	(Dryzek,	2013,	p.	9).	This	definition	is	different	
from	 the	 definition	 of	 policy	 core	 beliefs	 provided	 by	 the	 ACF,	 (which	 “represent	 a	
coalition’s	 basic	 normative	 commitments	 and	 causal	 perceptions”	 [Sabatier	 and	
Jenkins-Smith	1999,	p.	121]),	because	it	emphasises	the	importance	of	‘language’	and	
of	 interpretation	 instead	of	 ‘basic	normative	commitments’.	 It	 is	 therefore	perceived	
																																								 																				
25		 Although	 stories	 about	 the	 international	 diffusion	 of	 environmental	 norms	 and	 institutions	
often	 portray	 countries	 like	 Brazil	 as	 receptor	 countries	 in	 the	 diffusion	 of	 transnational	 ideas	 and	
environmental	 institutions	 (see,	 for	example,	Finnemore	and	Sikkink,	1998),	 these	macro-level	 studies	
tend	 to	 overlook	 the	 real	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 environmental	 perspectives	 develop	 in	 domestic	
countries	and	over-generalise	complex	national	interpretations	(Hochstetler	and	Keck,	2007;	Inoue	and	
Franchini,	2014).	
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to	be	more	empirically	observable	than	policy	core	beliefs,	and	for	this	 reason	 it	was	
adopted	here.	
The	checklist	of	elements	for	the	analysis	of	discourse	advanced	by	Dryzek	
(2013,	pp.17–20)	is	complemented	in	this	section	by	insights	from	Cultural	Theory	and	
the	Narrative	Policy	Framework.	The	resulting	theoretical	 framework	(which	will	now	
be	 described)	 is	 then	 applied	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 context	 (through	 the	
investigation	 of	 secondary	 literature	 and	 primary	 data)	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 for	 the	
identification	of	 the	main	Brazilian	environmental	discourses	 (see	table	2)26.	Dryzek’s	
‘checklist’	is	based	on	two	main	criteria	and	four	complementary	ones.		
The	 main	 criteria	 are,	 first,	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 a	 discourse	 takes	
‘industrialism’	 as	 given	 (meaning	 “the	 long	dominant	 discourse	 of	 industrial	 society”	
[p.	 12]	 and	 its	 drive	 towards	 producing	 goods	 and	 services	 as	 part	 of	 what	 is	
considered	the	most	desirable	achievement	for	society)		and,	second,	the	character	of	
alternatives	 proposed,	 which	 can	 be	 either	 ‘prosaic’	 or	 ‘imaginative’.	 Prosaic	
alternatives	 propose	 to	 solve	 problems	 but	 do	 not	 point	 to	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 society.	
Imaginative	 alternatives,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 “seek	 to	 redefine	 the	 chessboard”	 and	
“may	 dissolve	 old	 dilemmas,	 treating	 environmental	 concerns	 not	 in	 opposition	 to	
economic	ones,	but	potentially	in	harmony	[with	them]”	(p.15).		
The	 four	complementary	criteria	are:	 (i)	 ‘basic	entities	whose	existence	 is	
recognized	or	 constructed’,	 (ii)	 ‘assumptions	about	natural	 relationships’,	 (iii)	 ‘agents	
and	their	motives’,	and	(iv)	 ‘key	metaphors	and	other	rhetorical	devices’	 (see	table	1	
for	a	summary	of	Dryzek’s	checklist	for	the	identification	of	environmental	discourses).	
	
Table	6	-	Summary	of	Dryzek’s	Checklist	of	Elements	for	the	Analysis	of	Environmental	Discourses	
1.	The	degree	to	which	a	discourse	takes	‘industrialism’	as	given	
(reformist	or	radical	axis)	
2.	The	type	of	alternatives	proposed	
(prosaic	or	imaginative	axis)	
3.	Basic	entities	
4.	Assumptions	about	natural	relationships	
5.	Agents	and	their	motives	
6.	Key	metaphors	and	other	rhetorical	devices	
Source:	Inspired	by	Dryzek	(2013)	
	
																																								 																				
26	 Thus,	 although	 the	 resulting	 theoretical	 framework	 can	 be	 used	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 other	 contexts,	
table	2	presents	an	application	that	is	specific	to	the	Brazilian	context.	
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The	 ‘basic	 entities	 whose	 existence	 is	 recognised	 and	 constructed’	 are	
referred	 to	 by	Dryzek	 (1988;	 2013)	 as	 the	 ‘ontology’	 of	 a	 discourse.	 Entities	 such	 as	
ecosystem	 (which	 are	 recognised	 by	 some	 actors	 but	 not	 by	 all),	 different	
interpretations	of	human	motivation	(rational,	egoistic,	compassionate,	etc.)	and	levels	
of	 analysis	 (states,	 populations,	 gender)	 are	 some	 examples	 of	 these	 basic	 entities.	
When	Dryzek	presents	 the	 analysis	 of	 discourses,	 however,	 the	entities	he	 identifies	
are	as	heterogeneous	as	‘finite	stocks	of	resources’,	‘nature	as	a	brute	matter’,	‘liberal	
capitalism’	 and	 ‘markets’.	 The	 lack	 of	 pre-defined	 entities	 to	 look	 for	 in	 this	 thesis	
hindered	 comparability	 between	 discourses	 and	 made	 the	 replicability	 of	 coding	 a	
daunting	 task.	 In	order	 to	 address	 this	difficulty	 and	 render	 this	 category	of	 analysis	
comparable	 and	 replicable,	 insights	 from	Cultural	 Theory	 have	 been	 used	 to	 restrict	
the	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘ontology’	 of	 environmental	 discourse	 to	 four	 specific	 ‘views	 of	
nature’.		
‘Views	 of	 nature’,	 ‘myths	 of	 nature’	 or	 ‘interpretations	 about	 ecosystem	
stability’	refer	to	an	analytical	category	originally	developed	by	ecologists	who	studied	
the	 reactions	 of	 different	 ecosystem-managing	 institutions	 to	 certain	 situations	
(Holling,	1979;	Schwarz	and	Thompson,	1990;	Forsyth,	2003).	Inspired	by	the	work	of	
Mary	 Douglas	 on	 Cultural	 Theory	 (1982),	 these	 authors	 categorised	 the	 ‘myths	 of	
nature’	 as	 capricious,	 tolerant,	 benign	 and	 ephemeral.	 Nature	 as	 capricious	 comes	
from	the	fatalist	orientation	in	Cultural	Theory,	in	which	world	events	and	relationships	
are	seen	as	random.	There	 is	no	point,	no	 logic	and	no	 learning	 involved	 in	 trying	to	
manage	 the	environment,	as	 changes	will	occur	 regardless	of	any	human	attempt	at	
control.	 A	 tolerant	 (also	 known	 as	perverse)	perspective	 acknowledges	 that	humans	
can	interfere	with,	and	alter	the	balance	of,	the	environment	without	risk,	but	only	up	
to	a	certain	point.	After	a	certain	threshold	of	interference	there	can	be	no	return	to	
equilibrium,	so	society	should	aim	to	establish	rules	that	prevent	this	threshold	being	
passed.	 This	 perspective	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘hierarchy’	 in	 Cultural	
Theory,	 which	 suggests	 centralised	 control	 of	 behaviour	 by	 an	 authority.	 Nature	 as	
ephemeral	 describes	 nature	 as	 fragile	 and	 susceptible	 to	 major	 and	 possibly	
permanent	 changes.	 It	 presupposes	 a	 very	 cautious	 attitude	 towards	 environmental	
changes	 and	 degradation,	 involving	 all	 actors	 potentially	 affected	 (‘egalitarian’	 in	
Cultural	 Theory	 terms)	 because	 everyone’s	 potential	 to	 alter	 the	 equilibrium	 is	 very	
high.	Nature	as	benign	 is	the	opposite	of	nature	as	ephemeral.	 In	this	view,	nature	 is	
61	
	
resilient	 enough	 to	 be	 subjected	 to	 practically	 any	 human	 interference	 without	 its	
overall	 equilibrium	 being	 jeopardised.	 This	 understanding	 implies	 an	 ‘individualist’	
mode	 of	 social	 organisation	 according	 to	 which	 everyone	 pursues	 their	 interests	
without	the	need	to	consider	the	whole	(Schwarz	and	Thompson,	1990;	Forsyth,	2003).		
The	 graphical	 representation	of	 these	 views	 is	 presented	 in	 figure	 2.	 The	
line	represents	nature’s	limits	and	the	sphere’s	potential	movements	stand	for	human	
interference,	which	 is	 seen	 to	 alter	 environmental	 equilibrium	 in	different	ways.	 For	
instance,	 in	 the	perverse/tolerant	 view	 of	 nature,	 human	 interference	must	 reach	 a	
certain	threshold	before	ecological	balance	is	completely	destroyed.	In	the	ephemeral	
view	 of	 nature,	 the	 balance	 is	 very	 unstable	 and	 minimal	 interference	 might	 cause	
irreversible	consequences.	In	benign	nature	we	have	the	opposite	perspective,	while	in	
capricious	 nature	 it	 does	 not	 really	 matter	 how	 humans	 interfere	 with	 the	
environment,	as	it	is	unpredictable	how	it	would	affect	ecological	equilibrium.	
	
	
Figure	2	-	The	Myths	of	Nature	
Source:	Adapted	from	Schwarz	and	Thompson,	1990,	p.5	
	
Regarding	 ‘assumptions	 about	 natural	 relationships’,	 Dryzek	 (2013,	 p.18)	
observes	 that	 “all	discourse	embodies	notions	of	what	 is	natural	 in	 the	 relationships	
among	 entities”	 –	 which	 may	 comprise	 humans	 or	 natural	 environments.	 Dryzek	
mentions	 competition,	 cooperation	 and	 hierarchy	 as	 possible	 natural	 relationship	
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assumptions.	In	order	to	further	specify	and	facilitate	comparability	across	cases	I	have	
divided	this	criterion	into	two	further	criteria.	First,	the	relationship	between	humans	
and	 nature,	 and	 second,	 relationships	 between	 humans.	 Drawing	 inspiration	 from	
Cultural	 Theory	 (which	 is	 close	 to	 Dryzek’s	 categories),	 four	 codification	 possibilities	
are	 attributed	 to	 these	 two	 sub-criteria:	 hierarchical	 relations,	 cooperative	 relations,	
competitive	 relations	 and	 fatalistic/accepting	 relations.	 The	 observable	 implications	
emerging	from	each	of	these	categories	will	be	described	in	section	3,	which	will	deal	
with	the	identification	of	each	specific	discourse.	
The	third	complementary	criterion	of	analysis	advanced	by	Dryzek	(2013)	is	
‘agents	 and	 their	motives’.	 Contrary	 to	what	 the	 name	might	 suggest,	 this	 category	
does	not	refer	to	those	who	actively	participate	 in	a	debate,	but	 it	 is	defined	as	how	
individuals	and	collectivities,	human	and	nonhuman	actors,	are	portrayed	 in	debates	
and	the	way	in	which	their	motivations	are	seen.	In	order	to	endow	this	criterion	with	
more	 empirical	 utility	 and	 allow	 for	 higher	 levels	 of	 comparability	 between	 cases,	 it	
was	 operationalised	 through	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘characters’	 provided	 by	 the	Narrative	
Policy	 Framework,	 which	 involves	 an	 analysis	 of	 whether	 actors	 are	 described	 as	
villains,	 victims	 or	 heroes	 in	 other	 actors’	 narratives.	 The	 identification	 of	 similar	
villains,	victims	and	heroes	by	different	actors	will	be	interpreted	as	a	sign	that	these	
actors	are	employing	the	same	conceptions	in	terms	of	‘agents	and	their	motives’.			
Finally,	 the	 fourth	 criterion	proposed	by	Dryzek	 (2013)	 is	 ‘key	metaphors	
and	other	 rhetorical	devices’,	meaning	 figures	of	 speech	used	as	 “rhetorical	devices,	
deployed	 to	 convince	 listeners	or	 readers	by	putting	a	 situation	 in	a	particular	 light”	
(Dryzek,	 2013,	 pp.	 17–19).	 The	 main	 metaphors	 expected	 to	 be	 present	 in	 each	
discourse	 is	briefly	presented	 in	table	7.	Their	 identification	was	 inductive	and	based	
on	empirical	data	and	secondary	literature	analysis.	The	identification	process	for	this	
and	the	other	six	categories	in	table	7	is	described	and	justified	in	the	next	section.	
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Table	7	-	Ideology	Frame	of	Brazilian	Environmental	Narratives	
	
Source:	Produced	by	the	Author	
	
	
	3.3.	The	Four	Discourses	
This	 section	describes	 the	main	 characteristics	 and	history	of	each	of	 the	
four	discourses	identified,	and	supports	the	proposition	that	these	four	environmental	
discourses	 are	 and	 have	 been	 the	 main	 environmental	 discourses	 in	 the	 history	 of	
Brazilian	 environmental	 debates.	 It	 maintains	 that	 these	 four	 patterns	 are	 a	 jointly	
exhaustive	 and	 mutually	 exclusive	 list	 of	 the	 main	 perspectives	 in	 Brazilian	
environmental	 debates	 past	 and	 present.	 Their	 mutual	 exclusivity,	 however,	 refers	
only	 to	specific	arguments,	meaning	 that	 it	 is	practically	 impossible	 to	accommodate	
two	different	 types	of	discourses	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 same	argument	and	preserve	
coherence.	 Although	 actors	 can	 still	 adopt	 different	 discourses	 under	 different	
circumstances,	 it	 was	 observed	 during	 the	 analysis	 of	 National	 Congress	 debates	
(between	 2005	 and	 2015),	 interviews	 and	 media	 publications	 that	 the	 majority	 of	
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actors	 tended	 to	 maintain	 coherence	 and,	 when	 they	 did	 not,	 their	 predominant	
positions	 (or	 ‘policy	 core	policy	preferences’)	 could	 still	be	 inferred	 so	 they	could	be	
categorised	into	coalitions27.		
As	noted	by	Hochstetler	and	Keck	 (2007;	25%	Chapter	2,	 Introduction,	e-
book),	there	were	three	distinct	waves	or	defining	periods	of	Brazilian	environmental	
movements.	 The	 first	 occurred	 is	 the	 ‘developmentalist’	 period	 (described	 below),	
which	 lasted	 from	 the	 early	 1950s	 to	 the	 early	 1970s,	 and	 gave	 rise	 to	 the	 first	
conservation	 organisations	 and	 environmental	 research	 institutions.	 The	 first	
environmental	 organisations	 were	 commonly	 attached	 to	 a	 ‘preservationist’28	
perspective	of	conservation,	meaning	that	they	based	their	activities	on	the	view	that	
‘set-asides	 were	 the	 safest	 way	 to	 conserve	 the	 nation’s	 environmental	 heritage’	
(Hochstetler	and	Keck,	2007;	26%	Chapter	2,	Section	2,	e-book).		
This	 initial	 ‘preservationist’	 group	was	 joined	 by	 (or	 changed	 to)	 a	more	
politicised	group	that	emerged	during	the	period	of	political	liberalisation	that	began	in	
the	1970s	and	continued	until	the	late	1980s.	The	emergence	of	this	second	wave	of	
Brazilian	 environmentalism,	 as	will	 be	described	 in	more	detail	 in	 the	 following	 sub-
sections,	 cannot	be	detached	 from	the	broader	 context	of	 the	 re-democratization	of	
the	 country,	 characterised	 by	 demands	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 environmental	 concerns	
and	 representatives	 in	 formal	politics.	 The	 success	of	 this	 group	 in	 gaining	 access	 to	
electoral	politics	paved	the	way	for	the	emergence	of	a	third	group	in	the	90s,	which	
emphasised	the	idea	of	social	justice	in	environmental	policies	and	has	become	known	
as	 the	 ‘socio-environmentalist’	 movement	 (Hochstetler	 and	 Keck,	 2007,	 Chapter	 4,	
																																								 																				
27	 For	 example,	 the	 two	 most	 similar	 ideologies	 identified	 –	 preservationism	 and	 socio-
environmentalism	–	both	of	which	are	radical	discourses	according	to	Dryzek’s	 (2013)	characterisation	
(i.e.	that	oppose	industrialism),	cannot	be	mutually	supported	in	the	same	kind	of	policy	argument	due	
to	 the	 fundamental	 differences	 in	 their	 assumptions	 about	 natural	 relationships.	 While	 the	 former	
perspective	 does	 not	 support	 the	 domination	 of	 nature	 by	 humans	 (due	 to	 its	 strict	 egalitarian	
perception	 of	 this	 relationship)	 and	 would,	 therefore,	 advocate	 the	 non-interference	 in	 nature,	 the	
latter	would	assume	some	level	of	human	domination	through	the	use	and	steering	of	nature.	Similarly,	
while	the	first	view	places	a	much	larger	emphasis	on	the	role	of	science	and	experts	in	the	relationship	
among	humans,	the	second	would	not	accept	a	hierarchical	social	organisation.	Thus,	if	an	actor	argues,	
for	example,	that	parks	shall	be	closed	for	research	and	touristic	appreciation,	it	becomes	very	unlikely	
that	 s/he	will	 also	 be	 able	 to	 simultaneously	 defend	 communitarian	management	 and	 use	 of	 natural	
resources	and	so	on.	Therefore,	at	the	level	of	specific	arguments,	these	views	are	mutually	exclusive.	
28		The	terms	in	inverted	commas	are	a	literal	reproduction	of	these	authors’	terms	and	are	used	for	the	
labelling	of	the	discourses	identified	in	this	chapter.	
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section	10,	60%	e-book).	The	timeline	in	figure	3	provides	a	historical	overview	of	the	
predominant	discourses	throughout	the	history	of	Brazilian	environmental	politics29.	
	Figure	 3,	 represents,	 therefore,	 this	 thesis’	 systematisation	 and	
interpretation	 of	 the	 literature	 and	 data	 on	 the	 history	 of	 Brazilian	 environmental	
discourses.	 It	relies	on	the	discursive	features	 identified	 in	the	theoretical	framework	
presented	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 (which	 merges	 theoretical	 considerations	 from	
Dryzek,	Cultural	Theory	and	the	Narrative	Policy	Framework)	and	applies	them	to	the	
Brazilian	context	 through	an	analysis	of	 secondary	 literature	 (mainly	Hochstetler	and	
Keck,	 2007)	 and	 empirical	 data	 (interviews,	 analysis	 of	 debates	 in	 the	 National	
Congress	and	in	the	media).	These	findings	are	explained	in	detail	in	the	following	four	
subsections,	which	cover	each	discourse	and	their	histories	in	Brazilian	environmental	
debates	 (and	 also	 in	 section	 7.2	 of	 chapter	 7,	 which	 focuses	 on	 justifying	 the	
identification	 of	 winning	 and	 losing	 coalitions).	 The	 shifting	 dominance	 of	 these	
discourses	 was	 found	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 political	 changes,	 international	 pressures	 and	
treaties,	 disappointment	 effects	 (for	 example,	 with	 the	 recommendations	 and	
conditionality	 of	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 IMF)	 	 and/or	 economic	
changes	(such	as	commodity	booms).	
	
	
Figure	3	-	Dominance	of	Discourses	in	Brazilian	Environmental	Politics	
Source:	Produced	by	the	Author	
	
	
3.3.1.	Neo-developmentalism	
Neo-developmentalism	 is	 a	 discourse	 that	 takes	 industrialism	 as	 given	 (a	
reformist	 discourse	 in	Dryzek’s	 terms)	and	 sees	economic	development	as	a	priority,	
even	 though	 environmental	 balance	may	 be	 impaired	 in	 the	 process	 of	 securing	 it.	
																																								 																				
29	Although	administrative	economic	 rationalists	were	not	 found	 to	predominate	at	 any	 specific	 time,	
they	 have	 been	 part	 of	 debates	 since	 at	 least	 the	 early	 90s	 and	 have	 markedly	 influenced	 the	
environmental	 administration	 of	 Dilma’s	 government	 between	 2010	 and	 2016	 (especially	 the	 guiding	
principles	of	the	Ministry	of	Environment).	
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Because	environmental	damage	is	not	seen	as	an	important	problem,	if	solutions	are	
proposed	to	tackle	 it,	 they	tend	to	be	prosaic,	proposing	no	drastic	changes	to	social	
organisation.	It	is	associated	with	a	‘Promethean’	environmental	perspective	according	
to	which	“there	 is	nothing	wrong	with	projecting	economic	growth	 into	an	 indefinite	
future”	 (Dryzek,	2013,	p.	54).	Another	characteristic	of	 this	paradigm	 is	 the	denial	of	
nature	 and	ecosystems	as	 relevant	 factors	 in	 the	 formulation	of	 policies,	 apart	 from	
their	 role	 as	 a	 “store	 of	 matter	 and	 energy”	 (Dryzek,	 2013,	 p.	 59).	 This	 discourse	
portrays,	 therefore,	 a	 benign	 view	 of	 nature,	 as	 the	 indefinite	 continuation	 of	
economic	development	 is	not	perceived	 to	 irreversibly	affect	ecological	balance.	The	
relationship	 between	 humanity	 and	 nature	 is	 hierarchical,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	
domination	of	the	latter	by	the	former	is	the	standard	view,	but	human	relationships	
are	 perceived	 as	 competitive	 because	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 resources	 and	 the	 need	 to	
continue	increasing	economic	development	indefinitely.	Among	the	rhetorical	devices	
and	 key	 metaphors	 used	 in	 this	 discourse	 (as	 identified	 during	 the	 historical	 and	
content	 analysis)	 are	 progress,	modernity,	 national	 self-sufficiency	 and	 self-assertion	
(national	pride),	pragmatism	in	achieving	economic	development,	the	civilizing	mission	
of	 those	 who	 promote	 development,	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 protecting	 and	
guaranteeing	property	rights	and	complete	freedom	in	the	use	of	property	(especially	
land).	
This	 discourse	 is	 rooted	 in	 Brazil’s	 colonial	 past.	 During	 colonial	 times,	
development	 was	 understood	 as	 the	 exploitation,	 by	 European	 countries,	 of	 the	
resources	 of	 the	 non-European	 world	 (Wallerstein,	 2005).	 After	 World	 War	 Two,	
however,	the	strengthening	of	anticolonial	movements	in	Asia	and	Africa	and	renewed	
nationalist	 sentiment	 in	 Latin	 America	 (see	 Franco	 and	 Drummond,	 2009,	 on	 the	
origins	 of	 nationalism	 in	 Brazil),	 led	 to	 ‘development’	 being	 seen	 as	 something	 for	
countries	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘global	 South’	 to	 pursue	 themselves,	 in	 a	 self-assertion	 of	
their	 political	 and	 economic	maturity	 and	 capacity.	 The	 central	 idea	 underlying	 this	
new	perspective	was	 that,	 if	 the	 right	policies	were	adopted,	 countries	of	 the	global	
South	would	be	able	to	equal	the	levels	of	technological	modernisation	and	wealth	of	
the	countries	of	the	North	(Wallerstein,	2005).	Based	on	this	specific	understanding	of	
‘development’	 as	 the	 achievement	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 technological	 standards	
comparable	to	those	of	the	North,	a	comprehensive	corpus	of	academic	literature	was	
produced	 by	 Latin	 America.	 These	 works	 advanced	 several	 economic	 and	 political	
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prescriptions	 on	 how	 to	 achieve	 ‘development’	 and	 generated	 a	 school	 of	 thought	
often	referred	to	as	‘developmentalism’.		
In	 Brazil,	 the	 political	 implementation	 of	 this	 view	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	
policies	 implemented	 by	 President	 Getulio	 Vargas	 during	 his	 first	 mandate	 (which	
began	 in	1930).	Vargas’	signature	policies	consisted	 in	the	promotion	of	state-owned	
companies	 and	 import-substitution	 industrialisation.	 These	 policies	 and	 the	 goals	
underpinning	them	were	later	systematised	as	a	coherent	economic	model	by	a	group	
of	scholars	from	the	United	Nations	Economic	Commission	for	Latin	America	(ECLAC	or	
CEPAL)	 in	1949.	During	his	period	at	CEPAL,	 the	distinguished	Argentinian	economist	
Raul	 Prebisch	 laid	 the	 foundation	 for	 a	 structuralist	 account	 of	 how	 Latin	 America	
would	achieve	development.	According	to	him,	the	structure	of	the	global	markets	–	in	
which	 countries	 at	 the	 'core'	 export	 manufactured	 products	 to	 countries	 on	 the	
'periphery',	which	usually	specialise	in	the	production	of	primary	products	–	generates	
persistent	inequality.	The	proposed	solution	for	this	structural	problem	was	a	change	
in	 the	 profile	 of	 exports	 by	 peripheral	 countries,	 through	 a	 policy	 of	 import-
substitution	 industrialisation.	 The	 interventionist	 and	 centralising	 state	 required	 to	
implement	this	policy	was	supposed	to	actively	create	national	companies	and	directly	
promote	the	development	of	technology	and	competition	to	free	developing	countries	
from	having	to	import	technology-intensive	goods.30	
Although	 the	 developmentalist	 perspective	 has	 been	 considerably	
influential	since	its	creation	in	the	early	50s	and	throughout	the	entire	military	period	
(1964–1986)	it	did	not	survive	the	historical	and	economic	changes	of	the	1980s.	These	
included	the	exhaustion	of	the	import-substitution	industrialization	model	(due	to	the	
fact	 that	 the	 excessive	 support	 was	 impeding	 the	 development	 of	 internationally-
competitive	 companies	 in	 Brazil),	 a	 huge	 foreign	 debt	 crisis,	 an	 inflation	 boom,	 the	
ascension	 of	 neoliberal	 ideas	 associated	 with	 the	 ‘Washington	 Consensus’,	 and	 the	
increasing	dependency	of	the	Brazilian	economy	on	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	
																																								 																				
30	 Prebisch	 and	 other	 scholars	 from	 CEPAL	 (such	 as	 Furtado	 and	 Anibal	 Pinto)	 inspired	 a	 group	 of	
scholars	 who	 later	 created	 the	 Latin	 American	 structuralist	 tenet	 of	 ‘dependency	 theory’,	 strongly	
influencing	Brazilian	political	 and	academic	 circles.	 Formed	by	 important	names	of	Brazilian	 academic	
(and	 in	 some	 cases	 political)	 history	 such	 as	 Fernando	 Henrique	 Cardoso	 (former	 president	 of	 the	
country	 from	1995	until	 2003);	 Enzo	 Faletto,	Maria	 Conceição	 Tavares,	 José	 Serra,	 Cardoso	de	Mello,	
Osvaldo	 Sunkel	 and	 Francisco	 Oliveira	 (the	 ‘dependentistas’	 as	 they	 are	 often	 referred	 to)	 helped	 to	
bring	the	enhancement	of	systemic	competitiveness	 in	 international	markets	to	the	centre	of	Brazilian	
political	agenda	(Vernengo,	2004).		
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loans	 (Bresser-Pereira,	 2009).	 These	 factors	 led	 to	 a	 marked	 change	 in	 the	
predominant	development	model	adopted	in	the	country,	which,	during	that	decade,	
shifted	from	the	‘national-developmentalism’	strategy	of	strong	state	interventionism	
to	a	more	hands-off	approach	(Bresser-Pereira,	2009).		
In	the	2000s,	however,	 it	has	been	argued	that	predominant	political	and	
economic	ideologies	changed	again	(Trubek	et	al.,	2014).	After	more	than	30	years	of	
unsatisfactory	results	from	the	neoliberal	consensus	for	Latin	American	countries,	and	
in	 face	 of	 renewed	 economic	 autonomy	 from	 international	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	
IMF,	 neoliberal	 paradigms	 started	 to	 lose	 their	 grip.	 In	 this	 context,	 studies	 have	
highlighted	 changes	 in	 Brazilian	 economic	 policies	 and	 the	 ideological	 orientation	 of	
the	government	since	the	second	mandate	of	President	Lula	(2007–2010)	(i.e.	Bresser-
Pereira,	 2009;	 Panizza,	 2013).	 These	 changes,	 which	 might	 also	 be	 related	 to	 the	
establishment/consolidation	of	 the	Workers’	 Party	 (traditionally	 an	opposition	party)	
in	power,	which	have	been	commonly	interpreted	in	the	literature	as	bringing	to	light	a	
new	 development	 model,	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘neo-developmentalism’	 (in	 a	 clear	
reference	 to	 the	 afore-mentioned	 Prebisch-inspired	 school	 of	 developmentalists)31	
(Trubek	et	al.,	2014).	
Similar	 to	 the	 original	 national-developmentalism,	 the	 developmentalism	
of	the	twenty-first	century	(or	 ‘neo-developmentalism’,	as	 it	will	be	called	hereafter),	
also	 focuses	 on	 state	 intervention	with	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 enhancing	 the	 country’s	
competitiveness	 in	 international	 markets.	 The	 new	 model,	 however,	 promotes	 a	
growth	 strategy	 largely	 reliant	 on	 exports	 of	 commodities	 and	 founded	 on	 the	
perspective	that	states	should	be	heavily	 interventionist	but	not	become	a	substitute	
for	the	market	(as	in	the	previous	type	of	developmentalism).	States	should,	therefore,	
simply	aim	to	help	markets	by	removing	structural	barriers	to	growth	(Trubek,	2014).	
Accordingly,	 market	 opportunities	 ought	 to	 be	 expanded	 by	 stimulating	 research,	
facilitating	 exports,	 promoting	 public-private	 partnerships	 and	 removing	 legal	 and	
economic	barriers	to	market	expansion.			
																																								 																				
31	This	new	political	orientation	is	not	exclusive	to	Latin	American	countries,	and	has	also	been	described	
to	refer	to	other	developing	countries	as	 'new	developmental	state'	or	 '	state	capitalism',	defined	as	a	
'system	 in	 which	 the	 state	 functions	 as	 the	 leading	 economic	 actor	 and	 uses	 markets	 primarily	 for	
political	gain.'	(Bremmer,	2009).	
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In	 the	 operation	 of	 this	 new	paradigm,	 some	 economic	 precepts	 such	 as	
central	bank	independence	and	inflation	targets	are	combined	with	state	support	to	a	
few	 national	 champions	 in	 strategic	 areas	 (chiefly	 energy	 production)	 and	 an	
expressive	 infusion	 of	 resources	 from	 national	 development	 banks	 (such	 as	 the	
Brazilian	Development	 Bank	 [BNDES])	 in	 large	 infrastructure	 projects.	 Additionally,	 a	
heightened	focus	on	direct	cash	redistribution	programmes	(such	as	‘Bolsa	Família’	or	
family	stipend	in	English)	is	a	crucial	aspect	of	the	new	model,	which	has	given	rise	to	
the	oft-mentioned	‘new	middle	class’	 in	Brazil,	which	has	been	used	to	legitimise	the	
adoption	of	this	new	paradigm	(Trubek,	2014).	Finally,	similarly	to	the	previous	model,	
it	 features	a	strong	rhetorical	component,	which	argues	 in	 favour	of	nationalism	and	
self-assertiveness	 against	 foreign	 interferences	 in	 pursuit	 of	 development	 (Bresser-
Pereira,	2009).		
The	 ideological	 enthusiasm	 and	 governmental	 reinforcement	 of	 this	 neo-
developmentalist	 paradigm	 cannot,	 however,	 be	 detached	 from	 the	 circumstances	
from	 which	 they	 emerged.	 The	 2008	 world	 economic	 crisis	 has	 turned	 inelastic	
commodity	exports	into	a	safe	and	extremely	lucrative	trade	alternative,	especially	for	
countries	with	natural	comparative	advantages	such	as	Brazil.	Also	incentivised	by	the	
increasing	 demand	 of	 the	 Chinese	market,	 commodity	 prices	went	 through	 a	 boom	
around	2010,	directly	benefiting	countries	such	as	Brazil,	which	were	suddenly	flooded	
with	unexpectedly	large	amounts	of	international	currency.	This	change	in	commodity	
exports	 was,	 therefore,	 a	 crucial	 external	 event	 underpinning	 the	 predominance	 of	
neo-developmentalist	discourse	at	this	time.	It	increased	the	power	of	the	agribusiness	
sector,	competition	for	natural	resources	(such	as	land,	wood,	water,	minerals)	and	led	
to	 the	 intensification	 of	 environmental	 conflicts	 (see	 section	 2	 of	 chapter	 7	 for	 a	
detailed	 description	 of	 this	 external	 event).	 It	 was	 found,	 moreover,	 that	 the	
‘fetishization	 of	 development’	 (Dirlik,	 2014)	 that	 accompanies	 neo-developmentalist	
thought	 has	 resulted	 in	 lower	 priority	 being	 given	 to	 environmental	 topics	 in	
government	agendas	(interviews	18,	37,	46),	a	move	that	can	also	be	linked	to	the	so-
called	 ‘roll-back’	 in	environmental	 standards	 for	which	 the	case	 studies	 in	 this	 thesis	
provide	support	(Lima	and	Garcia,	2014,	p.	273).32		
	
																																								 																				
32	The	case	studies	in	this	thesis	will	be	used	to	qualify	and	discuss	this	argument	in	further	detail.	
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3.3.2.	Preservationism	(Deep	Ecology)	
Preservationism	is	the	view	that	the	conservation	of	natural	resources	has	
intrinsic	 value	 and	 must	 be	 pursued	 against	 all	 odds.	 It	 is	 a	 radical	 discourse	 as	 it	
directly	 opposes	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘industrialism	as	 given’	 and	 imaginative	as	 its	 proposed	
alternatives	to	current	reality	 imply	drastic	changes	 in	the	contemporary	relationship	
between	 humanity	 and	 nature.	 Its	 view	 of	 nature	 is	 ephemeral	 because	 nature	 is	
perceived	 as	 an	 extremely	 unstable	 equilibrium,	 which	 a	 minimum	 of	 human	
interference	can	change	 irreversibly.	The	 relationship	between	humans	and	nature	 is	
marked	by	egalitarianism	 centred	on	the	notion	of	 ‘biocentric	equality’,	according	to	
which	 all	 species	 have	 intrinsic	 value	 and	 which	 criticises	 the	 ‘anthropocentric	
arrogance’	of	considering	humans	superior	to	any	other	species.	It	also	promotes	‘self-
realisation’,	 meaning	 the	 “identification	 with	 a	 larger	 organic	 ‘Self’	 beyond	 the	
individual	person”,	which	also	points	to	an	egalitarian	view	of	the	relationship	between	
humanity	and	nature	(Dryzek,	2013,	pp.	187–188).	The	relationship	among	humans,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 strong	 reliance	 on	 the	 authority	 of	 scientific	
knowledge	 and	 is	 therefore	hierarchical.	 The	 rhetorical	 devices	 characteristic	 of	 this	
discourse	 invoke	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency,	 catastrophe	 and	 are	 frequently	 based	 on	
passionate	personal	stories	to	do	with	the	relationship	between	humanity	and	nature.	
In	 practical	 terms,	 preservationists	 defend	 an	 agenda	 of	 preserving,	 expanding	 and	
protecting	wilderness	areas	from	the	perceived	deleterious	influence	of	humans.		
Preservationism	 began	 to	 gain	 relevance	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	
debates	 in	 the	1950s	 (Hochstetler	 and	Keck,	 2007).	 This	 first	wave	of	 environmental	
movements	was	a	reaction	to	the	developmentalist	notion	prevalent	up	to	that	period,	
but	 was	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	 international	 context	 in	 which	 ‘deep	 ecology’33	
movements	had	emerged.	The	international	influence	of	deep	ecology	movements	on	
Brazilian	 environmental	 leaders	 started	 to	 materialise	 with	 trainings	 promoted	 by	
agencies	 such	 as	 USAID	 in	 the	 1970s.	 The	 influx	 of	 deep	 ecological	 thought	 was	
reinforced	in	the	south	of	Brazil	by	scholarship	programs	and	debates	promoted	by	the	
Association	of	Ex-Scholarship	Holders,	whose	members	had	returned	from	scholarships	
																																								 																				
33	 Deep	 ecology	is	 a	 term	 coined	 by	 the	 philosopher	Arne	 Næss	in	 1973.	 It	 refers	 to	 an	
ecological	movement	 that	 maintains	 that	 all	 living	 beings	 are	 inherently	 worthy,	 regardless	 of	 their	
utility	to	humans.	It	proposes,	therefore,	a	restructuration	of	society	according	to	this	perspective.	
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in	 Germany;	 by	 the	 international	 Rotary	 Club	 and	 by	 the	 return	 of	 Brazilian	 exiles,	
mainly	from	Europe,	at	the	end	of	the	1970s	(Hochstetler	and	Keck,	2007,	25%	eBook).		
The	 first	 deep	 ecology	 organisations	 in	 Brazil	 were	 consolidated	 shortly	
before	the	military	coup	(1986).	These	organisations	did	not	undertake	high	 levels	of	
public	 exposition	 and	 activism	 (possibly	 due	 to	 the	 political	 context	 of	 the	 military	
regime)	but	strongly	relied	on	scientific	research	as	their	main	persuasion	strategy.	The	
organisations	 themselves	 were	 mainly	 composed	 of	 scientists.34	 Additionally,	 ‘the	
language	of	 science’	used	by	 representatives	of	 this	perspective	“resonated	with	 the	
technocratic	 and	 modernizing	 orientations	 of	 developmentalist	 governments	 of	 the	
time”,	 which	might	 have	 helped	 the	 group	 to	 gain	 credibility	 in	 the	military	 regime	
(Hochstetler	and	Keck,	2007,	26%).	The	hierarchical	perception	in	terms	of	humanity’s	
relationship	 with	 nature	 is,	 thus,	 similar	 to	 the	 developmentalist	 tradition,	 which	
strongly	 values	 technocratic	 and	 modernising	 initiatives.	 This	 fact	 favoured	 many	
instances	of	cooperation	between	developmentalist	governments	and	preservationist	
groups	 in	Brazil,	 such	as	 in	closing	 large	areas	of	 land	 (parks)	both	 to	protect	nature	
and	assure	territorial	sovereignty	and	national	defence	(Foresta,	1991).	
	
3.3.3.	Socio-environmentalism	
Socio-environmentalism	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 a	
particularly	 Brazilian	 environmental	 perspective	 (Santilli,	 2005;	 Inoue	 and	 Franchini,	
2014).	 Largely	 associated	 with	 social	 justice	 (which	 was	 strongly	 incorporated	 into	
Brazilian	social	movements	during	the	redemocratization),	this	discourse	advances	the	
idea	that	ecological	and	social	sustainability	cannot	be	promoted	separately	(Inoue	and	
Franchini,	2014,	p.12).	Its	main	message,	therefore,	is	that	the	protection	of	the	rights	
of	traditional	and	indigenous	communities,	as	well	as	of	small	farmers35	is	the	pathway	
towards	sustainability.	Its	view	of	industrialism	is	radical	and	the	alternatives	proposed	
are	 imaginative	because	this	discourse	values	 traditional	 forms	of	social	organisation	
over	industrialism	for	the	protection	of	the	environment.	The	view	of	nature	espoused	
																																								 																				
34	 Such	 as	 the	 biologist	 Maria	 Tereza	 Jorge	 Padua	 (IBDF),	 the	 agronomist	 and	 bio-geographer	 Alceu	
Magnannini	(FBCN)	and	the	ecology	professor	and	natural	history	researcher	Paulo	Nogueira	Neto.	
35	 I	 argue	 that	 movements	 such	 as	 MST	 (Landless	 Workers’	 Movement)	 in	 Brazil,	 also	 adopted	 this	
perspective,	especially	in	relation	to	debates	about	empowering	small	farmers	through	the	maintenance	
of	 traditional	 practices	 (such	 as	 the	 use	 of	 seeds	 which	 are	 not	 genetically	 modified,	 and	 therefore	
generate	more	seeds	to	be	replanted)	and	agroecology.	
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by	 this	perspective	 is	capricious	because	 the	 focus	 is	on	 responding	and	adapting	 to	
(instead	 of	 actively	managing)	 environmental	 changes.	 Similar	 to	 the	 preservationist	
view	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 humanity	 and	 nature,	 socio-environmentalists	
consider	themselves	to	be	part	of	a	larger	whole	and	not	managers	of	nature,	implying	
a	 sense	 of	 equality.	 Relationships	 between	 humans	 is	 based	 on	 egalitarian	
assumptions,	 according	 to	 which	 everyone	 should	 participate	 in	 and	 contribute	 to	
social	 organisation.	 Among	 the	 main	 rhetorical	 devices	 of	 this	 discourse	 is	 the	
appreciation	of	alternative	social	 traditions,	which	approximate	Rousseau’s	notion	of	
the	 ‘noble	 savage’,	 symbolising	 innate	 goodness	 and	 purity	 not	 corrupted	 by	
civilisation.	The	ideas	of	social	networks	and	the	rule	of	the	people	are	also	featured.	
Accordingly,	 three	 broad	 principles	 or	 concepts	 provide	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 socio-
environmental	 tradition:	 ecological	 sustainability,	 social	 sustainability	 (the	 need	 to	
alleviate	 poverty	 and	 social	 inequality	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 nature)	 and,	 finally,	 the	
promotion	of	cultural	diversity	and	social	participation	 in	managing	 the	environment	
(Santilli,	2005).		
Although	 socio-environmentalism	has	many	 similarities	with	what	Dryzek	
(2013,	pp.	209–115)	has	named	 ‘social-ecology’	 and	 ‘environmentalism	of	 the	global	
poor’,	 the	 term	 socio-environmentalism	 will	 be	 used	 here	 in	 order	 to	 stress	 the	
particularities	of	the	Brazilian	version,	which	is	closely	linked	to	the	historical	moment	
of	democratisation	in	which	it	emerged	in	the	80s,	and	to	the	context	of	the	political	
organisation	of	 traditional	 rubber	tapper	communities	 in	 the	Amazon	rainforest.	This	
tradition	of	environmental	activism	emerged	in	Brazil	as	a	direct	reaction	to	exogenous	
and	 authoritarian	 projects	 implemented	 during	 the	 military	 period	 (Inoue	 and	
Franchini,	 2014),	 which	 were	 frequently	 associated,	 as	 pointed	 before,	 with	
preservationist	 perspectives36.	 Although	 science	 still	 played	 a	 relevant	 role	 for	many	
participants	 of	 the	 socio-environmentalist	 discourse,	 Hochstetler	 and	 Keck	 (2007)	
maintain	that	the	earlier	adherents	of	this	new	perspective	tended	to	reject	the	notion	
of	scientific	rationality,	and	focused	primarily	on	public	environmental	education	and	
awareness-raising	 campaigns.	 Additionally,	 three	 historical	 events	 are	 highlighted	 by	
these	authors	as	crucial	in	understanding	the	emergence	and	strength	acquired	by	this	
																																								 																				
36	 Preservationists,	 similarly	 to	 authoritarian	 regimes,	 also	 adopt	 a	 top-down	 conception	 of	 the	
organisation	of	territory.	The	idea	of	closing	large	parks	and	removing	those	living	there	was	positively	
seen	 by	 the	 adepts	 of	 both	 perspectives,	 even	 if	 the	 latter	 were	 concerned	 about	 sovereignty	 and	
territorial	protection,	and	the	former	were	interested	in	environmental	preservation.	
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movement.	The	first	is	the	end	of	the	military	dictatorship.	The	second	is	the	murder	of	
the	 environmental	 activist	 and	 rubber	 tapper	 Chico	 Mendes,	 an	 important	 political	
leader	 in	 the	 state	of	Acre	 in	 the	North	of	 the	 country,	 and,	 lastly,	 the	preparations	
preceding	 the	United	Nations	 Conference	 on	 Environment	 and	Development	 (or	 the	
Earth	 Summit)	 that	 took	 place	 in	 Rio	 de	 Janeiro	 in	 1992.	 The	way	 in	which	 each	 of	
these	 events	 impacted	 the	history	 of	 environmental	 discourses	 and	policies	 in	Brazil	
will	now	be	discussed	in	detail.	
	First,	 the	 opportunities	 for	 political	 participation	 arising	 from	 re-
democratisation	 allowed	 environmental	 groups	 to	 become	 formally	 involved	 in	 the	
process	of	elaborating	a	new	constitution	and	promote	environmental	 ideas	 through	
formal	politics37	(Hochstetler	and	Keck,	2007).	According	to	Cardoso	(1989),	these	new	
opportunities	for	participation	resulted	in	a	considerable	degree	of	popular	autonomy	
for	popular	movements	in	general,	a	new	phenomenon	in	the	country.	Because	of	the	
long	 history	 of	 clientelistic	 relations,	 which	 had	 dominated	 Brazilian	 politics,	 social	
movements	 of	 all	 types	 were	 united	 by	 a	 strong	 plea	 for	 social	 participation	 and	
environmental	 groups	were	no	exception.	Accordingly,	 “their	 rejection	of	 clientelism	
leads	them	to	affirm	both	the	independent	display	of	each	citizen’s	will	and	respect	for	
the	rights	of	the	poor	communities”	(Cardoso,	1989,	p.19).	
The	 second	 factor	 frequently	 associated	 with	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	
socio-environmentalist	 tradition	 in	Brazil	 is	 the	murder,	by	a	 cattle	 rancher,	of	Chico	
Mendes,	 a	 rubber	 tapper	 and	 activist	 for	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 ‘peoples	 from	 the	 forest’	
who	 had	 strong	 connections	 with	 international	 environmental	 organisations.	 The	
construction	 of	 roads,	 dams,	 and	 the	 expansion	 of	 farming	 in	 the	 Amazon	 region	
throughout	 the	 military	 period	 threatened	 the	 lifestyle	 of	 several	 indigenous	
communities	 and	 traditional	 populations	 whose	 subsistence	 was	 based	 on	 the	
extraction	of	forest	products.	These	groups	organised	a	social	movement	led	by	Chico	
Mendes	 –	 the	 ‘Alliance	 of	 the	 Peoples	 of	 the	 Forest’	 –	 in	 order	 to	 defend	 their	
																																								 																				
37	Two	environmental	groups	were	distinguishable	 in	 the	Brazilian	political	 scene	of	 the	80s.	The	 first,	
mainly	constituted	by	returned	exiles	from	Europe	who	had	been	inspired	by	the	ecological	ideas	of	the	
European	 Green	 Party,	 formed	 the	 Brazilian	 Green	 Party	 and	 chose	 to	 act	 in	 politics	 through	 an	
organised	party	 (although	they	also	considered	themselves	an	environmental	movement).	The	second	
group	objected	to	 the	 first	group’s	choice	 to	pursue	environmental	goals	 through	a	specific	party	and	
chose	to	advance	environmental	ideas	within	the	other	parties	or	through	lobbying.	This	second	group	
feared	 that	 associating	environmental	 goals	with	one	 specific	 party	 could	undermine	 the	 influence	of	
the	 movement	 and	 was	 also	 suspicious	 of	 the	 quality	 of	 Brazilian	 democracy	 in	 allowing	 new	 and	
‘counter-cultural’	parties	to	act	freely	on	the	political	stage.	
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traditional	 extractivist	 way	 of	 life	 and	 oppose	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 forest.	 This	
movement	 consistently	 promoted	 the	 ideas	 that	 the	 social	 and	 the	 environmental	
cannot	 be	 separated	 and	 that	 environmental	 protection	 is	 intimately	 connected	 to	
poverty	alleviation,	two	of	the	central	claims	of	socio-environmentalism.		
Mendes	 and	 his	 movement	 benefited	 from	 considerable	 international	
visibility	 during	 the	 80s,	 epitomised	 by	 the	 awarding	 of	 prizes	 such	 as	 the	 UNEP’s	
Global	 500	 Roll	 of	 Honour	 and	 the	 American	 Ecology	 Society	 Better	 Life	 award,	
conferred	 to	 Mendes	 in	 1987	 in	 recognition	 of	 his	 environmental	 achievements.	 In	
1988,	Mendes’	murder	by	 local	 farmers	who	opposed	his	pleas	further	 increased	the	
international	 visibility	 of	 Brazilian	 environmental	 situation38	 resulting	 in	 the	
strengthening	 of	 socio-environmentalist	 demands	 and	 fresh	 momentum	 for	
environmental	 legislation	 to	 be	 approved	 by	 the	 government.	 Additionally,	Mendes’	
movement	continued	through	the	leadership	of	Marina	Silva,	a	former	rubber	tapper	
and	close	ally	of	Mendes	who	was	later	appointed	by	President	Lula	as	environmental	
minister	 in	 2003	 (remaining	 environmental	 minister	 until	 2008,	 when	 internal	
governmental	 conflicts	 over	 the	 approval	 of	 infrastructure	 projects	 in	 the	 Amazon	
region	resulted	in	her	resignation).	
The	success	of	the	demands	and	of	the	discourse	advanced	by	the	Peoples	
of	the	Forest	Alliance	is	evidenced	by	several	pieces	of	new	environmental	legislation	
and	 policies	 enacted	 since	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	 movement.	 As	 remarked	 by	 Santilli	
(2005),	 a	 very	 restrictive,	 command-and-control	 tendency	 of	 the	 environmental	
legislation	 that	predominated	 in	Brazil	 before	 the	1990s	was	partially	 substituted	by	
more	 participatory	 and	 community-oriented	 laws	 after	 that	 decade.	 This	 change	 is	
epitomised	by	laws	such	as	the	Water	Resources	Law	(9.433/1997),	which	established	
the	requirement	that	management	of	water	resources	involve	communities	and	users,	
and	 the	 Law	 of	 the	 National	 System	 of	 Conservation	 Units	 (9.985/2000),	 which	
recognised	 ‘extractive	 reserves’	 as	 areas	 of	 sustainable	 use	 and	 conferred	 property	
rights	 to	 communities	 dependant	 on	 the	 extraction	 of	 natural	 resources	 such	 as	
rubber,	nuts	or	medicinal	plants	for	subsistence.	In	the	late	1980s,	moreover,	a	strong	
and	successful	resistance	movement	against	the	construction	of	hydroelectric	plants	in	
																																								 																				
38	 The	murder	was	 even	 published	 by	 the	New	 York	 Times:	 Simons,	Marlise.	 Brazilian	who	 fought	 to	
protect	 amazon	 is	 killed.	 New	 York	 Times,	 24/12/1988.	 Available	 at:	
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/24/world/brazilian-who-fought-to-protect-amazon-is-killed.html	
Accessed:	23/07/2015.	
75	
	
the	Xingu	River,	a	river	surrounded	by	indigenous	communities	and	the	Amazon	forest,	
emerged.	The	alliance	between	environmental	activists,	human	rights	supporters	and	
indigenous	 communities	 resulted	 in	 a	 broad	 process	 of	 social	 debate	 and	 pressure	
against	this	construction,	culminating	in	the	participation	of	more	than	3,000	people	in	
what	 has	 been	 named	 the	 ‘Altamira	meeting’	 of	 1989.	 The	meeting	 gained	 national	
and	international	visibility	when	a	native	Brazilian	put	a	knife	against	the	throat	of	the	
president	of	 the	state	electricity	provider.	The	 resulting	social	 commotion	associated	
with	 the	 strength	 and	 international	 visibility	 of	 socio-environmentalist	 arguments	
delayed	the	beginning	of	the	construction	until	2011,	when	the	discourse	lost	strength.		
A	 final	 important	 factor	 for	 the	 development	 and	 consolidation	 of	 the	
socio-environmentalist	tradition	in	Brazil	was	the	selection	of	the	country	as	the	host	
of	 the	1992	UN	Conference	on	Environment	and	Development.	The	preparations	 for	
the	 Conference	 increased	 the	 connections	 between	 national	 and	 international	
environmental	organisations	and	raised	international	awareness	of,	and	funds	for,	the	
demands	of	national	movements	such	as	the	Alliance	of	the	Peoples	of	the	Forest.	An	
example	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	 international	 awareness	 of	 these	 movements	 was	 the	
creation	 of	 the	 Mamurauá	 Sustainable	 Development	 Reserve	 in	 1991.	 As	
demonstrated	 by	 Inoue	 and	 Lima	 (2007),	 without	 the	 influence	 of	 transnational	
networks	 involving	 local	 actors	 and	 international	NGOs	 (such	 as	WWF,	 Conservation	
International	(CI)	and	Wildlife	Conservation	Society),	it	would	have	been	very	difficult	
for	 movements	 such	 as	 the	 ‘Lake	 Preservation	 Movement	 of	 Mamurauá’,	 who	
demanded	to	have	the	right	to	stay	within	the	Mamurauá	reserve	and	to	participate	in	
the	elaboration	of	 its	management	plan,	 to	have	made	 their	demands	known	 to	 the	
government.	 Hence,	 all	 these	 historical	 events	 directly	 point	 to	 and	 strengthen	 the	
underlying	precept	of	Brazilian	socio-environmentalism	that	social	and	environmental	
sustainability	are	not	separable	elements	of	environmental	policy-making.	
	
3.3.4.	Administrative	economic	rationalism		
The	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 view	 holds	 that	 governments	
should	 help	 market	 actors	 to	 exploit	 natural	 resources,	 but	 also	 establish	 some	
controls	and	be	allowed	to	benefit	politically	or	economically	from	this	process.	Thus,	
from	 this	 perspective,	 as	 long	 as	 resource	 use	 follows	 governmental	 priorities	 and	
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guidelines,	irreversible	ecological	imbalances	are	not	considered	a	risk.		Industrialism	is	
taken	 for	 granted	 in	 this	 discourse	 as	 no	 drastic	 social	 changes	 are	 proposed	 and	
prosaic	alternatives	to	social	organisation,	based	on	traditional	governmental	control,	
are	advanced.	 	Nature,	 therefore,	 is	perceived	as	 tolerant,	 enduring	changes	up	 to	a	
certain	 point,	 which	 should	 be	 established	 by	 central	 authority.	 	 The	 relationship	
between	 humans	 and	 nature	 is	 hierarchical	 because	 humans	 determine	 how	 much	
interference	nature	can	endure	and	subject	it	to	their	plan.	Little	attention	is	devoted	
to	the	potential	contributions	of	social	participation	in	this	discourse,	characterising	a	
hierarchical	approach	regarding	the	relationship	between	humans.	This	perspective	is,	
moreover,	 commonly	 portrayed	 as	 a	 moderate,	 non-ideological	 view	 based	 on	
rhetorical	 devices	 that	 emphasise	 pragmatism,	 sustainable	 development	 and	 the	
possibility	of	effective	control	in	the	way	nature	is	approached.	
This	discourse	 is	also	deeply	 ingrained	 in	Brazilian	history.	Even	 though	 it	
has	 never	 been	 a	 dominant	 social	 discourse,	 it	 dominated	 executive	 government	
mentality	 at	 least	 between	 2010	 and	 2016,	 during	 the	mandate	 of	 President	 Dilma	
Rousseff.	This	perspective	has	its	roots	in	the	context	of	the	re-democratization	in	the	
late	1980s,	which	was	also	characterised	by	a	severe	economic	crisis	and	the	ascension	
of	 liberal	 ideas.	During	 this	 time	of	 hyperinflation	 and	economic	 turmoil,	 recipes	 for	
protecting	 the	 environment	 without	 harming	 markets	 resonated	 with	 IMF’s	
‘conditionalities’	and	prescriptions	of	‘best	practices’	and	were	thus	largely	promoted	
(interview	18).	Additionally,	as	remarked	by	Hochstetler	and	Keck	(2007,	47%	Chapter	
3,	section	15,	e-book),	although	that	period	was	characterised	by	“much	more	space	
for	environmental	concerns	in	government,	government	officials	wanted	solutions,	not	
protests”.	 More	 recently,	 the	 changing	 ideological	 context	 resulting	 from	 President	
Rousseff’s	ascension	to	the	presidency	resulted	in	a	turn	towards	solutions	that	would	
increase	 market	 efficiency	 and	 modernise	 environmental	 policy-making	 but	 still	
maintain	a	centralised	government	in	control	of	this	process	(interviews	7,	18,	28,	42).	
This	 discourse	 is,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 a	 mix	 and	 adaptation	 of	 two	
perspectives	described	by	Dryzek	 (2013)	separately	as	administrative	rationalism	and	
economic	 rationalism.	 The	 former	 perspective	 is	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 centralised	
authority	of	governments	in	establishing	thresholds	of	environmental	exploitation.	The	
latter	 represents	 a	 commitment	 to	 using	 market	 mechanisms	 to	 achieve	
environmental	public	goals	and	relies	mainly	on	self-interest	and	competition	between	
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market	 actors.	 This	 perspective	 is	 hostile	 to	 direct	 environmental	 management	 by	
governments	after	the	basic	mechanisms	of	market	functioning	have	been	established	
by	 government.39	 This	 thesis	 argues	 that	 the	 Brazilian	 government	 has	 never	 fully	
manifested	either	perspective	in	environmental	management	and	debates,	but	rather	
a	mix	of	both.	Because	of	a	tradition	of	big,	paternalistic	government	and	weak	market	
institutions,	attempts	to	rely	on	market	mechanisms	have	ultimately	always	resulted	in	
the	state	acting	as	the	leading	economic	actor.	This	type	of	system	has	been	described	
by	 Bremmer	 (2009)	 as	 ‘state	 capitalism’	 or	 as	 ‘hierarchical	 capitalism’	 by	 Schneider	
meaning	 that	 “hierarchy	 often	 replaces	 or	 attenuates	 the	 coordinated	 or	 market	
relations	found	elsewhere”	(2013,	p.	8).		Through	this	discourse	the	state	works	along	
with	 companies	 to	 promote	 a	 favourable	 environment	 for	markets	 to	 thrive	 in,	 but	
dependence	on	the	direct	management	and	control	of	governments	is	not	abandoned	
and	the	use	of	market	mechanisms,	although	praised	and	aimed	for,	remains	limited	in	
practice.		
	
3.4.	Conclusion	
This	 chapter	 has	 provided	 the	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 basis	 for	 the	
discursive	framework	used	in	the	analysis	of	debates	and	the	categorisation	of	actors	
in	 the	 empirical	 part	 of	 this	 thesis.	 It	 has	 combined	 the	 theoretical	 contributions	
provided	by	Dryzek	 (2013)	 for	 the	analysis	of	environmental	discourses	with	 insights	
from	 Cultural	 Theory	 and	 the	 Narrative	 Policy	 Framework,	 which	 helped	 to	 make	
Dryzek’s	categories	more	empirically	operationalisable	and	 increased	 its	potential	 for	
comparability	 across	 cases.	 The	 resulting	 theoretical	 guidance	 was	 applied	 to	
secondary	 literature	 about	 Brazilian	 environmental	 debates	 and	 to	 primary	 data	
(obtained	during	interviews	and	an	analysis	of	National	Congress	and	media	debates),	
which	 resulted	 in	 a	 framework	 of	 four	 exhaustive	 and	 mutually	 exclusive	 Brazilian	
environmental	discourses.	This	analysis	constitutes	a	potentially	useful	contribution	to	
other	 analyses	 of	 Brazilian	 environmental	 politics	 as	 these	 categories	 can	 be	 easily	
applied	to	any	area	of	Brazilian	environmental	debate.	They	constitute,	therefore,	an	
																																								 																				
39	Which	would	be	very	similar	to	the	idea	of	‘regulatory	state’	developed,	among	others,	by	Majone,	G.	
(1997)	From	the	Positive	to	the	Regulatory	State:	Causes	and	Consequences	of	Changes	in	the	Mode	of	
Governance.	Journal	of	Public	Policy,	17,	pp	139-167.	
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original	 contribution	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 Brazilian	 environmental	 debate,	 which	
systematises	 data	 from	 secondary	 literature	 according	 to	 a	 theoretical	 framework,	
which,	 although	 inspired	by	 previous	 theoretical	 debates,	was	 developed	 specifically	
for	this	purpose.	
These	 four	discourses	are	not	considered	 to	be	equivalent	 to	 ‘policy	core	
beliefs’	in	ACF	terminology	because	of	the	importance	of	language	and	interpretation	
in	their	definition.	They	do	not	necessarily	represent,	therefore,	the	“basic	normative	
commitments	 and	 causal	 perceptions”	 (Sabatier	 and	 Jenkins-Smith,	 1999,	 p.	 121)	 of	
actors	 but	 simply	 their	 expressed	 interpretive	 schemes	 (which	 might	 or	 might	 not	
overlap	 with	 their	 basic	 normative	 commitments).	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 assumed,	
following	the	ACF,	that	actors	have	to	display	the	same	interpretive	schemes	in	order	
to	 form	 a	 coalitions40	 —	 a	 qualification	 considered	 necessary	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	
coalitions	 that	 are	 formed	 based	 on	 actor’s	 similar	 interests,	 but	 not	 on	 similar	
normative	beliefs.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
40	According	to	Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith	(1999,	p.	124)	“actors	within	an	advocacy	coalition	will	show	
substantial	consensus	on	issues	pertaining	to	the	policy	core”		
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PART	2:	EMPIRICAL	CASES		
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CHAPTER	4	–	CASE	STUDY	I:	FORESTS	
	
	
Forests	 have	 always	 been	 one	 of	 the	 most	 critical	 elements	 in	 the	
management	of	natural	resources	in	Brazil.	The	country	currently	has	about	61%	of	its	
territory	covered	with	forests,	a	total	of	5,151,332	km2	of	which	over	4	million	km2	are	
constituted	by	the	Amazon	rainforest	(World	Bank,	2015).	The	forested	area	in	Brazil	is	
mostly	 constituted	 by	 native	 forests.	 The	 economic	 use	 of	 these	 areas	 has	 long	
generated	debates	and	divided	Brazilian	society.	 In	2012,	the	Brazilian	 law	regulating	
native	 vegetation,	 the	 “Forest	 Code”	 –	 a	 regulation	 firstly	 established	 in	 1934	 and	
altered	 in	1965	and	2001	–	was	 (once	again)	 reformulated.	This	 chapter	 investigates	
the	 role	 of	 internal	 and	 external	 events,	 learning	 and	 negotiated	 agreement	 in	 this	
remarkable	policy	 change.	 It	 argues	 that	a	historical	 clash	between	advocates	of	 the	
extensive	 preservation	 of	 forests	 and	 those	 emphasising	 the	 economic	 benefits	 of	
converting	forested	lands	to	agriculture	was	reignited	in	2009	due	to	two	factors.	First,	
by	 a	 trend	 towards	 more	 severe	 punishment	 of	 unlawful	 deforestation	 (internal	
event),	and	second,	by	a	political	and	economic	environment	largely	favourable	to	the	
demands	of	farmers	(resulting	from	external	events	such	as	a	commodity	prices	boom	
and	changes	in	governing	coalitions).	Therefore,	the	hypotheses	drawn	from	the	ACF,	
namely,	 that	 negotiated	 agreements	 and	 policy-oriented	 learning	 were	 relevant	
motivators	of	policy	change,	are	not	confirmed	by	this	case.				
This	chapter	will	be	organised	into	three	different	parts.	Part	4.1	describes	
the	 history	 of	 forest	 regulation	 in	 Brazil,	 its	 main	 internal	 and	 external	 events,	 and	
provides	an	analysis	of	saliency,	which	underscores	the	 importance	of	the	analysis	of	
the	new	Forest	Code.	Part	4.2	highlights	the	main	coalitions,	actors	and	narratives	 in	
the	2012	reformulation	of	the	Forest	Code.	Part	4.3	tests	the	hypotheses	drawn	from	
the	ACF	about	the	importance	of	 internal	and	external	events,	negotiated	agreement	
and	policy-oriented	learning	in	policy	change.	The	conclusion	re-states	the	importance	
of	 internal	 and	external	 events	 and	 the	 reduced	 role	of	policy-oriented	 learning	and	
negotiated	agreement	in	the	process	of	change	of	the	Forest	Code.		
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4.1.	The	History	of	Forest	Policies	in	Brazil	
4.1.1.	Introduction	
This	section	will	briefly	describe	the	history	of	forest	policy	standards	and	
their	 implementation	 in	 Brazil.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 trace	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 argumentative	
clashes	that	marked	the	debates	surrounding	the	reformulation	of	the	Forest	Code	in	
2012.	The	goal	 is	also	to	evidence	the	salience	and	historical	 relevance	of	 the	recent	
Forest	Code	reform	and	justify	the	subsequent	analysis	of	the	debates	related	to	it.	As	
this	 part	 will	 demonstrate,	 although	 enforcement	 has	 often	 been	 flawed	 and	 not	
always	 reflected	 the	 predominant	 discourses	 in	 Brazilian	 forestry	 policy,	 discourses	
have	 varied	 considerably	 over	 the	 history	 of	 forestry	 regulation	 in	 Brazil	 and	 more	
recent	 changes	 represent	 a	 return	 to	 historical	 discourses.	 This	 part	 proceeds	 as	
follows:	 section	 4.1.2	 analyses	 secondary	 literature	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	
predominant	 discourses	 in	 forest	 policies	 and	 standards	 between	 1530	 and	 2005.	
Section	 4.1.3	 uses	 data	 from	 the	 National	 Congress	 to	 trace	 all	 the	 forest	 related	
standards	approved	between	2005	and	2015	and	offers	an	analysis	of	 their	 salience.	
Section	 4.2.4	 concludes,	 emphasising	 the	 importance	 of	 this	 part	 for	 the	 whole	
chapter.	
	
4.1.2.	The	Alternation	of	Discourses	in	Forest	Policies	from	1530	to	2005		
Figure	 4,	 below,	 summarises	 the	 historical	 predominance	 of	 different	
discourses	 in	 Brazilian	 forestry	 regulations	 and	 policies,	 which	 are	 now	 described	 in	
detail.	 These	 are	 different	 but	 have	 some	 overlaps	 with	 the	 overall	 dominance	 of	
environmental	discourses	described	in	the	previous	chapter.	
	
Figure	4	-	Dominant	Discourses	in	Brazilian	Forestry	Regulations	and	Policies	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
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Since	 colonial	 times	 (1530–1822),	 there	 have	 been	 attempts	 to	 regulate	
forest	use	 in	Brazil.	 In	1681	a	policy	of	 the	Portuguese	Crown	determined	that	sugar	
cane	plantations	could	not	be	established	less	than	3.3	km	from	each	other	in	order	to	
guarantee	 sufficient	 forestry	 reserves	 to	 attend	 to	 owner’s	 fuel	 demands	 (Castro,	
2013).	 	 During	 the	 16th	 and	 17th	 centuries,	 the	 extraction	 of	 Pau-Brasil	 –	 a	 wood	
widely	used	in	Europe	for	fabric	tinting	–	and	other	economically	valuable	woods,	were	
closely	 monitored	 by	 the	 Portuguese	 Crown	 which	 restricted	 their	 removal	 to	
authorised	agents	(Bacha,	2004;	Castro,	2013).	The	motivations	that	characterised	the	
formulation	of	 forest	 standards	 in	 the	colonial	period	were	mostly	economic,	aiming	
either	at	guaranteeing	a	constant	supply	of	fuel	to	land	owners	or	assuring	Portuguese	
monopoly	over	 valuable	woods.	 Environmental	 concerns,	 although	already	emerging	
among	 illuminist	 philosophers	 in	 Portugal,	 were	 considered	 subversive	 by	 the	
aristocracy	 and	 the	 Church	 and	 totally	 dismissed	 at	 that	 time	 (Castro,	 2013;	Miller,	
2000).	 From	 this	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 government	 control	 and	 the	 governmental	
and/or	 private	 benefit	 accruing	 from	 this	 control,	 it	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 an	
administrative	economic	rationalist	mentality	predominated	in	forest	standards	during	
colonial	times.	
This	 reality	 began	 to	 slightly	 change	 after	 Brazilian	 independence	 from	
Portugal	 in	 1822.	 Although	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 perspective	
prospered	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 independence	 with	 the	 publication	 of	 new	
interventionist	 regulations	–	such	as	a	 law	requiring	 the	conservation	of	at	 least	one	
sixth	 of	 the	 natural	 vegetation	 in	 all	 private	 properties,	 the	 prohibition	 of	 removing	
Pau-Brasil	 and	 other	 valuable	 wood	 types,	 and	 the	 country’s	 first	 criminal	 code	 in	
1930,	 which	 stipulated	 severe	 penalties	 for	 illegal	 deforestation,	 strong	 opposition	
from	land	owners	led	to	the	revoke	of	restrictions	on	the	types	of	woods	that	could	be	
removed	 in	 1931.	 After	 that	 year,	 forestry	 policies	 were	 characterised	 by	 providing	
strong	 stimulus	 for	 fast	 colonisation	 –	 understood	 as	 occupying	 the	 territory	 with	
agriculture	 or	 cattle	 ranching	 –	 which	 contributed	 to	 the	 failure	 of	 any	 attempt	 at	
government	 control	 over	 forest	 use	 and	 removal	 (Kengen,	 2001).	 This	 period,	
portrayed,	 therefore,	 the	predominance	of	a	developmentalist	perspective	according	
to	which	nature	was	viewed	as	a	hindrance	to	economic	development.		
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During	 the	 first	 Brazilian	 Republic	 (1889–1929)	 or	 República	 Velha	 (Old	
Republic)	Brazilian	 forest	policies	were	no	different	 than	during	 the	previous	period.	
This	era	was	marked	by	the	dominance	of	the	agricultural	aristocracies	of	the	states	of	
São	Paulo	and	Minas	Gerais.	Apart	 from	 the	 creation	of	 a	 fruitless	Brazilian	 Forestry	
Service	 in	 1921,	 no	 other	 novelties	 emerged	 in	 terms	 of	 forestry	 regulations	 and	
policies.	As	observed	by	Kengen	(2001),	the	Constitution	of	1891,	the	first	republican	
constitution	in	the	country,	made	absolutely	no	allusions	to	forestry	conservation	and	
espoused	 a	 prominently	 liberal	 view,	 according	 to	 which	 land	 owners	 were	 given	
complete	 freedom	 over	 the	 use	 of	 their	 lands.	 This	 marked,	 therefore,	 the	
continuation	 a	 neo-developmentalist	mentality.	 In	 the	 state	 of	 São	 Paulo	 alone,	 6.4	
million	 hectares	 are	 estimated	 to	 have	 been	 deforested	 between	 1886	 and	 1920,	 a	
rate	of	0.76%	of	the	total	surface	of	the	state	per	year	(SOS	Mata	Atlântica,	1998).	
	In	1930,	a	new	political	phase	was	 inaugurated	 in	Brazil.	After	 the	Great	
Depression	in	1929,	Brazilian	exports	of	coffee	fell	abruptly.	This	decrease,	associated	
with	 internal	 dissidence	 within	 the	 old	 agricultural	 oligarchies	 from	 São	 Paulo	 and	
Minas	Gerais,	led	to	the	formation	and	empowerment	of	a	new	group.	Led	by	Getúlio	
Vargas	–	who	would	become	the	Brazilian	president	 for	the	following	15	years	–	this	
new	group	 included	a	nascent	 scientific,	 civil	 society	and	 industrial	 community.	They	
advanced	 a	 more	 progressive	 agenda,	 which	 included	 an	 attempt	 to	 regulate	 and	
control	natural	resources	(Nunes,	1997).	During	Vargas’	administration,	the	first	Forest	
Code	(Decreto-lei	n⁰	23.793	–	23/01/34)	was	published.	The	code	stipulated	that	25%	
of	every	rural	property	should	remain	natural	vegetation	and	established	that	riparian	
buffer	zones	should	be	conserved.	The	code	was,	moreover,	extremely	centralising.	It	
determined	 that	 the	 burden	of	 identification,	 classification	 and	 indemnity	 related	 to	
forest	preservation	should	be	placed	on	the	state	administration	(Article	11,	Decreto-
lei	 n⁰	 23.793)	 and	 no	 preservation	 requirements	 could	 be	 implemented	 before	 land	
owners	had	been	indemnified	by	the	government.	As	a	consequence	of	placing	such	a	
large	administrative	and	financial	burden	on	an	embryonic	state	apparatus,	 the	code	
was	not	 successful	 in	achieving	 its	objectives	 (Leitão,	2014;	Castro	2013).	From	1934	
until	 1965	 (when	 the	 code	was	 reformulated)	 there	was	only	one	 registered	 case	of	
prosecution	 based	 on	 the	 code	 (interview	 with	 Alceo	 Magnanini,	 cited	 by	 Leitão,	
2014).	 Stacking	 the	 deck	 by	 permeating	 an	 environmentally	 progressive	 regulation	
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with	 unrealistic	 application	 procedures	 might	 represent	 Vargas’	 political	 strategy	 of	
satisfying	his	main	political	base	of	scientists	and	civil	society	activists	(part	of	a	group	
known	as	the	‘liberal	alliance’)	without	directly	opposing	the	still-powerful	agricultural	
aristocracy.	In	this	way,	Vargas	was	able	to	shift	the	blame	for	the	code’s	failure	onto	
the	 judicial	 power,	which,	 according	 to	 historical	 reports	 by	 the	 director	 of	 Brazilian	
Forestry	 Service	 in	 1950,41	 did	 not	 make	 any	 efforts	 to	 press	 charges	 of	 illegal	
deforestation	 (Castro,	 2013).	 This	 period	 exemplifies,	 therefore,	 a	 return	 to	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 standards	 in	 which	 the	 state	 assumed	 a	 central	
role,	 even	 though	 the	developmentalist	mentality	 that	previously	predominated	was	
maintained	through	the	flawed	enforcement	of	new	standards.	
The	 ineffectiveness	of	 the	previous	 regulations	motivated	 the	Minister	of	
Agriculture,	Armando	Monteiro	Filho,	to	propose	its	reformulation	in	the	1960s.	Filho	
promoted	 a	 consultation	 period,	 which	 took	 three	 years	 and	 involved	 a	 team	 of	
specialised	lawyers,	agronomists,	botanists	and	public	servants.	In	1965,	a	new	Forest	
Code	was	published	determining	that	50%	of	the	vegetation	of	rural	properties	located	
in	the	Amazon	forest	and	20%	of	the	vegetation	of	properties	located	in	other	regions	
of	the	country	should	be	maintained	intact	or	used	according	to	specific	management	
criteria	and	under	the	authorisation	of	the	forestry	service	(an	innovation	in	relation	to	
the	previous	code).	Additionally,	 if	these	areas	had	already	been	destroyed,	the	code	
determined	 that	 owners	 had	 to	 bear	 the	 burden	 of	 restoration.	 Apart	 from	 this	
obligatory	 conservation	 stipulation	 (known	 as	 the	 legal	 reserve),	 the	 new	 legislation	
also	 stipulated	 two	other	 types	 of	 areas:	 the	 first	 known	as	permanent	 preservation	
areas,	including	riparian	zones,	steep	slopes	and	the	top	of	hills	and	mountains,	which	
could	not	be	deforested.	The	second	were	areas	of	 free	use,	consisting	 in	the	rest	of	
the	property	where	forests	could	be	removed	for	agricultural	production	or	any	other	
activities	to	take	place.	The	second	version	of	the	code	also	regulated	the	use	of	fire	
but,	in	order	to	be	accepted	by	the	military	regime	(1964–1986),	it	guaranteed	almost	
																																								 																				
41	 “The	 borough’s	 judge,	 the	 prosecutor,	 the	 police	 chief	 and	 the	 commissioner	 are	 always	 ready	 to	
repress	 regular	misdemeanours	 [...].	However,	attacks	on	nature	–	which	constitutes	 the	backbone	of	
this	country:	 the	 jungle,	 the	 forests,	 the	climate,	 the	waters,	all	of	which	constitutes	 the	environment	
where	people	 live	and	work	–	are	unknown,	not	considered	misdemeanours	and,	 therefore,	 this	other	
part	of	our	nation	is	sacrificed	[…]”	(Sobrinho,	1950	quoted	by	Castro,	2013	–	translation	and	emphasis	
by	the	author).	
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full	liberty	for	the	government	to	deforest	(see	table	9	for	a	structured	comparison	of	
all	the	forest	codes	throughout	Brazilian	history).		
Therefore,	 although	 the	 1965	 Forest	 Code	 established	 stronger	
preservation	requirements	(bringing	some	elements	of	the	preservationist	discourse	to	
the	 debate),	 the	 predominant	 objective	 of	 this	 period’s	 forest	 policies	 was	 the	
development	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 forestry	 industry	 under	 the	 ultra-centralising	 and	
interventionist	 military	 government	 (1964–1986)	 (interviews	 50,	 51).	 In	 1966,	 a	 law	
was	passed	(Law	n⁰	5106)	establishing	fiscal	incentives	for	reforestation.	The	Brazilian	
Institute	of	Forestry	Development	 (IBDF)	was	created	 in	1967	and	a	new	decree	was	
approved	in	1970	increasing	the	fiscal	incentives	for	reforestation.	From	1966	to	1988,	
the	Brazilian	government	offered	direct	subsidies	for	the	establishment	of	an	industry	
of	planted	 forests	 in	Brazil.	Thus,	although	the	1965	code	did	not	directly	 incentivise	
the	removal	of	native	trees	for	the	plantation	of	commercial	species	and	did	not	have	
an	 overly	 administrative	 rationalist	 mentality,	 the	 policies	 that	 accompanied	 it	 did	
(interviews	50,	51).	 In	addition	 to	 the	 incentives	 for	 the	plantation	of	exotic	 species,	
there	 were	 agricultural	 incentives	 for	 the	 occupation	 of	 the	 Amazon	 and	 of	 the	
Northeast	 regions	during	 the	military	 regime	(1964–1986),	pushing	 the	deforestation	
frontier	a	bit	 further	and	going	against	 the	enforcement	of	preservationist	 standards	
(Kengen,	 2001).	 Conflicts	 among	 forestry	 and	 land	 regulation,	 moreover,	 were	
remarkable	at	 that	 time.	One	of	 the	pre-requisites	 for	 securing	ownership	of	 land	 in	
situations	of	missing	land	titles,	was	to	deforest	and	then	cultivate	that	land,	in	direct	
contradiction	 of	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 second	 Forest	 Code	 (Bacha,	 2004).	 Finally,	
large	 infrastructure	projects	–	 such	as	 the	Transamazônica	 road	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	
Amazon	 forest	 –	 were	 promoted	 by	 the	 government	 during	 this	 period,	 further	
stimulating	 deforestation.	 These	 latter	 two	 strategies	 (colonisation	 and	 large	
infrastructure	 programs)	 were	 typical	 of	 a	 developmentalist	 mentality,	 aimed	 at	
civilising	 wild	 areas	 with	 no	 concern	 for	 the	 environmental	 impact.	 The	 economic	
administrative	 rationalism	 of	 an	 interventionist	 and	 economically-oriented	
government	therefore	shared	space	with	developmentalist	policies	during	the	60s,	70s	
and	early	80s.		
Several	events	unfolded	from	the	late	1980s	onwards,	however,	that	year	
marked	a	clear	change	in	the	way	environmental	and	forestry	policies	were	thought	of	
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in	 the	country.	As	 remarked	by	Hall	 (1997),	 the	suspension	of	World	Bank	 loans42	 to	
the	colonisation	and	road-building	programmes	in	the	Amazon	marked	the	beginning	
of	 a	 period	 in	 which	 traditionally	 marginalised	 local	 people	 (particularly	 from	 the	
Amazon	region)	were	“brought	onto	the	centre	stage”	and	perceived	as	fundamentally	
important	for	the	success	of	environmental	policies	(Hall	1997,	p.	9).	Also	motivated	by	
the	international	visibility,	connections	and	resources	brought	to	Brazil	by	UN	Rio	1992	
Conference	 and	 by	 the	 successes	 of	 the	 PPG7	 Programme	 (Pilot	 Programme	 for	 the	
Protection	 of	 Brazilian	 Tropical	 Forests)	 launched	 by	 the	 eight	 members	 of	 the	 G7	
(Germany,	 US,	 France,	 Italy,	 UK,	 Japan,	 Canada	 and	 Russia,	 which	 was	 included	 in	
1997)	the	1990s	demonstrated	the	strength	of	socio-environmentalist	ideas.	
This	 trend	continued	 in	 the	2000s	but	 shared	 the	discursive	 space	with	a	
more	preservationist	mentality,	less	concerned	with	local	people	and	more	concerned	
with	 centralised,	 command-and-control	 strategies	 of	 preservation.	 In	 1994,	 for	
instance,	 the	 Sistema	 de	 Vigilância	 da	 Amazonia	 (SIVAM)	 was	 created,	 involving	 a	
sophisticated	 network	 of	 radars	 and	 satellite	 intended	 for	 the	 surveillance	 of	 the	
Amazon	region	with	regard	to	military	defence,	drug	trafficking	and	deforestation.	The	
administration	of	the	system,	however,	has	been	found	to	treat	small	farmers	“as	the	
major	culprits	of	destruction”	(Hall,	1997,	p.	20)	 in	a	more	preservationist	 fashion.	 In	
2004,	moreover,	 the	government	 launched	 the	PPCDam	 (the	Plan	of	Prevention	and	
Control	of	Deforestation	 in	 the	Legal	Amazon),	which	was	accompanied	by	a	 striking	
reduction	 in	deforestation	 levels	 in	 the	Amazon	 forest	 (see	graph	1	below).	PPCDam	
was	marked	by	strict	command-and-control	strategies	of	monitoring	and	punishment	
of	illegal	deforestation	and	it	is	often	described	as	one	of	the	main	policies	underlying	
the	marked	 reduction	 in	deforestation	 levels	 in	 the	Amazon	 forest	 after	 2004	 (IPEA-
Giz-CEPAL,	2011).		
																																								 																				
42	Which	had	been	 related	 to	 the	 setting	up	of	 the	National	Rubber	Tapper	Council	 and	 international	
repercussion	of	the	assassination	of	the	rubber	tapper	activist	Chico	Mendes	in	1988.	
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Graph	1	-	Historical	series	of	deforestation	levels	in	the	Legal	Amazon	(km2/year)	
Source:	INPE,	available	at:	http://www.inpe.br/noticias/noticia.php?Cod_Noticia=3944			
	
4.1.3.	The	2005–2015	Decade:	Standards	and	Saliency	Analysis	
When	we	 focus	 on	 the	 period	 between	 2005	 and	 2015	 and	move	 from	 the	
analysis	of	secondary	literature	to	an	empirical	analysis	of	the	main	regulations	passed	
by	the	Lower	Chamber43	 the	evidence	points	 to	 the	predominance	of	preservationist	
and	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 (economic	 use	 stimulated	 by	 the	 state)	
measures	 (see	 table	 8)	 up	 until	 2012.	 After	 2012,	 however,	 this	 trend	was	 reversed	
with	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code,	 representing	 a	 return	 to	 more	
developmentalist	 perspectives,	 which	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 economic	
development	 despite	 environmental	 degradation.	 For	 instance,	 the	 bill	 for	 the	
management	of	public	 forests	 (PL	4776/2005)	passed	 in	2005,	allowed	the	economic	
exploration	of	public	forests	by	authorised	companies,	 in	a	clear	attempt	to	promote	
the	 private	 sector	 through	 the	 rigorous	 control	 and	 surveillance	 of	 the	 government	
(typical	of	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	mentality)	(see	first	line	of	table	8).	
																																								 																				
43	A	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	internal	events	during	this	time	period	was	pursued	based	on	
the	debates	of	the	Lower	Chamber.		In	this	period,	147	regulatory	propositions	were	presented	
in	the	Lower	Chamber	containing	the	word	‘forest’	 in	 its	 index.	Six	were	eliminated	from	the	
analysis	because	they	referred	to	a	city	called	‘Alta	Floresta’	rather	than	to	forests.	The	search	
for	‘native	vegetation’	was	also	pursued,	but	no	different	items	were	found	in	comparison	to	
the	 search	 for	 the	word	 ‘forest’.	Despite	 the	high	number	of	 propositions	only	nine	 actually	
resulted	in	new	regulations,	eight	of	which	were	authored	by	the	executive	power	and	one	by	
the	 Senate.	 The	 one	 proposed	 by	 the	 Senate	 was	 an	 amendment	 to	 one	 of	 the	 other	
regulations	 described,	 so	 it	was	 not	 considered.	 The	 content	 of	 each	of	 the	 eight	 remaining	
new	regulations	was	analysed	and	one	was	excluded	from	this	description	because	it	was	not	
directly	relevant	to	forest	policies	(it	was	related	to	the	determination	of	conservation	areas,	
which	is	covered	in	another	chapter).	The	content	of	the	seven	remaining	new,	forest-related	
regulations	approved	between	2005	and	2015	is	summarised	in	table	1.		
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Another	example	is	that	the	forest	regulations	passed	during	this	time	period	concern	
the	 authorisation	 of	 the	 government	 to	 enforce	 anti-deforestation	measures	 during	
the	period	between	the	announcement	and	actual	creation	of	preservation	areas	(see	
line	 2	 of	 the	 table	 8).	 This	was	 perceived	 to	 be	 necessary	 due	 to	 the	 rising	 trend	 in	
deforestation	 in	 the	 aftermath	of	 the	 announcement	of	 new	preservation	 areas	 and	
characterises	 a	 preservationist	 mentality.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 two	 examples,	 all	
standards	approved	by	 the	Lower	Chamber	 that	were	 related	 to	 forest	policies	were	
scrutinised	 over	 the	 period	 of	 2005	 to	 2015,	 and	 a	 mix	 of	 preservationist	 and	
administrative	economic	rationalist	measures	were	identified	up	until	the	approval	of	
the	new	Forest	Code	in	2012.	
To	support	the	analysis	of	the	content	of	new	forest	standards	between	2005	
and	2015	and	of	their	predominant	orientation,	a	saliency	analysis	was	performed	 in	
order	to	select	the	most-debated	case	of	 forest	regulatory	change	to	be	the	focus	of	
the	narrative	analysis	and	of	the	assessment	of	the	drivers	of	policy	change	advanced	
by	the	ACF.	The	saliency	analysis	of	the	debates	of	the	Lower	Chamber	demonstrates	
that	 the	 2012	 new	 Forest	 Code	 was	 the	 most	 controversial	 and	 widely-debated	
measure	in	the	period	(see	the	last	column	of	table	8).	When	counting	the	number	of	
times	 that	 each	 regulatory	proposition	was	mentioned	by	 the	 Lower	Chamber	News	
Agency	 between	 2005	 and	 2015,	 those	 related	 to	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code	 were	most	
frequently	mentioned	(119	times).	When	the	search	term	is	changed	to	a	specific	law	
number	(e.g.	12.651),	the	number	of	times	it	is	mentioned	by	the	News	Agency	rises	to	
246.	Finally,	when	the	words	‘forest	code’,	which	is	how	it	was	usually	referred	to,	are	
searched	for,	the	number	of	mentions	skyrockets	to	4,201,	far	above	the	second-most-
debated	 forest-related	 bill	 (whose	 regulatory	 proposal	 number	 was	 mentioned	 65	
times,	 and	 whose	 most-commonly	 used	 name	 [‘project	 of	 law	 of	 public	 forest	
management’]	 was	mentioned	 776	 times).	 It	 is	 concluded,	 therefore,	 that	 the	most	
salient	policy	problem	in	the	Brazilian	forest	subsystem	between	2005	and	2015	was	
the	reform	of	the	Forest	Code.	For	this	reason	sections	3	and	4	will	be	entirely	focused	
on	it.			
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Table	8	-	Main	forest	standards	approved	between	2005	and	2015	and	their	salience	
Presentation	
date	
Regulation	 Author	 Content	 Main	consequence	 Times	mentioned	
by	the	Chamber’s	
News	Agency	
(2005–2015)	
21/02/2005	 PL	
4776/2005	
Executive	
power	
Regulates	the	
sustainable	
management	of	
public	forests,	
institutes	the	
Brazilian	Forest	
Service	and	creates	
the	National	Fund	for	
Forest	Development	
	
Promotes/regulates	
the	economic	use	of	
forests	
(administrative	
economic	
rationalist)	
95	(for	‘PL	
4776’)	
	
776	(for	‘project	
of	law	of	public	
forest	
management’)		
21/02/2005	
	
	
31/05/2005	
MP	
239/2005	
	
PLV	
13/2005	=>	
MPV	
239/2005	
Executive	
power	
	
MP	 Nicias	
Ribeiro	
(PSDB)	
Authorises	
government	to	limit	
the	use	of	resources	
or	deforestation	in	
areas	where	
protected	areas	are	in	
the	process	of	being	
created.	
	
Promotes/regulates	
the	conservation	of	
forests	
(preservationist)	
53	
	
28/05/2008	 MPV	
432/2008	
Executive	
power	
Establishes	measures	
to	stimulate	the	
payment	of	rural	
credit	debts,	making	
the	system	more	
flexible	for	loans	
designed	to	reforest	
degraded	areas	
	
Promotes/regulates	
the	economic	use	of	
forests	
(administrative	
economic	
rationalist)	
80	
30/05/2008	 PLP	
374/2008	
Executive	
power	
Improves	rural	
security	system	for	
agricultural,	cattle	
ranching,	fisheries	
and	forest	production	
Promotes/regulates	
the	economic	use	of	
forests	
(administrative	
economic	
rationalist)	
13	
04/08/2008	 MPV	
438/2008	
Executive	
power	
Relates	to	the	tax	
system	for	cash	
donations	received	
by	public	financial	
institutions	for	the	
conservation	and	
sustainable	use	of	
Brazilian	forests	
	
Promotes/regulates	
the	conservation	of	
forests	
(preservationist)	
9	
10/12/2009	 Decree	
7.029/09	
Executive	
Power	
Established	that	
farmers	should	
comply	with	legal	
reserve	requirements	
until	11/06/2011,	
otherwise	they	would	
be	punished	
	
Promotes/regulates	
the	conservation	of	
forests	
(preservationist)	
14	
28/05/2012	 MPV	
571/2012	
Executive	
power	
Established	the	final	
version	of	the	third	
Forest	Code	(Law	
12.651,	of	25th	May,	
2012)	with	the	vetoes	
and	alterations	of	the	
executive	power.	
Favours	agricultural	
production	at	the	
expense	of	forest	
conservation	
(administrative	
economic	
rationalist)	
119	(for	‘MPV	
571’)	
	
246	(for	
‘12.651’)	
	
4,201	(for	
‘forest	code’	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
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4.1.4.	Conclusion	
This	 first	 part	 has	 provided	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 long	 history	 of	 forest	
regulations	in	Brazil	since	the	colonial	period,	assessed	the	different	views	of	the	world	
that	predominated	in	this	subsystem	over	history,	and	provided	a	detailed	analysis	of	
changes	 in	 standards	 that	 occurred	 between	 2005	 and	 2015.	 It	 has	 identified,	
moreover,	 that	 among	 all	 the	 changes	 identified	 between	 2005	 and	 2015,	 the	
alterations	 to	 the	previous	Forest	Code	were	undeniably	 the	most	 salient	 in	debates	
taking	 place	 in	 the	 National	 Congress.	 This	 analysis	 justifies	 the	 subsequent	 focus	
adopted	in	part	4.2	on	debates	about	the	new	Forest	Code	and	provides	the	historical	
basis	for	the	claim	that	a	strong	developmentalist	perspective	has	resurged	after	a	long	
period	during	which	it	was	not	dominant.	
	
4.2.	The	2012	Forest	Code	
4.2.1.	Introduction	
This	 part	 focuses	 on	 the	 debates	 specifically	 related	 to	 the	 2012	 Forest	
Code	 and	 provides	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 different	 positions,	 narratives	 and	 coalitions	
involved.	 It	argues	 that	 three	main	coalitions	were	 formed	during	 the	debates	about	
the	new	code.	The	first	coalition	advocated	significant	changes	to	the	previous	Forest	
Code	 and	 followed	 a	 neo-developmentalist	 view	 of	 the	 world,	 according	 to	 which	
economic	 development	 (in	 this	 case	 represented	 by	 the	 use	 of	 land	 for	 agriculture	
purposes)	 should	 be	 prioritised	 over	 environmental	 protection.	 This	 group	 was	
constituted	mainly	of	law-makers	who	self-identify	as	part	of	the	‘rural	caucus’	of	the	
National	Congress,	agribusiness,	and	some	members	of	the	executive	government.	The	
second	coalition	identified	was	directly	opposed	to	any	changes	to	the	previous	forest	
regulations	and	held	a	preservationist	perspective.	 It	 argued	 that	previous	 standards	
were	sufficient	and	that	their	enforcement	should	be	made	even	stricter.	This	coalition	
was	 formed	of	 politicians	 of	 the	 ‘environmentalist	 caucus’	 of	 the	National	 Congress,	
members	of	the	scientific	community	who	were	active	in	the	debate,	NGOs	and	parts	
of	 associations	 of	 rural	 workers	 and	 the	 executive	 government.	 Finally,	 the	 third	
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coalition	 defined	 its	 position	 after	 the	 dissensus	 between	 the	 previous	 two	 was	
settled.	It	displayed	a	middle-ground	position,	according	to	which	some	changes	to	the	
previous	regulation	were	necessary	to	improve	the	capacity	of	state	enforcement	(due	
to	inconsistencies	between	the	previous	regulation	and	other	sectors’	regulations)	and	
also	 to	 favour	 small	 land	 owners.	 This	 group	 displayed	 a	 mix	 of	 administrative	
economic	rationalism,	according	to	which	the	state	should	favour	economic	activities	
while	 maintaining	 strong	 and	 centralised	 controls,	 and	 socio-environmentalism,	
according	 to	 which	 minorities	 should	 be	 protected	 and	 allowed	 the	 liberty	 to	 use	
nature	as	they	see	fit.	This	third	coalition	was	composed	mainly	of	law	makers	of	the	
Workers’	Party	(PT),	the	majority	of	the	executive	government,	the	industry	of	planted	
forests	and	a	few	representatives	of	other	smaller	parties.	
4.2.2.	The	Different	Positions	
The	third	version	of	the	Brazilian	Forest	Code	was	published	on	25th	May,	
2012	 (Law	nº	 12.651).	 Its	main	 differences	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 previous	 code	 are	 that	
required	areas	of	permanent	preservation	were	reduced	and	the	restoration	of	areas	–	
either	of	permanent	preservation	or	 legal	 reserves	–	 that	had	been	degraded	before	
the	22nd	July,	2008,	were	no	longer	required.44	Thus,	if	 illegal	deforestation	occurred	
before	this	date	and	land	owners	were	already	using	the	areas	for	other	activities	they	
became,	 according	 to	 the	 changes	 promoted	 by	 the	 new	 code,	 exempt	 from	
restoration	 requirements.	 Another	 change	brought	 about	 by	 the	 2012	 code	was	 the	
dimensions	of	permanent	preservation	areas.		These	became	associated	with	the	size	
of	the	properties	and	no	longer	with	ecological	characteristics	(such	as	the	width	of	the	
river)	 as	 had	 previously	 been	 the	 case.	 Finally,	 a	 ceiling	was	 fixed	 for	 the	maximum	
total	 area	 of	 permanent	 preservation	 to	 be	 maintained	 on	 small	 and	 medium	
properties	 (see	 table	 9	 for	 a	 comparison	of	 the	main	differences	between	 the	 three	
Brazilian	forest	codes).	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
44	Just	to	recapitulate,	here	are	the	categories	of	the	Forest	Code:	legal	reserve	are	shares	(percentages)	
of	the	property	that	must	be	entirely	conserved;	permanent	preservation	areas	 include	riparian	zones,	
steep	slopes	and	the	top	of	hills	and	mountains;	and	areas	of	free	use	consist	in	the	rest	of	the	property	
where	forests	can	be	removed	for	agricultural	production	or	any	other	activity.	
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Table	9	-	Comparison	between	forest	codes	
	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	based	on	the	laws.	
	
As	 demonstrated	 in	 section	 4.2.2,	 alterations	 to	 the	 Forest	 Code	 were	 the	
most	 salient	 issue	 in	 the	Brazilian	 forest	 subsystem	 in	 the	period	between	2005	and	
2015.	For	the	analysis	of	the	main	actors	in	this	debate,	1,495	articles	from	the	Lower	
Chamber’s	News	Agency	were	analysed	corresponding	to	all	the	articles	containing	the	
expression	‘forest	code’	published	between	2005	and	2015	on	the	Chamber’s	website.	
With	 the	 aid	 of	 the	 Lower	 Chamber’s	website	 search	 engine,	 a	 total	 of	 74	 different	
actors	were	identified	in	these	1,495	articles,	68	of	them	with	identifiable	positions	in	
relation	to	the	new	Forest	Code.	Their	names,	professional	affiliation	and	the	number	
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of	 times	 they	were	mentioned	 is	 described	 in	 appendix	 I.	 From	 these	1,495	 articles,	
207	 articles	 were	 selected	 according	 to	 their	 relevance	 (based	 on	 their	 titles	 and	
summaries)	 for	 a	 more	 in-depth	 analysis.	 This	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 actors	 can	 be	
divided	 into	 three	 groups	 according	 to	 their	 main	 positions.	 Those	 supporting	
extensive	 changes	 to	 the	 previous	 Forest	 Code,	 those	 supporting	 some	 changes	
(mainly	intended	to	favour	small	land	holders),	and	those	opposing	any	changes	to	the	
previous	 regulation.	 The	 categorisation	 of	 actors	 took	 into	 consideration	 the	 three	
most	conflict-heavy	topics:	1)	the	size	and	definition	of	the	riparian	buffer	zone,	2)	the	
requirements	 for	 the	 restoration	 of	 areas	 illegally	 degraded	 in	 the	 past	 and,	 3)	 the	
requirements	of	legal	reserve.	Actors	tended	to	be	coherent	over	time	in	opposing	all	
changes	in	these	three	areas,	supporting	marked	changes	or	partial	changes.		
The	 arguments	 of	 those	 defending	 no	 changes	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	
previous	 regulations	 maintained	 that	 riparian	 buffer	 zones	 (areas	 of	 permanent	
preservation)	 should	 be	 determined	 according	 to	 the	 width	 of	 the	 river	 and	 should	
correspond	to:	
• 30	metres	for	rivers	up	10	metres	wide,		
• 50	metres	for	rivers	between	10	and	50	metres,		
• 100	metres	for	rivers	between	50	and	200	metres	wide,		
• 200	metres	for	rivers	between	200	and	600	metres	wide,		
• 500	metres	for	rivers	wider	than	600	metres.	
	
For	 this	 group,	 the	 tops	 and	 sides	 of	 mountains,	 areas	 higher	 than	 1,800	
metres,	 sandbanks,	 and	 river	 springs	 should	 continue	 to	 be	 considered	 areas	 of	
permanent	 preservation	 as	 stated	 in	 the	 previous	 code.	 Additionally,	 any	 previously	
degraded	 permanent	 preservation	 or	 legal	 reserve	 areas	 should	 be	 completely	
restored,	 regenerated	or	 compensated	 for,	 independently	of	when	degradation	 took	
place.	Finally,	they	maintained	that	the	percentage	of	the	properties	to	be	conserved	
as	legal	reserve	should	be	at	80%	for	properties	located	in	the	Amazon	region,	30%	for	
properties	located	in	the	cerrado,	and	20%	in	other	regions	of	the	country,	and	should	
be	 measured	 separately	 from	 permanent	 preservation	 areas.	 Among	 the	 68	 actors	
with	 identifiable	 positions	 in	 the	 debates	 about	 the	 new	 code,	 22	 supported	 this	
position.	 Because	 of	 the	 undisputed	 priority	 placed	 on	 environmental	 protection,	
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despite	 economic	 costs,	 by	 this	 group,	 their	 arguments	 were	 categorised	 as	
‘preservationist’.	
Directly	 opposing	 this	 group’s	 views	 were	 the	 proposals	 of	 the	 group	
advocating	extensive	changes	to	the	previous	regulation.	This	group	organised	around	
the	main	 argument	 that	 riparian	buffer	 zones	 (areas	of	 permanent	preservation)	 for	
rivers	up	to	five	metres	should	not	be	larger	than	15	metres,	but	that	these	should	be	
allowed	 to	be	 reduced	 to	7.5	metres	by	 state-level	 (regional)	 regulations.	This	group	
did	not	advocate	changes	to	the	required	buffer	area	for	larger	rivers	and	river	springs,	
but	 proposed	 changes	 to	 the	 measurement	 methods.	 Measures	 should	 be	 taken,	
according	 to	 this	 group,	 from	 the	 lower	margin	 of	 the	 river	 (dry	 season)	 instead	 of	
from	 the	highest	margin,	 as	previously	 advanced	by	 the	 regulation.	Additionally,	 the	
proposal	 was	 that	 the	 protection	 applied	 to	 mountains,	 areas	 higher	 than	 1,800	
metres,	 and	 sandbanks	 should	 be	 removed.	 In	 terms	 of	 legal	 reserves,	 although	 the	
proportion	 of	 legal	 reserve	 areas	 per	 region	 was	maintained,	 it	 was	 suggested	 that	
having	 legal	 reserves	 should	 no	 longer	 be	 required	 for	 small	 properties	 (up	 to	 four	
‘fiscal	modules’	–	a	variable	measure	fixed	by	municipalities	and	varying	 from	five	to	
110	hectares	depending	on	the	region	of	the	country).	Larger	properties,	on	the	other	
hand,	would	have	their	area	of	legal	reserve	calculated	only	in	relation	to	the	area	that	
exceeded	four	fiscal	modules	and	it	was	proposed	that	permanent	preservation	areas	
should	be	considered	in	the	calculation	of	total	legal	reserves	areas.	Finally,	according	
to	 this	proposal,	 farmers	who	had	degraded	more	 than	allowed	would	be	no	 longer	
punished	 if	 the	degradation	occurred	before	July	2008	–	the	date	when	the	Brazilian	
Law	 of	 Environmental	 Crimes	 was	 published	 (a	 report	 produced	 by	 the	 Special	
Commission	 on	 the	 Forest	 Code,	 Deputy	 Aldo	 Rebelo,	 June	 2010).	 In	 practice	 this	
proposal	meant	 that	 the	 punishment	 for	 degradation,	which	 had	 been	 considered	 a	
crime	by	the	previous	code,	should	be	waived.	21	of	the	68	actors	tended	towards	this	
position,	 which	 was	 categorised	 as	 ‘neo-developmentalist’	 because	 of	 the	
predominance	 of	 economic	 concerns	 around	 increasing	 the	 available	 land	 for	
agriculture,	despite	environmental	costs.	
The	 middle-ground	 position	 accepted	 that	 changes	 were	 required	 but	
suggested	 more	 moderate	 alternatives.	 Although	 different	 conciliatory	 propositions	
were	advanced,	the	one	most	frequently	referred	to	was	that	supported	by	members	
of	the	executive	government,	federal	deputies,	and	senators	from	the	Workers’	Party.	
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This	group	often	based	 its	arguments	on	the	need	to	alter	 the	regulation	 in	order	 to	
protect	 family/small	 farmers	but	defended	strict	 requirements	 for	 large	 land	holders	
(even	 though	 some	 of	 their	 proposals	 also	 benefited	 large	 farmers).	 For	 this	 group,	
riparian	 buffer	 zones	 (permanent	 preservation	 areas)	 should	 have	 the	 following	
measures:		
	
• 8	metres	for	properties	between	1	and	2	fiscal	modules,	
• 15	metres	for	properties	between	2	and	4	fiscal	modules,	
• 20	metres	for	properties	between	4	and	10	fiscal	modules,	given	that	
the	river	is	not	wider	than	10	metres	and	between	30	and	100	metres	
of	buffer	zones	for	wider	rivers,	
• Between	 30	 and	 100	 metres	 for	 properties	 larger	 than	 10	 fiscal	
modules.	
	
They	therefore	reduced	the	preservation	requirements	for	very	small	land-
holders	 by	 even	 more	 than	 was	 initially	 suggested	 by	 the	 advocates	 of	 extensive	
changes,	 and	 maintained	 what	 was	 proposed	 by	 them	 in	 relation	 to	 properties	
between	two	and	four	modules.	They	also	supported	the	group	promoting	extensive	
changes	 by	 establishing	 a	 ceiling	 for	 the	 amount	 of	 riparian	 areas	 that	 should	 be	
preserved	 based	 on	 the	 size	 of	 the	 property	 (see	 table	 10	 below).	 The	 reason	 they	
were	 categorised	 as	 more	 moderate	 by	 this	 analysis	 is	 that	 they	 also	 opposed	
proposals	from	the	extensive	change	group.	For	instance,	their	proposals	did	not	allow	
small	 farmers	 to	 keep	 legal	 reserves	 unrestored	 (or	 no	 longer	 have	 them)	 and	 also	
supported	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 requirement	 for	 the	 preservation	 of	 mountains,	
areas	 higher	 than	 1,800	 metres,	 and	 sandbanks.	 They	 have,	 therefore,	 advanced	 a	
middle-ground	 proposal	 on	 the	main	 areas	 of	 disagreement	 between	 the	 two	 other	
groups	while	at	 the	same	time	 furthering	 flexibilisation	 for	very	small	 farmers	 (up	 to	
two	 fiscal	 modules).	 25	 out	 of	 68	 actors	 were	 found	 to	 position	 themselves	 in	 this	
group,	 which	 mixed	 elements	 of	 socio-environmentalist	 discourse	 (regarding	 the	
protection	 of	 small	 farmers)	 and	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 discourse	 (in	
relation	 to	 the	 flexibilisation	 of	 rules	 to	 favour	 the	 economic	 use	 of	 land,	while	 still	
maintaining	strict	governmental	standards).	
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Table	10	-	Main	positions	and	number	of	actors	in	each	coalition	
	 	
POSITION	1:	No	
regulatory	changes	
(preservationist)	
	
	
POSITION	2:	Extensive	
regulatory	changes	
(neo-developmentalist)	
	
POSITION	3:	Partial	regulatory	
changes	(administrative	
economic	rationalist/socio-
environmentalist)	
	
Area	of	
permanent	
protection	
(riparian	and	
other	buffer	
zones)	
-		30	metres	for	rivers	
up	10	metres	wide		
-	50	metres	for	rivers	
between	10	and	50	
metres		
-	100	metres	for	rivers	
between	50	and	200	
metres	wide		
-	200	metres	for	rivers	
between	200	and	600	
metres	wide		
-	500	metres	for	rivers	
wider	than	600	metres	
	
Top	and	side	of	
mountains,	areas	
higher	than	1,800	
metres,	sandbanks,	and	
river	springs	should	
continue	to	be	
considered	areas	of	
permanent	
preservation	
-	For	rivers	up	to	5	metres,	
not	larger	than	15	metres,	
but	these	should	be	
allowed	to	be	reduced	
down	to	7.5	metres	by	
state-level	(regional)	
regulations		
-	Measurement	methods	
should	be	changed:	
measures	should	be	taken	
from	the	lower	margin	of	
the	river	(dry	season)	
instead	of	from	the	highest	
(rainy	season)	
	
There	should	be	no	
required	protection	to	
mountains,	areas	higher	
than	1,800	metres,	and	
sandbanks.	
-	8	metres	for	properties	
between	1	and	2	fiscal	modules	
-	15	metres	for	properties	
between	2	and	4	fiscal	modules	
-	20	metres	for	properties	
between	4	and	10	fiscal	modules,	
given	that	the	river	is	not	wider	
than	10	metres		
-	Between	30	and	100	metres	for	
wider	rivers.	
Between	30	and	100	metres	for	
properties	larger	than	10	fiscal	
modules	
	
A	ceiling	should	be	established	in	
terms	of	the	percentage	of	the	
property	occupied	by	areas	of	
permanent	protection	
	
Top	and	side	of	mountains,	areas	
higher	than	1,800	metres,	
sandbanks,	and	river	springs	
should	continue	to	be	considered	
areas	of	permanent	preservation.	
Restoration	
Requirements	
Any	previously	
degraded	permanent	
preservation	or	legal	
reserve	area	should	be	
completely	restored,	
regenerated	or	
compensated	for,	
independently	of	when	
degradation	took	place.	
Farmers	should	restore	
degraded	areas,	but	only	
areas	degraded	before	July	
2008.	
Farmers	should	restore	degraded	
areas,	but	only	areas	degraded	
before	July	2008.		
Legal	Reserve	
Legal	reserve	should	
consist	of	80%	for	
properties	located	in	
the	Amazon	region,	
30%	for	properties	
located	in	the	Cerrado,	
and	20%	in	other	
regions	of	the	country	
and	be	equally	applied	
to	large	and	small	
properties	
	
	
No	legal	reserves	should	be	
required	for	small	
properties	(up	to	4	‘fiscal	
modules’).		
Larger	properties,	should	
have	their	areas	of	legal	
reserve	calculated	only	in	
relation	to	the	area	that	
exceeds	4	fiscal	modules	
and	permanent	
preservation	areas	should	
be	considered	in	the	
calculation	of	total	legal	
reserve	areas.	
Legal	reserve	should	consist	of	
80%	for	properties	located	in	the	
Amazon	region,	30%	for	
properties	located	in	the	
Cerrado,	and	20%	in	other	
regions	of	the	country	and	be	
equally	applied	to	large	and	small	
properties	
	
Number	of	
actors	
22	 21	 25	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
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4.2.3.	The	Narratives	
4.2.3.1	Thematic	coding	and	argumentative	map			
During	 the	 content	 analysis	 of	 the	 texts,	 the	 arguments	 of	 the	 group	
supporting	extensive	changes	 to	 the	previous	 regulation	was	 inductively	divided	 into	
four	large	codes,	which	were	the	most	frequently	mentioned	in	the	texts	analysed:	1)	
agribusiness’s	contribution	to	the	country’s	economy	(mainly	increased	exports	and	job	
openings),	 2)	 the	 need	 to	 guarantee	 food	 security	 by	 permitting	 more	 areas	 to	 be	
cultivated,	 3)	 the	nationalist	 argument,	which	highlights	 the	 fact	 that	Brazil	 protects	
the	most	forest	areas	of	anywhere	in	the	world	and,	4)	 legal	security,	suggesting	that	
regulatory	 changes	are	necessary	 in	order	 for	 those	who,	 in	 the	past,	 complied	with	
other	regulations	(such	as	the	Land	Statute,	which	ensured	 land	ownership	based	on	
the	 use	 of	 lands)	 to	 avoid	 being	 punished	 by	 contemporary	 environmental	
requirements.	
In	 opposition	 to	 these	 arguments,	 those	 opposing	 any	 regulatory	 change	
repeatedly	emphasised	that	1)	the	government	was	captured	by	the	private	interests	
of	agribusiness	and,	therefore,	was	not	acting	in	a	way	that	considered	the	public	good	
of	society	(capture).	From	this	broader	criticism,	two	narratives	emerged:	2)	criticism	
of	 establishing	 a	 deadline	 before	 which	 restoration	 would	 not	 be	 necessary	 -	 the	
amnesty	argument,	3)	criticism	of	the	ecological	 losses	associated	with	the	reduction	
of	permanent	preservation	areas	and	the	flexibilisation	of	how	legal	reserves	should	be	
calculated.	Finally,	two	topics	were	formulated	by	this	group	in	direct	opposition	to	the	
food	 security	 and	 economic	 contribution	of	 agribusiness	 arguments.	 The	 first	 argues	
that	 4)	agribusiness	 is	 not	 responsible	 for	 feeding	 Brazilians,	 as	 they	 export	most	 of	
their	 production	while	 Brazilians	 are	 fed	 by	 small	 farmers,	 and	 the	 second	 that	 it	 is	
possible	 5)	 to	 reconcile	 increased	 agricultural	 economic	 contribution	 to	 the	 country	
with	 environmental	 protection	 by	 applying	 more	 technology	 to	 increase	 the	
productivity	of	land.	
The	coalition	supporting	partial	regulatory	changes	based	their	positioning	
on	four	different	arguments,	all	of	them	related	to	the	need	to	protect	small	farmers,	
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who	 (in	 this	 view)	 should	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 demands	 of	 environmental	
protection	as	 large	farmers	due	to	their	economic	vulnerability.	First,	they	also	relied	
on	the	argument	about	1)	food	security,	however	the	focus	was	placed	on	small	 land	
holders	and	followed	the	criticism	from	the	no-changes	coalition	that	small	farmers	are	
those	 that	 actually	 produce	 the	 food	 that	 is	 consumed	 in	 Brazil.	 It	 is	 stated	 that	 by	
scaling	 the	 protection	 requirements	 according	 to	 the	 size	 of	 farms	 (the	 famous	
‘ladder’),	as	well	as	by	setting	limits	on	the	total	size	of	protected	areas,	family	farmers	
would	be	benefited.	Second,	the	partial	alterations	to	the	code	are	defended	against	
the	argument	of	those	who	want	the	status	quo	to	be	maintained	by	the	use	of	more	
technology	 through	 the	 argument	 that	 (2)	 small	 farmers	 cannot	 afford	 to	 use	more	
technology	due	to	their	economic	vulnerability,	so	required	protection	should	actually	
be	made	more	flexible	for	them.	This	group	counters	the	nationalist	argument	through	
the	 idea	 that	 (3)	associating	 the	 level	of	protection	with	 the	size	of	properties	 is	 fair	
and,	finally,	agrees	with	those	proposing	radical	reforms	by	also	maintaining	that	the	
government	has	to	guarantee	(4)	 legal	security	to	all	farmers	(so	legislation	has	to	be	
altered).	
The	main	arguments	used	by	each	coalition	are	arranged	 in	 the	 following	
argumentative	map,	a	presentation	strategy	proposed	by	Dunn	(2012).	All	codes	used	
and	 described	 herein	 are	 further	 clarified	 through	 some	 of	 their	 respective	 quotes	
included	in	appendix	III,	IV	and	V	of	this	chapter	for	verification.		
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Figure	5	-	Argumentative	map	of	the	debate	about	the	new	forest	code	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author.	
	 	
	
4.2.3.2	Narrative	Analysis	
In	 the	 narrative	 analysis45	 of	 the	 data,	 four	 discourses	 (or	 settings)	 were	
identified,	 which	 characterised	 the	 three	 coalitions	 described	 above.	 First,	 those	
supporting	extensive	changes	 to	 the	 regulation	 focused	on	 the	 importance	 it	has	 for	
the	economic	development	and	portrayed	environmental	impacts	as	a	necessary	cost	
to	 be	 paid.	 This	 is	 typical	 of	 a	 developmentalist	 discourse.	 Second,	 those	 opposing	
changes	 to	 the	previous	 regulation	based	 their	position	on	 the	need	 to	preserve	 the	
environment,	 even	 though	economic	 losses	will	 be	 incurred.	 This	 closely	 reflects	 the	
preservationist	discourse.	The	third,	more	moderate	narrative,	supported	the	change	
of	a	few	parts	of	the	code	to	accommodate	the	economic	demand	for	more	 land	for	
agriculture	with	the	maintenance	of	the	majority,	but	not	all,	environmental	protection	
requirements.	Due	to	the	idea	that	environmental	protection	can	be	balanced	with	the	
ideal	of	economic	development	through	specific	rules	(thresholds)	and	also	due	to	the	
focus	on	protecting	more	vulnerable	populations	(small	 farmers)	elements	from	both	
																																								 																				
45	Drawn	from	the	‘Narrative	Analysis	Framework’	by	Jones	and	McBeth	(2010).	
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the	administrative	economic	rationalist	and	from	the	socio-environmentalist	discourses	
were	identified	in	the	narratives	advanced	by	this	third	group.		
The	 main	 ‘victims’,	 ‘villains’	 and	 ‘heroes’	 of	 these	 three	 groups	 were	
considerably	 coherent	 among	 actors	 and	 are	 summarised	 in	 table	 11	 below.	 The	
victims	 of	 those	 proposing	 extensive	 regulatory	 changes	 were,	 for	 example,	 the	
farmers,	 who	 were	 portrayed	 as	 constantly	 under	 attack	 by	 unrealistic	 regulatory	
requirements.	The	villains	of	that	narrative	were	environmentalists,	who	were	seen	to	
be	driven	by	international	interests	and	not	interested	in	what’s	best	for	the	country.	
The	 heroes	 were	 once	 again	 farmers	 who,	 even	 though	 they	 had	 to	 face	 this	
disproportionate	 regulatory	 burden,	 were	 still	 the	 main	 actors	 responsible	 for	 the	
economic	 success	 of	 the	 country.	 For	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist/socio-
environmentalist	 discourse	 the	 victims	 were	 small	 farmers	 and	 society,	 who	 were	
vulnerable	 to	old	and	 incoherent	 regulations.	The	main	villain	 in	 their	 story	was	bad	
past	 regulation	 (and	 so,	 indirectly,	 the	past	 governments	 that	 formulated	 them)	and	
the	heroes	were	small	farmers	(i.e.	those	who	actually	feed	Brazilians)	and	the	current	
government	 (i.e.	 the	 sensible	 government	 proposing	 proportionate	 and	 coherent	
regulations).	Finally,	for	those	advancing	the	maintenance	of	previous	regulations,	the	
villains	were	certainly	the	members	of	agribusiness	who	had	captured	the	government	
and	convinced	it	to	make	regulations	that	would	be	favourable	to	their	interests.	The	
victims	 would	 be	 society	 as	 a	 whole,	 future	 generations	 and	 whoever	 incurred	 the	
costs	of	complying	with	previous	regulations	(which	were	now	being	altered	to	favour	
those	who	did	not	comply),	and	the	heroes	would	be	environmentalists	and	scientists	
who	were	opposing	 this	unacceptable	proposal	and	protecting	 the	public	good.	 	The	
main	 ‘plots’	 (which	were	already	described	 in	 the	process	of	argument	mapping)	are	
also	described	in	table	11.	
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Table	11	-	Narrative	analysis	
Policy	Problem	 SETTING	 VICTIMS	 VILLAINS	 HEROES	 MAIN	PLOTS	
CHANGES	TO	
THE	FOREST	
CODE	
Neo-
developmentalist	
(extensive	
changes)	
Farmers	
	 Environmentalists	 Farmers	
Farmers	provide	the	
country	with	food	security	
	
Farmers	help	in	the	
economic	development	of	
the	country	
	
No	other	country	has	
forest	protection	
regulations	as	strict	as	
ours,	which	put	us	at	a	
disadvantage	
Administrative	
economic	
rationalist	/	socio-
environmentalist	
(partial	changes)	
Farmers	
	
Society		
Bad	past	
regulation		
Small	farmers	
	
Current	
government	
Small	farmers	assure	the	
country’s	food	security	
	
Small	farmers	are	poor	and	
cannot	afford	
technological	solutions	
	
Government	should	
provide	legal	security	to	
farmers	
	
Preservationists	
(no	changes)	
Society	
	
Future	
generations	
	
Whoever	has	
complied	with	
previous	
regulations	
Large	farmers	
Environmenta
lists	
		
Scientists	
Government	has	been	
captured	by	agri-business	
	
Amnesty	of	past	wrong-
doings	(deforestation)	is	
unfair	
	
Environmental	losses	will	
be	huge	with	new	rules	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	based	on	media	publications	
	
	
	
	
	
	
4.2.4.	The	Coalitions	
The	description	of	the	number	of	actors	analysed	per	party	or	social	group	is	
presented	in	appendix	II	for	this	chapter.	These	were	coded	according	to	the	positions	
they	expressed	during	debates.	 In	Graph	2	below	are	the	descriptive	statistics	of	 the	
percentage	of	actors	within	each	group	favouring	none,	some	or	extensive	regulatory	
changes,	respectively.		
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Graph	2	 -	Percentage	of	Actors	 in	each	Group	Supporting	None,	Partial	or	Extensive	Changes	 to	 the	
Previous	Forest	Regulation	
PV:	Green	 Party.	 Psol:	 Socialism	 and	 Freedom	 Party.	 PSB:	 Socialist	 Brazilian	 Party.	 NGOs:	 SOS	Mata	
Atlântica,	 Greenpeace,	 Instituto	 SocioAmbiental	 (ISA)	 Instituto	 de	 Pesquisa	 Ambiental	 da	 Amazônia	
(IPAM).	Scientists:	EMBRAPA,	ABC,	SBPC,	USP,	UFSC,	Inpa,	Centro	Universitário	do	Oeste	Paulista.	Rural	
Workers:	 CONTAG,	 Fetraf-Sul,	 Via	 Campesina,	 Sindicato	 Nacional	 dos	 Trabalhadores	 de	 Pesquisa	 e	
Desenvolvimento	Agropecuário.	Industry	(planted	forests):	Abracelpa,	ABRAF,	Fibria.	PT:	Workers	Party.	
Executive	Power:	President	Dilma,	3	ministers	of	environment,	3	ministers	of	agriculture.	PSDB:	Party	of	
Brazilian	 Social	 Democracy.	 DEM:	Democratics	 (Party).	PMDB:	Brazilian	 Democratic	Movement	 Party.	
Industry	 (agribusiness):	 National	 Confederation	 of	 Agriculture	 (CNA).	 PP:	 Progressive	 Party.	 PCdoB:	
Communist	Party	from	Brazil.	PDT:	Democratic	Work	Party.	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
The	actors	most	active	in	the	no-changes	(preservationist)	coalition	were:	
• Political	 parties:	 PV	 (Green	 Party),	 Psol	 (Socialism	 and	 Freedom	 Party),	 PSB	
(Socialist	Brazilian	Party);	
• NGOs:	SOS	Mata	Atlântica,	Greenpeace,	Instituto	SocioAmbiental	(ISA)	Instituto	
de	Pesquisa	Ambiental	da	Amazônia	(IPAM)			
• Several	scientists:	mainly	from	ABC,	SBPC,	USP,	Unicamp	and	Inpa	in	the	case	of	
the	first	‘no-changes’	coalition		
	
The	 actors	most	 active	 in	 the	 ‘extensive	 changes’	 (neo-developmentalist)	
coalition	were:	
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• Deputies	 from:	 the	 PSDB	 (Party	 of	 Brazilian	 Social	 Democracy),	 DEM	
(Democratic	 Party),	 PMDB	 (Brazilian	 Democratic	 Movement	 Party);	 PP:	
Progressive	Party;	PCdoB	-	Communist	Party	from	Brazil	and	PDT	-	Democratic	
Work	Party;	
• Agribusiness	-	National	Confederation	of	Agriculture	(CNA).		
	
Finally,	 the	moderate	coalition	 (administrative	economic	 rationalist/socio-
environmentalist)	was	largely	formed	of:	
• Members	of	the	executive	power	(ministers	and	the	president),		
• Representatives	of	the	Workers’	Party	in	the	Congress,	
• 	Representatives	of	the	planted	forest	industry	(Abracelpa,	ABRAF,	Fibria)	who	
were,	 however,	 slightly	 closer	 to	 the	 position	 of	 the	 preservationist	 coalition	
than	 the	 other	 members	 of	 the	moderate	 coalition	 (but	 still	 accepted	many	
changes	to	the	previous	code).		
	
None	of	the	coalitions	had	all	its	proposals	adopted.	The	final	results	were	
a	 reflection	 of	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 and	 of	 the	 administrative	
economic	 rationalist/socio-environmentalist	 coalitions.	 The	 neo-developmentalists	
were	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 ‘winning’	 coalition	 because	 they	 demanded	 regulatory	
reforms	in	the	first	place.	Therefore	they	succeeded	in	putting	the	issue	on	the	agenda	
and	 in	getting	several	of	 their	demands	approved.	The	other	coalitions	responded	to	
the	 demands	 of	 the	 latter,	 either	 by	 opposing	 any	 changes	 (preservationists)	 or	 by	
trying	 to	 impede	 that	 the	 changes	 be	 as	 drastic	 as	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 group	
initially	 intended	 (administrative	 economic	 rationalist/socio-environmentalist	
coalition).	
	
4.2.5.	Conclusion	
The	analysis	of	the	coalitions	that	were	formed	during	this	highly	adversarial	
standard-setting	 process	 revealed	 three	 main	 positions.	 First,	 the	 position	 of	 those	
advancing	extensive	changes	to	the	previous	regulation	in	order	to	reduce	the	burden	
104	
	
of	environmental	conservation	for	farmers.	This	coalition	was	found	to	promote	neo-
developmentalist	 arguments	 stressing	 the	 importance	 of	 agriculture	 and	 of	 the	
availability	of	more	agricultural	land	for	the	country’s	economic	development.	Second,	
the	position	of	actors	strongly	opposing	any	regulatory	reform,	which	was	found	to	be	
associated	with	preservationist	narratives	according	to	which	the	environment	should	
be	protected	against	all	odds.	Finally,	a	third,	more	moderate,	coalition	supported	the	
idea	 that	 the	 code	 should	 be	 changed,	 but	 a	 few	 environmental	 conservation	
measures	 should	 be	 maintained	 and	 the	 main	 focus	 of	 the	 changes	 should	 be	 the	
protection	 of	 family	 farmers.	 The	 arguments	 put	 forward	 by	 this	 third	 coalition	
depicted	 narratives	 that	 are	 associated	 with	 a	 socio-environmentalist	 perspective,	
according	to	which	more	vulnerable	populations	should	be	allowed	liberty	in	the	use	of	
environmental	resources,	but	they	exhibited	elements	of	the	administrative	economic	
rationalist	perspective,	according	to	which	environmental	conservation	and	economic	
development	 can	 be	 reconciled	 through	 the	 implementation	 of	 centralised	 and	
detailed	rules.	
The	argument	mapping	and	narrative	analysis	pursued	in	this	part	provided	a	
dynamic	 analysis	 of	 the	 debate	 and	 was	 useful	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 more	
moderate	 arguments	 of	 the	 ‘partial-changes’	 coalition	 emerged	 only	 after	 the	
dissensus	 among	 the	 two	 first	 groups	 has	 already	 been	 established,	 and	 featured	 a	
more	conciliatory	nature,	incorporating	arguments	and	counter-arguments	from	both	
initial	 coalitions.	 Finally,	 it	 was	 demonstrated	 that,	 although	 none	 of	 the	 coalitions	
were	 successful	 in	 having	 their	 positions	 fully	 represented	by	 the	2012	 Forest	 Code,	
the	most	successful	coalition	was	the	neo-developmentalist	one.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	
that	this	was	the	coalition	 initially	proposing	the	regulatory	changes	(while	the	other	
two	 only	 reacted)	 and	 also	 because	 many	 of	 their	 original	 proposals	 regarding	 the	
reduction	of	the	requirements	of	forested	areas	were	actually	approved.	
	
4.3.	ACF	Sources	of	Policy	Change	
4.3.1.	Introduction	
This	part	will	draw	on	the	first	 two	 in	order	to	assess	 the	reasons	 for	 the	
approval	of	the	2012	Forest	Code.	Following	the	ACF,	this	part	analyses	the	importance	
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of	external	and	internal	events,	negotiated	agreement	and	policy-oriented	learning	in	
the	 changes	 represented	 by	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 new	 code.	 It	 complements	 the	
previous	parts	by	providing	a	more	dynamic	analysis	of	the	debates	and	contributions.	
It	also	provides	an	analysis	of	external	events	that	is	also	applicable	to	the	other	two	
case	studies	and	will,	therefore,	only	be	provided	once.	
	
4.3.2.	External	Events	
The	 ACF	 emphasises	 that	 events	 external	 to	 the	 subsystem	 –	 namely	
changes	 in	 socioeconomic	 conditions,	 in	 public	 opinion,	 in	 the	 systemic	 governing	
coalition	and	 changes	 in	other	policy	 subsystems	–	might	promote	 changes	 in	policy	
core	beliefs	and,	as	a	consequence,	in	policies.	Having	considered	the	relevant	external	
events	 in	 Brazil	 between	 2005	 and	 2015,	 I	 maintain	 that	 changes	 in	 socioeconomic	
conditions	 and	 in	 the	 governing	 coalition	 were	 the	 most	 impactful	 to	 the	 changes	
occurring	 in	 environmental	 policies,	 particularly	 the	 boom	 in	 the	 export	 of	
commodities	 and	 the	 ascendance	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 power	 of	 the	
agribusiness	sector.		
Agribusiness	is	one	of	the	most	competitive	businesses	in	Brazil	and	is	one	
of	 the	main	 sectors	 responsible	 for	 the	 continuous	 growth	of	 the	Brazilian	economy	
during	the	1990s	and	2000s.	In	2015,	this	sector	accounted	for	approximately	23%	of	
Brazilian	GDP	and	for	44%	of	its	total	exports,	making	Brazil	the	fourth-largest	exporter	
of	commodities	in	the	world	only	behind	China,	India	and	the	US	(Bajpai,	2015).	Even	
though	it	is	a	highly	mechanised	and	technology-intensive	sector,	statistics	from	2013	
reveal	that	 in	that	year,	at	 least	a	third	of	the	active	 labour	force	of	the	country	was	
employed	 by	 this	 sector	 (PwC,	 2013).	 Brazilian	 agribusiness	 has	 noticeable	
participation	in	several	major	food	value	chains,	namely:	oilseeds	and	grain	(soybean,	
corn,	 cotton,	 coffee),	 animal	 protein	 (bovine,	 poultry	 and	 pork),	 orange	 juice,	 and	
sugar	 and	 ethanol.	 Estimates	 point,	 in	 addition,	 to	 the	 high	 availability	 of	 resources	
such	 as	 land	 and	water	 that	 offer	 the	 sector	 significant	 potential	 for	 expansion.	 The	
sector	is	said	to	have	the	capacity	to	provide	for	up	to	40%	of	global	additional	demand	
for	food	until	2050	(PwC,	2013).		
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Between	2005	and	2015,	there	were	marked	changes	in	the	economic	and	
political	 power	 of	 the	 agribusiness	 sector.	 These	 were	 underpinned	 by	 two	 crucial	
external	events:	1)	 the	boom	in	the	exports	of	commodities	between	2009	and	2011,	
which	 provided	 the	 agribusiness	 sector	 with	 a	 considerable	 increase	 in	 economic	
power	and	2)	the	composition	of	the	National	Congress,	which	shifted	towards	a	more	
conservative	and	agribusiness-oriented	configuration	in	the	2011	election.46	These	two	
external	 events	 favoured	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 three	 cases	 investigated	 in	 this	 thesis	
through	 the	 redistribution	 of	 resources	 (political	 and	 economic	 power)	 among	
coalitions,	 mainly	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition,	 which,	 as	
already	observed,	started	to	predominate	after	the	mid-2000s.	
The	 boom	 in	 the	 exports	 of	 commodities	 favoured	 agribusiness	
economically,	both	because	of	increases	in	prices	and	in	the	quantity	of	exports.	As	can	
be	 seen	 in	 figure	6,	 after	 the	economic	 crisis	of	2008	until	 at	 least	 the	end	of	2011,	
there	 was	 a	 sharp	 increase	 in	 the	 prices	 of	 Brazilian	 exported	 commodities.	 This	 is	
often	attributed	to	the	fact	that	the	rising	demand	of	the	Chinese	market,	mainly	for	
soy,	pushed	commodity	prices	up,	directly	benefiting	countries	such	as	Brazil,	who	was	
already	 a	 competitive	 player	 in	 the	 commodity	 market.	 Other	 central	 products	 in	
Brazil-China	trade	relations,	such	as	iron	ore	and	oil,	also	saw	marked	price	increases	
between	2008	and	2012	(see	figure	7).	
In	addition	to	the	price	increases,	the	quantities	of	products	exported	also	
increased	slightly.	The	amount	of	commodity	exports	as	a	percentage	of	total	exports	
has	risen	from	63%	in	2009/10	to	65%	in	2012/13	in	Brazil,	with	food	items	making	up	
52%	of	the	total	commodity	exports	in	2012/13	(UNCTAD,	2014).	As	figure	8	indicates,	
moreover,	 agrifood	exports	have	been	on	 the	 rise	 in	Brazil,	with	a	particularly	 steep	
increment	 between	 2009	 and	 2011.	 Therefore,	 both	 prices	 and	 quantities	 of	
commodities	 exported	 attest	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 economic	 power	 of	 agribusiness	
sector	between	2008	and	2013.	
																																								 																				
46	Assessing	whether	the	increase	in	the	political	power	of	the	agribusiness	sector	can	be	attributed	to	
the	 increase	 in	 its	 economic	 power	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 thesis,	 but	 the	 temporal	 sequence	of	
increasing	economic	power	preceding	the	increase	in	political	power	indicates	that	this	is	likely	to	be	the	
case.	
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Figure	 6	 -	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean:	 real	 private	 investment	 and	 commodity	 export	 price	
growth,	2004–14.	
Source:	Magud	(2015).		Available	at:	http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2015/05/12/commodity-blues-corporate-investment-in-latin-
america/	Accessed	on:	29/05/2015	
	
	
Figure	7	-	Commodity	Prices	
Source:	CRB	Index/Tendências	Consultoria/	O	Estado	de	SP	(2015)	
	
	
Figure	8	-	Brazilian	agrifood	trade	between	1995	and	2013	
Source:	UN	CoTrade	database	(2013)	
	
The	 second	 external	 event	 identified	 as	 relevant	 for	 the	 resource	
redistribution	 among	 coalitions	 relevant	 in	 all	 three	 cases	 was	 the	 change	 in	 the	
composition	 of	 the	 National	 Congress,	 which	 shifted	 towards	 a	 considerably	 more	
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conservative	and	agribusiness-oriented	composition	 in	 the	2011	elections.	Data	 from	
DIAP	 (Departamento	 Intersindical	 de	 Assessoria	 Parlamentar)	 –	 a	 research	 institute	
that	analyses	the	ideological	affiliation	of	members	of	the	National	Congress	–	reveals	
that	 the	 number	 of	 federal	 deputies	 and	 senators	 who	 publicly	 admitted	 being	
supportive	of	agribusiness	demands	(and	who	self-identify	as	part	of	the	‘rural	caucus’)	
went	from	111	during	the	2003–2007	mandate	to	160	during	the	2011–2015	mandate,	
the	 latter	 being	 the	 period	 in	 which	 the	 three	 regulatory	 changes	 analysed	 by	 this	
thesis	 occurred	 (DIAP,	 2014).	 The	 political	 power	 of	 members	 of	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	coalition	(mainly	composed	by	members	of	the	rural	caucus)	 in	the	
National	Congress,	has,	therefore,	increased	in	this	time	period.	
Further	evidence	of	the	increase	in	the	political	power	of	the	agribusiness	
sector	relates	to	campaign	donations.	The	analysis	of	the	five	largest	campaign	donors	
to	the	winning	presidents	between	2002	and	2014	reveals	that	the	amount	donated	by	
agribusinesses	 increased	 considerably.	 In	 2002,	 the	main	 donors	 to	 Lula’s	 campaign	
were	either	 from	consumer	goods	or	banking	 industries	 (see	 table	12).	 In	2006,	 two	
agricultural	producers	were	 ranked	among	 the	 top	 five	donors,	with	one	 leading	 the	
group.	 In	2010,	during	Dilma	Rousseff’s	first	election,	the	meat	producer	JBS	was	the	
third-largest	 donor.	 In	 2014,	 the	 meat	 producer	 became	 the	 lead	 donor	 and	 the	
amount	donated	by	 these	 five	 top	contributors	was	nearly	 ten	 times	greater	 than	 in	
2002.	 This	 fact	 demonstrates	 not	 only	 the	 increased	 influence	 of	 the	 agribusiness	
sector	over	this	time,	but	also	the	greater	overall	importance	that	campaign	donations	
acquired	in	Brazilian	politics.	
	
	
Table	12	-	Top	5	donors	to	Lula’s	campaign	-	2002	
Source:	Transparencia	Brasil	http://www.asclaras.org.br		
	
Company	Name	 Sector	 Industry	 Sub-Industry	 Donation	in	
Reals	
Cia	de	Tecidos	Norte	de	Minas	 Consumer	
Discretionary	
Apparel	and	textile	
products	
Textile	products	 R$	2,060,625	
Banespa	S/A	 Financials	 Banking	 Banks	 R$	1,400,000	
Recofarma	Industria	do	Amazonas	
LTDA	(The	Coca	Cola	Company)	
Consumer	staples	 Consumer	products	 Beverages	 R$	1,000,000	
Js	Administracao	de	Recursos	S/A	 Finance	 Banking	 Banks	 R$	1,000,000	
Banco	Abn	Amro	Real	S/A	 Finance	 Banking	 Banks	 R$	650,000	
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Table	13	-	Top	5	donors	to	Lula’s	campaign	-	2006	
Source:	Transparencia	Brasil	http://www.asclaras.org.br		
	
Table	14	-	Top	5	donors	to	Dilma’s	campaign	-	2010	
Source:	Transparencia	Brasil	http://www.asclaras.org.br		
	
Table	15	-	Top	5	donors	to	Dilma’s	campaign	-	2014	
Company	Name	 Sector	 Industry	 Sub-industry	 Donation	in	
Reals	
JBS	S/A	 Consumer	staples	 Consumer	products	 Agricultural	
producers	
R$	20,000,000	
OAS	S/A	 Industrials	
	
Engineering	and	
construction	
Engineering	Services	 R$	20,000,000	
Andrade	Gutierrez	S/A	 Industrials	
	
Engineering	and	
construction	
Infrastructure		
construction	
R$	11,000,000	
Odebrecht	 Industrials	 Engineering	and	
construction	
Infrastructure		
construction	
R$	8,100,000	
Banco	BTG	Pactual	S/A	 Finance	
	
Institutional	financial	
services	
Institutional	
brokerage	
R$	6,500,000	
Source:	 Folha	 de	 Sao	 Paulo.	 http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2014/09/1519452-maior-doador-
de-campanhas-concentra-repasses-a-governistas.shtml		
	
There	 were,	 therefore,	 one	 socioeconomic	 and	 two	 political	 external	
events	influencing	the	distribution	of	resources	among	the	coalitions	active	in	debates	
about	environmental	regulations	in	Brazil.	The	socioeconomic	changes	arising	from	the	
increase	in	the	prices	and	quantities	of	commodities	exported	between	2008	and	2013	
and	the	marked	increase	in	participation	of	the	rural	caucus	in	the	National	Congress	
as	well	as	in	the	amount	of	presidency	campaign	donations	made	by	the	agribusiness	
sector.	
	
Company	Name	 Sector	 Industry	 Sub-industry	 Donations	in	
Reals	
Sucocitrico	Cutrale	LTDA	 Consumer	staples	 Consumer	products	 Agricultural	producers	 R$	4,000,000	
Itau	Unibanco	S.A.	 Finance	 Banking	 Diversified	banks	 R$	3,500,000	
Gerdau	Acos	Longos	S.A.	 Materials	 Iron	and	steel	 Steel	producers	 R$	3,100,000	
Jbs	S/A	 Consumer	staples	 Consumer	products	 Agricultural	producers	 R$	2,502,000	
Banco	Alvorada	S.A.	 Finance	 Banking	 Banks	 R$	2,500,000	
Company	Name	 Sector	 Industry	 Sub-industry	 Donation	in	
Reals	
	Andrade	Gutierrez	S/A	 Industrials	
	
Engineering	and	
construction	
Infrastructure		
construction	
R$	15,700,000	
Construcoes	e	Comercio	
Camargo	Correa	S/A	
Industrials	 Engineering	and	
construction	
Infrastructure		
construction	
R$	13,000,000	
Jbs	S/A	 Consumer	staples	 Consumer	products	 Agricultural	
producers	
R$	12,000,000	
Construtora	Queiroz	Galvao	S/A	 Industrials	
	
Engineering	and	
construction	
Infrastructure		
construction	
R$	7,880,000	
OAS	S/A	 Industrials	
	
Engineering	and	
construction	
Engineering	Services	 R$	7,400,000	
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4.3.3.	Internal	Events	
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 forest	 case	 revealed	 at	 least	 three	 important	 internal	
events	to	be	fundamental	triggers	of	the	reform	of	the	forest	code.	The	first	two	were	
the	assassination	of	the	rubber	tapper	Chico	Mendes	by	cattle	ranchers	in	1988	and	the	
1992	UN	Rio	Conference.	These	two	events	were	crucial	to	the	overall	 trend	towards	
stricter	forest	regulatory	enforcement	in	the	1990s	and	2000s,	as	described	in	part	4.1	
of	this	chapter.	The	high	international	visibility	brought	to	the	issue	of	deforestation	in	
Brazil	by	the	1992	UN	Rio	Conference,	and	by	the	Chico	Mendes	assassination	in	1988,	
saw	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 resources	 dedicated	 to	 environmental	 policies	 in	 Brazil,	 both	
from	 national	 and	 international	 sources.	 These	 two	 events	 improved	 forest	
preservation	 in	the	country,	both	because	of	an	 increase	 in	the	attention	paid	to	the	
‘people	of	the	forest’	and	their	important	role	in	preservation,	and	also	because	more	
resources	(technological	and	human)	were	made	available	to	tackle	deforestation.	
The	third	crucial	internal	event	was	the	Executive	Decree	7.029/09,	published	
in	 December	 2009.	 The	 decree	 fixed	 a	 deadline	 for	 farmers	 to	 comply	 with	 legal	
reserves	regulation.	 It	stated	that	by	2011	all	 farmers	should	be	compliant	with	 legal	
reserves	 regulations,	 otherwise	 they	 would	 be	 punished.	 This	 was	 identified	 as	 a	
crucial	 internal	event	underlying	the	subsequent	alteration	of	the	Forest	Code	due	to	
at	 least	 three	 factors.	 First,	 several	 actors	 explicitly	 referred	 to	 this	 decree	 while	
debating	the	reform	of	the	code	(it	was	mentioned	14	times	in	the	News	of	the	Lower	
Chamber	 in	 2011).	 Some	 actors,	 such	 as	 scientists	 (represented	 by	 SBPC	 and	 ABC),	
even	 suggested	 that	 instead	 of	 altering	 the	 entire	 code,	 the	 date	 of	 punishments	
predicted	by	 the	decree	should	simply	be	postponed	 (Lower	Chamber	News	Agency,	
25/04/2011).	The	President	of	the	Lower	Chamber	asked	the	environment	minister	to	
negotiate	this	date	and	she	accepted	the	postponement	of	punishment.	That	this	was	
even	 considered	 as	 an	 alternative	 already	 points	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 decree.	
Second,	the	temporal	coincidence	of	the	publication	of	this	decree	and	the	re-ignition	
of	debates	about	altering	the	Forest	Code	is	remarkable.	Old	 legislative	proposals	for	
reforming	 the	code	were	 revived	and	new	ones	 (such	as	 the	Project	of	Law	6227/09	
launched	in	October	2009)	were	made	at	almost	the	same	time	as	the	publication	of	
the	decree.	A	commission	for	the	debate	of	all	these	reform	proposals	was	formed	by	
the	 Lower	 Chamber	 on	 September	 2009,	 signalling	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 efforts	 that	
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would	 culminate	 in	 2012	with	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 new	 code.	 This	was	 four	months	
before	the	publication	of	the	decree,	but	not	necessarily	before	the	decree	had	started	
to	 be	 considered	 by	 the	 executive	 power	 and	 came	 to	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	 law	
makers.	 Third,	 the	Minister	 of	 the	 Environment,	 Izabella	 Teixeira,	when	 interviewed	
about	the	Forest	Code	explicitly	mentioned	that	“the	spark	that	ignited	the	new	Forest	
Code	 mayhem	 was	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	 Law	 of	 Environmental	 Crimes”	 in	 a	 clear	
reference	to	Decree	7.029/09	(interview	42,	30/10/15).	
	
4.3.4.	Negotiated	Agreement	
As	 mentioned	 in	 chapter	 2,	 ‘negotiated	 agreement’	 refers	 to	 “situations	 in	
which	coalitions	that	have	been	fighting	for	decades	come	to	a	negotiated	agreement	
representing	 a	 substantial	 change	 from	 the	 status	 quo”	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 to	
“agreements	involving	policy	core	changes	[that]	are	crafted	among	previously	warring	
coalitions”	 (Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007	p.	205).	 This	 sub-section	assesses	 the	 level	of	
negotiated	 agreement	 achieved	 between	 coalitions	 before	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 new	
forest	code.	It	argues	that	coalitions	achieved	a	very	low	level	of	negotiated	agreement	
and	maintains	that	it	is	because	of	a	‘hurting	stalemate’,	i.e.	the	most	crucial	motivator	
of	 negotiated	 agreement,	 according	 to	 the	 ACF,	 was	 not	 present	 (Weible	 and	
Nohrstedt,	2013,	p.	132;	Weible	and	Jenkins-Smith,	2016,	p.	24).	
As	 observed	 in	 chapter	 2	 (section	 2.3.4)	 the	 ACF	 does	 not	 provide	 any	
standardised	way	to	assess	the	level	of	negotiated	agreement	in	policy	subsystems.	As	
a	consequence,	three	observable	implications	were	proposed	and	will	be	used	in	this	
empirical	analysis:		
1. How	 often	 coalitions	 seek	 to	 influence	 decisions	 through	
instruments	that	are	not	based	on	personal	interaction	and	negotiation	(such	as	
vetoes,	 amendments	 and	 judicial	 actions).	 The	 analysis	 of	 this	 observable	
implication	 was	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 higher	 the	 frequency	 of	
recourse	 to	 these	 non-agreement	 based	mechanisms,	 the	 lower	 the	 level	 of	
negotiated	agreement	in	the	case.	
2. The	 number	 of	 venues	 used	 by	 actors	 during	 the	 negotiation	
process.	The	assumption	here	is	that	the	higher	the	number	of	venues	used	for	
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negotiation,	the	lower	the	level	of	negotiated	agreement.	The	logic	underlying	
this	assumption	is	that,	if	coalitions	maintain	negotiations	restricted	to	specific	
institutional	 venues	 (for	 example,	 within	 the	 National	 Congress	 or	 within	
specific	commissions	within	the	National	Congress)	and	do	not	seek	to	include	
other	venues	such	as	courts,	other	agencies	or	the	media,	then	that	means	that	
actors	 are	 satisfied	with	 the	 level	 of	 collaboration	 that	 is	 taking	place	 in	 that	
environment,	 so	 actors	 consider	 it	 legitimate	 to	 continue	 using	 it	 as	 the	 sole	
forum	for	debates	(Weible,	Pattinson	and	Sabatier,	2010).	On	the	other	hand,	if	
the	debate	is	taken	to	courts,	media,	independent	agencies	or	any	other	venue,	
it	indicates	less	negotiation	and	more	disagreement.	
3. The	 occurrence	 of	 ‘devil	 shift’,	 measured	 through	 the	
identification	of	personal	attacks	and	the	use	of	pejorative	terms	to	refer	to	the	
other	 coalitions	 during	 debates.	 The	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘devil	 shift’	 refers	 to	
situations	 in	 which	 “actors	 tend	 to	 view	 opponents	 as	 being	 more	 powerful	
than	they	actually	are”	(Leach	and	Sabatier	2005,	p.	494)	and	exaggerate	their	
maliciousness	 (Jenkins	 Smith	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 45%;	 Sabatier,	 Hunter,	 and	
McLaughlin,	1987).	
	
First,	 in	almost	all	 stages	of	 the	negotiation	process	of	 the	new	Forest	Code	
there	were	several	clear	attempts	to	influence	decisions	through	instruments	not	based	
on	 personal	 interaction	 and	 negotiation,	 which	 can	 also	 be	 called	 institutional	
manifestations	 of	 disagreement.	 For	 example,	 when	 the	 report	 of	 the	 Special	
Commission	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code	 bills	 was	 voted	 on	 in	 this	
Commission,	 five	alternatives	 to	 the	main	report	were	presented,	 three	representing	
the	 perspectives	 of	 the	 preservationist	 coalition	 (PT,	 PV	 and	 PSol)	 and	 two	
representing	the	views	of	the	developmentalist	group	(PMDB	and	PT).	 It	 is	 important	
to	 observe,	 therefore,	 that	 even	 deputies	 from	 the	 same	 party	 (PT)	 supported	
opposing	reports,	both	of	which	were	different	from	the	one	approved	by	the	majority	
of	 the	 Commission.47	 Even	 after	 the	 bill	 had	 been	 voted	 on	 by	 the	 entire	 Lower	
Chamber	in	May	2011,	an	amendment	(amendment	164)	was	proposed	and	approved,	
																																								 																				
47	 During	 the	 voting,	 Sarney	 Filho	 from	 the	 Green	 Party	 tried	 to	 delay	 the	 process	 through	
requests	 for	 nominal	 votes	 and	 other	 institutional	 manoeuvres.	 The	 deputy	 was	 personally	
attacked	by	Luiz	Carlos	Heinze	(PP-RS),	generating	confusion.		
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which	in	large	part	reverted	the	results	of	the	previous	negotiations	with	the	executive	
government.	After	this	amendment,	the	text	was	altered	twice	again.	The	final	version	
was	voted	on	in	2012.		
The	absence	of	consensus	around	this	final	version	is	verified	not	only	by	the	
continuous	critical	statements	from	members	of	the	preservationist	coalition	but	also	
by	 the	12	 vetoes	 and	32	alterations	 to	 the	bill	 proposed	by	President	Dilma	Rouseff	
through	a	Provisional	Measure,	which	attempted	 to	bring	 the	proposal	 closer	 to	 the	
administrative	economic	 rationalist/socio-environmentalist	position	supported	by	 the	
executive	 government.	 	 After	 the	 presidential	 vetoes	 were	 analysed	 in	 the	 Lower	
Chamber,	they	were	subject	to	more	than	600	amendments,	once	again	pointing	to	a	
low	 level	 of	 negotiated	 agreement	 reached	 between	 members	 of	 the	 executive	
government	 and	 the	 Lower	 Chamber.	 After	 the	 resulting	 bill	 went	 back	 for	 the	
presidential	approval,	nine	additional	points	were	vetoed.		
In	 addition	 to	 the	 sheer	 number	 of	 vetoes	 and	 amendments	 that	
characterised	 the	 elaboration	 of	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code,	 three	 ‘Actions	 of	
Unconstitutionality’	were	filed	by	members	of	the	Attorney	General’s	Office	(involving	
the	judicial	power	in	the	debate)	and	one	by	the	party	Psol	(supporting	preservationist	
claims).48	 	Finally,	 in	the	period	after	the	approval	of	the	 law	in	2012	until	2016,	two	
bills	have	been	published	by	deputies	from	the	developmentalist	coalition	proposing	to	
alter	 it,49	which	also	points	 to	 the	persistence	of	dissent.	 In	 sum,	evidence	 from	 the	
regulatory	process	reveals	that	none	of	the	identified	coalitions	could	rely	exclusively	
on	inter-personal	negotiations	of	the	bill	and	all	of	them	had	to	use	institutional	checks	
and	 balances	 to	 make	 their	 positions	 heard.	 The	 review	 of	 this	 long	 negotiation	
process	exposed,	 therefore,	a	 rather	adversarial	picture	 in	which	the	 judiciary	power	
was	 involved	 twice,	 one	 legislative	 amendment	 reversed	 previous	 negotiations	 with	
the	executive	power,	and	the	total	of	presidential	vetoes	numbered	21.			
Second,	 the	number	of	 alternative	 venues	was	 considerably	high,	 as	 already	
evidenced	 by	 the	 above	 analysis	 of	 institutional	manifestations	 of	 disagreement.	 As	
observed,	 the	 judicial	power	was	 involved	 twice	and	 the	executive	power	vetoed	21	
																																								 																				
48	These	had	not	yet	been	approved	by	the	Supreme	Court	of	Justice	as	of	April	2016.	
49	PL	6330/13	by	Deputy	Afonso	Hamm	(PP-RS)	proposes	that	 fruit	 trees	be	used	 in	the	restoration	of	
buffer	 zones.	 The	 second	 PL6830/13	 by	 Deputy	 Valdir	 Colatto	 (PMDB-SC)	 proposes	 that	 the	 size	 of	
protected	areas	located	within	cities	be	defined	by	mayors	and	no	longer	by	the	federal	law.	
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decisions	 taken	 in	 the	 National	 Congress.	 In	 the	 National	 Congress,	 the	 debate	was	
initiated	 in	 the	 Commission	 of	 Agriculture,	 but	 was	 also	 intensely	 debated	 by	 the	
Commission	 of	 Environment	 and	 Sustainable	 Development,	 and	 by	 a	 third	 Special	
Commission	created	specifically	 for	 the	debate	about	 the	reform	of	 the	Forest	Code.	
The	very	need	 for	a	special	 commission	points	 to	 the	 low	 level	of	agreement	among	
members	of	the	agricultural	and	environmental	commissions	and	to	a	dispute	over	the	
most	legitimate	venue.		
Finally,	personal	public	attacks	during	negotiations	were	frequently	 found	
in	the	analysis	of	the	data,	indicating	the	occurrence	of	devil	shift.	It	is	assumed	that	in	
a	 situation	 of	 high	 negotiated	 agreement,	 personal	 public	 attacks	 would	 not	 occur.	
There	were,	however,	two	incidents	of	personal	attacks	during	the	negotiations	of	the	
new	 Forest	 Code	 that	 were	 reported	 in	 the	 material	 analysed	 (in	 this	 case	 by	 the	
National	Congress	News	Agency).	One	was	against	 the	Green	Party’s	Deputy,	 Sarney	
Filho,	in	the	negotiation	of	the	initial	report	produced	in	2009	by	the	Lower	Chamber’s	
Special	Commission:	Sarney	Filho	was	accused	by	a	member	of	 the	developmentalist	
coalition,	 Luiz	 Carlos	 Heinze	 (PP-RS),	 of	 following	 his	 father’s	 example	 in	 “delivering	
Brazil	to	foreign	interests”	(Lower	Chamber	News	Agency,	2010,	06	July).	The	second	
occurred	 in	May	2011	when	Senator	Marina	Silva	 (from	the	preservationist	coalition)	
accused	 the	 Lower	 Chamber’s	 rapporteur	 Aldo	 Rebelo	 of	 fraud	 in	 the	 Forest	 Code	
report,	 and	 he	 retaliated	 by	 accusing	 her	 ex-husband	 of	 illegal	 deforestation	 (Lower	
Chamber	News	Agency,	2011,	12	May).	
Additionally,	 as	 the	 following	 quotations	 demonstrate,	 coalition	 publicly	
refers	to	the	others	pejoratively,	denoting	cases	of	exaggeration	of	the	maliciousness	
of	 opponents	 (or	 ‘devil	 shift’).	 In	 the	 first	 example,	 those	 supporting	 changes	 in	 the	
Forest	 Code	 (neo-developmentalists),	 refer	 to	 those	 that	 oppose	 them	
(preservationists)	of	“environmental	fundamentalism”.	On	the	other	hand,	a	member	
of	the	preservationist	coalition	refers	to	her	opposition	as	“those	who	want	to	increase	
their	land	sizes	instead	of	adding	technology”	and	as	“the	representatives	of	the	most	
anachronistic	economic	 interests”.	The	negative	definitions	used	by	each	coalition	 to	
refer	 to	their	opposition	contributed	to	the	 identification	of	devil	 shift,	which	 in	 turn	
contributed	to	the	absence	of	negotiated	agreement.		
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“FAO	 has	 affirmed,	 repeatedly,	 that	 the	 world	 needs	 to	 increase	 food	
production	by	40%	and	that	Brazil	 is	one	of	the	qualified	countries	to	make	
this	contribution.	If	it	depends	on	the	environmental	fundamentalism	settled	
around	the	new	Forest	Code	–which	remains	the	most	stringent	code	in	the	
world–one	 can	 not	 do	 it”	 (Abreu,	 2012,	 10	 October,	 ‘Código	 sem	
fundamentalismo’,	 Folha	 de	 São	 Paulo,	 translation	 and	 emphasis	 by	 the	
author).	
------	
“Freedom	 of	 thought	 is	 one	 of	 the	 greatest	 achievements	 of	 our	 precious	
democracy.	The	code	 is	no	 longer	about	 forests	and	becomes	a	concession	
system	 for	 the	 predatory	 occupation	 of	 those	 who	 want	 to	 increase	 their	
land	sizes	 instead	of	adding	 technology	 [to	production].	 It	goes	 in	opposite	
direction	to	the	21st	century	and	it	 is	a	setback”50	 (Silva,	2012,	26	October,	
‘Fato	e	Opinião’,	Folha	de	São	Paulo	translation	and	emphasis	by	the	author).	
-------	
“The	plan	 for	 combatting	deforestation	was	 supported	by	 the	Forest	Code,	
which	 is	 currently	 being	 disfigured	 to	 ‘regularise’	 past	 and	 future	
deforestation.	 This	 is	 the	 year	 in	 which	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 most	
anachronistic	 economic	 interests	 have	 abandoned	 their	 pretense	 and	
imposed	 their	 agenda”51	 (Silva,	 2012,	 07	 September,	 ‘Legado	 Devastado’	
Folha	de	São	Paulo,	translation	and	emphasis	by	the	author).	
	
Regarding	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 outcome,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 a	 negotiated	
agreement	was	not	achieved	because	of	 the	absence	of	a	 ‘hurting	 stalemate’,	which	
has	been	defined	as	a	situation	in	which	there	is	uncertainty,	interdependence	among	
coalitions,	 and	 incentives	 for	 negotiation	 to	 take	 place	 (chapter	 2,	 section	 2.3.5).	
Confirming	 theoretical	 expectations,	 it	 was	 noticed	 that	 incentives	 for	 negotiation	
were	 very	 low	 between	 the	 main	 coalitions.	 The	 only	 coalition	 truly	 interested	 in	
regulatory	 change	 was	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 one.	 The	 administrative	 economic	
rationalists	had	considered	the	approval	of	the	new	Forest	Code	a	political	victory	for	
the	National	Congress	(particularly	from	the	so	called	‘ruralists’	of	the	Lower	Chamber)	
against	 the	 executive	 government,	 as	 revealed	 by	 the	 interview	 with	 the	 former	
Minister	of	Environment,	Izabella	Teixeira52	(interview	42).	The	preservationists,	on	the	
other	hand,	completely	opposed	the	negotiation	of	changes	as	these	were	perceived	
																																								 																				
50	A	 liberdade	de	pensamento	 'e	uma	das	maiores	conquistas	de	nossa	preciosa	democracia.	O	código	
deixa	 de	 ser	 florestal,	 torna-se	 um	 sistema	 de	 concessões	 para	 a	 ocupação	 predatória	 de	 quem	 quer	
aumentar	terras	em	vez	de	agregar	tecnologia.	Vai	na	contramão	do	século	21	e	é	um	retrocesso	(Silva,	
2012,	26	October,	‘Fato	e	Opinião’,	Folha	de	Sao	Paulo).	
51	O	Plano	de	Combate	ao	Desmatamento	tinha	sustentação	no	Código	Florestal,	agora	desfigurado	para	
"regularizar"	o	desmatamento	passado	e	futuro.	Este	é	o	ano	em	que	os	representantes	dos	 interesses	
econômicos	mais	 atrasados	 deixaram	 de	 lado	 o	 fingimento	 e	 impuseram	 sua	 agenda	 (Silva,	 2012,	 07	
September,	‘Legado	Devastado’	Folha	de	São	Paulo).	
52	Anonymity	was	not	required	by	the	minister.	
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to	make	the	previous	law	less	strict	in	environmental	terms.	Incentives	for	negotiation	
were,	thus,	very	unequally	distributed	and	only	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	had	
actual	incentives	to	push	the	negotiation	forward.	
Interdependence	 between	 actors	was	 also	 low.	 The	 strength	 of	 the	 rural	
caucus	 in	 the	National	Congress	provided	 them	with	a	 comfortable	position	because	
other	groups	had	limited	capacity	to	block	their	decisions.	Although	vetoes	were	used	
by	 the	 president,	 the	 dependency	 of	 the	 president	 on	 the	 political	 support	 of	 the	
congress	and	the	limitations	of	this	tactic	(which	does	not	allow	new	proposals	to	be	
made	subsequently),	was	not	perceived	to	contribute	to	the	interdependence	of	actors	
in	achieving	their	interests.		
	Finally,	 uncertainty	 was	 low	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 consequences	 of	
approving	the	law	or	remaining	with	the	previous	regulation	were	relatively	clear	to	all	
coalitions	 involved.	The	degree	of	certainty	was	 increased	by	the	Presidential	Decree	
7.029/09,	 which	 determined	 that	 all	 farmers	 who	 were	 not	 compliant	 with	 the	
requirements	of	the	previous	code	would	be	punished	from	2011.	This,	alongside	the	
tendency	towards	stricter	regulatory	enforcement	(which	had	been	promoted	by	the	
executive	 government	 since	 at	 least	 the	 late	 1990s),	 provided	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	 group	 with	 sufficient	 certainty	 that	 they	 should	 push	 for	 an	
alteration	of	the	previous	regulation,	and	left	preservationists	with	no	doubt	that	they	
should	 peremptorily	 oppose	 it.	 There	 was,	 therefore,	 no	 hurting	 stalemate	 and,	
consequently,	negotiated	agreement	was	not	found	to	occur	in	the	negotiation	of	the	
2012	Forest	Code.	
	
4.3.5.	Policy-oriented	Learning	
Policy-oriented	learning	refers	to	“relatively	enduring	alternations	of	thought	
or	behavioural	intentions	that	result	from	experience	and/or	new	information	and	that	
are	 concerned	 with	 the	 attainment	 or	 revision	 of	 policy	 objectives”	 (Sabatier	 and	
Jenkins-Smith	 1999,	 p.	 123).	 The	 three	 observable	 implications	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	
learning	for	policy	change	that	will	be	observed	in	this	section	are:	1)	heightened	public	
and	 political	 attention	 to	 technical	 information,	 2)	 the	 mobilisation	 by	 coalitions	 to	
exploit	or	exchange	technical	information,	in	other	words,	the	occurrence	of	‘analytical	
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debate’,	and	3)	change	in	the	content	of	policy	or	regulations	 (for	 justifications	about	
the	 choice	 of	 these	 three	 observable	 implications	 see	 chapter	 2,	 section	 2.3.3).	 All	
three	observable	 implications	are	considered	necessary	 to	evidence	 the	 relevance	of	
learning	in	processes	of	policy	change.	
In	 order	 to	 assess	 the	 heightened	 public	 and	 political	 attention	 paid	 to	
technical	 information,	 this	 section	 will	 trace	 all	 the	 occasions	 in	 which	 scientists	
participated	 in	 debates	 in	 the	 Lower	 Chamber	 about	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code	 (all	 the	
instances	are	summarised	in	table	16).		
Researchers	 from	 Embrapa	 –	 the	 government	 agency	 for	 agronomic	
research	–	had	 frequent	participation	 in	 Lower	Chamber	debates	 in	November	2009	
and	March	 2010.	 They	 have	 always	 emphasised	 the	 need	 for	 legislation	 to	 protect	
ecologically	 vulnerable	areas	 such	as	 river	declivities	and	other	areas	of	 ‘fragile	 soil’.	
Later,	 in	 June	 2012,	 a	 technician	 from	 ‘Embrapa	 Vegetables’	 participated	 in	 the	
debates,	defending	the	idea	that	rules	should	be	more	flexible	only	for	small	farmers,	
because	the	majority	of	vegetable	producers	in	Brazil	are	small	farmers	(see	lines	1,	2	
and	 19	 of	 table	 16	 for	 a	 summary	 of	 their	 positions).	 Both	 positions	 demonstrate,	
therefore,	an	alignment	with	the	partial-changes	coalition.	
Further	 scientist	 participation	 in	 debates	 about	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code	 in	 the	
Lower	Chamber	occurred	in	May	2010.	The	environmental	caucus	promoted	a	debate	
and	invited	two	professors	from	University	of	São	Paulo	to	participate.	Professor	Jean	
Paul	Metzger,	a	specialist	in	landscape	ecology,	presented	a	scientific	study	about	the	
proposed	 reforms,	 defending	 the	 idea	 that,	 contrary	 to	 the	 proposals	 to	 reduce	
riparian	buffer	zones,	these	should	not	be	diminished	but	increased	from	the	proposed	
30	metres	to	at	least	100	metres	in	order	to	fulfil	 its	ecological	role.	He	also	opposed	
the	proposal	to	combine	the	legal	reserve	and	riparian	areas	in	the	calculation	of	total	
protected	 areas	 of	 a	 property,	 because	 these	 two	 types	 of	 areas	 have	 “biologically	
distinct	functions”.	Similarly,	Professor	Gerd	Spavorek,	a	specialist	in	soil	preservation	
and	 land	use	planning,	 defended	 the	maintenance	of	 previous	 legislation	by	 arguing	
that	it	could	be	applied	without	harm	to	agribusiness	interests53	(lines	3	and	4,	table	6).	
																																								 																				
53	 This	 position	 was	 echoed	 by	 the	Minister	 of	 Environment	 Izabella	 Teixeira	 in	 June	 2010,	
when	 she	mentions	 studies	 by	 the	University	 of	 São	 Paulo	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 riparian	
zones	 and	 legal	 reserves	 have	 a	 large	 role	 in	 the	 conservation	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 their	
protection	does	not	imply	less	agriculture	production	for	the	country.	
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These	researchers	were	therefore	aligned	with	the	positions	of	the	preservationist	(no-
changes)	coalition.	
In	November	2010,	the	independent	scientific	societies	the	SBPC	(Brazilian	
Society	 for	 the	 Progress	 of	 Science)	 and	 the	 ABC	 (Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Sciences)	
participated	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 the	 debate.	 These	 scientific	 societies	 established	 a	
working	 group	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	 an	 in-depth	 technical	 analysis	 of	 the	 bill	 and	
advanced,	in	a	public	hearing,	the	idea	that	the	vote	on	the	new	Forest	Code	should	be	
postponed	until	more	 scientific	 evidence	had	been	produced	 (see	 line	5,	 table	6).	 In	
the	 same	public	hearing,	Professor	 Luis	Carlos	Moraes	 from	 the	Centro	Universitário	
do	Oeste	Paulista,	defended	extensive	changes	to	the	forest	regulation	and	referenced	
evidence	 (first	 produced	 by	 Embrapa)	 that	 Brazilian	 environmental	 legislation,	 if	
rigorously	 enforced,	 would	 leave	 only	 one	 third	 of	 the	 territory	 available	 for	
agricultural	 production.	 This	 was	 held	 by	 the	 professor	 to	 not	 be	 “economically	
sustainable	 in	 the	medium	 and	 long	 term”	 (see	 line	 6,	 table	 16).	Moraes’s	 position,	
which	was	close	 to	 the	neo-developmentalist’s	 coalition	position,	was	not	 supported	
by	the	SBPC	or	the	ABC.	
On	 February	 2011,	 a	 seminar	 was	 organised	 by	 the	 environmentalist	
caucus	in	which	Professor	Gerd	Sparoveck	from	the	University	of	São	Paulo,	Professor	
Ricardo	 Rodrigues	 from	 the	University	 of	 Campinas	 (Unicamp),	 and	 a	 representative	
from	 the	 SBPC	 revealed	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	 scientific	 working	 group	 established	
four	months	before.	The	SBPC	representative	maintained	 that	 the	proposed	changes	
to	 the	previous	 Forest	 Code	would	be	 “a	 disaster	 for	 environmental	 conservation	 in	
Brazil	 and	 that	 changes	 would	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 an	 increase	 in	 agriculture	
productivity”	 (line	 7,	 table	 16).	 Professor	 Sparoveck	 argued	 that,	 even	 if	 there	 was	
absolute	 compliance	 with	 the	 previous	 regulation	 there	 would	 still	 be	 103	 million	
hectares	 of	 free	 use	 areas	 ready	 to	 be	 used	 for	 agriculture.	 According	 to	 him	 “it	 is	
possible	to	double	agricultural	production	in	the	country	in	the	next	20	years	without	
more	deforestation”	(line	8,	table	6).	Professor	Ricardo	Rodrigues	reiterated	that	“land	
owners	will	 still	 have	 70%	 of	 their	 properties	 to	 exploit	 if	 the	 previous	 code	 is	 kept	
unchanged”	and	argued	that	small	river	buffer	zones	should	not	be	reduced	because	
“these	 are	 the	 rivers	 most	 susceptible	 to	 silting”	 (line	 9,	 table	 6).	 Finally,	 Professor	
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Carlos	Alfredo	Joly	(from	Unicamp),	a	botanist,	argued	that	the	reduction	of	vegetation	
coverage	around	rivers	as	well	as	on	mountains	and	slopes	could	lead	to	the	extinction	
of	several	 species.	The	biologist	affirmed	that	 if	 rules	about	riparian	buffer	zones	 for	
small	 rivers	were	changed	as	proposed	by	the	bill	“half	 the	amphibian	species	would	
disappear”	(line	10,	table	16)	(Lower	Chamber	News	Agency,	2011,	22	February).	The	
conclusions	 of	 the	 scientific	 report	 were	 therefore	 closer	 to	 the	 position	 of	
preservationists.		
	Finally,	on	April	2011,	 the	president	of	 the	SBPC,	Helena	Nader,	 came	to	
the	Lower	Chamber	to	present	the	results	of	the	report	of	the	scientific	working	group	
formed	 six	months	before.	 She	 requested	 that	 voting	be	postponed	 for	 at	 least	 two	
years	so	that	scientific	contributions	could	be	 incorporated	 into	the	new	bill	 (line	12,	
table	 16).	 The	 SBPC	 report	 included	 more	 than	 300	 scientific	 studies	 and	 focused	
specifically	 on	 the	 proposed	 changes	 to	 the	 code.	 Among	 the	 SBPC’s	 main	 findings	
were	 the	 risks	 involved	 in	 reducing	 riparian	 buffer	 zones.	 The	 report	 further	 argues	
that	riparian	protected	areas	in	Brazil	do	not	represent	more	than	6.9%	of	total	private	
properties,	 so	 maintaining	 the	 requirement	 for	 their	 preservation	 would	 not	 harm	
agricultural	 productivity	 (line	 13,	 table	 16).	 Other	 important	 findings	 of	 the	 report	
were:	
• The	need	to	consider	the	surrounding	areas	of	wetlands.	
• The	importance	of	the	higher	river	border	(that	of	the	rainy	season)	and	not	of	
the	lower	one	for	calculating	the	riparian	buffer	zone.		
• The	 maintenance	 of	 mountain	 tops	 and	 slopes	 as	 areas	 of	 permanent	
preservation.	
	
The	SBPC	report,	therefore,	opposed	changes	to	the	previous	code	and	was	
aligned	 with	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 preservationist	 coalition.	 Voting	 was,	 however,	 not	
postponed	 as	 the	 scientists	 requested,	 and	 none	 of	 their	 main	 findings	 were	
incorporated	 into	 the	 bill.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 proposal	 of	 subtracting	 permanent	
preservation	 areas	 from	 the	 calculation	 of	 total	 legal	 reserve	 required,	 scientists	
recognised	 the	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 proposal	 for	 areas	 such	 as	 the	Amazon	 (where	
legal	reserve	is	80%	of	private	property)	but	observed	that	more	scientific	studies	were	
needed.		
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On	March	2011,	a	specialist	in	environmental	law,	Luís	Carlos	Moraes	from	
the	Centro	Universitário	do	Oeste	Paulista,	raised	awareness	of	the	economic	burden	
that	the	restoration	of	all	degraded	areas	would	represent	for	municipalities,	thereby	
aligning	himself	with	the	neo-developmentalist	position.	According	to	data	from	2007,	
he	 argued	 that	 Brazil	would	 lose	R$	 22	million	 in	 income	 tax	 and	 that	 the	 country’s	
GDP	 would	 be	 reduced	 by	 R$	 74.3	 million	 (line	 11,	 table	 16).	 He	 did	 not	 present	
original	research	to	support	these	claims	and	was	found	to	be	the	only	scientist	clearly	
supporting	the	arguments	of	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition.	
On	February	2012,	another	event	was	held	 in	 the	Lower	Chamber	on	 the	
perspective	of	scientists	on	 the	new	code.	The	event	was	held	by	 the	environmental	
caucus	 and	 the	 perspectives	 advanced	 opposed	 the	 bill.	 Maria	 Tereza	 Piedade,	 for	
example,	a	researcher	from	the	Amazon	Research	Institute,	remarked	that	there	were	
high	risks	associated	with	the	use	of	the	lower	border	(the	drier	season	border)	of	the	
river	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 buffer	 zones	 areas,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 wetlands.	
Finally,	 in	 March	 2012,	 the	 SBPC	 published	 an	 open	 letter	 reinforcing	 the	 points	
previously	made	 in	 their	 report	 and	 calling	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 positions	
regarding	riparian	buffer	zones	and	the	amnesty	for	the	restoration	of	areas	degraded	
before	2008,	had	not	been	considered	by	the	Congress.54	At	 least	five	other	opinions	
from	scientists	against	the	reforms	proposed	by	the	bill	were	identified	in	the	analysis	
of	Lower	Chamber’s	debates.	They	are	not	described	here,	but	are	summarised	in	table	
16	(lines	15	to	20).		
	
Table	16	-	Scientists	participation	in	Lower	Chamber	debates	
	 Date	 Scientist	-	organisation	 Summary	of	the	main	claim	 Predominant	
coalition	alignment	
1	 November	
2009	
Gustavo	 Ribas	 Cursio	 –	
Embrapa	Forests	
Riparian	 declivities	 should	 be	
protected	
Preservationist	
2	 March	2010	 Walfrido	 Tomás	 –	
Embrapa	Pantanal	
Soil	 fragility	 should	 be	 considered	
when	designing	protection	rules	
Preservationist	
3	 May	2010	 Prof.	Jean	Paul	Metzger	–	
University	 of	 Sao	 Paulo	
(landscape	ecology)	
“Riparian	 buffer	 zones	 cannot	 be	
reduced	 in	 relation	 to	 previous	
regulations,	 they	 should	 be	
increased	 from	 the	 previous	 30	
metres	to	at	least	100	metres”.	
“Legal	 reserves	 and	 riparian	 buffer	
zones	 have	 different	 biological	
functions	 and	 cannot	 be	 added	 up	
Preservationist	
																																								 																				
54	http://www.agroecologia.org.br/2012/03/15/carta-aberta-da-sociedade-brasileira-para-o-progresso-
da-ciencia-sbpc-e-da-academia-brasileira-de-ciencias-abc/	
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in	 the	 calculus	 of	 preservation	
areas”	
4	 May	2010	 Prof.	 Gerd	 Spavorek	 –	
University	 of	 Sao	 Paulo	
(soil	 preservation	 and	
land	use	planning)	
“Previous	 legislation	 should	 be	
maintained	 and	 even	 its	 rigorous	
implementation	 will	 not	 harm	
agribusiness	interests”	
Preservationist	
5	 Nov	2010	 SBPC	and	ABC	 “Voting	 of	 the	 bill	 by	 the	 Lower	
Chamber	 should	 be	 postponed	
until	more	scientific	 input	 is	added	
to	it”	
Preservationist	
6	 Nov	2010	 Luis	 Carlos	 Moraes	 –	
Centro	 Universitário	 do	
Oeste	Paulista	
“Brazilian	 environmental	
legislation,	 if	 rigorously	 applied	
leaves	 only	 one	 third	 of	 the	
territory	 available	 for	 agricultural	
production,	 which	 is	 not	
economically	 sustainable	 in	 the	
medium	and	long	term”	
Neo-developmentalist	
7	 Feb	2011	 José	 Antonio	 Aleixo	 da	
Silva	–	SBPC	
“Proposed	 regulatory	 changes	 will	
be	 a	 disaster	 for	 environmental	
preservation	 in	 Brazil	 and	 changes	
are	 not	 necessary	 in	 increase	
agriculture	productivity”	
Preservationist	
8	 Feb	2011	 Prof.	 Gerd	 Spavorek	 –	
University	 of	 Sao	 Paulo	
(soil	 preservation	 and	
land	use	planning)	
“It	 is	 currently	 possible	 to	 double	
agricultural	 production	 in	 the	 next	
20	 years	 without	 more	
deforestation”	
Preservationist	
9	 Feb	2011	 Ricardo	 Rodrigues	 –	
University	of	Sao	Paulo	
“Land	owners	will	still	have	70%	of	
their	 properties	 to	 explore	 if	 the	
previous	code	is	maintained”	
	
“Small	 river	 buffer	 zones	 should	
not	 be	 reduced	 because	 these	
rivers	 are	 the	 most	 susceptible	 to	
silting”	
Preservationist	
10	 Feb	2011	 Carlos	 Alfredo	 Joly	 –	
University	 of	 Campinas	
(biologist)	
“The	 reduction	 of	 vegetation	
coverage	 around	 rivers	 as	 well	 as	
on	 mountains	 and	 slopes	 could	
lead	 to	 the	 extinction	 of	 several	
species”	
“If	rules	about	riparian	buffer	zones	
for	 small	 rivers	 are	 changed	 (as	
proposed)	 ‘half	 the	 amphibian	
species	will	disappear”	
Preservationist	
11	 March	2011	 Luís	 Carlos	 de	 Moraes	 –	
Centro	 Universitário	 do	
Oeste	Paulista	
“Brazil	would	 lose	 R$	 22	million	 in	
income	 tax	 and	 the	 country’s	 GDP	
would	 be	 reduced	 by	 R$	 74.3	
million	 if	 restoration	 of	 all	
degraded	areas	is	required”	
Neo-developmentalist	
	 Date	 Scientist	-	organisation	 Summary	of	the	main	claim	 Predominant	
coalition	alignment	
12	 April	2011	 Maria	 Helena	 Nader	 –	
SBPC	
	
	
“Voting	 of	 the	 new	 law	 should	 be	
postponed	in	at	least	two	years	for	
scientific	 studies	 to	 be	 properly	
incorporated	by	the	new	bill”	
Preservationist	
13	 April	2011	 SBPC	report	 “There	 is	 no	 scientific	 base	 for	
reducing	 riparian	 protected	 areas.	
These	areas	do	not	represent	more	
than	 6.9%	 of	 total	 private	
properties	 in	Brazil,	 so	maintaining	
their	 area	 would	 not	 harm	
Preservationist	
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agricultural	 productivity.	 Riparian	
buffer	 zones	 requirements	 should	
not	be	altered”		
Wetland	 surrounding	 areas	 should	
be	protected	
The	higher	border	of	the	river	(that	
of	 the	 raining	 season)	 should	 be	
considered	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	
the	riparian	buffer	zone	
Mountain	 tops	 and	 slopes	 should	
be	 considered	 areas	 of	 permanent	
preservation	
Considering	 permanent	
preservation	 areas	 and	 Legal	
Reserves	as	part	of	 the	percentage	
required	 for	 Legal	 Reserves	 is	 a	
decision	 that	 requires	 more	
scientific	studies	
14	 Feb	2012	 Maria	 Tereza	 Piedade	 –	
Amazon	 Research	
Institute	(Inpa)	
”Especially	 in	the	case	of	wetlands,	
there	are	high	risks	associated	with	
the	use	of	 the	 lower	border	of	 the	
river	 for	 the	 measurement	 of	
buffer	 zones.	 The	 higher	 border	
should	be	used”	
Preservationist	
15	 Feb	2012	 Yara	 Schaeffer-Novelli	 	 –	
University	 of	 Sao	 Paulo	
(Oceanographic	Institute)	
“The	 bill	 approved	 by	 the	 Senate	
will	 compromise	 the	 stability	 of	
mangroves”		
Preservationist	
16	 April	2012	 Márcio	 Ackerman	 –		
Institute	 of	 Technological	
Research	(IPT)	
“The	 new	 Forest	 Code	 should	 be	
completely	vetoed”	
“Not	 requiring	 the	 restoration	 of	
riparian	 buffer	 zones	 is	
irresponsible	and	people	can	die	 in	
landslides”		
Preservationist	
17	 May	2012	 Marcos	 Fava	 Neves	 –	
University	 of	 São	 Paulo	
(Economy	 and	 business	
department)	
“Brazil	has	enough	space	to	expand	
agribusiness	 without	 more	
deforestation”	
	
Preservationist	
18	 March	2012	 SBPC	open	letter	 Reinforced	 points	 previously	made	
and	 calls	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
their	 positions	 regarding	 riparian	
buffer	 zones	 and	 the	 amnesty	 for	
the	 restoration	 of	 areas	 degraded	
before	 2008	 had	 not	 been	
considered	by	the	Congress	
Preservationist	
	 Date	 Scientist	-	organisation	 Summary	of	the	main	claim	 Predominant	
coalition	alignment	
19	 April	2012	 Sérgio	 Sauer	 (University	
of	Brasilia	–UnB)	
The	 idea	 that	 the	 environment	
cannot	 be	 reconciled	 with	
agricultural	 production	 was	 a	
deceitful	 argument	 generated	 for	
the	 approval	 of	 this	 bill.	 However,	
the	 lack	 of	 environmental	
protection	will	 generate	 poor	 food	
security.	
Preservationist	
20	 June	2012	 Celso	Moretti	 –	 Embrapa	
Vegetables	
Rules	 about	 riparian	 protected	
areas	should	be	made	more	flexible	
for	small	farmers	
Administrative	
economic	
rationalist/socio-
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environmentalist	
21	 June	2012	 João	de	Deus	Medeiros		–	
Professor	 in	 the	 Botanic	
Department	 at	 Federal	
University	 of	 Santa	
Catarina		
“Technically,	a	riparian	zone	5	
metres	long	is	not	effective	as	a	
riparian	zone,	but	considering	that	
small	farms	constitute	a	small	
portion	of	the	Brazilian	territory	
the	impacts	are	manageable”	
Administrative	
economic	
rationalist/socio-
environmentalist	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
There	 is,	 therefore,	ample	evidence	 that	 scientists	actively	contributed	 to	
the	 debates	 about	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code.	 Technical	 information	 was	 mentioned	 by	
policy	makers	on	much	rarer	occasions	though.	On	only	four	occasions	could	the	use	of	
scientific	information	by	policy	makers	be	identified	in	the	material	analysed	(see	table	
17).	 	 For	 instance,	 Reinhold	 Stephanes,	 the	 Minister	 of	 Agriculture	 at	 the	 time,	
mentioned	the	study	from	Embrapa	in	June	2009	to	support	the	idea	that	the	burdens	
of	the	forest	regulation	on	the	agriculture	sector	would	be	significant	(line	1,	table	17).	
The	study	was	used	by	him	to	argue	that,	 if	environmental	 legislation	was	effectively	
enforced	then	only	one	third	of	the	Brazilian	territory	would	be	left	for	agriculture.	The	
neo-developmentalist	 deputy	 Moreira	 Mendes	 also	 cited	 Embrapa’s	 study	 to	 argue	
that	 Brazil	 had	 the	 lowest	 levels	 of	 deforestation	 in	 the	world	 (implying	 that	 forest	
regulations	were	overly	strict)	(line	2,	table	17).	
In	March	2010,	deputy	Moacir	Micheletto	 (PMDB-PR)	 (line	3,	 table	17),	a	
member	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition,	 when	 criticised	 by	 preservationist	
deputies	 for	 the	 proposed	 Forest	 Code	 reforms	 retorted	with	 Embrapa’s	 arguments	
relating	to	soil	fragility	(line	2,	table	16).	However,	instead	of	using	these	arguments	to	
advance	 more	 moderate	 changes	 to	 the	 code	 (as	 the	 researchers	 from	 Embrapa	
implied),	the	deputy	used	them	to	emphasise	the	technical	limitations	of	the	previous	
code	and	the	need	for	extensive	changes	to	the	regulation.	The	other	politicians	using	
scientific	arguments	were	 the	Minister	of	Environment	 Izabella	Teixeixa,	 (member	of	
the	 partial-changes/administrative	 economic	 rationalist/socio-environmentalist	
coalition)	 who	 used	 the	 University	 of	 Sao	 Paulo	 study	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 that	
regulations	should	not	be	made	less	environmentally	strict.		
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Table	17	-	Use	of	scientific	information	by	politicians	in	Lower	Chamber	debates	
	 Date	 Actor	using	the	information	
Source	of	
information	 Claim	
Alignment	of	the	
policy	maker	
1.	 June	2009	
Minister	of	
Agriculture,	
Reinhold	
Stephanes	
Embrapa	
“If	environmental	
legislation	is	fully	
complied	with	in	Brazil	
there	will	be	only	one	
third	of	the	territory	left	
for	agriculture”	
Neo-
developmentalist	
2.	 November	2011	
Deputy	Moreira	
Mendes	(PPS-
RO)	
Embrapa	
“Brazil	has	the	lowest	
levels	of	deforestation	in	
the	world”	
Neo-
developmentalist	
3.	 March	2010	
Deputy	Moacir	
Micheletto	
(PMDB-PR)	
‘technical	
studies’		
“Technical	studies	say	
that	the	type	of	soil	and	
depth	of	rivers	should	be	
considered	in	the	
determination	of	levels	
of	environmental	
protection,	so	the	
current	law	(which	only	
considers	the	width	of	
the	river)	is	harming	
small	farmers”	
Neo-
developmentalist	
4.	 June	2010	
Minister	of	
Environment	–	
Izabella	Teixeira	
University	of	
Sao	Paulo	
(Esalq	-	
Agriculture	
Dept)	
“It	is	possible	to	keep	
Legal	Reserves	and	still	
produce	more	without	
any	deforestation.	
Studies	from	Esalq	
(University	of	Sao	Paulo)	
show	that	riparian	buffer	
zones	and	Legal	Reserves	
play	an	even	larger	role	
than	protected	areas	
and	indigenous	lands	in	
the	conservation	of	
biodiversity”	
Administrative	
economic	
rationalist/socio-
environmentalist	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
This	 analysis	 reveals,	 moreover,	 that	 although	 scientists	 were	
predominantly	opposed	to	regulatory	changes	(and	therefore	more	closely	aligned	to	
the	 preservationist	 coalition),	 politicians	 from	 this	 coalition	 have	 not	 directly	 used	
scientific	 arguments	 in	 their	 argumentation.	 This	 is	 a	 puzzling	 finding	 that	might	 be	
related	 to	 concerns	 from	 scientists	 or	 politicians	 that	 scientific	 findings	 would	 be	
considered	 less	 legitimate	 if	 they	were	used	 in	a	more	political	manner.	 Evidence	of	
this	concern	was	found	in	the	SBPC	and	ABC	report,	which	frequently	emphasised	its	
independent	character.		
In	 terms	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 on	 actor’s	 positions	 over	
time,	no	change	could	be	identified.	The	analysis	focused	on	the	position	of	a	three	key	
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actors	 (one	 from	 each	 coalition)	 before	 and	 after	 the	 SBPC/ABC	 report:	 Moreira	
Mendes,	 leader	 of	 the	 rural	 caucus	 in	 the	 Lower	 Chamber	 and	 part	 of	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	 group;	 Sarney	 Filho,	 leader	 of	 the	 environmentalist	 caucus	 in	 the	
Lower	Chamber	and	one	of	the	most	vocal	actors	of	the	preservationist	coalition;	and	
Izabella	 Teixeira,	 Minister	 of	 Environment	 and	 part	 of	 the	 administrative	 economic	
rationalist/socio-environmentalist	 coalition.	 Although	 the	 investigation	 is	 admittedly	
partial,	these	three	actors	are	considered	to	be	the	most	representative	and	the	most	
vocal	actors	of	each	coalition,	justifying	the	choice	to	focus	on	their	arguments	alone55.		
The	comparative	table	of	crucial	statements	by	each	of	these	actors	before	
and	after	 the	 report	 is	 summarised	 in	 table	18.	Although	Moreira	Mendes	mentions	
the	need	for	more	scientific	evidence	 in	one	of	his	 first	declarations	on	the	 issue,	he	
never	refers	to	the	SPBC/ABC	report	after	 its	publication.	He	does	refer,	however,	to	
data	from	Embrapa	and	to	other	statistics	from	non-identified	sources	after	April	25th,	
2011	(henceforth	‘t2’)	but	the	citations	are	used	to	support	the	preservationist	position	
he	had	always	 supported.	 	 Similarly,	 Sarney	Filho,	 from	 the	preservationist	 coalition,	
does	not	change	position.	At	t2	he	mentions	that	the	requirements	of	the	new	Forest	
Code	 are	much	 below	 “what	 the	most	 optimistic	 technicians	 and	 researchers	would	
recommend”,	 but	 he	 alludes	 to	 no	 specific	 source.	 Finally,	 although	 the	Minister	 of	
Environment,	Izabella	Teixeira,	gave	her	first	declaration	in	the	Lower	Chamber	before	
April	25th,	2011	 (henceforth	 ‘t1’),	 citing	scientific	arguments	about	 the	 importance	of	
legal	 reserves	 and	 permanent	 preservation	 areas,	 she	 was	 not	 found	 to	 refer	 to	
scientific	 arguments	 after	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 report	 and	 her	 position	 did	 not	
demonstrate	 marked	 changes.	 The	 only	 point	 that	 seems	 to	 have	 become	 more	
flexible	 in	 her	 narrative	 at	 t2	 is	 the	 allowance	 of	 2008	 as	 the	 date	 before	 which	
deforestation	would	not	be	considered	illegal.		When	interviewed	for	this	research	she	
implied	that	this	change	might	have	been	a	result	of	the	awareness	she	acquired	that	
the	2008	concession	was	a	previous	political	agreement	made	by	President	Lula	with	
the	 rural	 caucus,	 which	 had	 to	 be	 maintained	 (interview	 42,	 30/10/15).56	 	 It	 was,	
therefore,	motivated	by	political	rather	than	technical	reasons.	
Finally,	 when	 interviewed	 for	 this	 research	 in	 2014,	 a	 leading	 researcher	
who	was	part	of	 the	SBPC	group	that	produced	the	report	confirmed	that	“scientists	
																																								 																				
55	And	the	overview	of	the	entire	debate	does	not	seem	to	contradict	these	findings.	
56	The	minister	did	not	require	anonymity.	
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tried	to	provide	support	for	the	elaboration	of	the	new	code	but	their	study	was	not	
considered	by	the	National	Congress	or	by	the	executive	government”	(interview	30).	
The	 analysis	 of	 debates	 and	 interviews	 revealed,	 therefore,	 that	 scientific	 evidence,	
although	 provided	 and	 systematised	 in	 a	 report,	 played	 a	 reduced	 role	 in	 altering	
original	positions	about	the	new	forest	code.	Policy	makers	have	not,	moreover,	used	
the	 findings	 of	 the	 SBPC/ABC	 report	 in	 their	 arguments,	which	 is	 something	 directly	
confirmed	by	one	of	the	scientists	participating	in	the	elaboration	of	the	report.	
Table	18	-	Comparative	table	of	positions	of	members	of	each	coalition	before	and	after	the	SBPC/ABC	
report	
Actor	and	coalition	 Statements	at	t1		
(before	April	25th,	2011)	
Statements	at	t2		
(after	April	25th,	2011)	
Moreira	Mendes	(coordinator	
of	the	rural	caucus)	neo-
developmentalist	
27/05/2009	
The	 definition	 of	 the	 areas	 to	 be	
preserved	 is	 a	 scientific	 issue,	 not	 a	
political	one	
27/09/2010	
90%	 of	 farmers	 would	 be	 illegal	 if	
current	 legislation	 was	 actually	
enforced.	 According	 to	 the	 current	
forest	code	it	is	illegal	to	plant	on	hills,	
but	 in	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	grapes	have	
been	produced	on	hills	 for	more	than	
100	years	
10/02/2011	
Mendes	 is	 against	 the	 requirement	 of	
legal	reserve,	and	opposes	criticisms	by	
arguing	 that	 the	 bill	 does	 not	
incentivise	 deforestation:	 “we	 are	
fighting	 to	 keep	 what	 is	 currently	
working	 in	agribusiness.	No	one	wants	
further	 deforestation,	 but	 we	 cannot	
imagine	 that	 what	 has	 been	 occupied	
for	so	long	has	to	be	converted	back	to	
forests,	this	is	a	crime”	
15/03/2011	
“There	is	no	amnesty.	Fines	will	be	only	
suspended	 for	 five	 years	 until	
regularisation	of	areas	take	place”		
	
25/04/2012	
“Many	 lies	 are	 being	 told	 about	 the	
agriculture	 stimulated	 deforestation	
levels.	 Embrapa’s	 research	 shows	
that	 Brazil	 is	 the	 country	 which	 has	
the	 lowest	 level	 of	 deforestation	 in	
the	 entire	 world.	 The	 bill	 does	 not	
promote	deforestation	 it	only	makes	
legal	 the	 situation	 of	 areas	 that	 are	
already	being	used”			
	
“It	 is	 a	 nonsense	 to	 reduce	 food	
production	 when	 one	 billion	 people	
in	the	world	are	facing	hunger”	
	
If	current	[bill]	report	is	approved	
there	will	be	a	reduction	of	33	million	
hectares	of	productive	land	in	our	
country.	Even	though	this	is	not	
enough	for	“chicken	head”	
environmentalists	(ambientalóides)	
who	support	the	idea	that	areas	that	
have	been	used	for	more	than	a	100	
years	should	now	be	restored.	
	
Sarney	Filho	(coordinator	of	
the	environmentalist	caucus)	
–	preservationist	
24/02/2010	
The	report	will	make	rules	about	legal	
reserve	and	permanent	protection	
more	flexible,	which	is	a	rollback	
13/04/2010	
Planting	 on	 the	 top	 of	 mountains	 is	
illegal.	 	 Merging	 legal	 reserves	 and	
areas	 of	 permanent	 protection	 in	 the	
same	 calculation	 will	 be	 a	 green	 light	
for	more	deforestation	
15/06/2010	
The	 bill	 goes	 against	 Brazil’s	 interests.	
It	amnesties	fresh	deforestation	
24/05/2011	
The	 approved	 bill	 is	 a	 disaster,	 it	 is	
not	 a	 forest	 code	but	 an	 agricultural	
code	 and	 it	 could	 compromise	
international	 agreements	 signed	 by	
Brazil		
25/04/2012	
“The	 rule	 of	 at	 least	 15	 metres	 of	
protected	 areas	 around	 rivers	 of	 up	
to	 10	 metres	 was	 reintroduced	 due	
to	 the	 request	 of	 Deputy	 Sarney	
Filho”	
03/11/2014	
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15/06/2010	
There	 is	 no	 need	 to	 deforest	 more	 in	
order	to	keep	agricultural	productivity.	
The	 bill	 could	 generate	 more	
deforestation.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 permit	
the	 continued	 use	 of	 areas	 that	 have	
been	used	for	50	or	100	years,	but	not	
of	 areas	 deforested	 two	 years	 ago,	
against	current	law	
20/04/2011	
The	 permanent	 protected	 area	 should	
be	 15	 metres	 for	 all	 farmers,	 and	 not	
only	 for	 large	 ones.	 Whoever	 is	
currently	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 law	
should	 be	 rewarded	 with	 fiscal	
measures	
What	the	law	requires	today	is	much	
less	 than	 what	 the	 most	 optimistic	
technicians	 and	 researchers	 would	
recommend.	 Areas	 of	 Permanent	
Preservation	 are	 crucial	 for	 the	
conservation	of	soil,	water,	 flora	and	
fauna,	 all	 essential	 for	 the	
sustainability,	 the	 sustainability	 of	
agriculture	included	
04/03/2015	
Areas	 of	 permanent	 preservation	
should	 be	 returned	 to	 the	 limits	 of	
the	previous	forest	codes.	
Izabella	Teixeira	(Minister	of	
the	Environment)	–	
administrative	economic	
rationalist/socio-
environmentalist	
09/06/2010	
“The	changes	being	discussed	 in	 terms	
of	 legal	 reserves	 may	 go	 against	
international	 agreements	 Brazil	 has	
signed.	These	should	be	considered	by	
legislators.	 Farmers	 can	maintain	 legal	
reserves	 and	 produce	 more,	 without	
deforestation.	We	need	 to	understand	
where	 Brazilian	 productive	 areas	 are,	
the	 role	 of	 Legal	 Reserves	 and	 of	
Permanent	 Preservation	 Areas	 in	 the	
protection	of	Biodiversity.	Studies	from	
Esalq	 show	 that	 riparian	 buffer	 zones	
and	 legal	 reserves	 play	 an	 even	 larger	
role	 than	 protected	 areas	 and	
indigenous	lands	in	the	conservation	of	
biodiversity”	
	01/04/2011	
We	 have	 to	 protect	 biodiversity	 using	
more	 modern	 ecological	 tools	 that	
allow	 us	 to	 improve	 the	 income	 of	
those	who	have	forests	on	their	lands	
We	have	been	listening	to	the	positions	
of	family	farmers,	conservationists	and	
large	 producers	 so	 we	 can	 evaluate	
whether	 we	 are	 on	 the	 right	 path	 for	
the	 elaboration	 of	 a	 modern	 Forest	
Code.	The	main	idea	is	that	it	can	solve	
unfair	 situations	 from	 the	 past	 and	
allow	 for	 sustainable	 agricultural	
production,	 the	 development	 of	 a	
forest	 economy	 and	 biodiversity	
conservation	to	take	place	in	Brazil	
25/10/2011	
I	 hope	 the	 issue	 of	 amnesty	 for	
foresters	is	revised	by	the	Senate			
We	are	 in	a	 constructive	negotiation	
with	the	Congress.	The	debate	should	
result	 in	 more	 environmental	
security.	 But	 	 environmental	
regularisation	 cannot	 be	 confused	
with	 amnesty	 for	 those	 who	
deforested	
25/05/2012	
“We	 changed	 [the	 requirements	 of	
permanent	 preservation	 areas]	
considering	 the	 size	 of	 the	 property,	
the	width	of	the	river	and	the	impact	
of	regularisation	according	to	the	size	
of	 the	 property.	 Considering	 social	
and	environmental	factors”	
“The	 2008	 date	 for	 regularisation	 to	
start	was	a	political	agreement	made	
by	 Lula,	 we	 couldn’t	 reverse	 it”	
	
	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
4.3.6.	Conclusion	
This	third	section	has	assessed	the	four	sources	of	policy	change	suggested	by	
the	ACF	in	relation	to	the	changes	represented	by	the	new	2012	Forest	Code.	Its	main	
finding	 is	 that,	 although	 important	external	 and	 internal	events	 can	be	 confirmed	as	
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causes	of	 this	 regulatory	 change,	negotiated	agreement	 and	policy-oriented	 learning	
cannot.		
In	 relation	 to	 external	 events	 it	 maintains	 that	 changes	 in	 socioeconomic	
conditions	 and	 in	 the	 governing	 coalition	 were	 the	 most	 impactful,	 particularly	 the	
boom	in	the	export	of	commodities	and	the	ascendance	of	the	economic	and	political	
power	of	the	agribusiness	sector.	The	 internal	events	 identified	as	 important	triggers	
of	 the	 debates	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code	 were	 the	 assassination	 of	 the	
rubber	 tapper	Chico	Mendes	by	cattle	 ranchers	 in	1988,	 the	1992	UN	Rio	Conference	
and	 the	 Presidential	 Decree	 7.029/2009	 determining	 that	 all	 farmers	who	were	 not	
compliant	with	the	requirements	of	the	previous	code	would	be	punished	from	2011.	
The	first	two	internal	events	were	perceived	to	be	crucial	to	the	overall	trend	towards	
the	 stricter	 forest	 regulatory	 enforcement	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s,	 as	
described	in	section	4.1	of	this	chapter.	They,	therefore,	 indirectly	contributed	to	the	
accumulation	 of	 resentments	 towards	 previous	 regulations	 by	 agribusiness,	 which,	
once	 in	a	position	of	greater	political	and	economic	power,	pushed	 for	changes.	The	
third	event	was	more	directly	related	to	the	proposal	of	regulatory	reform.			
Negotiated	 agreement	was	not	 identified	 as	 a	 relevant	 source	of	 regulatory	
change	 due	 to	 three	 factors.	 First,	 there	 was	 a	 high	 reliance	 on	 institutional	
mechanisms	 not	 based	on	 negotiation	 and	 agreement	 during	 the	 process	 leading	 to	
the	approval	of	the	new	code.	As	the	analysis	revealed,	the	president	issued	21	vetoes	
against	 Congress	 bills,	 the	 judiciary	 power	 was	 involved	 twice	 with	 allegations	 of	
unconstitutionality,	 and	 previously	 negotiated	 agreements	 were	 reversed	 by	
amendments.	 Second,	 regarding	 the	venues	of	negotiation,	a	 special	 commission	 for	
the	discussion	of	the	Forest	Code	had	to	be	created	in	the	Lower	Chamber,	revealing	
that	the	issue	was	sufficiently	contentious	to	discount	it	being	discussed	in	any	of	the	
permanent	commissions.		Finally,	the	occurrence	of	‘devil	shift’	–	or	the	exaggeration	
of	opponents’	maliciousness	–	a	phenomenon	associated	with	high	levels	of	adversity	
and	low	levels	of	negotiated	agreement,	was	also	identified	through	cases	of	personal	
insults	and	pejorative	references	to	opponents	in	the	media.	
Policy-oriented	learning,	similarly,	could	not	be	identified.	Although	scientists	
contributed	 extensively	 to	 the	 political	 debate	 and	 even	 produced	 a	 systematic	
scientific	 report	 with	 a	 summary	 of	 more	 than	 300	 scientific	 studies	 specifically	
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regarding	the	proposed	changes	to	the	code,	this	contribution	was	not	used	by	policy-
makers	during	debates	and	changes	in	the	positions	of	key	actors	remained	the	same	
after	the	report	was	published.	Actual	analytical	debate,	in	which	scientific	or	technical	
arguments	are	used	to	counter	opponent’s	positions	was	practically	non-existent.	It	is	
concluded,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 that	 both	 negotiated	 agreement	 and	 policy-oriented	
learning	 played	 a	 reduced	 role	 in	 the	 standard-setting	 process	 of	 the	 new	 Brazilian	
Forest	Code,	while	internal	and	external	events	were	found	to	be	relevant.		
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CHAPTER	5	–	CASE	STUDY	II:	PESTICIDES	
	
	
5.1.	Introduction	
This	chapter	focuses	on	the	case	of	pesticide	regulatory	changes	in	Brazil.	It	
describes	 the	 history	 of	 this	 policy	 subsystem,	 its	 main	 changes	 between	 2005	 and	
2015,	 the	most	 salient	 policy	 problems,	 coalitions	 and	 narratives	 formed	during	 this	
time	 and	 investigates	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 regulatory	 changes	 observed.	 Although	 it	
identifies	 several	 regulatory	 changes	 in	 the	 area,	 it	 focuses	 the	 analysis	 on	 the	 two	
most	 salient	 actual	 or	 proposed	 changes,	 namely	 Law	 12.873/2013,	 which	 allowed	
unregistered	pesticides	to	be	produced	and	imported	in	cases	of	phytosanitary	or	zoo-
sanitary	 emergencies,	 and	 Bill	 209/2013,	 which	 intended	 to	 establish	 a	 new	 unified	
pesticide	 registration	 agency	 under	 the	 central	 command	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture,	 substituting	 the	 current	 tripartite	 system,	which	 involves	 the	Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	the	Ministry	of	Environment	and	the	Ministry	of	Health	(this	one	had	not	
yet	been	approved	at	the	moment	of	writing).	This	chapter	maintains	that	regulatory	
changes	 can	 be	 most	 clearly	 attributed	 to	 two	 events.	 The	 first	 is	 external	 to	 the	
subsystem	and	 is	 related	 to	 the	orientation	of	 the	majority	of	 the	National	Congress	
and	the	strength	of	the	rural	caucus	within	it.	The	second,	internal	to	the	subsystem,	
relates	to	the	marked	increase	in	the	use	of	pesticides	in	the	country	during	the	time	
period	 analysed,	 which	 overburdened	 the	 administrative	 structure,	 delaying	 the	
registration	process	of	new	pesticides.	The	chapter	also	investigates	the	role	of	policy-
oriented	 learning	 and	 negotiated	 agreement	 between	 stakeholders	 as	 sources	 of	
policy	 change	 and	 concludes	 that	 these	 two	 latter	 factors	 did	 not	 play	 a	 discernible	
role	in	the	identified	regulatory	changes.	
	Accordingly,	this	chapter	contributes	to	the	overall	argument	of	the	thesis	
in	two	ways.	First,	by	investigating	the	relevance	of	the	four	sources	of	policy	change	
identified	by	the	ACF	and,	second,	by	analysing	the	causal	mechanisms	through	which	
they	operated.	The	results	of	the	empirical	analysis	provide	support	to	the	claim	that	
external	 and	 internal	 events	 are	 sufficient	 sources	 of	 regulatory	 change	 and	 that	
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learning	and	negotiated	agreement	are	not	necessary	for	policy	changes	to	occur.	This	
is	 particularly	 surprising	 given	 the	 high	 potential	 relevance	 of	 technical/scientific	
information	 in	 an	 area	 such	 as	 pesticide	 regulation.	 In	 addition	 to	 involving	 a	 lot	 of	
scientific	 uncertainty	 and	 having	 scope	 for	 the	 application	 of	 scientific	 knowledge,	
there	 has	 been	 a	 lot	 of	 participation	 of	 scientists	 in	 debates.	 Their	 contributions,	
however,	 were	 dismissed	 by	 the	 political	 actors	 of	 the	 debate	 as	 exaggerated	 or	
biased.	In	terms	of	causal	mechanisms,	the	chapter	provides	support	to	the	idea	that	
interest	calculations	should	be	included	as	explanations	of	policy	change.	
	The	 chapter	 proceeds	 as	 follows:	 Section	 5.2	 describes	 the	 history	 of	
pesticide	 regulation	 in	Brazil.	 It	demonstrates	 that	Brazilian	 regulations	on	pesticides	
are	 consistently	 changing	 towards	 less	 strict	 environmental,	 health	 and	 tax	 controls	
and	highlights	important	internal	events	affecting	the	history	of	this	policy	subsystem.	
Additionally,	this	section	highlights	the	most	salient	policy	problems	in	the	sector,	and	
justifies	 the	 subsequent	 focus	 on	 Law	 12.873/2013	 and	 Bill	 209/2013.	 Section	 5.3	
pursues	an	analysis	of	the	coalitions	and	narratives	relevant	in	the	debates	about	these	
regulations.	 It	 demonstrates	 that	 three	 main	 coalitions	 have	 been	 active	 in	 these	
debates	 –	 neo-developmentalists,	 administrative	 economic	 rationalists	 and	
preservationists/socio-environmentalists	 –	 and	 that	 the	 direction	 of	 regulatory	
changes	 predominantly	 favoured	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 group.	
Section	 5.4	 assesses	 the	 influence	 of	 internal	 events,	 the	 incidence	 of	 negotiated	
agreement	 and	 learning	 in	 the	 debates	 about	 these	 two	 regulatory	 changes	 and	
investigates	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 non-occurrence	 of	 the	 latter	 two.	 Section	 5.5	
concludes.	
	
5.2.	A	brief	history	of	Pesticide	Regulation	in	Brazil		
This	section	provides	a	brief	history	of	the	regulation	of	pesticides	in	Brazil	
since	1934	and	sheds	light	on	the	main	changes	in	standards	in	this	policy	subsystem,	
emphasising,	 in	particular,	 the	period	between	2005	and	2015	and	setting	 the	scene	
for	the	analysis	of	the	coalitions	and	narratives	that	have	been	active	in	this	process.		
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As	 will	 be	 seen,	 a	 trend	 emerged	 towards	 standards	 that	 establish	 less	
control	 and	 more	 incentives	 for	 the	 use	 of	 pesticides.	 Additionally,	 the	 cases	 of	
regulatory	 change	 identified	 in	 this	 section	 go	 against	 the	 history	 of	 strengthening	
controls	that	had	previously	characterised	the	evolution	of	pesticide	regulation	in	the	
country.	 The	 weakening	 of	 controls	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	coalition,	which	has	promoted	an	agenda	of	facilitation	in	the	import	
and	registration	of	pesticides.	
	The	first	law	on	pesticides	in	Brazil	was	established	by	presidential	decree	
in	 1934.	 Known	 as	 the	 Regulation	 of	 Vegetable	 Sanitary	 Defence	 (Regulamento	 de	
Defesa	Sanitária	Vegetal	 -	Decree	Nº	24.114,	12th	of	April	1934),	 it	determined	 that	
new	products	had	to	be	registered	by	the	Service	of	Vegetable	Sanitary	Defence	of	the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 but	 it	 did	 not	 establish	 any	 requirement	 that	 toxicological	 or	
environmental	 evaluations	were	 carried	 out	 before	 approval.57	 	 It	was	 only	 in	 1989,	
with	 the	 sanctioning	 of	 Pesticide	 Law	 7.802,	 that	 the	 sector	 began	 to	 be	 regulated	
more	strictly	 in	terms	of	environmental	and	health	requirements	(Pelaez	et	al.,	2015;	
Pelaez,	 Terra	 and	 Silva,	 2010).	 The	 1989	 law,	which	was	 still	 the	 operative	 pesticide	
regulation	in	the	country	at	the	time	of	writing,-	established	new	and	relatively	strict	
control	in	terms	of	health	and	environmental	risks.58		
These	 stricter	 controls	were	 consistently	 attacked	 in	 the	 period	 between	
2005	and	2015,	and	remarkable	standard	changes	have	resulted	 in	order	to	facilitate	
and	promote	the	use	of	pesticides	in	Brazil.	As	indicated	by	column	6	(‘Does	the	final	
decision	 favour	 the	 use	 of	 synthetic	 pesticides?’)	 of	 table	 19,	 which	 presents	 an	
exhaustive	analysis	of	all	regulatory	changes	that	culminated	in	a	final	decision	during	
																																								 																				
57	Decree	55.871	established	 some	 limits	 for	pesticide	 residues	 in	 food	 in	March	1965,	mainly	due	 to	
requirements	from	importing	countries,	and	a	few	infra-legal	rulings	were	published	after	1970	setting	
some	minimal	health	criteria	for	the	use	of	pesticides.	 
58 Among	its	 innovations	were:	the	prohibition	of	the	registration	of	pesticides	considered	to	be	more	
toxic	 than	 pre-registered	 suitable	 equivalents	 (art.	 3	 §	 5º),	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 suspension	 or	
cancellation	of	registrations	by	request	of	civil	society	(art.	5),	a	requirement	to	register	all	the	workers	
involved	 in	 the	 handling	 and	 application	 of	 pesticides	 (art.	 4	 ),	 the	 possibility	 of	 attributing	
environmental	or	health	damage	caused	to	the	use	of	pesticides	(art.	14)	and	the	need	for	toxicological,	
environmental	 and	 agronomic	 efficiency	 analysis	 to	 be	 undertaken	 before	 the	 registration	 of	 a	 new	
pesticide	 (art.	 5)	 (Law	 7.802/89).	 Additionally,	 a	 provision	 considered	 to	 be	 particularly	 audacious	 in	
terms	of	 its	precautionary	character	was	 the	possibility	of	banning	pesticides	based	on	 their	potential	
mutagenic,	carcinogenic,	reproductive	and	endocrinal	impacts,	or	of	including	the	consideration	of	non-
chemical	 criteria	 in	 the	 assessment,	 such	 as	 the	 level	 of	 instruction	of	 the	 rural	workers	 applying	 the	
product,	or	the	level	of	monitoring	and	control	available	on	the	ground	(Art	3	§	6º,	c,	e). 
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the	 period	 analysed,59	 attempts	 to	 further	 restrict	 or	 regulate	 the	 use	 of	 pesticides	
were	 consistently	 rejected	 in	 this	 time	 period,	 while	 regulations	 favouring	 its	 use	
tended	to	thrive.60	The	analysis	of	whether	these	regulatory	decisions	have	favoured	
the	wider	use	of	pesticides	was	based	on	the	identification	of	economic	incentives	or	
on	the	removal	of	previously	established	controls.61		
	In	2004,	for	example,	a	presidential	decree62	reduced	to	zero	the	incidence	
of	 some	 taxes	 (PIS/Pasep	 and	 COFINS)	 on	 the	 import	 and	 trade	 of	 fertilizers	 and	
pesticides.	 Law	 Nº	12.545,	 of	 14th	 of	 December	 of	 2011,	 in	 addition,	 included	
pesticides	 as	beneficiaries	of	 the	 Fund	 for	 Financing	 Exports	 (FFEX),	 subsidising	 their	
sales	 abroad.	 Decree	 6461	 of	 the	 senate	 is	 another	 example	 of	 the	 facilitation	 of	
pesticide	use.	It	reduced	taxes	for	fuel	used	in	aviation	and	promoted	aerial	spraying	of	
pesticides,	which	is	a	common	technique.	Finally,	attempts	to	establish	further	checks	
on	 the	use	of	pesticides	 (such	as	PL	7490/10	or	PL	3615/12),	 requirements	 for	more	
transparency	 around	 its	 use	 (such	 as	 PL	6448/09),	more	 severe	 punishments	 for	 the	
illegal	use	of	pesticides	 (such	as	PL	1811/11),	 restrictions	around	 specific	 substances	
(such	 as	 the	 attempt	 of	 the	 Ministério	 Público)	 or	 ways	 of	 applying	 pesticides	
(PLS	681/11)	 were	 consistently	 rejected	 by	 the	 National	 Congress.
																																								 																				
59	 This	 table	was	 produced	 by	 searching	 for	 the	word	 ‘pesticides’	 in	 the	 publications	 of	 the	Deputies	
Chamber	 and	 of	 the	 Senate	 agency	 news	 between	 01/01/2005	 and	 31/12/2015	 and	 selecting	 all	
references	to	bills	or	public	acts	that	culminated	in	a	final	decision.	
60	 The	 only	 proposal	 approved	 that	 might	 negatively	 affect	 the	 use	 of	 pesticides	 during	 the	 period	
analysed,	even	if	in	an	indirect	manner,	was	the	tax	exemption	conceded	to	agents	of	natural	control	of	
plant	 diseases	 (on	 31/08/2011).	 This	 measure,	 nonetheless,	 was	 taken	 several	 years	 after	 pesticides	
themselves	 gained	 important	 tax	 exemptions	 and	 does	 not	 directly	 oppose	 the	 use	 of	 pesticides	 but	
simply	promotes	the	use	of	alternative	methods.	
61	These	proposals	were	all	originally	launched	with	the	aims	presented	in	column	2	(‘proposal’)	of	table	
1.	There	were,	in	general,	no	alterations	to	the	original	proposals.		
62		Decree	5.195,	in	2005	substituted	by	the	Decree	5.630.	
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Table	19	-	National	Congress	recent	decisions	on	pesticide-related	regulatory	changes	
Date	of	the	
final	decision	 Proposal	 Origin	 Bill	 Decision	
Does	the	final	decision	
favour	the	use	of	
synthetic	pesticides?	
Times	mentioned	by	the	
Chamber’s	news	agency	
(2005–2015)	–	saliency	
21/05/2008	
Reduces	taxes	(‘CIDE’)	for	aviation	fuel	 Executive	Power	 DEC	6461	
(of	the	Senate)	
PL	5569/13	
	
Approved	by	the	Senate	 Yes	 4	
17/08/2011	
Makes	a	technical	report	by	official	institutions	
mandatory	in	order	for	any	pesticide	to	be	allowed	to	
be	registered	in	the	country	
MP	Beto	Faro	
(PT-PA)	
PL	7490/10	
Rejected	by	the	Commission	of	
Agriculture,	Livestock,	Supply	and	
Rural	Development	of	the	Deputies	
Chamber	
Yes	 2	
31/08/2011	
Reduces	taxes	(eliminates	the	payment	of	
PIS/Pasep	and	Cofins)	on	the	import	and	trade	of	agents	
of	biological	control	of	plant	diseases	
Deputy	Mendes	
Thame	(PSDB-SP)	
PL	1024/11	
Approved	by	the	Commission	of	
Agriculture,	Livestock,	Supply	and	
Rural	Development	of	the	Deputies	
Chamber	
No	 2	
19/10/2011	
Requires	the	food	industry	to	include	information	about	
all	pesticides	and	similar	substances	used	in	the	
production	process	of	vegetable	based	food	on	the	label	
MP	Sarney	Filho	
(PV-MA)	
PL	6448/09	
Rejected	by	the	Commission	of	
Economic	Development	Industry	
and	Commerce	of	the	Deputies	
Chamber	
Yes	 1	
19/10/2011	
Increases	the	stringency	of	punishment	for	illegal	use	of	
pesticides	
MP	Amauri	
Teixeira	(PT-BA)	
PL	1811/11	
Rejected	by	the	Commission	of	
Agriculture,	Livestock,	Supply	and	
Rural	Development	of	the	Deputies	
Chamber	
Yes	 3	
22/11/2011	
Includes	pesticides	as	beneficiaries	of	the	Financing	
Fund	for	Exports	(FFEX)	
MP	Ratinho	Júnior	
(PSC-PR)	
Amendment	to	
PLV	28/2011	
(Resulting	in	the	
Law	Nº	12.545,	
of	14th	Dec.	
2011)	
Approved	 Yes	 1	
25/09/2013	
Requirement	of	agricultural	aviation	companies	to	send,	
to	the	bodies	responsible	for	agriculture	and	
environmental	protection,	copies	of	agronomical	
prescriptions	for	the	application	of	pesticides	and	
annual	reports	on	operations	conducted	
Deputy	Padre	
João	(PT)	
PL	3615/12	
Rejected	by	the	Commission	of	
Agriculture,	Livestock,	Supply	and	
Rural	Development	of	the	Deputies	
Chamber	
Yes	 7	
28/10/2013	
Allows	unregistered	pesticides	to	be	used	in	cases	of	
phytosanitary	or	zoo-sanitary	emergencies	
Executive	Power	 Decree	8.133	
converted	to	
Law	12.873/12	
Approved	by	both	chambers	and	
converted	in	Law	 Yes	 22	
09/04/2014	
Suspension	of	the	authorisation	of	pesticides	containing	
the	herbicide	2,4-D	while	the	toxicology	re-evaluation	is	
not	pursued	by	ANVISA	
Ministério	Público	
(Public	Attorney’s	
Office)	
-	 Rejected	by	Federal	Court	of	Justice	 Yes	 0	
12/03/2015	
Prohibition	of	aerial	spraying	of	pesticides	 Senator	Ana	Rita	
Esgario	
(PT	–	ES)	
PLS	681/11	 Rejected/	filed	by	the	Senate	
	 Yes	 0	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	based	on	the	news	published	by	the	Deputies	Chamber	and	Senate	websites.	
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Additionally,	although	not	yet	a	regulatory	change	on	which	a	final	decision	
has	been	made	(and,	thus,	not	represented	in	table	19),	an	alteration	of	the	pesticide’s	
registration	structure	and	processes	began	to	be	debated	in	2013	with	the	issuance	of	
Bill	 209/2013	 and	 received	 considerable	 attention	 from	 policy	 makers.	 	 The	
registration	 process	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 involves	 toxicological	 evaluations	 by	 the	
health	 agency	 (ANVISA),	 an	 environmental	 risk	 assessment	 by	 the	 environmental	
agency	(IBAMA)	and	an	evaluation	of	agronomic	efficacy	undertaken	by	the	Ministry	of	
Agriculture.	 Based	 on	 criticisms	 about	 the	 excessive	 bureaucracy	 involved	 in	 this	
tripartite	 evaluation	 process,	 the	 bill	 intends	 to	 establish	 a	 new	 unified	 registration	
agency	under	the	central	command	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture.		
Although	 this	 bill	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 approved	 in	 May	 2016	 (when	 this	
chapter	was	written),	a	saliency	analysis	of	the	main	policy	problems	on	the	agenda	of	
pesticides	from	2005	until	201563	indicated	that	the	main	policy	problem	discussed	in	
this	 subsector	 was	 the	 excessive	 bureaucracy	 in	 the	 registration	 of	 new	 products,	
which	 puts	 both	 this	 Bill	 and	 Law	 12.873/2013	 in	 the	 spotlight	 of	 the	 most	 salient	
regulatory	changes.	As	demonstrated	by	graph	3	and	table	20	below,	although	other	
policy	problems	were	also	frequently	discussed	in	the	debates	analysed,	the	problem	
of	 registration	 red	 tape	 (bureaucracy	 and	 inefficiency)	 was	 the	most	 debated	 issue.	
The	 temporal	 analysis	 provided	 in	 table	 20	 reveals,	 moreover,	 that	 excessive	
bureaucracy	 in	 registration	 has	 been	 debated	 more	 often	 (and	 has	 involved	 more	
actors)	during	the	most	recent	periods,	while	other	policy	problems,	such	as	demands	
for	 less	 taxation	 on	 pesticides,	 were	 concentrated	 in	 the	 period	 before	 2010.	 The	
problem	of	the	amount	of	pesticides	used	in	the	country	and	concerns	about	toxicity	
and	environmental	damages	of	their	use	have	also	increased	in	recent	years	(which	is	
consistent	with	the	increased	use	of	pesticides	in	the	country)	but	have	not	resulted	in	
as	much	debate	as	the	problem	of	registration	red	tape64.		
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
63	Identified	through	the	codification	of	every	policy	problem	mentioned	in	the	65	documents	analysed	
and	by	counting	of	times	they	were	cited	
64	Because	the	bill	had	not	been	approved	yet	at	the	time	of	writing,	I	had	to	develop	this	alternative	
way	to	justify	its	saliency.	
136	
	
	
	
	
	
Graph	3	-	Main	policy	problems	on	the	agenda	about	pesticides	(2005–2015)65		 	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	using	Atlas.ti	
	
Table	20	-	Policy	problem	citations	per	year	(excluding	same	author	citations)	
	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	using	Atlas.ti	
	
The	investigation	of	the	reasons	for	this	temporal	 increase	 in	the	salience	
of	 the	 policy	 problem	of	 excessive	 bureaucracy	 in	 the	 registration	of	 new	pesticides	
and	the	demonstrated	 increase	 in	the	debate	about	this	specific	policy	problem	was,	
during	the	analysis	of	debates,	directly	related	to	the	increase	in	the	use	of	pesticides	
in	the	country	and	the	consequent	overload	of	the	administrative	structures	in	charge	
of	organising	 the	 registrations.	 These	 two	 important	 internal	events	are	discussed	 in	
more	detail	 in	 section	5.4	of	 this	 chapter,	 after	 the	narratives	and	 coalitions	 formed	
during	 the	 debates	 of	 these	 two	 most	 salient	 regulations	 are	 analysed	 in	 the	 next	
section.	
	
	
																																								 																				
65	Light	grey	columns	refer	to	policy	problems	associated	with	the	view	that	pesticides	should	be	more	
heavily	controlled,	and	dark	grey	columns	are	policy	problems	emerging	from	the	assumption	that	use	
should	be	facilitated	or	promoted.	
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5.3.	Narrative	and	Coalition	Analysis	
	This	 section	 analyses	 the	 narratives	 and	 coalitions	 formed	 during	 the	
debates	of	both	Law	12.873	-	authorising	the	trade	and	use	of	unregistered	pesticides	
in	 case	 of	 ‘phytosanitary	 or	 zoo-sanitary	 emergencies’,	 and	 Bill	 209/2013,	 which	
proposes	 an	 alteration	 to	 the	 registration	 institutional	 structure	 substituting	 the	
tripartite	system	(involving	the	Ministry	of	Environment,	the	Ministry	of	Health	and	the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture)	 for	 a	 monolithic	 system	managed	 solely	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture.	 These	 regulations	were	 selected	 for	 this	 analysis	 because	 they	 are	 both	
aimed	at	solving	the	excessive	bureaucracy	involved	in	the	process	of	the	registration	
of	new	pesticides	–	the	policy	problem	identified	as	the	most	salient	in	this	subsystem	
between	 2005	 and	 2015.	 Narrative	 analysis	 is	 used	 in	 this	 section	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 the	
identification	of	coalitions	and	is	complemented	by	thematic	coding,	pursued	through	
the	coding	of	mentions	of	specific	policy	problems	by	different	groups	of	actors.	A	total	
of	65	texts	(mainly	from	the	National	Congress	Agency	News)	were	used	in	this	analysis	
(please	refer	to	chapter	1,	section	1.4	for	a	detailed	description	of	the	texts	used).		
	
5.3.1.	Narrative	Analysis	
Three	 main	 narratives	 were	 identified	 and	 analysed	 according	 to	 the	
narrative	analysis	criteria	proposed	by	Jones	and	McBeth	(2010),	who	advance	that	a	
policy	 narrative	 contains	 four	 fundamental	 elements:	 1)	 a	 setting	 –	 or	 the	 basic	
assumptions,	2)	characters	–	who	can	be	specified	as	victims,	heroes	and	villains,	3)	a	
plot	–	advancing	causal	mechanisms	and	the	relationship	between	the	setting	and	the	
characters	and,	4)	a	moral	of	the	story	–	corresponding	to	the	specific	policy	solution,	
goal	 or	 policy	 change	 proposal	 being	 advanced	 by	 the	 narrative.	 Each	 of	 these	 four	
criteria	was	identified	in	the	texts	analysed	and	coded	through	the	use	of	the	software	
Atlas.ti.	(detailed	outputs	are	provided	in	Appendix	I	for	this	chapter).	
In	the	first	narrative	identified	–	here	referred	to	as	neo-developmentalist	
according	to	the	elements	of	discourse	analysis	identified	in	chapter	3	–	the	setting	or	
basic	 assumption	 is	 that	 pesticides	 are	 good	 for	 the	 country,	 either	 because	 they	
favour	economic	gains	 (international	 trade	was	 the	most	 frequently	mentioned	gain)	
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or	because	they	guarantee	food	security.	This	basic	assumption	clearly	relates	to	the	
central	 message	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 discourse,	 according	 to	 which	 caring	
about	the	environment	is	a	luxury	and	economic	development	should	be	prioritised.		In	
relation	 to	 the	 characters	 (victims,	 villains	 and	 heroes)	 of	 this	 narrative,	 the	 most	
frequently	mentioned	victim	was	the	agribusiness	sector,	which	is	depicted	as	suffering	
from	excessive	bureaucracy	in	the	registration	process	of	new	pesticides	and	of	being	
vulnerable	 to	 great	 economic	 losses	 because	 of	 exaggerated	 governmental	 control	
over	pesticide	use.		Excessive	bureaucracy	itself	is	frequently	portrayed	as	a	villain	by	
the	 actors	 using	 this	 narrative.	 ANVISA	 and	 IBAMA	 are	 also	 implied,	 as	 they	 are	
highlighted	 as	 the	 main	 perpetrators	 of	 these	 bureaucratic	 hurdles.	 The	 heroes	 are	
regulatory	reforms	that	facilitate	registration	(such	as	Law	12.873	or	Bill	209/2013)	and	
the	 proposed	 unified	 registration	 agency	 to	 be	 coordinated	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture.	 The	plot	 of	 this	 first	 narrative	 is	 that	 excessive	 bureaucracy	 is	 hindering	
economic	 development,	 food	 security	 and	 putting	 the	 entire	 Brazilian	 economy	 and	
society	at	 risk.	The	moral	of	 the	story	or	policy	solution	advanced	 is	 that	 registration	
should	be	made	easier	and	faster,	the	triple	registration	structure	should	be	replaced	
with	a	faster,	possibly	unified	system,	and	that	the	flexibilisation	of	the	system	(such	as	
in	 case	 of	 exceptions	 to	 non-registered	 pesticides	 during	 phytosanitary	 and	 zoo-
sanitary	emergencies)	should	continue	or	be	intensified.		
Among	 the	 actors	 advancing	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 narrative	 were	
several	MPs,	particularly	those	associated	with	the	ruralist	caucus,	such	as	Luis	Carlos	
Heinze	 (PP-RS)	 (President	 of	 the	 Frente	 Parlamentar	 Agropecuaria),	 Deputy	 Valdir	
Colatto	 (PMDB-SC),	 and	 those	 participating	 either	 in	 the	 Commission	 of	 Agriculture	
and	Land	Settlement	of	the	Senate,	or	 in	the	Agriculture,	Cattle	Ranching	and	Supply	
Commission	 of	 the	Deputies	 Chamber	 (such	 as	 Senator	Waldemir	Moka	 [PMDB-MS]	
and	Senator	Blairo	Maggi	[PR-MT]).	This	narrative	also	found	resonance	in	declarations	
of	 members	 of	 ABIFINA	 (Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Chemical	 Industries	 and	
Biotechnology),	 representatives	of	 the	National	Union	of	 the	 industries	of	Vegetable	
Defence	Products	(SINDIVEG),	of	the	National	Confederation	of	Agriculture	(CNA),	and	
of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 (MAPA).	 	 A	 summary	 of	 the	 characters	 and	 plots	
associated	with	 this	 and	 the	other	 two	narratives	 surrounding	 the	policy	problem	of	
excessive	 bureaucracy	 in	 the	 registration	 of	 pesticides	 is	 presented	 in	 table	 21.	 The	
139	
	
actors	organising	around	this	narrative	are	detailed	in	figure	9	below	(between	‘80%’	
and	 ‘100%’,	 representing	 the	 high	 frequency	 of	 their	 declarations	 against	 greater	
control	on	the	use	of	pesticides).	
The	 second	 narrative	 identified	 was	 located	 within	 the	 larger	 discursive	
category	 of	 administrative	 economic	 rationalism	 and	 was	 more	 moderate	 in	 the	
regulatory	changes	it	advanced.	This	position	was	most	clearly	represented	by	ANVISA,	
and	 sometimes	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Environment	 (which	 tended	 more	 towards	 the	
preservationist/socio-environmentalist	 position	 most	 of	 the	 time).	 It	 favoured	 the	
acceleration	 of	 the	 registration	 process	 and	 the	 reduction	 of	 bureaucracy	 through	
more	 investments	 in	 the	agencies	 in	charge	of	 registration	 rather	 than	 through	 their	
removal	(interviews	57,	58).		
The	setting	or	basic	assumption	of	this	narrative	is	that	the	acceleration	in	
the	approval	of	new	pesticides	 (and	 the	consequent	 favouring	of	economic	activities	
that	rely	on	their	use)	 is	positive	 insofar	as	 it	 is	properly	controlled	and	regulated	by	
the	 government,	 which	 is	 a	 typical	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 story.	 The	
victims	 are	 seen	 as	 both	 the	 exporting	 agriculture	 sector,	 which	 is	 suffering	 from	
excessive	bureaucracy	and	control	over	the	use	of	pesticides,	but	also	(and	in	contrast	
to	the	first	narrative)	regulatory	agencies	who	suffer	from	a	lack	of	staff	and	pressure	
from	the	productive	sector	to	authorise	pesticides	quicker.	The	villains,	as	portrayed	by	
this	 group,	 are	 the	 limited	 resources	 invested	 in	 the	 administrative	 capacity	 of	 the	
state	 (staff,	 labs	etc.)	 and	also	 the	pesticide	 industry,	which	 is	blamed	 for	 asking	 for	
unnecessary	 registrations	 (of	 products	 not	 intended	 to	 be	 commercialised)	 just	 to	
guarantee	 a	 place	 in	 the	 queue	 and	 protect	 their	market	 share	 (this	 view	 is	mainly	
expressed	by	ANVISA).	The	heroes	are	the	regulatory	agencies	themselves,	which	are	
seen	as	capable	of	solving	the	problem	if	more	 investment	and	perhaps	a	careful	re-
structuring	of	 the	 regulatory	 apparatus	 is	 granted.	 The	plot	 is	 that,	 if	 the	amount	of	
control	 is	not	reduced	and	environment	and	health	analyses	continue	to	be	pursued,	
reform	 of	 the	 institutional	 structure	 of	 registration	 to	 promote	 more	 efficiency	 is	
desirable	because	it	would	favour	the	industry	without	reducing	government	control.	
The	actor	located	between	20%	and	80%	on	figure	9	are	the	actors	who	were	found	to	
most	 closely	 represent	 this	 discourse,	 although	 those	 between	 10%	 and	 20%	 and	
between	80%	and	90%	have	also	adopted	this	position	in	some	of	their	declarations.		
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At	the	other	end	of	the	ideological	spectrum	are	those	actors	categorised	
as	adopting	a	preservationist	or	socio-environmentalist	discourse,	who	formed	part	of	
the	 same	 coalition	 regarding	 the	 issue	 of	 registration	 bureaucracy.	 Following	 the	
premises	of	 these	 two	discourses,	 actors	 in	 this	 coalition	 strongly	oppose	 the	use	of	
pesticides	 and	 the	need	 for	 reform	 in	 the	 registration	 regulations	of	 new	pesticides,	
but	 diverge	 in	 their	 reasons	 for	 this	 opposition.	 While	 preservationists	 hold	 that	
pesticides	should	be	severely	controlled	because	of	their	impacts	on	the	environment,	
socio-environmentalists	point	to	the	risks	pesticides	represent	to	rural	communities	as	
the	main	reason	for	opposition.	None	of	these	groups,	therefore,	identify	bureaucracy	
in	pesticide	registration	as	a	policy	problem	and,	therefore,	they	oppose	any	reform.	A	
former	member	of	ANVISA,	Carlos	Meirelles,	for	example,	has	declared	the	proposal	to	
unify	the	institutional	structure	of	registration	to	be	a	“huge	rollback	on	the	regulatory	
structure	of	pesticides”.	In	his	words,	the	creation	of	a	new	regulatory	agency	means	
‘regressing’	in	terms	of	pesticide	control.	This	narrative	is	echoed	by	several	members	
of	civil	society,	social	movements,	research	institutions	and	politicians,	many	of	which	
are	 part	 of	 the	 ‘Permanent	 Campaign	 against	 Pesticides	 and	 for	 Life’	 (Campanha	
Permanente	contra	os	Agrotóxicos	e	pela	Vida).		The	setting	or	basic	assumption	of	this	
coalition	 is	 the	 belief	 that	 pesticides	 are	 ‘poisons’	 (a	 word	 frequently	 used	 in	 their	
narrative)	that	harm	the	delicate	environmental	and	social	equilibrium	and	should	be,	
as	much	as	possible,	avoided	or	banned	(for	this	group	the	costs	of	extensively	using	
pesticides	are,	therefore,	larger	than	benefits	both	in	social	and	environmental	terms).	
The	villains	of	this	narrative	are	large	multinational	agrochemical	corporations	who	see	
Brazil	as	a	‘pesticide	haven’	where	products	forbidden	in	other	parts	of	the	world	can	
be	 dumped,	 as	 well	 as	 agribusinesses	 that	 uses	 such	 products	 indiscriminately.	
Registration	bureaucracy,	therefore,	is	not	a	relevant	reason	for	regulatory	change	as	it	
only	 affects	 the	 villains	 of	 this	 narrative,	 namely,	 industries	 and	 larger	 agricultural	
producers.	The	adherents	of	this	narrative	perceive	the	policy	problem	of	red	tape	in	
registration	 as	 a	 justification	 for	 industrial	 lobbying	 (and	 not	 as	 an	 actual	 policy	
problem).	 In	this	differently-framed	policy	problem,	the	victims	are	the	environment,	
the	Brazilian	population	in	general	(who	have	to	eat	contaminated	products)	and	rural	
workers	and	small	land	owners	due	to	the	negative	health	and	social	consequences	of	
pesticide	use.	The	potential	hero	is	the	government,	which	is	depicted	as	the	only	actor	
capable	of	protecting	 its	population	 from	private	pressure	and	promoting	alternative	
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production	methods	such	as	agroecology.	The	central	plot,	therefore,	is	that	the	policy	
problem	 of	 excessive	 bureaucracy	 in	 registration	 does	 not	 exist	 and	 is	 simply	 an	
attempt	by	the	private	sector	to	capture	the	government,	which	should	be	resisted	by	
the	government.		
In	sum,	the	narrative	analysis	of	the	texts	in	relation	to	the	policy	problem	
of	excessive	bureaucracy	revealed	four	broader	discourses	and	the	formation	of	three	
coalitions.	 First,	 the	neo-developmentalists	 focused	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 use	 of	
pesticides	 for	 the	 economic	 development	 of	 the	 country	 without	 considering	
environmental	 and	 health	 impacts	 to	 be	 large	 enough	 policy	 problems	 to	 motivate	
action	 or	 further	 political	 debate.	 This	 group	 strongly	 favoured	 the	 reform	 of	
regulations	related	to	the	registration	or	the	 import	of	pesticides	 in	order	to	remove	
bureaucratic	 hurdles	 and	 were	 the	 proposers	 of	 these	 reforms	 (those	 who	 put	 the	
policy	problem	in	the	agenda).	Second,	a	more	moderate	narrative	supporting	the	use	
of	 pesticides	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 economic	 activities	 but	 with	 strict	 control	 and	
regulation	 from	 the	 government	 (administrative	 economic	 rationalist)	 was	 also	
identified.	The	actors	departing	from	this	standpoint	were	supportive	of	changes	in	the	
regulation	 of	 registration	 insofar	 as	 they	 did	 not	 limit	 the	 regulatory	 power	 of	 the	
government.	 Finally,	 the	preservationist/socioenvironmentalist	 coalition	 opposed	 the	
facilitation	of	the	use	of	pesticides	due	to	their	ecological	and	health	risks	and	opposed	
any	 regulatory	 reform	 intended	 to	 facilitate	 registration	 and	 import.	 Table	 21	below	
provides	a	summary	of	the	narrative	analysis	and	examples	of	citations	extracted	from	
the	texts	that	represent	the	claims.	
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Table	21	-	Narrative	Analysis	main	policy	problem	
Policy	problem	 Setting	 Victims	 Villains	 Heroes	 Main	plots	(taken	from	the	texts)	
Pesticides	
Registration	-	red-
tape/time	
consumption	
Neo-
developmentalist	
Agricultural	
producers,	
pesticides	
industry,	
Brazilian	
population	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Red	tape,	
regulatory	
agencies	
(ANVISA,	
IBAMA)	
Regulatory	and	
institutional	reform	
-	 ‘Regulatory	 agencies	 are	
inefficient	and	not	transparent’	
-	 ‘ANVISA/red-tape	 is	 putting	
agricultural	 production	 at	 risk	
which	will	lead	to	economic,	food	
security	 and	 national	 security	
issues’;	
-	 ‘Agricultural	 Producers	 are	
constantly	 threatened	 by	 new	
plagues	 without	 the	 capacity	 to	
defend	 their	 production	 due	 to	
registration	red	tape’	
-	 ‘Agricultural	 producers	 have	 to	
use	 pesticides	 irregularly	 and	 go	
against	 the	 law	 because	 of	 red-
tape’	
-	 ‘Red-tape	 hinders	
competitiveness,	 market	
efficiency	of	the	pesticides	sector’	
Administrative	
rationalist	
Regulatory	
Agencies;	
Agricultural	
Producers	
Lack	of	
resources	for	
regulatory	
agencies,	
pesticide	
industry	
	
	
	
	
Regulatory	agencies	
(after	more	
investment	in	
staff/structure)	
‘A	 careful	 toxicological	
evaluation	takes	time’	
‘Regulatory	 Agencies	 are	 under	
pressure’	
‘There	 is	 not	 enough	 staff	 and	
resources	 to	 attend	 to	 the	
demand	for	new	registrations’	
‘Pesticide	 industry	 is	applying	for	
registrations	 just	 to	 save	 a	 spot	
on	 the	 queue	 and	 not	 to	
effectively	 produce	 or	 sell	 the	
product’	
‘Reforms	 should	 be	 pursued	 but	
environmental	 and	 toxicological	
evaluations	 shall	 not	 be	
flexibilised’	
Preservationist/socio
-environmentalist	
Brazilian	
population,	
rural	
workers,	
small/family	
land	owners	
Pesticide	
industry	
Government	(which	
should	promote	
stricter	regulation	
and	control	of	the	
use	of	pesticides)	
‘Regulatory/institutional	 reform	
for	more	efficiency	in	registration	
will	 favour	only	agribusiness	and	
harm	society’	
‘This	 demand	 is	 only	 industrial	
lobby	and	should	be	opposed’	
‘Government	 should	 not	 be	
captured	 by	 lobby	 and	 should	
protect	 Brazilians	 with	 more	
incentives	 to	 agroecology	 and	
stricter	 regulations	 for	 pesticides	
use’	
		Source:	Produced	by	the	author		
	
5.3.2.	Thematic	Coding66	
In	 order	 to	 test	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 above-described	 narrative	 analysis	
regarding	the	basic	assumptions	of	actors	(the	main	criteria	used	for	the	identification	
of	coalitions),	a	broader	analysis	of	arguments	related	to	other	policy	problems	in	this	
																																								 																				
66	This	section	pursues	a	different	type	of	thematic	coding	than	what	was	pursued	in	the	other	empirical	
chapters,	 because	 the	data	 about	 the	 specific	 policy	problems	 selected	 for	 the	narrative	 analysis	was	
limited.	For	this	reason,	and	to	provide	for	a	stronger	analysis,	data	related	to	debates	about	pesticides	
in	general	were	considered	for	thematic	coding.	
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same	subsystem	was	pursued.	Actors	were	divided	 into	17	groups	according	 to	 their	
institutional	affiliation	and	their	arguments	were	coded	according	to	the	type	of	policy	
problems	they	were	bringing	to	the	debate.	Policy	problems	were	divided	among	those	
1)	promoting	and	facilitating	the	use	of	pesticides,	or	2)	restricting	and	controlling	it	--	
and	the	number	of	times	the	actors	from	each	institutional	affiliation	promoted	each	
policy	problem	was	counted.	Table	4	provides	a	summary	of	this	coding	process,	which	
was	also	pursued	with	the	help	of	the	software	Atlas.ti.	Policy	problems	considered	to	
be	 pro-pesticide	 are	 indicated	 in	 dark	 grey	 and	 anti-pesticide	 ones	 in	 light	 grey.		
Members	were	categorised	as	for	or	against	pesticides	according	to	the	nature	of	the	
majority	of	policy	problems	they	raised	during	debates.	For	instance,	in	the	first	line	of	
the	 table	 members	 of	 the	 Workers’	 Party	 were	 coded	 as	 promoting	 anti-pesticide	
policy	problems	16	times	and	pro-pesticide	issues	only	twice.	For	this	reason	they	were	
considered	an	anti-pesticide’s	group	(and	marked	in	light	grey).	
Thus,	this	analysis	went	beyond	the	 issue	of	registration	bureaucracy,	but	
regarding	this	specific	policy	problem	(first	column	of	table	22),	19	out	of	25	citations	
were	made	 by	members	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition	 (as	 identified	 by	 the	
narrative	 analysis),	 confirming	 that	 they	 were	 the	 main	 promoters	 of	 this	 specific	
policy	problem.	
	
Table	22	-	Number	of	citations	of	specific	policy	problems	by	actor	groups	
	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	using	Atlas.ti	
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The	 total	 number	 of	 citations	 in	 relation	 to	 each	 policy	 problem	 were	
transformed	into	percentages	to	allow	for	comparability.67	For	instance,	between	2005	
and	2015	actors	from	the	Workers’	Party	brought	issues	to	the	agenda	that	favour	the	
use	of	more	pesticides	two	times,	and	 issues	that	oppose	 it	16	times.	Therefore,	this	
group	has	favoured	the	use	of	pesticides	 in	only	about	11%	of	their	citations,	placing	
them	between	10%	and	20%	in	the	anti-or	pro-pesticides	spectrum	(figure	9).		Groups’	
distributions	along	 the	spectrum	sit,	 therefore,	between	 two	extremes:	 from	 ‘always	
promoting	 policy	 problems	 that	 imply	 more	 control	 over	 pesticide	 use’	 to	 ‘always	
promoting	 policy	 problems	 that	 imply	 less	 control	 over	 pesticide	 use’.	 This	 analysis	
overlaps	with	 the	 narrative	 analysis	 pursued	 previously	 and	 attests	 the	 existence	 of	
three	coalitions.	At	the	extreme	right	of	the	continuum	(the	pro-pesticides	group)	are	
the	actors	recognised	as	neo-developmentalists	in	the	narrative	analysis.	They	include	
parties	 such	 as	 the	 Brazilian	 Democratic	 Movement	 Party	 (PMDB),	 the	 Progressive	
Party	 (PP),	 the	 Democratic	 Party	 (DEM)	 and	 the	 Social	 Democratic	 Party	 (PSD),	
representatives	 of	 the	 pesticide	 industry	 and	 of	 the	 National	 Confederation	 of	
Agriculture	 (CNA)	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 (MAPA).	 Actors	 advancing	 an	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 discourse	 were	 located	 in	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
spectrum	 and	 include	 only	 ANVISA,	 which	was	 perceived	 to	 have	 a	more	moderate	
discourse	 that	 accepted	 regulatory	 reforms,	 insofar	 as	 proper	 health	 controls	 were	
maintained	(scored	between	20%	and	80%).	Some	declaration	of	the	members	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment,	and	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	of	the	Workers’	Party,	and	
of	 the	Democratic	Work	 Party	 (PDT),	 however,	 also	 approximated	 the	 centre	 of	 the	
spectrum,	 even	 though	 they	 have	 more	 often	 mentioned	 policy	 problems	
characteristic	 of	 the	 other	 two	 extreme	 groups.	 Finally,	 the	 preservationist/socio-
environmentalist	coalition	practically	always	opposed	the	use	of	more	pesticides	in	the	
types	 of	 policy	 problems	 they	 advanced.	 This	 group	 was	 formed	 by	 civil	 society	
organisations,	 scientists	 and	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Agrarian	 Development	 and	 Social	
Development	 (MDA/MDS),	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Environment,	 PT	 and	 PDT	 –	 as	 also	
identified	 by	 the	 narrative	 analysis	 focusing	 specifically	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 excessive	
bureaucracy.	(Figure	10	provides	a	visualisation	of	the	coalitions).		
																																								 																				
67	For	example,	if	agents	from	ANVISA	proffered	arguments	for	actions	that	would	ultimately	favour	the	
use	of	more	pesticides	3	times,	and	arguments	that	ultimately	promote	more	restriction	7	times	during	
the	period	of	time	analysed,	ANVISA	would	be	located	at	the	30%	point	of	the	spectrum.	
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Figure	9	-	Actors’	positions	on	the	pesticide	ideological	spectrum	
	
Civil	Society:	Permanent	Campaign	Against	Pesticides	and	For	Life,	Movement	of	Landless	Workers	,Via	
Campesina,	 	 National	 Confederation	 of	 Agricultural	 Workers;	 MDA/MDS:	 Ministry	 of	 Agrarian	
Development/Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development	 ;Scientists:	 ABRASCO,	 UNESP,	 Unicamp,	 University	 of	
Mato	Grosso,	Brazilian	Association	of	Agroecology	 ;	PT:	Workers’	Party;	PDT:	Democratic	Work	Party;	
MMA/IBAMA:	 Ministry	 of	 Environment/IBAMA;	 MS/ANVISA:	 Ministry	 of	 Health/ANVISA;	 MAPA:	
Ministry	of	Agriculture;	PMDB:	Brazilian	Democratic	Movement	Party;	CNA:	National	Confederation	of	
Agriculture;	PP:	Progressive	Party;	DEM:	Democratics	 (Party);	Pesticide	 Industry:	National	Association	
for	 the	 Diffusion	 of	 Fertilizers	 (ANDA);	 National	 Association	 of	 Vegetable	 Defense	 (ANDEF)	 ,	 National	
Union	of	Agriculture	Defense	Products	 (SINDAG);	National	Association	of	Pesticides	 (AENDA);	National	
Union	of	the	Industry	of	Vegetable	Defense	Products	(SINDIVEG),	Brazilian	Association	of	Chemicals	and	
Biotechnology	(ABIFINA);	PSD:		Social	Democratic	Party	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
Figure	10	-	Analysis	of	coalitions	
	
Civil	Society:	Permanent	Campaign	Against	Pesticides	and	For	Life,	Movement	of	Landless	Workers	,Via	
Campesina,	 	 National	 Confederation	 of	 Agricultural	 Workers;	 MDA/MDS:	 Ministry	 of	 Agrarian	
Development/Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development	 ;Scientists:	 ABRASCO,	 UNESP,	 Unicamp,	 University	 of	
Mato	Grosso,	Brazilian	Association	of	Agroecology	 ;	PT:	Workers’	Party;	PDT:	Democratic	Work	Party;	
MMA/IBAMA:	 Ministry	 of	 Environment/IBAMA;	 MS/ANVISA:	 Ministry	 of	 Health/ANVISA;	 MAPA:	
Ministry	of	Agriculture;	PMDB:	Brazilian	Democratic	Movement	Party;	CNA:	National	Confederation	of	
Agriculture;	PP:	Progressive	Party;	DEM:	Democratics	 (Party);	Pesticide	 Industry:	National	Association	
for	 the	 Diffusion	 of	 Fertilizers	 (ANDA);	 National	 Association	 of	 Vegetable	 Defense	 (ANDEF)	 ,	 National	
Union	of	Agriculture	Defense	Products	 (SINDAG);	National	Association	of	Pesticides	 (AENDA);	National	
Union	of	the	Industry	of	Vegetable	Defense	Products	(SINDIVEG),	Brazilian	Association	of	Chemicals	and	
Biotechnology	(ABIFINA);	PSD:		Social	Democratic	Party	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
Finally,	a	temporal	analysis	of	actors’	positions	was	also	pursued	in	order	to	
allow	for	the	identification	of	changes	in	actors’	positions	over	time.	The	declarations	
of	 three	 key	 groups	 of	 actors	were	 analysed	 over	 the	 ten	 years	 of	 debates	 and	 the	
results	indicated	that	their	positions	remained	stable.	ANVISA,	for	instance,	was	found	
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to	consistently	defend	itself	against	criticisms	of	inefficiency	in	registration	or	to	point	
to	 the	 damaging	 effects	 of	 the	 unregulated	 use	 of	 pesticides	 on	 human	 health	
throughout.	Their	representatives	always	pointed	to	the	necessity	of	hiring	more	staff	
and	having	more	resources	in	order	to	be	able	to	comply	with	the	demands	for	quicker	
registration.	 Representatives	 of	 the	 agribusiness	 industry	 (CNA),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
coherently	maintained	 their	 position	 of	 strong	 criticism	 and	 complaint	 in	 relation	 to	
bureaucratic	hurdles	related	to	the	registration	and	import	of	unregistered	pesticides,	
but	 increased	 the	 attention	 paid	 to	 the	 topic	 in	 the	 latter	 years	 of	 the	 analysis	 (see	
table	 20).	 Lastly,	 the	 group	 of	 NGOs	 and	 scientists	 who	 formed	 the	 ‘Permanent	
Campaign	against	Pesticides	and	for	Life’	 in	2011,	also	remained	extremely	critical	of	
pleas	 for	 less	 control	over	 imports	or	 registration	of	new	pesticides	 throughout.	 The	
only	 variation	 noticed	 was	 that	 this	 group	 became	 more	 organised	 following	 the	
institutionalisation	 of	 the	 campaign,	 which	might	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 stronger	
criticisms	made	by	neo-developmentalists.	The	next	section	assesses	 the	role	of	new	
information	in	the	debates	and	provides	further	evidence	of	the	stability	of	coalitions’	
position	over	time.	
	
5.4.	Sources	of	Policy	Change	
This	 section	 assesses	 the	 importance	 of	 internal	 events	 (or	 events	
proximate	 to	 the	 policy	 subsystem),	 negotiated	 agreement	 (meaning	 “agreements	
involving	policy	core	changes	[that]	are	crafted	among	previously	warring	coalitions”,	
Sabatier	&	Weible,	2007,	p.	205)	and	policy-oriented	learning	(or	“relatively	enduring	
alternations	of	 thought	or	behavioural	 intentions	 that	 result	 from	experience	and/or	
new	 information	 and	 that	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	 attainment	 or	 revision	 of	 policy	
objectives”,	Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith,	1999,	p.	123)	as	sources	of	regulatory	change	
in	 the	pesticide	subsystem	 in	Brazil.	 It	advances	 that	 the	 latter	 two	sources	of	policy	
change	 identified	 by	 the	 ACF	 as	 necessary	 for	 policy	 change	 to	 occur	 were	 not	
necessary	 in	 this	 case.	 Because	 the	 policy	 problem	 of	 excessive	 bureaucracy	 was	
identified	as	the	most	salient,	Law	12.873	(on	the	import	of	unregistered	pesticides	in	
situations	 of	 zoo-sanitary	 and	 phytosanitary	 emergencies)	 and	Bill	 209/2013	 (on	 the	
unification	of	registration	agencies	under	the	leadership	of	Ministry	of	Agriculture)	will	
be	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 analysis.	 Although	 the	 latter	 has	 not	 yet	 resulted	 in	 effective	
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regulatory	 change	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 internal	 events,	 negotiated	
agreement	 and	 learning	 in	 the	 processes	 leading	 to	 it	 can	 already	 be	 assessed.	 The	
results	 indicate	that	coalitions	achieved	very	 low	 levels	of	negotiated	agreement	and	
policy-oriented	learning	in	this	case.	In	order	to	explain	this	result,	three	fundamental	
drivers	 of	 negotiation	 and	 learning	 identified	 by	 the	 literature	 on	 collaborative	
governance	 are	 investigated,	 namely,	 consequential	 incentives,	 uncertainty,	 and	
interdependency	among	actors	(the	justification	for	the	selection	of	these	three	criteria	
is	provided	in	section	2.3.5	of	chapter	2).	
	
5.4.1.	Internal	Events	
Two	sorts	of	 internal	events	were	found	to	be	relevant	for	the	regulatory	
changes	analysed	(Law	12.873	and	Bill	209/2013).	The	first	is	indirectly	related	to	this	
roll-back	 in	 standards	of	pesticide	control	and	 refers	 to	a	historic	public	 scandal	 that	
motivated	the	approval	of	a	relatively	strict	pesticide	regulation	in	1989	(Pesticide	Law	
7.802),	 nurturing	 resentments	 among	 the	neo-developmentalist	 coalition	 that	would	
later	be	displayed	in	the	regulatory	changes	proposed.	The	main	historic	scandal	in	the	
history	of	this	subsystem	was	the	contamination	of	River	Guaiba	(in	the	south	of	the	
country)	 by	 pesticides	 in	 May	 of	 1982.	 This	 fact,	 aided	 by	 the	 work	 of	
environmentalists	from	the	Rio	Grande	de	Sul	Association	for	the	Protection	of	Natural	
Environment	 (AGAPAN),	 resulted	 in	 the	mobilisation	of	public	 and	political	 attention	
around	 the	 debate	 and	 initiated	 a	 series	 of	 events	 that	 led	 to	 the	 approval	 of	 Law	
7.802	 (Franco,	 2014;	 Hochstetler	 and	 Keck,	 2007).	 Two	 months	 after	 the	
contamination	of	the	river,	on	22nd	of	July	1982,	a	state	level	law	–	Decreto	Lei	30.787	
-	 was	 published	 regulating	 the	 use	 of	 organochlorine	 products	 (pesticides)	 in	 the	
region.	 After	 another	 two	 months,	 a	 State	 Decree	 –	 Decreto	 Estadual	 30.811	 –	
established	 the	 requirement	 for	 an	 agronomic	 report,	 containing	 an	 analysis	 of	
ecological	and	toxicological	factors	to	allow	for	the	commercialisation	of	pesticides	in	
the	state	(Franco,	2014,	pp.	38–39).	Following	these	events,	Pedro	Simon	–	a	politician	
from	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	involved	in	the	elaboration	of	these	regulations	–	was	named	
Minister	of	Agriculture.	He	brought	 the	debate	 to	 the	 federal	 level	 by	establishing	 a	
special	 commission	 for	 the	 revision	 of	 previous	 national	 pesticide	 regulation.	 This	
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special	 commission	was	 composed	of	 a	plurality	of	 actors	 from	 the	government	and	
civil	society,	which	meant	that	the	final	proposal,	had	a	rather	balanced	and	technical	
character	and	resulted	in	a	pesticide	regulation	considered	to	be	progressive	in	terms	
of	environmental	standards	(Franco,	2014,	p.55).	
The	second	important	internal	event	is	related	to	the	increase	in	the	use	of	
pesticides	in	the	country	and	the	consequent	overload	of	the	administrative	structures	
in	 charge	 of	 organising	 the	 registrations	 (exposing	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 administrative	
capacity	of	the	state).	The	relevance	of	this	event	was	evidenced	both	by	members	of	
the	 pesticide	 industry,	 who	 constantly	 pointed	 out	 the	 long	 waiting	 lists	 and	
demanding	 bureaucratic	 requirements	 they	 have	 to	 face	 to	 have	 new	 pesticides	
registered	 in	 the	 country,	 as	well	 as	by	members	of	 the	Ministry	of	Health	 (ANVISA)	
who,	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 criticisms	 of	 the	 former	 group,	 emphasised	 the	 limited	
material	 and	 personnel	 resources	 they	 had	 to	 cope	with	 the	 increasing	 demand	 for	
new	 registrations	 (public	 hearing	 in	 the	 Lower	Chamber,	 2015,	 2nd	 July).	 The	 limited	
administrative	capacity	 (in	terms	of	material	 resources	and	staff)	of	the	state	to	deal	
with	 the	 increasing	 demand	 for	 new	 product’s	 registrations,	 was,	 therefore,	 the	
second	internal	event	identified	as	important	for	the	regulatory	changes	analysed.	
In	sum,	there	were	two	relevant	internal	events	in	this	subsystem.	First,	the	
contamination	 of	 River	 Guaiba	 led	 to	 the	mobilisation	 of	 an	 environmentalist	 group	
(AGAPAN)	 to	 exploit	 the	 scandal	 to	 promote	 an	 anti-pesticide	 agenda.	 This	
mobilisation	associated	to	the	ascension	to	power	of	leaders	who	were	favourable	to	
demands	 for	more	pesticide	 control,	 and	 the	overall	momentum	given	 to	 regulatory	
reforms	by	the	re-democratization	of	the	country	led	to	the	approval	of	relatively	strict	
regulations	 in	 terms	of	environmental	protection,	 that	generated	 resentment	among	
neo-developmentalists	 that	 started	 to	 push	 for	 their	 alteration	 when	 they	 acquired	
more	power.	Second,	the	limits	of	the	administrative	capacity	of	the	state	to	deal	with	
the	 increasing	demand	of	registration	of	new	products,	an	event	referred	to	both	by	
members	of	 the	neo-developmentalist	 coalition	and	by	members	of	 the	government	
(administrative	economic	rationalist	coalition).	
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5.4.2.	Negotiated	Agreement	
This	sub-section	assesses	the	importance	of	negotiated	agreement	for	the	
changes	 in	 the	 import	 procedures	 of	 pesticides	 in	 cases	 of	 zoo-sanitary	 or	
phytosanitary	 emergencies	 (which	 resulted	 in	 Law	 12.873)	 and	 for	 the	 proposed	
changes	 to	 registration	 procedures	 and	 the	 proposed	 unification	 of	 the	 assessment	
process.	The	level	of	negotiated	agreement	is	assessed	through	three	criteria:	1)	how	
often	coalitions	seek	to	influence	decisions	through	instruments	that	are	not	based	on	
personal	 interaction	 and	 negotiation	 (such	 as	 vetoes,	 amendments	 and	 judicial	
actions).	It	is	assumed	that	the	higher	the	frequency	of	recourse	to	these	mechanisms,	
the	lower	the	level	of	negotiated	agreement	in	the	case.	2)	The	number	of	venues	used	
by	 actors	 during	 the	 negotiation	 process.	 The	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	 higher	 the	
number	of	venues	used	for	negotiation,	the	lower	the	level	of	negotiated	agreement.	
The	 logic	 underlying	 this	 assumption	 is	 that	 if	 coalitions	 maintain	 the	 negotiation	
within	 specific	 institutional	 venues	 (for	 example,	 within	 the	 National	 Congress	 or	
within	 specific	 commissions	 within	 the	 National	 Congress)	 and	 do	 not	 seek	 other	
venues	such	as	courts,	other	agencies	or	 the	media,	 that	 is	because	actors	 feel	 their	
positions	are	being	heard	in	the	original	venue,	and	therefore,	collaboration	is	likely	to	
be	happening	(Weible,	Pattinson	and	Sabatier,	2010).	3)	The	incidence	of	‘devil	shift’	or	
the	exaggeration	of	the	power	and	maliciousness	of	one’s	opponents	during	debates,	
was	also	considered	as	evidence	of	reduced	levels	of	negotiated	agreement.68		
In	relation	to	the	use	of	mechanisms	of	negotiation	not	based	on	personal	
collaboration	and	agreement,	two	fundamental	facts	point	to	low	levels	of	negotiated	
agreement.	 The	 first	 relates	 to	 the	 proposition	 of	 Law	 12.873	 by	 presidential	
provisional	 decree	 (Medida	 Provisoria	 619/2013)	 –	 an	 essentially	 unilateral	 non-
negotiated	legislative	tool.	It	is	noteworthy,	moreover,	that	this	unilateral	proposition	
was	 not	 backed	 by	 a	 consensus,	 not	 even	 of	 the	 executive’s	ministries.	 As	 revealed	
during	an	interview	with	a	member	of	the	Ministry	of	Environment	(MMA),	the	MMA	
publicly	 opposed	 the	 law,	 which	 was	 perceived	 as	 a	 ‘rollback	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	
pesticides’	 (interview	58).	 Further	evidence	of	 reduced	negotiated	agreement	 in	 this	
case	 is	 that,	 in	 November	 2013,	 the	 Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Collective	 Health	
																																								 																				
68	For	further	justifications	for	the	choice	of	these	three	parameters	see	chapter	2	section	2.d.	
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(ABRASCO),	an	association	of	public	health	researchers,	asked	for	an	evaluation	of	the	
Ministério	Público	(the	Brazilian	equivalent	of	the	U.S.	Office	of	the	Attorney	General)	
about	 the	 relevance	 of	 filing	 a	 Direct	 Act	 of	 Unconstitutionality	 against	 Law	 12.873.	
Although	the	Act	was	not	filed,	ABRASCO	publicly	declared	its	opposition	and	refused	
to	 recognise	 the	 rule.69	 Finally,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2016,	 the	 Ministério	 Público	
published	 a	 memorandum70	 that	 spoke	 out	 against	 the	 proposed	 changes	 to	 the	
registration	 procedures	 for	 new	 products.	 This	 evidence	 not	 only	 points	 to	 the	
involvement	of	the	judicial	sector	(another	venue),	but	also	to	the	use	of	mechanisms	
other	than	direct	personal	negotiations	for	the	treatment	of	the	topic.	
Regarding	 the	 number	 of	 venues	 of	 negotiation,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
involvement	of	the	judicial	power	in	the	above-mentioned	memorandum,	there	was	a	
clear	attempt	by	members	of	the	Brazilian	Health	Research	Agency	(Fiocruz,	which	 is	
linked	to	the	Ministry	of	Health)	to	include	other	venues	in	the	debate	about	the	new	
registration	procedures.	This	group	attempted,	 for	 instance,	to	bring	the	topic	to	the	
National	 Commission	of	 Chemical	 Safety	 (CONASQ)	 including	 it	 in	 the	 agenda	of	 the	
meeting	 I	 attended	 on	 26/11/2014.	 However,	 because	 members	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture	did	not	attend,	the	issue	was	not	debated	during	that	meeting.	
In	 terms	of	 the	 incidence	of	 ‘devil	 shift’,	 a	 representative	 indication	 is	 an	
episode	 involving	a	 former	manager	of	ANVISA,	who	accused	the	agency	of	 falsifying	
his	 signature	 for	 the	 registration	 of	 unauthorised	 pesticides.	 The	 manager	 declared	
that	 he	 left	 the	 health	 agency	 due	 to	 “serious	 irregularities	 such	 as	 the	 approval	 of	
products	 without	 toxicological	 evaluation,	 the	 falsification	 of	 his	 signature	 and	 the	
intentional	disappearance	of	irregular	processes”.	Additionally,	Fiocruz	(also	part	of	the	
Ministry	 of	 Health)	 declared	 in	 a	 public	 letter	 that	 ‘the	 process	 of	 pesticide’	
deregulation,	 especially	 regarding	 the	 environmental	 and	 health	 sectors,	 reflects	
constant	institutional	attacks	from	the	agribusiness	sector.	Finally,	Federal	Deputy	Dr.	
Rosinha,	from	the	Workers’	Party,	published	an	accusatory	declaration	on	the	day	Law	
12.873	was	approved	by	 the	 Lower	Chamber.	He	proclaimed	 that	 “ruralists	–	are,	 in	
the	dead	of	night	–	always	at	night	–	creatively,	and	in	partnership	with	other	sectors	
of	 the	 congress	 and	 of	 the	 executive	 government,	 promoting	 the	 use	 of	 chemical	
																																								 																				
69	See	http://abrasco.org.br/dossieagrotoxicos/	
70	https://www.ecodebate.com.br/2016/03/09/mpf-e-contra-projeto-de-lei-que-transfere-analise-de-
registro-de-agrotoxicos-para-o-ministerio-da-agricultura/		
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poisons”.	These	kind	of	accusatory	declarations	were	considered	sufficient	 indication	
of	the	limited	trust	between	actors	in	this	policy	subsystem	and	the	incidence	of	what	
has	been	referred	by	the	ACF	literature	as	‘devil	shift’	(45%,	Jenkins-Smith	et	al.,	2014,	
45%;	Sabatier,	Hunter	and	McLaughlin,	1987).	
In	 order	 to	 explain	 the	 occurrence	 of	 limited	 negotiated	 agreement,	 this	
analysis	also	investigated	the	incidence	of	the	three	hypothesised	drivers	of	negotiated	
agreement	 and	 learning	 (see	 chapter	 2,	 section	 2.3.5),	 namely	 consequential	
incentives,	 interdependence	 and	 uncertainty	 –	 the	 three	 of	 which	 are	 pointed	 as	
leading	to	a	hurting	stalemate.	
First,	 no	 consequential	 incentives,	 meaning	 incentives	 that	 present	 the	
issue	as	salient	and	imply	negative	consequences	for	non-negotiation,	were	identified.	
Members	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition	 already	 had	 the	 support	 of	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 for	 the	 regulatory	 changes	 proposed	 and	 did	 not	 need	 to	
convince	 other	 sectors	 of	 the	 government	 in	 order	 for	 regulatory	 changes	 to	 be	
approved	due	to	the	sheer	power	of	the	rural	caucus	in	the	Congress.		
Second,	 the	 interdependence	 between	 actors	 was	 particularly	 low.	
Because	 the	 coalition	 proposing	 the	 regulatory	 change	 was	 the	 dominant	 coalition	
(neo-developmentalists)	and	because	 it	was	self-sufficient	 (in	the	sense	that	they	did	
not	 depend	 on	 the	 support	 of	 the	 other	 two	 coalitions	 to	 have	 new	 regulations	
approved),	negotiation	was	not	a	requirement.	Uncertainty	about	the	new	regulations,	
however,	although	present,	only	affected	the	minority	coalitions	of	the	administrative	
economic	 rationalists	 and	 socio-environmentalists/preservationistists.	 These	 two	
groups	 tended	 to	 lose	much	 of	 their	 control	 over	 the	 registration	 and	 authorisation	
process	 of	 new	 pesticides,	 which	 increased	 their	 uncertainty.	 It	 did	 not	 affect,	
however,	the	dominant	neo-developmentalist	coalition,	which	secured	more	certainty	
and	control	over	the	process	of	pesticide	registration	with	the	regulatory	changes.	The	
analysis	 of	 the	 three	 drivers	 of	 negotiated	 agreement	 provide,	 as	 a	 consequence,	
plausible	justifications	for	the	low	levels	of	negotiated	agreement	identified.	
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5.4.3.	Policy-oriented	Learning	
	
Sabatier	 and	 Jenkins-Smith	 (1988,	 p.	 155)	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 first	
condition	 for	 policy-oriented	 learning	 to	 occur	 is	 that	 “both	 sides	 have	 sufficient	
technical	 resources	 to	 be	 able	 to	 criticize	 the	 others’	 causal	model	 and	 data”.	 It	 is,	
therefore,	 the	 “analytical	 debate	 among	 different	 coalitions”	 that	 refines	 actors’	
understandings	 about	 the	 seriousness,	 causal	 relationships	 and	 consequences	of	 the	
policy	 problem	 on	 the	 agenda	 (Sabatier	 and	 Jenkins-Smith	 1988,	 p.	 155).	 For	 this	
reason,	this	sub-section	investigates	the	occurrence	of	analytical	debate,	based	on	the	
use	of	technical	information,	by	policy	makers	from	different	coalitions,	in	the	debates	
about	 pesticide	 regulatory	 change.	 It	 assesses	 whether	 actors’	 arguments	 changed	
when	exposed	to	technical	information.	With	this	aim,	the	section	starts	by	describing	
the	different	occasions	when	technical	information	was	displayed	in	the	debates,	and	
proceeds	 by	 tracing	 policy-makers’	 use	 of	 this	 information	 in	 their	 statements.	 The	
analysis	went	beyond	the	policy	problem	of	excessive	red	tape	in	registration	in	order	
to	 increase	 the	 representativeness	 of	 the	 sample.	 Lastly,	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	
three	key	actor’s	arguments	before	and	after	important	technical	evidence	was	added	
to	the	debate	is	pursued	in	order	to	identify	its	impacts,	and,	therefore,	the	degree	of	
policy-oriented	learning	that	took	place.	
The	first	 important	 issue	 involving	technical	evidence	in	the	debate	about	
pesticide	 regulation	 was	 related	 to	 Bill	 4762/05,	 intended	 to	 ban	 the	 use	 of	
organochlorine-based	 pesticides	 due	 to	 cases	 of	 poisoning	 of	 rural	 workers,	 and	
proposed	 by	 members	 of	 the	 preservationist/socio-environmentalist	 coalition.	 The	
researcher	 Eduardo	 Garcia	 Garcia	 from	 the	 Jorge	 Duprat	 Figueiredo	 Foundation	 for	
Work	Safety	and	Medicine,	was	invited	by	the	supporters	of	this	bill	to	a	debate	in	the	
Lower	 Chamber,	 and	 provided	 data	 estimating	 that	 there	 were	 around	 150	 to	 200	
thousand	pesticide-related	poisonings	per	year	in	Brazil	(see	line	one	of	table	23).	The	
reaction	 from	 the	 pesticide	 industry	 (the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition)	 to	 these	
allegations	 came	 only	 six	 years	 later,	 when	 the	 Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Chemical	
Industry	 invited	Professor	Trapé,	 from	the	University	of	Campinas,	who	claimed	that,	
despite	the	increase	in	the	use	of	pesticides	in	the	country,	the	number	of	intoxication	
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cases	was	 sharply	 declining	 and	many	 of	 the	 diagnoses	 of	 intoxication	made	 by	 the	
health	system	were	incorrect	(see	line	5	of	table	23	for	specific	statements).	None	of	
the	two	opposing	coalitions	were	found	to	have	altered	their	positions	 in	face	of	the	
contradictory	evidence	presented	by	the	two	scientists.	
Another	 relevant	 case	 of	 analytical	 debate	 around	 pesticide	 regulation	
occurred	 when	 the	 Federal	 University	 of	Mato	 Grosso	 (UFMT)	 published	 a	 study	 in	
2011,	revealing	that	two	to	six	different	types	of	pesticides	were	found	in	samples	of	
breast	milk	of	women	from	Rio	Verde	–	Mato	Grosso	(a	city	located	close	to	the	largest	
soy	production	 farms	 in	 the	country).	 	This	 study,	which	 is	 the	most	 frequently	cited	
scientific	study	in	Lower	and	Higher	Chamber	debates	about	pesticides,	evidenced	the	
existence	of	 the	pesticide	DDE	 (derived	 from	DDT)	 in	100%	of	 the	 samples	of	breast	
milk	of	62	women,	Endosulfan	in	76%	of	the	samples,	and	Deltametrin	in	34%.	DDE	had	
been	banned	 in	Brazil	 since	2009	 (one	year	before	 the	milk	 samples	were	 collected)	
and	Endosulfan	was	banned	in	2013.		The	analysis	of	the	impact	of	the	UFMT’s	study	
on	the	debates	revealed	that	 it	was	first	mentioned	by	a	policy	maker	on	April	2010,	
when	 Deputy	 Celia	 Rocha	 (PTB-AL)	 (a	 member	 of	 the	 preservationist/socio-
environmentalist	 coalition)	 used	 the	 study	 in	 support	 of	 bills	 restricting	 the	 use	 of	
pesticides	(see	line	3	of	table	24	for	specific	statements).	Examples	of	bills	supported	
by	Deputy	Rocha	through	the	use	of	the	study	include	Bill	4762/05,	forbidding	the	use	
of	organochlorine-based	pesticides	(mentioned	above),	Bill	713/99,	aimed	at	banning	
2,4-D,	 Bill	 3986/2000,	 which	would	make	 notifying	 the	 authorities	 of	 rural	 workers’	
intoxication	 by	 pesticides	 mandatory,	 and	 Bill	 3615/12,	 which	 would	 increase	
regulation	of	agriculture	aviation	companies.71		
In	July	2012,	the	UFMT	study	was,	once	again,	formally	debated	in	public.		
Professor	Pignati	from	UFMT	was	invited	to	present	the	study	(see	line	9,	table	23,	for	
the	 statements	 he	 made	 on	 the	 occasion).	 The	 National	 Association	 of	 Vegetable	
Defence	 (ANDEF)	 invited	 two	 other	 scientists,	 one	 from	 University	 of	 Campinas	
(Professor	 Felix	 Guillermo	 Reyes)	 and	 another	 from	 the	 University	 of	 São	 Paulo	
(Professor	Eduardo	Peixoto),	 to	participate	 in	the	debate.	During	the	debate	the	two	
latter	 scientists	 questioned	 the	 scientific	 and	 methodological	 validity	 of	 the	 UFMT	
study	 (lines	10	and	11,	 table	23)	and	Professor	Pignati	defended	 it	 (line	9,	 table	23).	
According	 to	 a	 third	 expert	 who	 followed	 the	 debates,	 the	 criticisms	 had	 been	
																																								 																				
71	As	of	the	time	of	writing	(May	2016)	none	of	these	bills	have	yet	been	approved.	
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requested	(and	paid	for)	by	the	industry	and	the	experts	advancing	them	had	not	even	
read	the	UFMT’s	research	(interview	60).	Additionally,	because	these	experts	had	been	
explicitly	 invited	 by	 members	 of	 the	 pesticide	 industry	 (part	 of	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	 coalition),	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 their	 positions	was	 debatable	 and	 had	
little	 influence	 on	 the	 position	 of	 Professor	 Pignati	 (also	 a	 member	 of	 the	
preservationist/socio-environmentalist	coalition).	
Among	other	technical	contributions	identified	(which,	although	presented	
in	 table	 23,	 will	 not	 be	 described	 here	 in	 detail	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 did	 not	
generate	 analytical	 debate),	 representatives	 of	 the	 pesticide	 industry	 also	 directly	
contributed	 to	 the	 debates	 about	 pesticides	 regulations	 with	 technical	 information.	
Arguing	 that	 Brazilian	 pesticide	 regulation	 is	 amongst	 the	 strictest	 in	 the	world,	 the	
Vice-President	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Fine	 Chemical	 Industries	 and	
Biotechnology	 (ABIFINA),	 Tarciso	 Bonachela,	 presented	 data	 in	 September	 2011,	
maintaining	that	more	than	168	tons	of	empty	pesticide	packages	had	been	recycled	
since	2012	(see	line	6,	table	23).	
The	analysis	of	how	all	 this	 technical	 information	affected	 the	position	of	
key	 stakeholders	 in	 each	 of	 the	 three	 coalitions	 reveals	 that	 information	 that	
challenged	core	beliefs	was	generally	received	with	suspicion	and	no	actual	change	in	
actors’	 positions	 took	 place	 over	 the	 decade	 analysed.	 For	 example,	 in	 face	 of	 the	
evidence	presented	by	Professor	Trapé	about	the	intoxication	of	rural	workers,	Deputy	
Padre	João	(PT-MG)	(member	of	the	preservationist/socio-environmentalist	coalition)	
responded	that	things	“were	not	as	simple	as	they	were	being	presented	by	Professor	
Trapé”,	 and	 that	 he	had	other	data	 showing	 the	higher	 incidence	of	 cancer	 in	 areas	
with	 higher	 use	 of	 pesticides	 (see	 line	 5,	 table	 8).	 Similarly,	Deputy	Amaury	 Teixeira	
(PT-BA),	also	from	the	preservationist/socio-environmentalist	group,	questioned	Trapé	
by	 asking	 why	 Brazil	 was	 so	 much	 less	 restrictive	 than	 other	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	
pesticides	 (if	pesticides	were,	 indeed,	so	well-controlled	 in	 the	country)	 (line	6,	 table	
8).	 In	 relation	 to	 data	 about	 Brazilian	 successes	 in	 collecting	 and	 recycling	 pesticide	
packaging	presented	by	Mr.	Bonachela,	Teixeira	responded	by	stating	that	he	did	not	
believe	the	data	was	true	due	to	several	examples	he	had	seen	in	the	countryside	of	
people	using	pesticide	packaging	 to	store	milk	or	drink	water	 (Lower	Chamber	News	
Agency,	2011,	October	20).	
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Similarly,	 Deputies	 Paulo	 Cesar	 Quartiero	 (DEM-RR)	 and	 Valdir	 Colatto	
(PMDB-SC),	both	members	of	 the	neo-developmentalist	 coalition,	accused	 the	UFMT	
research	of	being	‘exaggerated’	(lines	8	and	9,	table	8).	During	the	same	public	hearing	
in	 which	 Professor	 Pignati	 presented	 the	 results	 of	 his	 research,	 these	 deputies	
repudiated	 Pignati’s	 results,	 declaring	 themselves	 “certain	 that	 Brazilian	 farmers	 are	
fully	dedicated	to	control	their	crops	without	harming	human	health”	(Lower	Chamber	
News	Agency,	2012,	July	03).		
Finally,	 members	 of	 ANVISA	 (from	 the	 more	 moderate	 administrative	
economic	rationalist	coalition)	did	not	produce	any	opinion	on	scientific	controversies.	
Their	scientific	arguments	were	based	on	data	produced	either	by	ANVISA	(about	the	
amount	 of	 vegetables	 unsuitable	 for	 consumption)	 or	 by	 Fiocruz	 (also	 part	 of	 the	
Ministry	of	Health)	about	 the	 incidence	of	pesticide	 intoxication	 (in	2011)	and	never	
involved	other	researchers’	arguments	(lines	2	and	7,	table	24).	Moreover,	even	after	
Professor	Trapé	denied	the	seriousness	of	the	intoxication	problem	in	Brazil,	accusing	
ANVISA	 of	 producing	 misleading	 data	 (in	 October	 2011),	 no	 response	 was	 given	 by	
members	 of	 ANVISA.	 A	 subsequent	 declaration	 from	 José	 Agenor	 Álvares	 da	 Silva	
(Director	 of	ANVISA)	 on	May	2012	 (line	 7,	 table	 24)	 focused	only	 on	 the	 increase	 in	
pesticide	consumption	 in	Brazil	but	made	no	reference	to	the	debate	about	workers’	
intoxication	 levels.	 This	 might	 have	 been	 a	 deliberate	 attempt	 to	 avoid	 the	 further	
politicisation	of	scientific	arguments.		
In	summary,	while	members	of	the	preservationist/socio-environmentalist	
coalition	and	those	of	the	neo-developmentalist	group	explicitly	declared	themselves	
to	be	suspicious	and	unconvinced	of	the	scientific	arguments	supporting	each	other’s	
views,	 ANVISA,	 from	 the	 administrative	 rationalist	 coalition,	 avoided	 engaging	 in	
scientific	controversies.	The	occurrence	of	policy-oriented	learning	(here	equated	with	
an	 actor’s	 engaging	 in	 analytical	 debates	 and	 altering	 their	 positions	 in	 light	 of	 new	
information)	could	not,	therefore,	be	verified,	even	though	technical	information	was	
extensively	provided	and	used	during	debates.	All	technical	contributions	to	the	Lower	
and	Higher	Chamber	debates	about	pesticides	are	summarised	in	table	23.	Table	24,	in	
turn,	 summarises	 the	 occasions	 in	which	 policy-makers	 used	 technical	 arguments	 in	
their	narratives.	
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It	 is,	 therefore,	 concluded	 that	 neither	 negotiated	 agreement	 nor	 policy-
oriented	 learning	 could	 be	 identified	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 debates	 about	 pesticide	
regulatory	 change.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 drivers	 of	 negotiated	
agreement	discussed	in	the	previous	subsection	(i.e.	 lack	of	consequential	 incentives,	
interdependence	 and	 uncertainty)	 can	 also	 be	 used	 as	 explanations	 of	 the	 non-
occurrence	 of	 learning	 among	 coalitions	 (for	 a	 justification	 of	 the	 use	 of	 the	 same	
drivers	for	both	criteria	see	chapter	2	section	2.3.5).	
	
Table	23	-	Technical	arguments	identified	in	Lower	and	Higher	Chamber	debates	between	2005	and	
2015	
	 Date	 Scientist	–	organisation		 Claim	
1.	 September	
2005	
Eduardo	 Garcia	 Garcia	 –	 Fundação	
Jorge	 Duprat	 Figueiredo	 de	
Segurança	 e	 Medicina	 do	 Trabalho	
(FUNDACENTRO)	 –	 Jorge	 Duprat	
Figueiredo	 Foundation	 for	 Work	
Safety	and	Medicine	
Pesticide	intoxications	has	been	treated	in	a	simplistic	way	in	Brazil.	The	
inadequate	use	of	products	has	been	pointed	as	the	cause	of	problems,	
and	 the	 solution	 that	 has	 been	 proposed	 is	 to	 educate	 workers.	
However,	this	makes	the	workers	wrongly	responsible.	The	right	thing	to	
do	would	be	to	substitute	or	restrict	more	dangerous	products,	based	on	
their	 toxicity	 levels.	 Nowadays	 toxicity	 data	 is	 not	 used	 for	 restricting	
products.	
It	is	estimated	that	nowadays	there	are	15	million	rural	workers	in	Brazil	
exposed	 to	 pesticides	 and	 that	 there	 are	 around	 150	 to	 200	 thousand	
intoxications	 per	 year.	
Research	 conducted	 by	 Fundacentro	 with	 five	 thousand	 rural	 workers	
from	 nine	 different	 states	 showed	 that	 more	 than	 28%	 of	 them	 had	
already	been	through	at	least	one	intoxication	during	their	lives. 	
2.	 Nov	2010	 Professor	Geraldo	Papa	–State	of	Sao	
Paulo	 University	 (UNESP)	
(entomologist)	
The	use	of	pesticides	 is	so	 important	that	there	would	be	a	shortage	of	
food	 if	 its	 use	 was	 banned.	 Pesticides	 correspond	 to	 99%	 of	 plagues	
control.	 Although	 ANVISA	 has	 to	 be	 careful	 in	 the	 registration	 of	 new	
products	 their	 authorisation	 takes	 too	 long.	 ANVISA	 should	 be	 better	
structured	to	undertake	analysis	faster.	
3.	 July	2011	 	Researcher	 Marcelo	 Augusto	
Boechat	 Morandi	 –	 EMBRAPA	
environment	
Brazil	needs	a	new	productive	model.	There	are	already	alternatives	for	
producing	food	in	a	more	ecological	manner,	but	government	has	to	
incentivise	them.	In	the	short	term	improving	the	use	of	traditional	
practices	with	more	monitoring	and	training,	as	well	as	the	restriction	of	
highly	toxic	products	can	already	contribute	to	the	reduced	use	of	
pesticides.	But	more	sustainable	practices	need	also	to	be	developed	
such	as	direct	plantation,	biological	fixation	of	nitrogen,	and	the	
integration	of	forests,	agricultural	production	and	cattle	ranching.	
Professionals	need	also	to	be	educated	in	ecology.	
4.	 July	2011	 Researcher	Vicente	Eduardo	Soares	e	
Almeida	–	Embrapa	vegetables	
	
	
	
	
	
Brazil	has	enough	technology	to	produce	fruits	and	vegetables	in	an	
ecological	manner.	But	public	policies	are	required	for	this	agro-
ecological	transition	to	happen.	 
5.	 October	2011	 Ângelo	 Trapé	 –	 University	 of	
Campinas	 (Unicamp)	–Coordinator	of	
environmental	health	department	
The	use	of	pesticides	is	not	too	harmful	to	human	health.		
There	 has	 not	 been,	 in	 the	 past	 four	 years,	 any	 case	 of	 farmers’	
intoxication	in	our	university	hospital,	which	is	in	charge	of	more	than	six	
million	 people	 in	 the	 region.	 In	 research	 conducted	 with	 10.5	 million	
people	with	an	average	exposure	to	pesticides	of	18	years,	only	2%	had	
experienced	some	sort	of	health	impact.	
Despite	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 pesticides	 in	 the	 country,	 the	 number	 of	
intoxication	 cases	 is	 sharply	 declining.	 Many	 of	 the	 diagnoses	 of	
intoxication	made	by	the	health	system	are	incorrect.	
We	can’t	compare	the	use	of	pesticides	in	tropical	countries	with	its	use	
in	European	countries.	We	are	using	less	than	we	should	be. 
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6.	 Sept	2011	 Tarciso	Bonachela	–	Vice	President	of	
the	 Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Fine	
Chemical	 Industries	 and	
Biotechnology	(ABIFINA)		
More	than	168.6	tons	of	empty	pesticides	packages	have	been	recycled	
since	2012.	
7.	 May	2012	 Professor	 Victor	 Manoel	 Pelaez	 –	
Federal	 University	 of	 Parana	 (Public	
Policy)	
The	 international	market	 for	 pesticides	 is	 an	 oligopoly.	 They	 sell	 seeds	
and	pesticides	together	and	farmers	cannot	choose.	Moreover,	pesticide	
companies	invest	more	in	marketing	than	in	research	and	development.	
Pesticide	regulatory	policy	needs	to	go	beyond	the	simple	concession	of	
registrations,	 it	 has	 to	 control	 safety	 and	 possible	 harms	 to	 human	
health.	 Dissociating	 health	 and	 economy	makes	 no	 sense.	 Agricultural,	
economic	and	health	policies	should	be	considered	together.	
8.	 May	2012	 Professor	 Anamaria	 Tambellini	 –	
Federal	University	of	Rio	de	Janeiro	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Pesticides	 are	 very	 toxic	 to	 rural	workers	 and	 pesticide	 producers.	 The	
government	has	to	protect	these	people.	Monitoring	is	very	flawed	and	
pesticides	should	be	used	selectively	and	in	a	controlled	and	responsible	
manner.		
Many	studies	show	that	pesticides	cause	cancer.	 I	don’t	condemn	their	
use,	but	they	should	be	used	carefully.	
	
9.	 July	2012	 Professor	Wanderlei	Pignati	–	Federal	
University	 of	 Mato	 Grosso	 (UFMT)	
(Public	Health)	
There	is	no	legal	limit	for	pesticides	in	breast	milk.	There	should	be	none.	
However,	DDE	was	present	in	100%	of	samples,	Endosulfan	in	76%,	and	
Deltametrina	in	34%.	
Another	study	we	have	been	doing	with	Fiocruz	over	the	past	four	years,	
which	 measures	 the	 contamination	 of	 air,	 rain	 and	 wells	 shows	 that	
contamination	happens	in	both	large	crops	of	soy	and	sugar	cane	and	in	
small	 crops	 of	 peppers,	 tomatoes,	 lettuce.	 To	 reverse	 this	 situation	
alternatives	methods	of	production	should	be	adopted,	such	as	organic	
and	agro-ecological	crops.  
 
Our	 research	 is	 not	 methodologically	 flawed,	 it	 was	 coordinated	 by	
Fiocruz	and	I	can	cite	at	least	other	15	scientific	papers	written	in	Brazil	
with	even	more	alarming	results. 
10.	 July	2012	 Professor	 Eduardo	 Peixoto	 –	
University	of	Sao	Paulo	(Chemistry)	
The	 UFMT	 research	 lacks	 scientific	 rigour.	 The	 results	 are	 inconclusive	
and	not	trustworthy.		
11.	 July	2012	 Professor	 Felix	 Guillermo	 Reyes	 –	
University	 of	 Campinas	 (Food	
toxicology)	
The	 UFMT	 research	 should	 be	 praised,	 but	 there	 are	 indeed	 a	 few	
methodological	issues.	
12.	 September	
2013	
Researcher	 Fernando	 Carneiro	 –	
Brazilian	 Association	 of	 Collective	
Health	(Abrasco)	
80%	of	properties	larger	than	a	hundred	hectares	use	pesticides.	The	
UFMT	research	has	demonstrated	the	presence	of	pesticides	in	breast	
milk	in	Lucas	do	Rio	Verde.	Another	study	states	that	cancer	mortality	
rates	have	increased	by	38%	in	cities	where	there	is	a	strong	agribusiness	
presence.	Finally,	PhD	research	has	shown	that	for	each	dollar	spent	on	
pesticides	in	Brazil,	the	Public	Unified	Health	System	(SUS)	has	to	spend	
US$	1.28	in	treatments,	almost	30%	more.	
	
13.	 September	
2014	
Professor	 Cesar	 Koppe	 Grisolia	 –	
University	of	Brasilia	(Biologist)	
The	 risks	 involved	 in	 pesticides	 go	 beyond	 ingested	 food.	 Pesticides	
contaminate	soil	and	water	reservoirs	that	supply	cities.	The	greater	risk	
today	is	not	the	food	but	the	water	the	population	is	ingesting.	
Research	 shows	 a	 higher	 incidence	 of	 Alzheimer’s	 and	 Parkinson’s	
disease	 among	 people	 who	 have	 been	 directly	 exposed	 to	 pesticides	
during	their	lives.			
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
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Table	24	-	Use	of	technical	information	by	politicians	in	Lower	and	Higher	Chamber	debates	between	
2005	and	2015	
	 Date	 Actor	using	the	
information	
Source	of	
information	
Claim	
1.	 August	
2007	
Deputy	Ribamar	Alves	(PSB	–	
MA)	
WHO	 Every	year	there	are	25	million	intoxications	by	pesticides	
around	 the	 world	 and	 approximately	 20	 thousand	
involuntary	 deaths.	 In	 our	 country	 the	 situation	 is	
worrisome	 because	 we	 are	 the	 largest	 consumers	 of	
pesticides	in	the	world. 	
2.	 April	2011	 José	Agenor	Álvares	da	Silva	
(Director	of	ANVISA	–	Ministry	
of	Health)	
Fiocruz	and	ANVISA	
researches	
Pesticides	can	cause	dizziness,	headaches–	consequences	
known	as	neurotoxicity.	These	are	neurological	and	there	
are	 mutagenic	 consequences,	 which	 can	 alter	 people’s	
genes.	Data	from	Fundação	Oswaldo	Cruz	(Fiocruz)	shows	
that	115	people	died	from	pesticide	poisoning	and	almost	
four	 thousand	 were	 poisoned	 in	 2009.	 ANVISA	 research	
also	shows	that	contamination	is	above	threshold	levels	in	
some	vegetables	such	as	pepper.	
3.	 April	2011	 Deputy	Celia	Rocha	(PTB-AL)	 UFMT	research	 UFMT	researchers	detected	two	to	six	different	types	of	
pesticides	in	the	breast	milk	of	62	women,	including	one	
which	has	been	forbidden	in	Brazil	since	1999.	
4.	 October	
2011	
José	Roberto	da	Ros	–	Vice	
President	of	the	National	
Syndicate	of	Agricultural	
Defence	Products	Industry	
(SINDIVEG) 	
Ângelo	Trapé	
(University	of	
Campinas	–	
Unicamp)	
Pesticides	 are	 necessary	 to	 develop	 crops	 and	 prevent	
plagues.	Pesticides	are	 in	 fourth	place	among	 the	causes	
of	 poisoning,	 coming	 after	 medicines,	 cleaning	 products	
and	poisonous	animals.	
5.	 October	
2011	
Deputy	Padre	João	(PT-MG)	
	
	
	
Ângelo	Trapé	
(University	of	
Campinas	–	
Unicamp)	
I	feel	uneasy	about	this	information	[provided	by	Trapé].	
Things	are	not	as	simple	as	they	seem.	There	is	scientific	
data	proving	that	areas	with	high	use	of	pesticides	have	
higher	incidence	of	cancer. 
6.	 October	
2011	
Deputy	Amaury	Teixeira	 Ângelo	Trapé	
(University	of	
Campinas	–	
Unicamp)	
If	 Brazil	 is	 using	 pesticides	 correctly	 [as	 your	 evidence	
seems	 to	 suggest],	 why	 are	 there	 so	 many	 pesticides	
being	used	here	that	are	banned	in	Europe	and	the	US?  
7.	 May	2012	 José	Agenor	Álvares	da	Silva	
(Director	of	ANVISA	–	Ministry	
of	Health)	
Non-specified	
research	
Brazil	 uses	 19%	 of	 all	 pesticides	 produced	 in	 the	 world.	
The	increase	in	the	use	of	these	products	had	been	of	93%	
in	 the	 world	 between	 2000	 and	 2010	 but	 in	 Brazil	 this	
increase	has	corresponded	to	190%.	
8.	 July	2012	 Deputy	 Valdir	 Colatto	 (PMDB-
SC)	
UFMT	research	 The	UFMT	 research	 is	 exaggerated,	Brazilian	 farmers	 are	
concerned	about	not	harming	human	health	
9.	 July	2012	 Deputy	 Paulo	 Cesar	 Quartiero	
(DEM-RR)	
UFMT	research	 The	UFMT	 research	 is	 exaggerated,	Brazilian	 farmers	 are	
concerned	about	not	harming	human	health	
10.	 May	 2012	
and	
July	2012	
Vinicius	 Freitas	 –	
Representative	of	the	Brazilian	
Association	of	Agroecology	
UFMT	research	 There	is	no	safe	level	for	the	consumption	of	pesticides.	
The	UFMT	research	has	shown	that	of	the	12	potable	
water	wells	from	schools	which	were	analysed,	83%	were	
contaminated	with	residues	of	several	types	of	pesticides.	
Moreover,	56%	of	rain	samples	contained	pesticides	and	
100%	of	breastfeeding	women	had	at	least	one	type	of	
pesticide	in	their	milk.	There	should	be	effective	public	
policies	for	agro-ecological	types	of	production.	Small	
farmers,	who	feed	70%	of	national	population	sometimes	
can	only	have	credit	for	loans	if	they	use	pesticides.	
11.	 July	2012	 Deputy	 Stefano	 Aguiar	 	 (PSC-
MG)	
UFMT	research	 What	 the	 UFMT	 research	 found	 is	 extremely	 serious	
because	 breastfed	 babies	 are	 extremely	 susceptible	 to	
toxic	 substances	 due	 to	 their	 underdeveloped	
immunological	systems.  
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
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5.5.	Conclusion	
This	chapter	 investigated	cases	of	changes	in	pesticide	regulation	in	Brazil	
between	 2005	 and	 2015.	 The	 chapter	 maintains	 that	 pesticide	 regulations	 in	 Brazil	
have	tended	towards	becoming	 less	 restrictive	 in	 terms	of	environmental	and	health	
requirements	 during	 this	 decade	 and	 that	 these	 regulatory	 changes	 have	 occurred	
without	 negotiated	 agreement	 or	 policy-oriented	 learning.	 Section	 5.2	 provided	 a	
historical	 overview	 of	 regulation	 in	 the	 sector,	 the	 most	 important	 internal	 events	
identified	in	this	policy	subsystem,	and	delivered	an	analysis	of	the	salience	of	different	
policy	problems	 in	65	texts	 involving	debates	about	pesticide	regulation.	This	section	
concluded	that	the	most	important	recent	internal	event	affecting	this	sector	was	the	
increase	 in	 the	 use	 of	 pesticides	 in	 the	 country	 and	 the	 resulting	 overload	 of	 the	
administrative	apparatus	of	the	state	 in	processing	the	registrations	of	new	pesticide	
products.	It	identified,	in	addition,	that	the	most	salient	policy	problem	among	actors	
is	 the	 issue	 of	 excessive	 bureaucracy	 in	 the	 registration	 of	 new	 products,	 an	 issue	
brought	to	the	agenda	by	members	of	 the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	and	which	
motivated	debates	on	two	regulatory	reforms:	the	authorisation	of	the	import	of	non-
registered	 pesticides	 in	 cases	 of	 zoo-sanitary	 or	 phytosanitary	 emergencies	 (by	 Law	
12.973)	 and	Bill	 209/2013,	which,	 although	not	 yet	 approved	 at	 the	 time	of	writing,	
intends	 to	 establish	 a	 new	 unified	 pesticide	 registration	 agency	 under	 the	 central	
command	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 (substituting	 the	 current	 tripartite	 system,	
which	 	 involves	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Environment	 and	 the	
Ministry	of	Health).		
Section	5.3	presented	a	narrative	analysis	of	the	debates	on	the	two	above-
mentioned	 regulatory	 changes	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 the	 different	 discourses	 and	
coalitions.	 Three	 coalitions	 were	 identified:	 1)	 the	 neo-developmentalists,	 proposing	
that	 regulations	 should	 be	 altered	 in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 bureaucracy	 involved	 in	
importing	and	registering	new	pesticides	in	the	country.	This	group	was	composed	of	
associations	 representing	 the	 pesticide	 and	 agribusiness	 industries	 and	 of	 political	
parties	 such	 as	 the	 Brazilian	 Democratic	 Movement	 Party	 (PMDB),	 the	 Progressive	
Party	 (PP),	 the	 Democratic	 Party	 (DEM)	 and	 the	 Social	 Democratic	 Party	 (PSD)	 in	
addition	 to	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 (MAPA).	 2)	 The	 administrative	 economic	
rationalists,	who	 were	 a	 more	 moderate	 coalition	 based	 on	 arguments	 that	 it	 was	
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possible	to	reduce	bureaucracy	and	improve	control	by	strengthening	the	capacity	of	
the	current	administrative	 structure	 (without	 re-structuring	 it)	 and	 that	all	ministries	
should	continue	to	be	directly	involved	in	the	process	of	registration.	This	coalition	was	
mainly	 formed	 of	members	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Health	 (ANVISA),	 but	 also	 to	 a	 lesser	
extent	by	members	of	the	Ministry	of	Environment,	who	were,	however,	less	vocal	on	
the	 topic.	 3)	 Finally,	 the	 preservationist/socio-environmentalist	 coalition	 did	 not	
recognise	 the	 registration	 issue	 as	 an	 actual	 policy	 problem,	 as	 pesticides	 are	 not	
perceived	by	this	group	as	a	necessity.	This	coalition	was	found	to	be	composed	of	the	
Ministry	 of	 Agrarian	 and	 Social	 Development	 (MDA/MDS),	 by	 diverse	 civil	 society	
organisations	 (including	 some	 family/rural	 workers’	 social	movements),	 by	 scientists	
(those	who	had	not	been	hired	by	specific	stakeholders),72	members	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment	 (also	giving	declarations	 to	 support	 this	 coalition),	 and	members	of	 the	
Workers’	Party	(PT)	and	the	Workers’	Democratic	Party	(PDT).		
After	 the	 identification	 of	 narratives	 and	 coalitions,	 section	 5.4	 assessed	
the	relevance	of	internal	events,	negotiated	agreement	and	policy-oriented	learning	as	
sources	of	regulatory	change	in	this	policy	subsystem.	It	demonstrated	that	negotiated	
agreement	and	policy-oriented	 learning	cannot	be	considered	relevant	causal	 factors	
in	 the	 regulatory	 changes	 in	 this	 subsystem,	 qualifying	 therefore,	 ACF’s	 hypothesis	
about	the	necessity	of	these	two	sources	of	policy	change.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
72	Scientists	explicitly	hired	by	members	of	the	industry	were	coded	as	part	of	the	industry.	
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CHAPTER	6	-	CASE	STUDY	III:	ACCESS	TO	GENETIC	RESOURCES	
AND	BENEFIT-SHARING	(ABS)	REGULATION	
	
	
6.1.	Introduction	
The	 opportunity	 to	 make	 economic	 use	 of	 naturally-occurring	 genetic	
resources	and	of	the	traditional	knowledge	associated	with	 it	 is	often	alluded	to	as	a	
latent	 fortune	 of	 mega-diverse	 countries.	 The	 development	 of	 products	 based	 on	
biodiversity	 and	 traditional	 knowledge	 is	 a	 well-established	 but	 scantly	 regulated	
practice.	 This	 chapter	 delves	 into	 the	 process	 of	 the	 regulation	 of	 access	 to	 genetic	
resources	and	the	sharing	of	benefits	arising	from	their	utilisation	in	Brazil	and	aims	to	
explain	the	reasons	underlying	the	regulatory	changes	this	sector	has	been	through	in	
2015.	The	issue	was	first	regulated	in	the	country	in	2001,	but	on	the	20th	May,	2015,	a	
new	 access	 and	 benefit-sharing	 (henceforth	 ABS)	 law	 was	 published.	 In	 order	 to	
investigate	the	reasons	underlying	this	regulatory	change,	this	chapter	will	provide	an	
analysis	 of	 the	 history	 of	 this	 policy	 subsystem	 in	 Brazil	 (section	 6.2),	 of	 the	 main	
coalitions	and	narratives	in	the	debate	preceding	the	2015	regulation	(section	6.3)	and,	
based	on	the	contributions	of	the	Advocacy	Coalition	Framework	(ACF)	on	the	sources	
of	policy	change,	section	four	will	assess	whether	regulatory	changes	were	heralded	by	
internal	 events,	 negotiated	 agreement	 and	 policy-oriented	 learning	 among	 these	
coalitions73.		
The	analysis	identified	three	active	coalitions	in	the	process	of	negotiation	
that	 preceded	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 2015	 ABS	 law:	 an	 administrative	 economic	
rationalist	 coalition,	mainly	 formed	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 the	 Environment	 (MMA),	 the	
Ministry	of	Industry	and	Foreign	Trade	(MDIC),	the	Ministry	of	Science,	Technology	and	
Innovation	 (MCTI)	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	 bio-industry;	 a	 neo-developmentalist	
coalition,	constituted	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	(MAPA)	representatives	of	the	agri-
business	 sector	 and	 members	 of	 the	 Congress	 supportive	 of	 their	 interests;	 and	 a	
socio-environmentalist	 coalition,	 formed	 by	 representatives	 of	 traditional	 and	
																																								 																				
73	External	events	related	to	the	Brazilian	context	have	been	described	in	chapter	4.	
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indigenous	communities,	 family	 farmers,	parts	of	 the	scientific	community	and	those	
supportive	of	their	demands	(such	as	NGOs	and	some	members	of	the	Congress).	
	The	 analysis	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 these	 coalitions	 revealed	 that,	
although	 negotiated	 agreement	 took	 place	 between	 the	 first	 two	 coalitions	 named	
above,	the	third	was	less	successful	in	having	its	voice	heard	and	in	participating	in	the	
negotiation	 process	 that	 led	 to	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 new	 law.	 This	 chapter	 will	
demonstrate,	 moreover,	 that	 although	 learning	 took	 place	 among	 two	 of	 the	 three	
coalitions,	scientific	evidence	was	of	little	importance	during	the	debates	in	the	Lower	
Chamber,	which	contests	the	ACF	in	that	policy-oriented	learning	shall	imply	the	use	of	
scientific/technical	evidence.		
The	results	of	the	analysis	point	to	the	importance	of	four	events	internal	
to	the	policy	subsystem	and	two	external	to	it.	The	first	internal	event	is	what	will	be	
referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘Novartis	 Scandal’	 in	 2000,	 which	 was	 caused	 by	 an	 agreement	
between	 the	 Swiss	 Pharmaceutical	 company	 Novartis	 and	 a	 Brazilian	 NGO	 to	 send	
genetic	 samples	 of	 plants	 to	 Switzerland.	 The	 second	 is	 related	 to	 the	 limits	 in	 the	
administrative	capacity	of	 the	state	to	 issue	genetic	access	authorisations	 in	a	 timely	
manner,	which	fostered	opposition	to	the	law	by	the	bio-industry	and	researchers.	The	
third	 is	 the	 imposition	 of	 fines	 on	 the	 bio-industry	 and	 researchers	 in	 2010	 for	 not	
complying	 with	 the	 previous	 ABS	 Law.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	
enforcement	of	previous	regulations	was	also	observed	to	play	an	important	role	in	this	
process	of	regulatory	change.	Lastly,	the	entry	into	force	of	the	UN	Nagoya	Protocol	in	
2014	was	also	 identified	as	a	crucial	occurrence	 igniting	debate	about	 the	new	2015	
regulation.	 A	 timeline	 locating	 these	 three	 events	 in	 the	 history	 of	 this	 policy	
subsystem	is	provided	below	and	further	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
	
	
Figure	11	-	Timeline	of	main	regulations	and	events	of	the	ABS	policy	subsystem	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
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The	two	external	events,	in	turn,	are	the	increase	in	the	political	power	of	
the	rural	caucus	in	the	National	Congress	after	the	2011	election	and	to	the	boom	in	
the	exports	of	commodities	 from	Brazil	between	2009	and	2010,	which	resulted	 in	a	
huge	increase	in	the	economic	power	of	the	agri-business	sector.	Because	these	have	
already	been	debated	in	chapter	4,	this	discussion	will	not	be	included	in	this	chapter.	
	
6.2.	The	history	of	ABS	regulation	
The	imbalance	of	power	between	users	of	biodiversity	(often	multinational	
companies	 or	 research	 centres)	 and	 its	 traditional	 providers	 (commonly	 local	
communities	from	the	global	south)	makes	biodiversity	access	and	benefit	sharing	an	
extremely	sensitive	policy	area	in	need	of	well-crafted	regulations.	In	order	to	address	
this	 regulatory	 challenge	 and	 foster	 the	 conservation	 of	 biodiversity,	 parties	 to	 the	
United	Nations	Convention	of	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	have	long	been	promoting	the	
fair	 and	 equitable	 sharing	 of	 the	 benefits	 arising	 from	 the	 utilisation	 of	 genetic	
resources	 and	 some	 countries,	 such	 as	 Brazil,	 are	 already	 regulating	 the	 issue	
domestically.	This	section	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	history	of	regulatory	efforts	
undertaken	both	internationally	and	in	Brazil	to	address	this	issue.74	
Until	1992,	biological	 resources	were	treated	as	 the	 ‘common	heritage	of	
mankind’,	 as	 established	 in	 the	 1972	 UNESCO	World	 Heritage	 Convention.	 In	 1992,	
however,	after	a	long	period	of	pressure	by	mega-diverse	countries	such	as	Brazil,	the	
UN	Convention	of	 Biological	Diversity	 recognised	 the	 rights	 of	 national	 governments	
over	 the	 genetic	 resources	 located	 in	 their	 territories.	 On	 29th	 October,	 2010,	 the	
‘Nagoya	Protocol	on	Access	to	Genetic	Resources	and	the	Fair	and	Equitable	Sharing	of	
Benefits	 Arising	 from	 their	 Utilization’	 was	 adopted	 by	 the	 Parties	 to	 the	 CBD.	 The	
protocol,	which	entered	in	force	on	12th	October,	2014,	provided	more	legal	certainty	
for	providers	and	users	of	genetic	resources	and	traditional	knowledge,	ensuring	that	
the	providers	receive	a	share	of	the	benefits	accruing	from	the	use	of	their	resources.	
It	 also	 is	 intended	 to	 guarantee	 that	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	 communities	 are	
																																								 																				
74	 Because	 the	 issue	 began	 being	 regulated	 in	 Brazil	 only	 in	 2001,	 a	 historical	 analysis	 of	 the	
predominant	discourses	throughout	history	will	not	be	pursued.	However,	analysis	of	the	short	period	
from	 2001	 reveals	 that	 a	 socio-environmentalist	 perspective,	 which	 predominated	 in	 the	 2001	
regulation,	was	 substituted	by	 a	mix	of	neo-developmentalist	 and	administrative	economic	 rationalist	
views	in	2015.		
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empowered	in	the	process	of	allowing	access	to	genetic	resources,	requiring	users	to	
obtain	their	prior	and	informed	consent	for	access	as	well	as	fairly	rewarding	them	for	
the	use	of	their	traditional	knowledge	(UN,	2014).		
Brazil	 has	 always	 been	 among	 the	 leaders	 in	 setting	 the	 agenda	 of	
international	 biodiversity	 regulation	 and	 has	 usually	 been	 among	 the	most	 vocal	 of	
countries	 supporting	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Nagoya	 Protocol	 (Venkataraman,	 2009,	 p.	
25).	According	 to	a	member	of	 the	Brazilian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	 the	 fact	 that	
Brazil	 is	 the	most	biodiverse	 country	 in	 the	world	has	meant	 that	biodiversity	 issues	
are	 a	 priority	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	 country’s	 leadership	 role	 in	 international	
negotiations	 (interview	 40).	 Since	 2002,	 Brazil	 has	 been	 part	 of	 the	 group	 of	 “Like-
Minded	 Mega-Diverse	 Countries”	 (LMMC)	 and	 in	 2005	 it	 signed	 the	 “New	 Delhi	
Declaration	 on	 Access	 and	 Benefit	 Sharing”,	 furthering	 this	 agenda	 (Venkataraman,	
2009,	p.	25).	When	the	Nagoya	Protocol	was	approved	in	2010,	Brazil	was	among	the	
first	countries	to	sign.	After	the	Protocol	entered	in	force,	however,	the	urgency	faded	
and,	at	the	time	of	writing	(mid-2016)	ratification	has	not	yet	taken	place.		
In	Brazil,	ABS	regulation	was	first	proposed	by	then-Workers’	Party	Senator	
Marina	Silva	on	the	9th	November,	1995.	She	presented	the	Project	of	Law	(PL)	306/95,	
which	 was	 debated	 in	 several	 public	 hearings	 with	 traditional	 communities,	 NGOs,	
scientists	and	members	of	the	National	Congress	(Lima	and	Bensusan,	2003;	Machado	
and	Godinho,	2011).	 The	bill	was	 later	altered,	and	a	 second	bill	was	also	proposed,	
bringing	back	the	contents	of	the	original,	but	none	of	them	was	approved.75	However,	
in	 1998,	 another	 Project	 of	 Law	 on	 the	 topic	 was	 discussed	 by	 an	 inter-ministerial	
group	 of	 the	 executive	 government	 and	 sent	 to	 the	 Lower	 Chamber	 (PL	 4.751/98),	
which,	at	that	point,	had	accumulated	three	Projects	of	Law	on	the	same	topic	to	be	
voted	 on.	 Finally,	 again	 in	 1998,	 the	 executive	 government	 sent	 a	 Proposal	 of	
Constitutional	 Amendment	 (PEC	 no	 618/98)	 to	 Congress	 proposing	 that	 genetic	
resources	no	longer	be	linked	to	the	property	or	land	in	which	they	occur,	but	become	
national	 resources.	 Because	 of	 disagreements	 between	 the	 various	 parties	 in	 the	
debate,	 particularly	 concerning	 collective	 and	 private	 property	 rights	 and	 the	
entitlement	of	industry	and	indigenous	communities	regarding	patented	products	that	
																																								 																				
75	 It	 was	 first	 substituted	 by	 a	 proposal	 from	 senator	 Osmar	 Dias	 (PSDB)	 in	 1998	 (PL	 4.842/98)	 who	
disagreed	with	some	of	the	requirements	regarding	indigenous	rights,	and	then-senator	Jacques	Wagner	
(Workers’	Party)	proposed	another	Bill	(PL	4.579/98)	rescuing	contents	from	the	original	Silva’s	proposal	
in	terms	of	indigenous	and	traditional	communities’	rights	(Bensusan,	2003).	
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originate	from	traditional	knowledge	(see	Lima,	Baptista	and	Bensusan,	2003,	pp.	203–
216),	 none	 of	 these	 four	 regulatory	 proposals	 was	 ever	 voted	 on	 by	 the	 Lower	
Chamber.	
Further	 regulatory	 activity	 did	 not	 take	 place	 until	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
2000s,	when	a	scandal	 involving	the	Swiss	pharmaceutical	company	Novartis	and	the	
Brazilian	 research	 organisation	 Bioamazonia76	 (Associação	 Brasileira	 para	 Uso	
Sustentável	 da	 Biodiversidade	 da	 Amazônia)	 was	 exposed	 (henceforth	 the	 ‘Novartis	
scandal’).	 On	 29th	May,	 2000,	 Novartis	 signed	 a	 contract	with	 Bioamazonia	 for	 it	 to	
collect,	 identify,	 catalogue	 and	 send	 genetic	 material	 from	 the	 Amazon	 Forest	 to	
Novartis’s	head	office	 in	Switzerland.	According	to	the	contract,	Novartis	would	have	
unrestricted	 use	 and	 patent	 rights	 over	 the	 material	 collected	 and,	 in	 exchange,	
Bioamazonia	would	be	paid	1%	of	the	royalties	of	any	new	products	resulting	from	this	
material	over	a	period	of	ten	years	(Rocha,	2003).		
The	 first	 reaction	 to	 this	 contract	 came	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 the	
Environment	(MMA).	The	MMA	Secretary	of	Coordination	of	the	Legal	Amazon,	Mary	
Allegretti,	 publicly	 opposed	 the	 agreement,	 arguing	 that	 Bioamazonia	 should	 had	
consulted	the	MMA	before	signing	it	(Allegretti,	25/08/200077).	Following	the	reaction	
of	the	MMA,	the	scientific	sector	also	publicly	opposed	the	contract.	On	8th	June,	2000,	
Isaias	Raw,	President	of	the	Instituto	Butantan,	a	governmental	centre	for	biomedical	
research,	 published	 an	 article	 arguing	 that	 it	 represented	 a	 ‘spurious	 agreement	
transforming	 the	 Amazonia	 into	 the	 backyard	 of	 multinational	 companies’	 (Raw,	
08/06/200078).	
Pressured	 by	 public	 opinion	 (and	 by	 its	 Ministry	 of	 the	 Environment)	 to	
take	action,	 in	2000,	 the	executive	government	published	a	Provisional	Measure79,	 a	
presidential	 legal	act	 regulating	access	 to	genetic	material	 that	 took	 immediate	 legal	
effect	(MP2052/2000).	This	response	generated	further	criticisms	from	civil	society	and	
																																								 																				
76	Bioamazônia	was	created	as	a	‘social	organisation’	–	a	non-profit	institution	(according	to	the	terms	of	
Federal	Law	no.	9637/98)	that	had	a	contract	with	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment	for	assistance	with	
the	implementation	of	PROBEM	(The	Brazilian	Programme	of	Molecular	Ecology	for	the	Sustainable	Use	
of	Amazonian	Biodiversity).		
77	Available	at:	http://www.inpa.gov.br/cpca/charles/rtf/BioAmvsNovartis.rtf.	Accessed	July,	2016.	
78	 Available	 at:	 http://www.sbq.org.br/publicacoes/beletronico/bienio2/boletim177.htm#4.	 Accessed:	
July,	2016.	
79	There	are	two	requirements	for	a	provisional	measure	to	be	used:	the	urgency	and	relevance	of	the	
matter	in	need	of	regulation.	Because	of	the	urgency	of	the	issue,	this	regulation	involved	no	previous	
social	consultation	and	even	the	National	Congress	was	prevented	from	discussing	the	issue.	This	was,	
therefore,	an	example	of	an	extremely	hierarchical	process	of	standard	setting.	
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Congress.	The	latter,	as	previously	observed,	had	been	attempting	to	regulate	ABS	for	
more	 than	 five	 years	 at	 that	 point.	One	of	 the	 central	 criticisms	was	 that	 this	 initial	
Provisional	 Measure	 failed	 to	 address	 the	 rights	 of	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities	by	waiving	the	necessity	of	their	prior	 informed	consent	 in	situations	 in	
which	 access	 to	 genetic	 resources	 was	 of	 ‘relevant	 public	 interest’	 (Art.	 14	 MP	
2052/2000).	 The	 use	 of	 a	 Provisional	Measure	 to	 regulate	 the	 issue	was,	moreover,	
characterised	 as	 ‘anti-democratic’	 in	 a	 joint	 declaration	 of	 16	 NGOs	 that	 publicly	
opposed	 the	 new	 regulation	 (Osava,	 2000).	 Senator	 Marina	 Silva,	 who	 had	 first	
brought	the	theme	to	the	debate	in	the	National	Congress,	was	one	of	the	most	vocal	
critics	of	 this	Provisional	Measure.	She	remarked	the	fact	 that	the	bill	 she	sponsored	
had	already	been	discussed	and	approved	by	the	Senate,	and	accused	the	government	
of	 an	 act	 of	 ‘legislative	 piracy’	 by	 stealing	 the	 legislative	 functions	 of	 the	 Congress	
(Osava,	2000).		
The	provisional	measure	was	judicially	contested	in	the	Supreme	Court	of	
Justice	 by	 the	 Communist	 Brazilian	 Party	 (PCdoB)	 and	 by	 the	Workers’	 Party	 (PT)	 in	
partnership	with	 the	National	 Confederation	 of	 Agricultural	Workers	 (CONTAG)	who	
flagged	 two	 ‘direct	 actions	 of	 unconstitutionality’	 (Machado	 and	 Godinho,	 2011).	
Because	 of	 these	 judicial	 actions	 the	 text	 of	 the	 Provisional	Measure	 went	 through	
extensive	 reforms	 and	 it	 was	 eventually	 substituted	 on	 23rd	 August,	 2001,	 by	 the	
Provisional	Measure	2.186/2001,	which	was	valid	until	May	2015.	In	the	2.186	Law,	in	
an	attempt	to	extend	protection	for	indigenous	and	traditional	communities,	the	critics	
succeeded	in	including	a	new	clause	requiring	prior	informed	consent	from	the	owner	
of	 the	 land	 in	 which	 genetic	 resources	 are	 located.	 However,	 despite	 being	 more	
considerate	 towards	 the	 rights	 of	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 communities	 than	 the	
previous	 regulation,	 this	 second	 provisional	measure	 was	 opposed	 by	 several	 social	
sectors	 (including	 indigenous	and	traditional	communities	themselves)	 for	generating	
excessive	red	tape,	costs	and	difficulties	regarding	access	to	genetic	resources.	
The	 dissatisfaction	 became	more	 pronounced	when	monitoring	 began	 in	
2010	and	 IBAMA	 (the	environmental	monitoring	agency)	 issued	 the	 first	 fines	 to	 the	
private	 and	 research	 sectors.	 At	 that	 point,	 an	 organised	 movement	 of	 affected	
industries	emerged	to	push	for	changes	in	the	regulation	(interview	6).	This	group,	led	
by	 an	 association	 of	 pharmaceutical	 industries	 (Grupo	 FarmaBrasil),	 worked	 closely	
with	 the	Ministry	 of	 the	 Environment	 to	 elaborate	 a	 new	 bill	 that	would	 eventually	
167	
	
result	in	the	2015	law	(interviews	6	and	8).		The	Ministries	of	Science	and	Technology,	
as	 well	 as	 the	Ministry	 for	 the	 Development	 of	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	 were	 later	
included	 in	 this	 process	 and	 supported	 the	 final	 result	 (interview	 54).	When	 the	 bill	
was	sent	 to	 the	Congress,	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	 (MAPA),	which	 initially	 resisted	
the	bill	due	to	fears	of	taxation	of	agricultural	products	originating	in	foreign	countries,	
was	 included	 in	 the	 discussion	 (interview	 12).	 The	 reduced	 participation	 of	minority	
groups	 such	 as	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	 communities	 and	 family	 farmers	 in	 the	
negotiations	 was,	 however,	 constantly	 emphasised	 by	 interviewees	 and	 in	 public	
hearings	of	the	Lower	Chamber	(interviews	18,	43,	46).		
The	 next	 section	 analyses	 the	 three	 coalitions	 and	 the	 narratives	 that	
emerged	in	the	process	of	approval	of	this	new	law	in	2015.		
	
6.3.	Positions,	Arguments	and	Narratives		
6.3.1.	Positions	
Three	 divergent	 coalitions	were	 formed	 in	 the	 debates	 about	 the	 bill	 (PL	
7735)	that	eventually	resulted	in	Law	13.123/2015.	The	first	coalition,	referred	to	here	
as	 the	socio-environmentalist	 coalition,	was	mainly	 formed	by	NGOs,	 indigenous	and	
traditional	 communities,	 left-wing	 and	environmentalist	 parties	 (such	as	Psol,	 PT,	 PV	
and	PCdoB),	and	(at	least	initially)	by	the	Brazilian	Society	for	the	Progress	of	Science	
(SBPC).	 These	 actors	 opposed	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 bill	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 alleged	
illegitimacy	 of	 the	 process	 through	 which	 it	 was	 elaborated,	 namely,	 without	 the	
formal	 inclusion	 and	 consultation	 of	 members	 of	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	
communities.	For	this	group,	the	most	valued	consequence	of	the	new	law	would	be	
the	benefits	that	traditional	and	indigenous	communities	would	accrue	from	facilitated	
and	regulated	access	to	genetic	resources	and	traditional	knowledge.	This	group	was	
found	 to	 be	 based	 on,	 therefore,	 from	 a	 socio-environmentalist	 view	 of	 the	 world,	
according	to	which	traditional	and	indigenous	communities	have	a	fundamental	role	to	
play	in	the	protection	of	the	environment.		
The	second	coalition,	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition,	was	also	 initially	
against	the	approval	of	the	bill,	but	agreed	to	the	final	version	after	their	requirements	
were	 incorporated.	 This	 coalition	was	 formed	mainly	 of	 representatives	 of	 the	 agri-
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business	sector,	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	of	deputies	from	conservative	parties	
that	are	part	of	the	rural	caucus	in	the	National	Congress	(such	as	the	PMDB,	PP,	DEM).	
This	 group	 initially	 opposed	 the	 bill	 because	 they	 perceived	 the	 compensation	
requirements	 of	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	 communities	 to	 be	 a	 threat	 to	 the	
economic	interests	of	agri-business.	Once	this	threat	had	been	completely	neutralised	
through	alterations	to	the	bill,	this	coalition	became	supportive	of	it.		This	coalition	was	
organised,	 therefore,	 around	 a	 neo-developmentalist	 discourse,	 according	 to	 which	
the	 economic	 benefits	 of	 the	 use	 of	 genetic	 resources	 take	 precedence	 over	 other	
goals	such	as	protection	of	the	environment	or	traditional	communities’	rights.	
The	 third	 coalition	 identified	 is	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	
coalition.	 This	 coalition	 was	 found	 to	 be	 composed	 of	 parts	 of	 the	 executive	
government	(mainly	the	MMA,	the	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology	[MCTI]	and	the	
Ministry	of	Industry	[MDIC]),	a	group	of	bio-technology-based	industries	and	by	some	
representatives	 of	 the	Workers’	 Party	 (PT)	 in	 the	 National	 Congress.	 This	 group	 not	
only	 proposed	 the	 bill,	 but	 strongly	 supported	 it	 throughout	 the	 negotiations	 in	 the	
Congress.	 This	 coalition	 emerged	 in	 2010	 after	 the	 first	 fines	 were	 issued	 against	
companies	and	 researchers	who	had	not	 followed	 the	previous	 regulation	 (interview	
6).	 This	 coalition	 emerged	 with	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 GrupoFarma	 Brasil,	 a	 group	 of	
representatives	 from	 the	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 which	 contacted	 other	 nine	
industrial	associations,	companies	and	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment	to	produce	the	
first	draft	of	the	bill	 (interview	6).	This	group	had	regular	meetings	for	a	period	of	at	
least	two	years	and	was	directly	involved	in	the	negotiations	in	the	National	Congress.		
The	 assumptions	 that	 unified	 this	 latter	 coalition	 were	 based	 on	 an	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 view,	 according	 to	 which	 rules	 about	 benefit	
sharing	should	be	made	clearer,	more	efficient,	less	burdensome	for	the	industry	and	
researchers,	and	centrally	enforced	by	the	government.	According	to	this	perspective	
to	the	extent	that	rules	of	access	were	clear,	efficiently	enforced	by	the	government	
and	 easily	 applicable,	 conservation	 of	 biodiversity	 and	 benefit	 sharing	 would	 be	
effective	 and	 all	 sectors	 would	 benefit.	 A	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 coalitional	
affiliation	 of	 each	 of	 the	 28	 actors	 identified	 as	 active	 in	 the	 debates	 of	 the	 Lower	
Chamber	is	provided	in	appendix	II	for	this	chapter.		
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6.3.2	Thematic	Coding		
The	identification	of	these	three	coalitions	and	the	categorisation	of	actors	
was	 pursued	 through	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 main	 arguments	 of	 the	 debate,	 and	 by	
narrative	 analysis.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 thematic	 coding	 of	 the	main	 arguments	 of	 the	
debate	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 arguments	 is	 summarised	 by	 the	
argumentative	map	in	figure	12	and	explained	subsequently.	
	
	
	
Figure	12	-	Argumentative	map	of	the	debate	about	the	new	ABS	Law		
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
The	 arguments	 repeated	 most	 often	 in	 the	 debates	 about	 the	 new	 law	
advanced	 criticisms	 of	 the	 previous	 regulation	 (with	 33	 occurrences).	 These	 entailed	
arguments	 that	 pointed	 to	 the	 draconian	 character	 of	 the	 previous	 regulation,	 its	
complexity,	highly	bureaucratic	stipulations,	and	the	slow	processing	of	genetic	access	
requests	that	would	result.	These	kinds	of	arguments	gained	particular	traction	in	the	
narratives	of	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	group	(which	proposed	the	law	in	
the	first	place).	The	previous	regulation	was	referred	to	by	members	of	this	coalition	as	
a	serious	“disincentive	to	the	scientific	and	industrial	use	of	Brazilian	biodiversity”	and	
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as	“irrational”	in	economic	and	scientific	terms,	among	other	negative	qualifications.80	
Members	 of	 the	 government	 have	 also	 pointed	 to	 its	 “excessive	 command	 and	
control”	and	members	of	the	industry	reported	that	they	were	being	made	to	produce	
“biodiversity-free”	 certificates	 in	 order	 for	 products	 to	 be	 accepted	 and	
commercialised	 in	 the	production	 chain,	which	was	 considered	absurd	 (interview	6).	
The	complexity	and	inefficiency	of	the	previous	regulation	was,	however,	a	point	also	
widely	 agreed-upon	 by	 scientists	 and	 representatives	 of	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities,	who	 never	 disputed	 the	 need	 to	 revise	 this	 legislation,	 but	 rather	 the	
procedures	by	which	it	was	revised.	Members	of	the	agri-business	and	from	the	rural	
caucus	were	also	critical	of	 the	 law,	particularly	 in	 terms	of	 the	uncertainties	around	
the	export	of	agricultural	products	of	foreign	origin	(such	as	soy),	but	were	not	vocal	
on	the	bureaucratic	concerns.	
Another	frequently	mentioned	argument	 identified	 in	the	debates	related	
to	 the	 absence	 of	 opportunities	 for	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	 communities	 to	
participate	in	the	elaboration	of	the	new	regulation	and	to	the	nature	of	the	‘urgency’	
with	which	 the	bill	was	 sent	 to	 the	Congress.	 This	 argument,	which	was	 adopted	by	
members	 of	 the	 socio-environmentalist	 coalition,	 was	 coded	 as	 procedural	 criticism	
and	 was	 identified	 20	 times.	 The	 document	 ‘Rejection	Motion	 from	 traditional	 and	
indigenous	populations	and	familiar	farmers	to	the	businesses	sectors	involved	in	the	
elaboration	 and	 processing	 of	 the	 Project	 Law	 that	 sells	 and	 destroys	 national	
biodiversity’	published	on	18th	March,	2015,	for	example,	affirms	that	the	exclusion	of	
traditional	 and	 indigenous	 communities	 in	 the	 process	 of	 drafting	 the	 bill	 was	 a	
“deliberate	 and	 conscious	 decision	 of	 the	 government	 together	 with	 the	 ‘Business	
Coalition	for	Biodiversity”	(Rejection	Motion,	2015).	
Another	 frequent	 argument	 used	 by	 members	 of	 the	 socio-
environmentalist	coalition	was	their	emphasis	on	the	‘illegal’	character	of	the	bill,	due	
to	 its	 contradiction	 of	 international	 treaties	 and	 the	Brazilian	 Constitution	 (coded	 as	
illegality	of	 the	bill	–	22	occurrences).	 The	 fact	 that	no	 formal	 consultation	was	held	
with	 these	 communities	 before	 the	 bill	 was	 sent	 to	 the	 Congress	 was	 frequently	
mentioned	by	representatives	of	indigenous	and	traditional	communities	in	interviews,	
public	letters	addressed	to	the	government	and	public	speeches	made	at	the	Congress.	
According	 to	 this	 view,	 the	manner	 in	which	 the	Project	of	 Law	was	 formulated	was	
																																								 																				
80	See	the	full	list	of	quotations	coded	under	each	code	in	Appendix	I	
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against	 Convention	 no	 169	 of	 the	 International	 Organization	 of	 Labour	 –	 ratified	 by	
Brazil	 in	2003	–	which	establishes	the	rights	of	 indigenous	peoples	to	be	consulted	in	
relation	to	all	administrative	or	legal	procedures	that	affect	their	interests.	In	addition,	
this	 group	 also	maintained	 that	 there	was	 a	 disregard	 for	 the	 principle	 of	 ‘informed	
prior	 consent’	 of	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	 peoples	 in	 regard	 to	 access	 to	 genetic	
resources	(established	by	the	CBD	and	the	ILO	169	convention),	referring	to	the	bill’s	
provision	 that	 the	 proof	 of	 informed	 prior	 consent	 can	 be	 given	 by	 an	 official	
governmental	 body	 (Art	 9,	 §	 1,	 III)	 and	 also	 that	 it	 was	 non-compulsory	 for	 the	
government	to	consult	 its	own	specialist	 institutions	for	the	protection	of	 indigenous	
and	traditional	communities’	rights	in	drafting	the	benefit-sharing	agreements	(Art.	21	
–	unique	paragraph).	
Other	 less	 frequent,	 but	 still	 important,	 arguments	 from	 the	 socio-
environmental	 coalition	 were	 that	 the	 bill	 would	 provide	 no	 legal	 security	 to	 the	
industry	because	it	would	only	generate	more	conflict	with	indigenous	communities	(5	
occurrences);	 that	 the	 bill	was	 a	way	 to	 amnesty	 those	who	were	 not	 following	 the	
previous	 law	(5	occurrences);	 that	 it	was	a	result	of	governmental	capture	by	private	
interests	(12	occurrences)	and	that	benefit	sharing	would	become	an	exception	rather	
than	the	rule	(4	occurrences).	The	argument	that	the	bill	provides	no	legal	security	to	
the	industry	is	underscored	by	the	allegation	that	the	illegitimate	procedures	and	lack	
of	 social	 consensus	 accompanying	 the	 bill	 enhanced	 the	 potential	 for	 conflict	 and	
improper	implementation.		The	amnesty	criticism,	in	turn,	was	related	to	Art	17	§	10	of	
the	bill,	which	waived	the	obligation	of	sharing	the	benefits	of	the	commercialisation	
of	 products	 resulting	 from	 genetic	 access	 that	 occurred	 prior	 to	 29/06/200081.	
Regarding	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 government	 had	been	 captured	 by	 private	 groups,	
socio-environmentalists	pointed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	bill	originally	 imposed	a	 limit	on	
benefit	 sharing	of	1%	of	annual	net	 revenue	of	 the	product	 in	question	 (Art	20),	but	
allowed	this	to	be	reduced	down	to	0.1%	through	an	exclusive	agreement	between	the	
industry	and	the	government	“in	order	to	ensure	the	competitiveness	of	the	sector	in	
question”	 (Art	 21).	 Finally,	 it	 was	 often	 argued	 that	 the	 new	 law	 created	 so	 many	
restrictions	and	difficulties	around	benefit	sharing	that	it	actually	made	it	an	exception	
and	not	a	rule.	The	group	noticed,	for	instance,	that	the	bill	proposed	that	users	of	the	
genetic	 resources	 can	 choose	 whether	 they	 want	 to	 practice	 monetary	 or	 non-
																																								 																				
81	This	article	was	later	vetoed	by	President	Dilma	Rousseff.	
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monetary	 benefit-sharing	 and	 are	 also	 entitled	 to	 select	 the	 destination	 of	 non-
monetary	contributions.82		
Among	 the	 responses	 of	 the	 administrative	 rationalist	 coalition	 to	 the	
socio-environmentalists	was	an	emphasis	on	national	development	as	well	as	the	need	
to	 be	 quick	 in	 the	 approval	 of	 a	 new	 law,	 which	 was	 coded	 as	 the	managerialist	
argument.	 Mentioned	 exclusively	 by	 members	 of	 the	 government,	 the	 idea	 behind	
national	development	was	that	a	new	self-declaratory	system	to	be	established	under	
the	new	legislation	would	“provide	much	more	security	and	increase	the	speed	of	the	
process	of	economic	development”	of	the	country,	and	that	this	law	is	justified	by	the	
fact	that	“no	country	renounces	its	capacity	to	grow”.	This	was	closely	associated	with	
the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 idea	 that	 barriers	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 bio-
industry	 should	be	 removed	by	 the	government.	This	argument	was	used	 five	 times.	
Additionally,	 members	 of	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalition	 also	
maintained	that	more	consultation	would	have	ossified	the	process	and	that	it	would	
take	 too	 long	 time	 for	 the	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 communities	 to	 be	 officially	
instructed	and	consulted	on	 the	 issue	 through	public	consultations,	as	 they	had	very	
little	 technical	 knowledge	 on	 the	 topic.	 The	 argument	 that	 the	 process	 be	 fast	 and	
efficient,	coded	as	the	managerialist	argument,	occurred	seven	times.	
The	arguments	of	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	were	not	counted	as	
systematically,	 however,	 as	 all	 the	 above-described	 arguments,	 because	 they	 came	
mainly	from	two	unrecorded	interviews	(as	requested	by	interviewees	12	and	59)	and	
from	the	 tracing	of	 the	changes	proposed	by	members	of	 the	Congress	 to	 the	 initial	
bill.	 The	main	 argument	 of	 this	 third	 group	was	 that	 the	 risks	 of	 altering	 the	 law	 to	
better	regulate	and	facilitate	access	to	genetic	resources	and	traditional	knowledge	for	
the	 bio-industry	would	 have	 negative	 effects	 for	 agriculture,	 because,	 in	 this	 sector,	
Brazil	 is	a	user	of	 foreign	genetic	 resources	 (rather	 than	a	provider,	as	 in	 the	case	of	
the	 bio-industry).	 Therefore	 if	 benefit	 sharing	 became	 a	 regulated	 practice,	 there	
would	be	more	burdens	than	benefits	for	this	sector.	
																																								 																				
82	The	non-monetary	contribution	do	not	have	to	go	to	conservation	units	or	traditional	or	 indigenous	
communities	 but	 can	 go,	 for	 example,	 to	 the	 “provision	 of	 human	 resources	 for	 themes	 related	 to	
conservation	and	the	sustainable	use	of	genetic	resources	or	of	associated	traditional	knowledge”	(Art.	
19,	II,	e)	or	to	the	consolidation	of	“infra-structure	for	research	and	technological	development”	(Art.	19,	
§	3;	IV)	within	the	industry	itself.	
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This	general	point	was	specified	in	two	main	demands	that	were	identified	
through	the	tracing	of	the	changes	made	to	the	bill	by	the	National	Congress.	First,	by	
the	request	to	prevent	agricultural	products	from	bearing	any	of	the	costs	that	might	
come	 about	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 new	 law,	 something	 that	 was	 pursued	 during	
negotiations	and	successfully	achieved	by	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	through	
the	addition	of	Article	9,	§	383	to	the	bill,	which	determines	that	access	to	traditional,	
native	 or	 locally-adapted	 genetic	 resources	 for	 agricultural	 activities	 has	 to	 be	
considered	 to	 be	 access	 to	 traditional	 knowledge	 of	 ‘non-identifiable	 origins’,	 thus	
waiving	the	need	for	prior	informed	consent	in	the	case	of	access	to	genetic	resources	
for	 agricultural	 purposes.	 In	 this	 article	 of	 the	 bill,	 it	 was	 also	 established	 that	 any	
genetic	resource	that	 is	used	economically	for	agriculture	is	automatically	considered	
to	 have	 non-identifiable	 origins	 and	 is	 thus	 excluded	 from	 the	 requirement	 of	 prior	
informed	 consent.	 Additionally,	 Article	 10	 –	 V	 states	 that	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities	as	well	as	“traditional	farmers”	who	“create,	develop,	retain	or	conserve	
traditional	knowledge”	are	entitled	to	“freely	use	or	sell	products	that	contain	genetic	
resources	 or	 associated	 traditional	 knowledge”	 as	 long	 as	 the	 stipulations	 of	 other	
agricultural	 regulations	 are	 observed.	 These	 provisions,	 therefore,	 safeguarded	 the	
agricultural	sector	from	any	obligations	towards	traditional	or	indigenous	populations	
who	might	withhold	the	knowledge	of	the	genetic	resources	they	are	using.	
Second,	 the	neo-developmentalist	 group	demanded	 that	 the	definition	of	
the	 recipients	 of	 benefits	 include	 farmers	 (large	 and	 small)	 in	 addition	 to	 traditional	
and	 indigenous	 communities.	 This	 was	 achieved	 during	 negotiations	 through	 the	
inclusion	of	the	expression	‘traditional	farmers’	among	those	actors	considered	by	the	
bill	to	be	holders	or	providers	of	traditional	knowledge.	Thus,	as	opposed	to	the	initial	
version	 of	 the	 bill,	 which	 only	 considered	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 peoples	 as	
traditional	 knowledge	 holders,	 the	 Lower	 Chamber’s	 version	 allowed	 farmers	 to	 be	
																																								 																				
83	“§	3º	Access	to	genetic	resources	of	local,	traditional	or	native	varieties	or	locally-adapted	or	native	
species	 for	 agricultural	 activities	 comprises	 access	 to	 the	 non-identifiable	 traditional	 knowledge	 that	
originated	 the	 variety	 or	 species	 and	 does	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 previous	 consent	 of	 the	 indigenous	
population,	traditional	community	or	traditional	farmer	who	creates,	develops	and	detains	or	conserve	
the	variety	or	species”.	(Translated	by	the	author,	see	original	below).	
“§	3º	O	acesso	ao	patrimônio	genético	de	 variedade	 tradicional	 local	ou	 crioula	ou	à	 raça	 localmente	
adaptada	 ou	 crioula	 para	 atividades	 agrícolas	 compreende	 o	 acesso	 ao	 conhecimento	 tradicional	
associado	 não	 identificável	 que	 deu	 origem	 à	 variedade	 ou	 à	 raça	 e	 não	 depende	 do	 consentimento	
prévio	 da	 população	 indígena,	 da	 comunidade	 tradicional	 ou	 do	 agricultor	 tradicional	 que	 cria,	
desenvolve,	detém	ou	conserva	a	variedade	ou	a	raça.” 
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included	among	the	holders	of	traditional	knowledge.	Additionally,	instead	of	defining	
‘traditional	 farmers’	 as	 small	 and	 family	 farmers,	 only	 the	 approved	 definition	 of	 a	
‘traditional	 farmer’	 was	 allowed.84	 The	 process	 through	 which	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	coalition	had	 its	demands	represented	 in	the	bill	will	be	clarified	 in	
section	6.4.2,	which	provides	a	more	dynamic	perspective	of	the	negotiations.	
	
6.3.3	Narrative	Analysis	
This	 subsection	 complements	 the	 argumentative	 mapping	 through	 the	
method	 of	 narrative	 analysis,	which	 follow	 the	 strategies	 proposed	 by	 the	Narrative	
Policy	 Framework	 (NPF)	 (Jones	 and	 McBeth,	 2010).	 For	 the	 NPF,	 narratives	 are	
understood	as	“a	story	with	a	temporal	sequence	of	events	unfolding	in	a	plot	that	is	
populated	by	dramatic	moments,	symbols,	and	archetypal	characters	that	culminates	
in	a	moral	to	the	story”	(Jones	and	McBeth,	2010,	p.329).	Thus,	the	narrative	analysis	
identifies	 four	 fundamental	elements	 in	 the	arguments	of	a	debate:	1)	 the	setting	or	
the	 basic	 assumptions,	 which	 have	 already	 been	 analysed	 in	 the	 previous	 section	
through	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 discourse	 or	 view	 of	 the	 world	 epitomised	 by	 the	
arguments;	2)	 characters	–	who	can	be	 specified	as	 victims,	heroes	and	villains;	3)	 a	
plot	–	advancing	causal	mechanisms	and	the	relationship	between	the	setting	and	the	
characters,	 which	 has	 also	 been	 described	 in	 the	 previous	 analysis	 of	 specific	
arguments,	and	4)	a	moral	of	the	story	–	corresponding	to	the	specific	policy	solution,	
goal	or	proposed	policy	change	being	advanced	by	 the	narrative	 (Jones	and	McBeth,	
2010).	 Thus,	 because	 the	 settings	 and	 main	 plots	 of	 each	 of	 the	 narratives	 were	
already	identified	through	argumentative	mapping,	this	section	will	focus	only	on	the	
analysis	of	characters	and	the	moral	of	story	of	each	of	the	three	narratives.	
Regarding	 the	 analysis	 of	 characters	 in	 neo-developmentalist	 arguments,	
the	most	clearly	identified	villain	was	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment,	which	was	seen	
as	paying	no	heed	to	the	concerns	of	the	agri-business	sector	and	portrayed	as	a	threat	
																																								 																				
84	According	to	the	definition	of	the	final	law,	a	“traditional	farmer”	is	a:	
	“natural	 person	 who	 uses	 traditional,	 native	 or	 locally-adapted	 species,	
keeping	and	conserving	genetic	diversity,	including	family	farmers”	(Art	2,	II,	
translation	by	the	author).	
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to	 its	 interests,	 both	 in	 domestic	 and	 international	 negotiations	 (interview	 59).	
Allegations	 that	 the	 MMA	 had	 never	 taken	 into	 consideration	 the	 Brazilian	 agri-
business	 activities	 while	 negotiating	 national	 and	 international	 regulations	 on	 ABS	
were	 made	 by	 members	 of	 this	 group	 during	 interviews,	 and	 opposition	 to,	 and	
distrust	 of,	 the	 MMA	 was	 demonstrated.	 One	 interviewee	 from	 this	 coalition	 even	
described	the	relationship	between	the	Ministries	of	the	Environment	and	Agriculture	
as	a	“chat	between	the	deaf”	an	expression	meaning	that	the	parts	were	not	actually	
listening	to	and	considering	the	positions	of	each	other	(interview	59).	The	heroes,	and	
also	the	victims,	according	to	this	narrative	were	MAPA	and	agri-business,	who	were	
portrayed	 as	 those	 really	 considering	 the	 “economic	 reality	 of	 the	 country”	 and	
suffering	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 MMA’s	 reckless	 behaviour	 (interview	 59).	 The	
‘moral	of	the	story’	or	policy	solution	proposed	by	this	group	was	that	the	bill	should	
be	altered	to	exclude	their	potential	negative	effects	on	the	use	of	genetic	resources	
for	agriculture.	
As	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	the	socio-environmentalist	coalition	
opposed	the	bill	mainly	on	the	claim	that	the	procedures	adopted	for	the	drafting	of	
the	 bill	 were	 illegitimate,	 secret	 and	 non-inclusive	 of	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	
communities.	This	coalition	portrayed	indigenous,	traditional	communities	and	family	
farmers	 as	 the	 main	 victims	 of	 the	 new	 regulation.	 The	 heroes	 were	 the	 people	
defending	the	 interests	of	 this	vulnerable	group	(such	as	NGOs	or	scientists)	and	the	
villains	were	the	government	in	general,	the	industry,	and	the	representatives	of	agri-
business,	or,	in	other	words,	all	parties	that	were	trying	to	approve	the	new	regulation	
without	 sufficiently	 involving	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 communities.	 The	 ‘moral	 of	
the	story’	for	this	coalition,	on	the	other	hand,	can	be	summarised	as	a	request	for	the	
participation	and	inclusion	of	indigenous	and	traditional	communities	in	the	process	of	
drafting	the	new	law.	This	entails,	moreover,	that	more	time	should	have	been	allowed	
for	official	consultation	and	inclusion	of	these	groups.	
Finally,	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalition,	which	 proposed	
and	strongly	supported	the	approval	of	the	bill,	differed	from	the	other	two	because	of	
its	focus	on	demands	around	reducing	red	tape,	facilitating	access	to	genetic	resources	
for	the	industry	and	researchers,	and	establishing	a	clear	and	more	enforceable	kind	of	
regulation	 that	 was	 not	 an	 impediment	 to	 research	 and	 to	 the	 economic	 use	 of	
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biodiversity.	 The	 narrative	 presented	 by	 this	 very	 cohesive	 and	 organised	 coalition	
portrayed	 the	 bio-industry	 as	 the	 main	 hero	 of	 the	 country,	 able	 to	 advance	
technologies	 and	 research	 and	 with	 the	 potential	 to	 become	 a	 national	 champion	
(Rousseff,	 20/05/2015).	 A	 parallel	 hero	 in	 this	 narrative	 was	 the	 Ministry	 of	 the	
Environment,	described	as	 a	more	modern,	 efficient	 and	 technical	 institution	 than	 it	
had	been	 in	the	past,	and	as	a	ministry	that	encourages	and	facilitates	the	economic	
development	of	the	country	through	its	support	for	the	highly-promising	bio-industry	
(interview:	Minister	 Izabella	Teixeira,	20/10/2014).	 The	villains	 in	 this	narrative	were	
those	 trying	 to	 add	 more	 complexity	 to	 the	 authorisation	 process	 (by	 adding	
requirements	 such	 as	 the	 prior	 informed	 consent	 of	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities	and	the	need	for	preliminary	authorisation	for	access)	or	to	impede	the	
approval	 of	 the	 law,	 namely,	 critical	 NGOs	 and	 representatives	 of	 indigenous	 and	
traditional	 communities	 who	 wanted	 a	 formal	 consultation	 to	 take	 place.	 As	 an	
example	 of	 this	 vilification,	 Izabella	 Teixeira,	 then	 Minister	 of	 the	 Environment,	
declared	in	a	public	speech	at	the	launch	of	the	new	law	that	President	Rousseff	had	
asked	her	“to	get	rid	of	the	bureaucracy	and	to	get	rid	of	the	people”	in	the	approval	
process	of	the	new	law	in	order	to	bring	“people”	back	on	board	in	“a	national	policy	
of	 biodiversity	 that	 dialogues	with	 sustainable	 development”	 (Teixeira,	 20/05/2015).			
Finally,	the	victims	in	this	narrative	were	mainly	the	bio-industry	and	researchers	who	
needed	to	overcome	so	many	bureaucratic	hurdles	to	get	access	requests	approved.	At	
the	same	time,	the	losses	of	these	two	actors	were	also	presented	as	a	loss	to	Brazilian	
society	 and	 to	 traditional	 and	 indigenous	 communities,	 which	 could	 not	 claim	 any	
benefits	 if	 bureaucratic	 demands	 were	 so	 complex	 that	 they	 impeded	 access	 from	
being	granted	(interview	12,	21).		
According	 to	 this	 latter	perspective,	 the	 ‘moral	of	 the	story’	was	 that	 the	
law	should	be	altered	as	soon	as	possible	because	Brazil	would	be	at	risk	of	missing	out	
on	 	 important	opportunities	 in	 terms	of	 the	 international	 competitiveness	of	 its	bio-
industry	(if	the	previous	burdensome	law	were	to	be	maintained	for	much	longer).	This	
reasoning	was	motivated	by	the	entry	in	force	of	the	Nagoya	Protocol	in	2014,	and	the	
consequent	 likelihood	 that	 other	 countries	 would	 start	 regulating	 the	 issue	 and	
providing	 international	 competitors	with	 less	 regulatory	 burdens	 than	would	 be	 the	
case	in	Brazil	if	the	previous	regulation	was	maintained.	This	point	is	further	discussed	
and	clarified	in	section	6.4.	
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Table	25	-	Narrative	analysis	
Setting	 Victims	 Villains	 Heroes	 Main	plots	 Moral	of	the	story	
Neo-
developmentalists	
Agricultural	
producers,	
Brazilian	
population	(due	
to	 risks	 to	
economic	
stability)	
Environmentalists,	
negotiators	of	the	
Nagoya	Protocol	
(Ministry	of	the	
Environment,	
IBAMA),	legal	
insecurity	
Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	
Agricultural	
producers	
“We	 cannot	 permit	 Ibama,	
which	 is	 very	 distant	 from	 the	
productive	 chain,	 to	 be	 in	
charge	 of	monitoring	 research	
on	agriculture,	 cattle	 ranching	
and	 forestry.	 It	 has	 to	 be	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture”	
(Moreira,	2014)	
	
“Brazil	 hasn’t	 adhered	 to	 the	
Nagoya	 Protocol	 because	 of	
the	 legal	 uncertainties	 about	
the	 matter.	 Part	 of	 Brazilian	
society	 is	 afraid	 of	 the	
possibility	 that	 royalties	 will	
have	 to	 be	 paid	 by	 the	
agricultural	 sector	 regarding	
commodities	 (soy,	 corn)	which	
are	 of	 enormous	 importance	
for	 Brazilian	 exports”	 (Alves,	
Nov	2014)	
	
“Brazil	 has	 imposed	 its	
environmental	 model	 on	
Nagoya,	but	 it	never	 took	 into	
consideration	 our	 economic	
reality,	 based	 on	 commodity	
exports.	 Our	 agriculture	 is	 all	
based	 on	 exotic	 species	 but	
this	 fact	was	never	considered	
[by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 the	
Environment	 in	 the	
negotiations	of	 the	NP].	 It	has	
always	 been	 a	 ‘chat	 between	
the	 deaf’”	 (interview	 59,	
05/12/2014)	
The	 law	 can	 be	
altered,	 so	 long	 as	
the	 agriculture	
sectors’	interests	are	
taken	 in	
consideration	
Socio-
environmentalists	
Indigenous	and	
traditional	
communities,	
family	farmers	
Ministry	 of	 the	
Environment,	
industry,	 rural	
caucus	
Those	
defending	 the	
interests	 of	
indigenous	 and	
traditional	
communities	
“And	 what	 happened	 is	 that	
the	 bill	 was	 totally	 based	 on	
the	demands	of	the	industry,	it	
had	 incorporated	 nothing	 of	
what	 we	 had	 suggested.	
Instead,	 traditional	 peoples	
and	 communities	 lost	 very	
important	 rights	 which	 they	
had	 conquered	 through	 CBD.	
The	bill	 itself	 goes	 against	 the	
CBD,	 which	 is	 absurd”	
(Interview	5,	19/09/2014)	
	
“I	 see	 no	 other	 choice	 but	 to	
withdraw	 this	 proposal	 from	
the	 agenda	 to	 allow	 time	 for	
us	 to	 have	 this	 debate.	 We	
know	 the	 importance	 of	 this	
for	 the	 development	 of	 this	
country,	 but	 we	 cannot	
approve	 a	 proposal	 that	 we	
did	 not	 debate	 and	 that	 has	
identified	 serious	 problems	
harming	 our	 segment”	 (Belo,	
President	 of	 the	 National	
Council	 of	 Extractive	
Populations,	 Congress	 Public	
Hearing	11/11/2014)	
“For	 me,	 as	 a	 biomedical	
researcher,	 [the	 bill]	 is	
excellent.	 However,	 as	 the	
president	 of	 a	 society	 which	
includes	 every	 area	 of	
knowledge,	 I	 am	 concerned	
with	 questions	 about	
traditional	 communities.’	
(Nader,	 Helena,	 SBPC,	
interview	 with	 the	 website	
Agencia	Gestao	CT	&	I,	–Melo,	
2015,	28	April)	
	
	
The	 law	 can	 be	
altered	 as	 long	 as	
indigenous	 and	
traditional	
communities	 are	
involved	 and	 their	
opinions	 are	
considered	 in	 the	
process	
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Administrative	
economic	
rationalist	
Industry,	
scientists,	
Brazilian	
population,	
traditional	and	
indigenous	
communities	
Those	 willing	 to	
add	 red	 tape	 to	
the	 ABS	 process	
or	 to	 impede	 the	
approval	 of	 the	
bill	
Ministry	 of	 the	
Environment,	
industry	
“Changing	 this	 regulation	 is	
urgent.	We	are	chasing	a	debt	
that	has	perpetuated	 itself	 for	
14	 years	 and	 has	 been	
delaying	 scientific	 progress”	
(Diaferia,	 Adriana	 –	 Congress	
Public	Hearing,	11/11/2014)	
“There	 is	 a	 phenomenon	
within	the	Ministry	and	people	
will	 only	 perceive	 it	 when	 we	
leave.	 They	will	 see	 that	 there	
are	 very	 aggressive	 agendas,	
new	 guidelines,	 which	 are	 on	
the	 edge,	 for	 example,	
regarding	 access	 to	 genetic	
resources.	For	us	to	write	a	bill	
on	access	 to	genetic	 resources	
we	 have	 not	 met	 with	 our	
troops	 [traditional	
constituency],	we	met	with	the	
industry	 and	 commerce,	
science	 and	 technology	 and	
with	all	their	supply	chains	and	
we	 spent	 three	years	 seriously	
negotiating	the	Project	of	Law.	
And	 then	 if	 you	 compare	 [this	
group	of	negotiators]	with	 the	
traditional	 ‘biodiversity	 gang’	
you	will	notice	that	we	opened	
space	 to	 the	 bio	 industry	 of	
this	 country…	 [the	 Ministry	
never	 experienced	 such	 a	
thing”	 (Interview,	 Izabella	
Teixeira	 –	 Minister	 of	 the	
Environment,	 Brasilia,	
30/10/14)	
“We	have	all	 the	conditions	to	
lead	 in	 the	 area	 of	 bio-
technology.	 To	 lead,	 we	 have	
approved	 this	 law,	 which	
creates	 the	 adequate	
environment.	 Because	 I’ve	
learnt	 that	regarding	chemical	
pharmaceutical	 products	 we	
are	 still	 behind,	 but	 in	 bio-
technology,	 I	 have	 been	 told,	
we	have	the	conditions	to	lead.	
The	unequivocal	benefit	of	this	
new	 legislation	 is	 to	 simplify,	
the	 word	 is	 simplification,	 it	
simplifies	 because	 it	 removes	
gaps	 and	 inaccuracies”	
(President	 Rousseff,	 launch	
event	 for	 the	 new	 law,	
20/05/2015)	
“The	 idea	 of	 the	 new	 law	 is	
that	 everyone	 benefits,	 the	
industry	 will	 benefit	 but	 the	
communities	 will	 benefit	 as	
well	because	access	to	genetic	
resources	 and	 benefit	 sharing	
will	 no	 longer	 be	 curtailed”	
(interview	21,	26/09/2014)	
“We	are	 in	a	new	moment	 for	
Brazil,	 you	 [referring	 to	
President	 Rousseff]	 asked	 me	
to	 get	 rid	 of	 bureaucracy,	 to	
get	 rid	of	 the	people.	 I	 got	 rid	
of	 them	 but	 now	 they	 are	 on	
board	the	same	boat,	because	
now	we	have	the	conditions	to	
have	 a	 national	 policy	 for	
biodiversity	 that	 dialogues	
with	sustainable	development”	
(Izabella	Teixeira	–	Minister	of	
the	Environment,	event	for	the	
launching	 of	 the	 new	 law,	
20/05/2015)	
The	 law	 should	 be	
altered	 as	 soon	 as	
possible	
			Source:	Produced	by	the	author		
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6.4.	The	ACF	sources	of	policy	change	
6.4.1.	Internal	events	
As	mentioned	in	the	introduction	of	this	chapter,	four	internal	events	were	
identified	as	relevant	for	regulatory	change	during	the	analysis	of	this	case.	First,	the	
‘Novartis	 Scandal’	 in	 2000,	which	was	 a	 consequence	of	 an	 agreement	between	 the	
Swiss	 pharmaceutical	 company	 Novartis	 and	 a	 Brazilian	 NGO	 over	 the	 sending	 of	
genetic	samples	to	Switzerland.	Second,	the	limits	of	the	administrative	capacity	of	the	
State	 in	 actually	 enforcing	 the	 previous	 law,	 as	 exposed	 by	 the	 long-time	 taken	 for	
authorisation	of	genetic	access	to	be	issued.		Third,	the	imposition	of	fines	on	the	bio-
industry	and	 researchers	 for	not	 complying	with	 the	previous	ABS	 law	 that	began	 in	
2010	or,	in	other	words,	the	strengthening	in	the	enforcement	of	previous	regulations.	
Lastly,	the	entry	into	force	of	the	UN	Nagoya	Protocol	in	2014	was	also	identified	as	a	
crucial	 occurrence	 that	 reignited	 a	 sense	 of	 urgency	 around	 the	 drafting	 of	 a	 new	
regulation	in	the	view	of	the	members	of	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	and	
neo-developmentalist	coalitions.		
The	reason	why	the	Novartis	scandal	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	crucial	
internal	events	that	lead	to	the	regulatory	changes	in	2015	is	related	to	the	nature	of	
MP	 2.186/2001	 –	 the	 regulation	 that	 was	 issued	 right	 after	 the	 scandal	 and	 later	
substituted	 by	 the	 2015	 law.	 As	 observed	 in	 section	 two,	 the	 public	 and	 industry	
commotion	generated	by	this	event	was	considerable.	The	event	was	labelled	as	a	case	
of	 ‘biopiracy’	 by	 prestigious	 public	 personalities	 in	 the	 national	 media.	 As	 a	
consequence,	the	nature	of	the	2001	regulation	reflected	attempts	to	avoid	biopiracy	
and	restrict	genetic	access,	rather	than	promoting	and	facilitating	it	(interviews	20,	21).	
The	 restrictive	 and	 bureaucratic	 character	 of	 the	 2001	 regulation	 was,	 moreover,	
identified	 as	 a	 central	 argument	 for	 regulatory	 change,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 section	
two.	It	provided	the	basis	for	later	criticisms	that	the	law	was	over-burdening	the	bio-
industry	and	research	sectors	with	bureaucratic	requirements	and	holding	these	back	
in	 relation	 to	 foreign	 organisations,	 which	 did	 not	 have	 to	 comply	 with	 such	
requirements.	 An	 important	 (although	 indirect)	 relationship	 can,	 therefore,	 be	
identified	 between	 the	 ‘biopiracy’	 Novartis	 scandal,	 the	 overly-restrictive	 and	
bureaucratic	 character	 of	 the	 2001	 regulation	 and	 the	 more	 recent	 demands	 for	
regulatory	change	that	resulted	in	the	2015	law.		
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In	 relation	 to	 the	 limits	 to	 state	 to	 actually	 enforce	 the	 2001	 regulation,	
these	 started	 to	 become	apparent	 in	 that	 same	 year,	 and	were	only	 tackled	 around	
2013,	when	Cgen,	 the	 institution	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 authorisation	 of	 access	 to	 genetic	
resources	 was	 reorganised.	 Actors	 reported	 that	 until	 2013,	 access	 authorisation	
would	take	up	to	one-and-a-half	years	 to	be	 issued,	and	researchers	could	not	begin	
their	research	until	authorisation	had	been	given	(Natura	representative,	Folha	de	Sao	
Paulo,	10/03/15).	This	 fact,	added	to	the	requirement	that	companies	or	researchers	
obtain	 proof	 of	 prior	 and	 informed	 consent	 from	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities	 before	 they	 submit	 an	 authorisation	 request,	 increased	 the	 costs	
associated	with	genetic	resource	access	and	fostered	opposition	against	the	2001	law.		
The	Novartis	scandal	and	the	limits	of	the	state’s	administrative	capacity	to	
issue	authorisations	for	genetic	access	were	not,	however,	the	only	reasons	motivating	
regulatory	 change	demands.	 Following	 a	 tradition	of	 regulations	being	 very	 strict	 on	
paper	but	much	less	so	in	terms	of	enforcement,	the	stringency	and	extensive	paper-
work	 requirements	 of	 the	 2001	 regulation	 did	 not	 motivate	 action	 until	 signs	 were	
given	by	 the	government	 that	 the	 law	would	actually	be	enforced.	These	signs	came	
from	what	will	be	named	the	fining	event,	 in	reference	to	the	fines	that	began	to	be	
issued	 by	 IBAMA	 in	 2010	 to	 companies	 that	 were	 not	 compliant	 with	 the	 2001	
regulation.	 The	 fining	 event	made	 parts	 of	 the	 bio-industry	 aware	 of	 their	 duties	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 previous	 ABS	 law,	 which	 had	 often	 been	 ignored	 (interview	 6).	 This	
event	was,	moreover,	also	identified	by	interviewees	as	the	origin	of	the	formation	of	
the	bio-industry/government	administrative	economic	rationalist	coalition	(interviews	
6,	 8,	 54).	 According	 to	 a	member	 of	 Grupo	 FarmaBrasil,	 for	 example,	 the	 industrial	
mobilisation	 that	 resulted	 in	 the	 2015	 law	 began	 in	 2010	when,	 after	 the	 fines,	 the	
group	began	 to	mobilise	other	 entities	 to	 jointly	 draft	 a	new	bill.	Grupo	 FarmaBrasil	
contacted	 the	Ministry	 of	 the	 Environment	 and	 nine	 other	 entities,	 which	 began	 to	
have	 periodic	meetings	 until	 the	 bill	 was	 finalised	 (interview	 6).	 The	 fines	 issued	 by	
IBAMA	were,	therefore,	an	important	internal	event	that	raised	awareness	about	the	
requirements	 of	 the	 previous	 regulations	 among	 members	 of	 the	 bio-industry	 and	
catalysed	them	to	mobilise	for	regulatory	change.	
The	 fourth	 internal	 event	 that	 was	 identified	 during	 interviews	 as	
important	 for	 the	 2015	 ABS	 regulatory	 change	 was	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 UN	
Nagoya	 Protocol	 in	 2014.	 This	 event	 was	 identified	 as	 crucial	 for	 reigniting	 and	
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increasing	the	urgency	around	the	approval	of	a	new	regulation,	particularly	for	its	role	
as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 other	 countries	 to	 begin	 regulating	 the	 issue.	 The	 fact	 that	 other	
countries	would	start	to	regulate	the	topic	increased	the	uncertainty	of	the	agriculture	
sector	 around	 the	 impacts	 of	 other	 countries’	 regulations	 on	 Brazilian	 commodity	
exports.	 According	 to	 the	 interpretation	 of	 members	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	
coalition,	if	other	countries	regulated	the	issue	and	Brazil	continued	with	the	previous	
law,	 agri-business	 would	 have	 been	 required	 to	 share	 the	 benefits	 from	 the	 use	 of	
genetic	 resources	 of	 foreign	 origin	 (such	 as	 soy)	 with	 foreign	 countries,	 adversely	
affecting	 commodity	 prices.	 Therefore,	 a	 new	 internal	 law	 protecting	 the	 sector	
against	 this	 possibility	 needed	 to	 be	 approved	 before	 the	 protocol	 could	 also	 be	
ratified	by	Brazil	(interview	59).	
Another	 effect	 of	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 Nagoya	 Protocol	 that	
motivated	 the	 new	 law	 to	 be	 approved	 was	 related	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 business	
uncertainty	it	generated	for	Brazilian	bio-industry	(administrative	economic	rationalist	
coalition).	The	fact	that	the	issue	gained	more	international	visibility	and	started	to	be	
regulated	 by	 other	 countries	 increased	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 not	 following	 the	
previous	law	for	the	bio-industry.	This	can	be	attributed	for	example	to	the	increased	
likelihood	of	international	campaigns	of	‘naming	and	shaming’	by	international	NGOs,	
and	 also	 by	 the	 competition	 represented	 by	 companies	 which	 followed	 less	 strict	
regulations	 in	 their	home	countries.	 It	 is	maintained,	 therefore,	 that	 the	approval	of	
the	Nagoya	Protocol	was	another	crucial	 internal	event	that	catalysed	the	revision	of	
national	laws	that	culminated	in	2015	with	the	approval	of	Law	13.123.	
	
6.4.2.	Negotiated	agreement	
Negotiated	 agreement	 is	 defined	 in	 the	 ACF	 literature	 as	 “agreements	
involving	policy	core	changes	 [that]	are	crafted	among	previously	warring	coalitions”	
(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	p.	205).	This	case	qualifies	 for	 the	analysis	of	negotiated	
agreement	 because	 divergences	 between	 coalitions	 preceded	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
negotiations	of	the	2015	law	and	were	identified	during	interviews	as	having	existed	at	
least	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 negotiations	 of	 the	 Nagoya	 Protocol,	 due	 to	
divergences	 between	MAPA	 and	MMA	on	 the	 need	 to	 regulate	 the	 issue	 (interview	
55).	Additionally,	the	first	attempts	to	regulate	the	topic	in	the	Congress	–	beginning	in	
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1995	 with	 the	 efforts	 of	 members	 of	 the	 socio-environmental	 coalition	 –	 and	 the	
production	 of	 four	 different	 regulations	 that	 were	 never	 approved,	 attests	 to	 the	
longstanding	contentiousness	of	 the	 issue.	As	opposed	 to	what	was	 identified	 in	 the	
previous	two	case	studies,	negotiated	agreement	was	found	to	occur	in	this	case,	but	
only	between	two	out	of	the	three	coalitions	(between	the	neo-developmentalists	and	
the	administrative	economic	rationalists).		
Following	 the	 procedures	 adopted	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 negotiated	
agreement	in	the	other	case	studies,	this	analysis	was	based	on	the	identification	of	1)	
how	often	coalitions	seek	to	influence	decisions	through	instruments	that	are	not	based	
on	 personal	 interaction	 and	 negotiation	 (such	 as	 vetoes,	 amendments	 and	 judicial	
actions).	 It	 is	 assumed	 that	 the	 higher	 the	 frequency	 of	 recourse	 to	 these	 non-
agreement-based	 mechanisms	 of	 negotiation,	 the	 lower	 the	 level	 of	 negotiated	
agreement.	 2)	 the	 number	 of	 venues	 used	 by	 actors	 during	 the	 negotiation	 process.	
The	 assumption	 is	 that	 the	 higher	 the	 number	 of	 venues	 used	 for	 negotiation,	 the	
lower	the	level	of	negotiated	agreement.	The	logic	underlying	this	assumption	is	that	if	
coalitions	 carry	out	 the	negotiation	within	 specific	 institutional	 venues	 (for	 example,	
within	 the	 National	 Congress	 or	 within	 specific	 commissions	 within	 the	 National	
Congress)	and	do	not	seek	other	venues,	such	as	courts,	other	agencies	or	the	media,	
that	means	that	actors	consider	it	legitimate	to	continue	as	the	sole	forum	for	debates	
because	 they	 feel	 that	 their	 positions	 are	 being	 heard.	 This	 means,	 therefore,	 that	
collaboration	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 happening	 (Weible,	 Pattinson	 and	 Sabatier,	 2010).	
Alongside	these	two	criteria	is	3)	the	occurrence	of	‘devil	shift’,	measured	through	the	
identification	of	personal	attacks	and	offenses	and	the	use	of	pejorative	terms	to	refer	
to	 the	 other	 coalitions	 during	 debates.	 The	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘devil	 shift’	 refers	 to	
situations	in	which	“actors	tend	to	view	opponents	as	being	more	powerful	than	they	
actually	 are”	 (Leach	 and	 Sabatier,	 2005,	 p.	 494)	 and	 exaggerate	 their	maliciousness	
(Jenkins	Smith	et	al.,	2014,	45%;	Sabatier,	Hunter	and	McLaughlin,	1987).		
First,	 the	 use	 of	 non-negotiation-based	 mechanisms	 was	 limited,	
particularly	 regarding	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 and	 the	 administrative	 economic	
rationalist	coalitions,	which	underwent	a	clear	process	of	negotiation	and	subsequent	
convergence	 (explicitly	 acknowledged	 by	 actors	 during	 interviews).	 As	 attested	 by	 a	
member	of	the	industry-government	group,	initial	disagreements	with	the	agribusiness	
sector	 were	 due	 to	 “differences	 of	 economic	model”	 between	 the	 agribusiness	 and	
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biotechnology	 industries.	 These	 differences	 were	 addressed	 after	 the	 biotechnology	
industry	understood	agribusinesses’	“economic	 logic”	and,	as	 reported	by	one	of	 the	
interviewees,	both	sides	were	ultimately	able	“to	converge	on	a	unified	law”	(interview	
8).	 Additionally,	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 group	 did	 not	 oppose	 the	
changes	proposed	by	 the	neo-developmentalist	group	 in	Congress	 through	vetoes	or	
any	 other	 institutional	 mechanism,	 they	 simply	 requested	 that	 several	 items	 be	
maintained	in	the	new	regulation	(interview	12).	Finally,	the	few	vetoes	made	by	the	
president	after	the	bill	was	voted	on	in	Congress	were	mostly	related	to	assurance	of	
the	 competence	of	 the	executive	power	 in	 the	 authorisation	 and	 implementation	of	
the	 law	 rather	 than	 to	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 law	 itself	 (veto	 message	 14785).	
Representatives	 of	 the	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 communities,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
were	very	vocal	 in	 their	criticisms	of	 the	drafting	procedures	 for	 the	new	 law,	which	
restricted	 their	 participation.	 These	 representatives	 did	 not	 demonstrate,	 however,	
sufficient	 power	 and	 cohesiveness	 to	 decisively	 block	 or	 alter	 the	 course	 of	 the	
negotiations	through	vetoes,	judicial	action,	the	passing	of	legislative	amendments	and	
other	 institutional	mechanisms	 of	 negotiation.	 From	 this,	 it	 is	 concluded	 that	 direct	
negotiation	and	convergence	occurred	in	this	case,	but	only	in	relation	to	the	two	most	
powerful	 coalitions,	 namely	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalists	 and	 the	 neo-
developmentalists.	
Second,	 regarding	 the	 number	 of	 venues	 used	 by	 actors,	 the	 analysis	
revealed	that	debates	remained	restricted	to	certain,	specific	circles	in	the	Ministry	of	
the	Environment	and	in	the	National	Congress.	The	initial	proponents	of	the	law	were	
part	 of	 a	 bio-industry	 group	 gathered	 by	 Grupo	 FarmaBrasil,	 which	 had	 periodic	
meetings	with	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment	and	to	which	different	groups	(such	as	
selected	 representatives	of	 traditional	 groups)	were	discretionarily	 invited	 (interview	
8).	 The	 venue	 of	 negotiation,	 however,	 did	 not	 change,	 for	 example,	 to	 forums	
previously	established	by	indigenous	groups	or	other	venues.	Representatives	of	NGOs	
focused	on	Amazonian	indigenous	groups	(such	as	Grupo	de	Trabalho	da	Amazonia	–	
GTA)	have	reported,	moreover,	to	have	learned	about	the	debates	on	the	new	bill	by	
accident	 and	of	 having	been	 impeded	 from	contributing	 through	 the	mobilisation	of	
other	 venues	 (interview	 5).	 When	 the	 bill	 was	 sent	 to	 be	 voted	 on	 by	 the	 Lower	
Chamber,	 in	 turn,	 it	was	discussed	by	a	special	commission,	which	had	been	created	
																																								 																				
85	http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/lei/2015/lei-13123-20-maio-2015-780834-veto-146993-pl.html		
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specifically	to	debate	the	topic.	There	were	also	public	hearings	in	which	the	‘urgency	
regime’	(regime	de	urgência)	of	the	bill	was	criticised.	This	regime	meant	that	the	bill	
was	sent	 to	 the	Congress	but	was	not	debated	by	more	 than	a	single	commission	of	
the	Lower	Chamber,	as	was	the	case	 in	the	other	case	studies	analysed	 in	this	thesis	
(such	as	forestry).	
Additionally,	 although	 representatives	 of	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities	 had	 been	 previously	 officially	 involved	 in	 the	 drafting	 of	 other	 bills	
through	formal	consultations	promoted	by	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment	(interview	
26),	the	decision	to	follow	different	procedures	and	only	select	a	few	representatives	
of	the	group	to	participate	in	closed	meetings	in	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment	was	
made	explicitly	 in	order	to	accelerate	the	process	(interview	26,	20).	There	were	not,	
therefore,	several	venues	of	negotiation	in	the	debates	preceding	the	approval	of	the	
2015	law.	This	fact	indicates	that	the	groups	that	had	sufficient	resources	to	alter	the	
venue	 of	 negotiations	 (in	 this	 case	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 and	 administrative	
economic	 rationalist	 groups)	 considered	 the	 venues	 sufficiently	 legitimate	 and	were	
satisfied	with	the	level	of	negotiation	occurring	within	them.	
Finally,	 regarding	 the	 occurrence	 of	 devil	 shift,	 personal	 accusations	 and	
offences	 were	 not	 identified	 among	 members	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 or	 the	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalitions	 (interview	 8,	 12,	 54).	 As	 already	
mentioned,	 members	 of	 the	 bio-industry	 referred	 to	 previous	 disagreements	 as	 a	
matter	 of	 understanding	 each	 other’s	 ‘business	models’	 and	 never	 publicly	 opposed	
the	changes	proposed	by	the	neo-developmentalist	group	(interview	8).	On	the	other	
hand,	 members	 of	 the	 socio-environmentalist	 coalition	 did	 not	 demonstrate	 a	 high	
level	of	trust	towards	either	of	the	other	two	coalitions.	As	previously	mentioned,	they	
accused	the	industry-government	coalition	of	secrecy	in	the	drafting	of	the	bill	and	of	
purposefully	 impeding	 their	 contributions	 and	 participation	 even	when	 they	 actively	
tried	 to	 contribute	 (interview	 5).	 They	 also	 disagreed	 with	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	coalition	to	include	large	farmers	as	recipients	of	shared	benefits	and	
explicitly	 accused	 the	 other	 coalitions	 of	 having	 “ignored”	 them	 (Belo,	 11/11/2014,	
Lower	Chamber	News	Agency).	The	existence	of	trust	between	coalitions	 in	this	case	
was,	 thus,	 partial,	 and	 only	 observed	 between	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 and	 the	
administrative	economic	rationalist	coalitions.	
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As	 observed	 in	 chapter	 two,	 negotiated	 agreements	 are	 associated	 with	
the	 occurrence	 of	 a	 hurting	 stalemate,	 defined	 as	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 there	 are	 1)		
consequential	 incentives	 –	 namely,	 situations	 that	 present	 issues	 as	 salient	 to	
participants	 and	 the	 timing	 and	 pressure	 for	 a	 solution	 as	 ripe,	 2)	 interdependence	
among	 actors	 and,	 3)	 uncertainty	 (Emerson,	 Nabatchi	 and	 Balogh,	 2011).	 It	 is	
associated	with	the	occurrence	of	learning	among	coalitions.	The	analysis	of	this	case	
provides	support	to	these	theoretical	predictions.		
The	entry	into	force	of	the	Nagoya	Protocol	generated	at	least	three	types	
of	 consequential	 incentives	 for	 negotiations	 between	 administrative	 economic	
rationalists	and	neo-developmentalists	to	take	place.	First,	the	agricultural	sector	was	
threatened	by	the	possibility	that,	when	other	countries	started	to	regulate	the	sector,	
they	would	 have	 to	 share	 the	 benefits	 from	 the	 use	 of	 foreign	 genetic	 resources	 in	
agricultural	production.	They	were,	therefore,	motivated	to	participate	in	the	drafting	
of	the	Brazilian	law	in	order	to	avoid	this	possibility.	Second,	it	was	predicted	by	actors	
in	the	debate	that	the	entry	into	force	of	the	protocol	would	motivate	other	countries	
to	regulate	the	issue.	The	anticipation	that	other	countries	could	potentially	adopt	less	
restrictive	 and	 less	 bureaucratic	 ABS	 regulations	 caused	 concerns	 related	 to	
international	competition	among	members	of	the	Brazilian	 industry	and	government,	
especially	 as	 the	 government	 saw	 huge	 competitive	 potential	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 bio-
industry	(Rousseff,	2015).86	Similarly,	the	heightened	international	visibility	of	the	issue	
increased	business	uncertainty	and	risks	of	‘naming	and	shaming’	for	companies	which	
were	not	following	the	previous	law.	Finally,	as	demonstrated	by	Eimer	and	Donadelli	
(2016),	negotiations	around	the	international	regime	of	patent	regulations	resulted	in	
unenforceability	 (due	 to	 the	 unacceptance	 of	 several	 developed	 countries)	 of	 the	
requirements	 of	 prior	 and	 informed	 consent	 from	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities	for	the	registration	of	new	patents.	If	Brazil	were	to	strictly	advance	such	
requirements	 in	 its	 national	 regulations	 it	 would,	 therefore,	 suffer	 competitive	
																																								 																				
86	“We	have	all	the	conditions	to	lead	in	the	area	of	bio-technology.	To	lead,	we	have	approved	this	law,	
which	 creates	 the	 adequate	 environment.	 Because	 I’ve	 learnt	 that	 in	 the	 chemical	 pharmaceutical	
products	we	are	still	behind,	but	in	bio-technology,	I	have	been	told,	we	have	the	conditions	to	lead.	The	
unequivocal	benefit	of	this	new	legislation	is	to	simplify,	the	word	is	simplification,	it	simplifies	because	it	
removes	gaps	and	inaccuracies”	(President	Rousseff,	launch	event	for	the	new	law,	20/05/2015)	
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disadvantages	 internationally.	This	was	a	 risk	acknowledged	both	by	 the	bio-industry	
and	the	government	(interview	2;	Rousseff,	2015).		
Interdependence	 among	 actors,	 in	 turn,	 was	 high,	 at	 least	 between	 the	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 and	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalitions.	 The	
administrative	economic	rationalist	coalition	was	dependent	on	the	approval	of	the	bill	
by	 the	Congress,	which	had	a	strong	presence	 in	 the	neo-developmentalist	coalition.	
The	neo-developmentalist	coalition,	in	turn,	depended	on	the	negotiations	and	on	the	
bill	proposed	by	the	other	group	to	avoid	that	the	ratification	of	the	Nagoya	Protocol	
would	 have	 any	 adverse	 effects	 on	 the	 use	 of	 foreign	 agricultural	 products.	 Both,	
therefore,	perceived	 the	other	 coalition’s	 interests	as	useful	 for	 the	advancement	of	
their	own,	which	motivated	negotiation.	Uncertainty,	 lastly,	was	high,	both	regarding	
the	effects	of	 the	entry	 into	 force	of	 the	Nagoya	Protocol	 for	 the	agricultural	 sector	
(and	 the	 risk	 of	 affecting	 the	 price	 of	 the	 export	 of	 commodities)	 and	 for	 the	 bio-
industry	(with	the	risk	of	more	international	competition).	
In	 summary,	 the	 analysis	 reveals	 that	 negotiated	 agreement	 occurred	 in	
this	 case,	 even	 if	 it	was	 restricted	 to	members	 of	 the	neo-developmentalist	 and	 the	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalitions.	 Regarding	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	
representatives	 of	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 communities	 and	 the	 demands	 of	 the	
members	 of	 the	 socio-environmentalist	 coalition,	 little	 negotiated	 agreement	 took	
place.	As	will	 be	demonstrated	 in	 the	next	 section,	 learning	also	 took	place,	 at	 least	
between	 these	 two	 coalitions	 and	 in	 a	 less	 strict	 sense	 than	 is	 predicted	 by	 the	
definitions	of	policy-oriented	learning	given	by	the	ACF.	
		
6.4.3.	Policy-oriented	learning	
Policy-oriented	 learning	 refers	 to	 “relatively	 enduring	 alternations	 of	
thought	or	behavioural	intentions	that	result	from	experience	and/or	new	information	
and	that	are	concerned	with	the	attainment	or	revision	of	policy	objectives”	(Sabatier	
and	 Jenkins-Smith,	 1999,	 p.	 123).	 Similar	 to	 the	 analytical	 procedure	 adopted	 in	 the	
other	 empirical	 chapters,	 this	 chapter	will	 focus	 on	 three	 observable	 implications	 of	
the	 relevance	 of	 learning	 for	 policy	 change,	 which	 are:	 1)	 heightened	 public	 and	
political	 attention	 to	 technical	 information,	 2)	mobilisation	 of	 coalitions	 to	 exploit	 or	
exchange	 technical	 information,	 or	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 occurrence	 of	 ‘analytical	
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debate’	and,	3)	change	 in	 the	content	of	policy	or	 regulations	 (for	 the	 justification	of	
the	choice	of	these	three	observable	implications	see	chapter	2,	section	2.3).	All	three	
observable	implications	are	considered	necessary	to	attest	the	relevance	of	learning	in	
processes	 of	 policy	 change.	 It	 shows	 that,	 although	 scientific	 evidence	 and	 the	
participation	 of	 scientists	 did	 not	 play	 a	 large	 role	 in	 the	 interactions	 between	
coalitions,	 learning	 and	 convergence	 of	 policy	 proposals	 occurred	 through	 ‘elite	
networking’,	 namely	 “an	 identifiable	 elite	 bound	 by	 knowledge	 and	 expertise	 of	 a	
common	 policy	 problem	 and	 a	 shared	 concern	 for	 its	 resolution”	 (Bennett,	 1991	 p.	
224).	 The	 shared	 intention	 of	 neo-developmentalists	 and	 administrative	 economic	
rationalists	to	establish	a	new	regulation	and	their	capacity	to	be	‘bound	by	knowledge	
and	expertise’	made	it	possible	for	each	side	to	become	aware	of	the	other’s	concerns,	
utilise	their	own	technical	knowledge	in	amending	the	original	regulatory	proposition	
and	promote	its	adoption.	
First,	once	the	Nagoya	Protocol	entered	in	force,	the	overall	attention	paid	
to	 the	 topic	 of	ABS	 regulation	 increased,	with	 both	 the	bio-industry	 and	 agricultural	
sector	 fearing	 the	consequences	of	 international	 regulation	of	 their	 sector.	Attention	
to	technical	information,	on	the	other	hand,	also	increased,	but	technical	information	
was	 provided	 by	 actors	 from	 the	 coalitions	 themselves,	 instead	 of	 by	 scientists	 or	
external	policy	analysts	as	predicted	by	the	ACF.	The	role	of	scientists	as	providers	of	
technical	information	across	the	entire	process	was,	thus,	not	found	to	be	important.	
No	 scientific	 studies	 of	 economic	 impacts	 were	 produced	 or	 discussed	 during	 the	
drafting	or	negotiation	of	 the	new	regulations.	When	scientists	explicitly	participated	
in	 the	 debates	 of	 the	National	 Congress,	 they	 participated	 as	 an	 interest	 group	 that	
wanted	to	reduce	red	tape	in	the	approval	of	research	involving	genetic	material,	not	
as	a	group	providing	technical	information.		
The	analysis	of	 the	National	Congress	News	Agency	articles	 revealed	only	
three	instances	in	which	there	was	a	direct	participation	by,	or	reference	to,	scientists	
in	 the	 debates	 in	 the	 Congress.	 Two	were	 from	Helena	Nader,	 the	 president	 of	 the	
Brazilian	 Society	 for	 Scientific	 Progress	 (SBPC).	 Her	 main	 arguments	 were	 that	 the	
emergency	 character	 of	 the	 bill	 should	 be	 removed	 to	 allow	 for	 more	 debate	 and	
participation	by	 the	scientific	community	and	other	social	groups.	She	also	defended	
the	 idea	 that	 the	 Council	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 requests	 to	make	 use	 of	
genetic	 resources	 (Cgen)	 be	 reorganised	 to	 become	 more	 inclusive,	 guaranteeing	
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participation	and	voting	rights	to	researchers,	indigenous	peoples	and	industry	groups,	
and	 not	 only	 to	 members	 of	 the	 government	 as	 was	 previously	 the	 case.	 She	 also	
argued	 for	 indigenous	 peoples	 to	 have	 the	 right	 to	 represent	 themselves	 in	 the	
discussions	 and	 suggested	 that	 the	 research	 request	 registrations	 should	 not	 be	
entirely	considered	classified	so	that	the	process	is	more	transparent	(see	lines	1	and	2	
of	table	26).	Finally,	‘specialists’	are	mentioned	by	the	National	Congress	News	Agency	
to	be	supporting	the	new	law	in	terms	of	its	advances	in	de-criminalising	and	reducing	
red	 tape	 around	 scientific	 activities	 (line	 3,	 table	 26).	 This	 argument,	 although	 not	
specified	in	the	texts	analysed,	was	found	to	be	considerably	close	to	the	perspective	
of	the	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology	(CNPQ)	and	of	the	Embrapa	researchers,	as	
revealed	by	interviews	(interviews	20,	54).	Scientists	were,	therefore,	divided	between	
the	positions	of	either	accelerating	or	allowing	more	 time	 for	 the	debates	about	 the	
bill	 and,	 overall,	 did	 not	 contribute	 with	 technical	 information,	 but	 only	 with	 their	
opinions	as	coalition	members.	
The	 political	 attention	 paid	 to	 technical	 information,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
was	 assessed	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 use	 of	 scientific/technical	 arguments	 by	
politicians.	However,	because	scientists	did	not	contribute	with	technical	information,	
there	was	no	opportunity	for	politicians	to	use	technical	contributions	from	that	group.	
The	 only	 mention	 by	 policy-makers	 of	 the	 arguments	 of	 scientists	 was	 found	 in	 a	
reference	made	by	Deputy	Luciana	Santos	(PcdoB	-	PE)	(Lower	Chamber	News	Agency,	
06/11/2014).	 This	 reference	did	not	 relate,	 however,	 to	 technical/scientific	 facts	 but	
only	to	the	position	of	the	SBPC	regarding	the	low	percentage	of	the	profits	that	was	
being	used	 to	calculate	 the	amount	of	benefit	 sharing	and	 to	 their	view	that	benefit	
sharing	 should	 not	 only	 apply	 to	 final	 products.	 It	 can	be	 concluded,	 therefore,	 that	
because	 scientists	 did	 not	 participate	 in	 the	 debate	 as	 providers	 of	 scientific	
information	but	only	as	an	interest	group,	policy-makers	could	not	rely	on	information	
provided	by	them	to	advance	their	positions.	
These	findings	about	the	participation	of	scientists	do	not	mean,	however,	
that	there	was	no	analytical	debate	among	coalitions.	This	analysis	 identified	at	 least	
two	 main	 points	 at	 which	 analytical	 debate	 occurred	 between	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	 and	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalitions	 in	 this	
negotiation	 process.	 First,	 there	 was	 a	 debate	 on	 which	 types	 of	 genetic	 resources	
should	be	considered	in	the	new	legislation.	The	risk	here,	which	was	avoided	by	the	
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neo-developmentalist	 coalition,	 was	 that	 the	 new	 regulation	 would	 imply	 benefit	
sharing	 for	 the	 use	 foreign	 agricultural	 species	 such	 as	 soy	 (interview	 12).	 Another	
empirical	 point	 on	 which	 there	 was	 analytical	 debate	 focused	 on	 specific	 technical	
points	 in	 relation	 to	most	 sensitive	points	of	 the	productive	 chain	 for	 each	 industry.	
While	 the	bio-industry	did	not	want	 the	 initial	 links	of	 the	production	 chain,	 namely	
the	 research	 and	 development	 stage,	 to	 be	 impacted,	 agri-business	 was	 more	
concerned	about	 the	 impacts	of	benefit	 sharing	 in	 the	 later	 stages	of	 the	productive	
process	and	preferred	that	the	reproductive	material	(such	as	seeds)	be	taxed	instead	
of	 the	 final	 products.	 Once	 both	 coalitions	 learnt	 from	 each	 other	 about	 their	
respective	 positions,	 preferences	 and	 exceptions	 were	 agreed	 regarding	 agricultural	
products	and	the	divergence	between	both	coalitions	ceased	to	exist	(interview	8,	12).		
There	was,	 therefore,	 analytical	 debate,	 at	 least	 regarding	 these	 two	 specific	 points,	
even	though	neither	scientists	nor	external	policy	analysts	were	directly	involved.		
Finally,	after	the	bill	was	sent	by	the	executive	government	to	the	National	
Congress,	 extensive	 changes	 in	 the	 content	 of	 the	 bill,	 particularly	 concerning	 the	
exceptions	created	for	agricultural	products	were	made.	As	mentioned	in	the	section	
6.3.1,	these	changes	ranged	from	including	‘traditional	farmers’	as	recipients	of	benefit	
sharing	 to	 the	removal	of	agricultural	products	 from	the	 list	of	products	 that	 require	
prior	 and	 informed	 consent	 to	 be	 given	 before	 access	 to	 traditional	 knowledge	 is	
permitted.	 The	 acknowledgement	 by	 members	 of	 the	 administrative	 economic	
rationalist	coalition	that	these	changes	were	a	result	of	learning	about	the	agribusiness	
‘business	model’	was	considered	sufficient	evidence	of	learning	between	this	coalition	
and	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	 (interview	5).	The	 learning	that	was	 found	to	
take	 place	 between	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 and	 the	 administrative	 economic	
rationalist	 coalitions	was,	 however,	 based	 on	 evidence	 provided	 by	members	 of	 the	
pharmaceutical	and	agri-business	 industries	 themselves	and	did	not	explicitly	 involve	
independent	 technical	 studies.	 This	 provides	 reason	 for	 a	 revision	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
‘policy-oriented	learning’,	which	should	also	consider	the	role	of	elite	networking	as	a	
factor	that	leads	to	policy	change.	
	
	
	
	
190	
	
Table	26	-	Participation	of	scientists	in	Lower	Chamber	debates	
	 Date	 Scientist	–	
organisation	
Claim	 Predominant	
coalition	alignment	
1	 July	2014	 Helena	 Nader	
(President	 of	
the	 Brazilian	
Society	 for	
Scientific	
Progress	 –	
SBPC)	
“The	emergency	character	of	the	bill	should	be	
removed.	The	negotiation	process	should	allow	
for	 public	 hearings	 to	 take	 place,	 with	 the	
participation	 of	 the	 scientific	 community	 and	
of	 other	 representatives	 of	 social	 groups	
impacted	 by	 the	 issue	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 for	 a	
more	careful	analysis	of	the	bill	and	to	improve	
it.”  	
Socio-
environmentalist	
2	 Nov	2014	 Helena	 Nader	
(President	 of	
the	 Brazilian	
Society	 for	
Scientific	
Progress	 –	
SBPC)	
“We	defend	the	idea	that	representatives	from	
all	different	relevant	sectors	–	producers	and	
users	–	participate	in	the	Cgen,	have	their	voice	
represented	and	have	the	right	to	vote:	
researchers,	indigenous	peoples,	industry	
groups.	Cgen	has	to	work	as	an	interest	
mediation	institution	and	provide	effective	
social	control	over	the	activities	of	the	Council	
and	of	the	use	of	genetic	resources”.		
“SBPC	also	proposes	that	indigenous	and	
traditional	communities	personally	represent	
themselves	in	the	defence	of	their	interests,	
without	the	need	for	intermediaries.	Our	
organisation	criticises	the	exemption	of	benefit	
sharing	for	micro	and	small	companies	as	
provided	for	by	the	bill”.	
“There	should	not	be	excessive	secrecy	as	
proposed	by	the	bill.	The	text	of	the	bill	
determines	that	information	provided	by	
companies	and	researchers	in	their	preliminary	
registrations	for	research	should	be	made	
secret.	We	can	define	what	is	to	be	classified	
and	what	is	not	in	order	to	assure	more	
transparency.”	
Socio-
environmentalist	
3	 June	2015	 ‘Specialists’		 “One	of	 the	advances	of	 the	new	 law	was	 the	
de-criminalisation	 of	 scientific	 activities.	
According	to	the	legislation	previously	in	force,	
research	 conducted	without	 the	 authorization	
of	 Cgen	 was	 classified	 as	 bio-piracy.	 Because	
the	 authorisation	 process	 is	 slow,	 many	
scientists	used	to	work	illegally.”	
Administrative	
economic	rationalist	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
Table	27	-	Use	of	scientific	information	by	politicians	in	Lower	Chamber	debates	
Date	 Actor	using	the	
information	
Source	of	
information	
Claim	 Alignment	of	the	
policy-maker	
Nov	2014	 Federal	 Deputy	
Luciana	 Santos	
(PcdoB	-	PE)	
The	
scientific	
community	
“The	scientific	community	has	criticised	
the	 low	 percentage	 of	 royalties	 to	 be	
charged	 to	 those	 who	 manufacture	
products	 originating	 from	 biodiversity	
research.	 (The	 bill	 proposed	 the	
payment	 of	 1%	 of	 the	 net	 profit	
attributed	 to	a	product).	 Scientists	also	
disagree	 that	 only	 the	 final	 products	
should	 be	 eligible	 for	 benefit	 sharing,	
because	 sometimes	 intermediary	
products	are	also	commercialised.” 	
Socio-environmentalist	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
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6.5.	Conclusion	
This	chapter	presented	the	history	of	ABS	regulation	in	Brazil,	and	focused	
on	 the	main	 coalitions,	 narratives	 and	 the	 process	 of	 negotiation	 that	 preceded	 the	
regulatory	changes	that	occurred	in	Brazilian	ABS	law	in	May	2015	with	the	approval	of	
Law	13.123.	The	main	goal	was	to	identify	the	main	sources	of	this	regulatory	change.	
The	 analysis	 identified	 three	 main	 coalitions.	 The	 first	 coalition	 displayed	 an	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 view	 of	 the	world	 and	was	 composed	 of	 several	
members	of	the	Brazilian	bio-industry,	by	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment,	Ministry	of	
Science	and	Technology	and	Ministry	of	Industry	and	Foreign	Trade	and	was	not	only	
strongly	 supportive	of	 the	new	 law,	but	was	 the	group	 that	 initially	proposed	 it.	The	
second	coalition	held	a	neo-developmentalist	view	and	was	composed	of	the	Ministry	
of	Agriculture	and	representatives	of	the	rural	caucus	in	the	National	Congress	(which	
favours	the	agri-business	sector).	This	coalition	initially	opposed	the	approval	of	the	bill	
but,	after	negotiation	and	amendments	to	the	first	proposal	in	the	National	Congress	
to	protect	the	agriculture	sector,	 they	became	supportive	of	 its	approval.	Finally,	 the	
socio-environmentalist	 coalition,	 composed	 of	 representatives	 of	 traditional	 and	
indigenous	 communities,	 NGOs	 and	 members	 of	 the	 Congress,	 opposed	 the	 ‘hasty’	
approval	 of	 the	 law	 and	 demanded	more	 time	 and	 a	more	 inclusive	 debate	 before	
approving	 the	 law.	 Therefore,	 although	 members	 of	 this	 group	 were,	 in	 principle,	
supportive	of	the	reform	of	previous	regulation,	they	opposed	the	proposed	bill	due	to	
the	non-inclusive	procedures	used	by	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	coalition	
in	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 law	 and	 also	 because	 of	 specific	 points	 considered	 to	 be	
disadvantageous	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 group.	 Sectors	 of	 the	 scientific	 community	
(such	as	the	SBPC)	also	supported	the	demands	of	the	socio-environmentalists.	
Through	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 history	 of	 the	 regulation	 and	 policies	 of	 this	
subsystem,	 this	 chapter	 has	 identified	 four	 internal	 events	 considered	 relevant	
motivating	factors	of	regulatory	change.	The	first	 internal	event	found	to	be	relevant	
to	the	2015	regulatory	changes,	although	in	a	more	indirect	manner,	was	the	Novartis	
scandal.	After	an	agreement	between	Novartis	and	a	Brazilian	NGO	was	categorised	as	
an	act	of	‘biopiracy’	in	the	media,	the	government	responded	with	a	regulation	aimed	
at	restricting	access	to	genetic	resources.	The	draconian	nature	of	the	regulation	that	
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emerged	after	 the	scandal	motivated	opposition	by	researchers	and	members	of	 the	
bio	 industry	 and	 provoked	 a	 push	 for	 a	 new	 law.	 Second,	 the	 limits	 of	 the	
administrative	capacity	of	the	state	that	until	2013	took	approximately	one-year-and-
a-half	 to	 issue	 genetic	 access	 authorisations	 fostered	 discontentment	 with	 the	
previous	 regulation,	 particularly	 among	 the	 bio-industry	 and	 researchers.	 Third,	 the	
decision	by	IBAMA	(the	enforcement	agency	of	the	MMA)	to	begin	imposing	fines	on	
the	bio-industry	and	researchers	in	2010,	due	to	the	non-observance	by	these	actors	of	
the	authorisation	procedures	stipulated	by	the	previous	regulation	generated	further	
opposition	to	the	2001	regulation.	Finally,	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Nagoya	Protocol	
in	2014	stirred	 fears	 in	 the	agribusiness	 sector	 that	 they	would	be	 required	 to	 share	
benefits	 for	 exporting	 commodities	 and	 also	 raised	 concerns	 in	 the	bio-industry	 and	
government	 related	 to	 international	 regulatory	 competition	 (i.e.	 if	 other	 countries	
regulated	 the	 issue	 in	a	 less	 restrictive	way,	 the	Brazilian	bio-industry	would	be	at	 a	
comparative	 disadvantage)	 and	 business	 risks.	 The	 protocol,	 therefore,	 catalysed	
recognition	of	the	previous	regulation	as	a	problem	by	a	greater	proportion	of	society	
and	sparked	the	actual	negotiations.		
	In	terms	of	relevant	external	events,	the	strength	of	the	rural	caucus	in	the	
National	Congress,	similar	to	the	other	two	cases,	figured	prominently	 in	the	analysis	
of	 this	 case.	 Although	 negotiation	with	 the	 socio-environmentalist	 coalition	was	 not	
fundamental	 for	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 law,	 there	 had	 to	 be	 agreement	 between	
members	of	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	(largely	represented	by	the	Congress’	
rural	 caucus)	 and	members	 of	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalition	who	
originally	proposed	the	bill.		
Finally,	the	analysis	of	whether	negotiated	agreement	and	policy-oriented	
learning	 took	place	 revealed	 that,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	other	 two	 cases	 in	which	 these	
two	sources	of	policy	change	could	not	be	identified,	in	this	case	they	occurred.	Their	
occurrence	 was,	 however,	 partial	 and	 took	 place	 only	 between	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	and	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	groups.	This	is	explained	
by	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 hurting	 stalemate	 that	 emerged	 between	 these	 two	
coalitions	and	by	the	importance	of	‘elite	networking’	in	allowing	these	two	groups	to	
share	 and	 learn	 about	 technical	 information	 provided	 by	 each	 group.	 This	 explains,	
moreover,	 why	 the	 negotiations	 and	 requests	 of	 these	 two	 coalitions	 were	 most	
successfully	represented	in	the	final	law	than	the	claims	of	the	socio-environmentalist	
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group,	 which	 were	 consistently	 disregarded.	 In	 summary,	 this	 was	 another	 case	 in	
which	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 group	 were	 met.	 The	 role	 of	
negotiated	agreement	and	 learning	 in	this	process	differed,	however,	 from	the	other	
two	case	studies.		
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PART	3:	COMPARATIVE	DISCUSSION		
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CHAPTER	7	-	COMPARATIVE	ANALYSIS	
	
	
7.1.	Introduction	
The	aims	of	 this	chapter	are	threefold:	 firstly,	 to	provide	a	comparison	of	
the	 three	 case	 studies	 analysed	 in	 this	 thesis;	 secondly,	 to	 further	 advance	 and	
systematise,	based	on	this	comparative	analysis,	the	main	contribution	of	this	thesis	to	
the	ACF	 literature	and;	thirdly,	 to	remark	on	the	contributions	of	this	thesis	to	wider	
debates	 on	 Brazilian	 environmental	 regulations.		 After	 this	 introduction,	 section	 7.2	
provides	 a	 recapitulation	 of	 the	 coalitions	 identified	 in	 each	 of	 the	 case	 studies	 and	
analyses	their	patterns	of	success	and	failure	across	cases.	This	section	highlights	the	
predominance	of	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	across	the	case	studies	between	
2005	and	2015,	and	puts	this	finding	into	historical	perspective	in	order	to	pinpoint	a	
rupture	 with	 the	 previous	 period,	 during	 which	 the	 predominant	 narrative	 was	 the	
socio-environmentalist.	Section	7.3	analyses	the	narratives	used	by	the	government	to	
legitimise	this	turn	towards	neo-developmentalism.	It	provides	an	assessment	of	how	
ideas	of	development	 for	 social	 inclusion	were	used	 to	 justify	 this	 rupture	and	avoid	
severe	 electoral	 consequences	 for	 the	 Workers’	 Party.	 Section	 7.4	 provides	 an	
overview	of	the	main	findings	of	the	empirical	chapters	in	terms	of	internal	events.	The	
importance	of	internal	events	in	altering	actors’	cost-benefit	calculations	is	evidenced	
by	 this	 analysis,	 which	 provides	 support	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 ACF	 should	 more	
explicitly	 incorporate	 interest-based	explanations	 (Nohrstedt,	2005;	Nohrstedt,	2010;	
Hoberg,	1996;	Hann,	1995;	Ladi,	2005;	Szarka,	2010;	Schlager,	1995).	Section	7.5	delves	
into	 the	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 in	 terms	 of	 negotiated	
agreement.	 It	observes	 that	negotiated	agreement	only	occurred	 in	one	of	 the	three	
cases	investigated	and	advances	that	its	occurrence	can	be	attributed	to	the	existence	
of	a	 ‘hurting	 stalemate’.	 It	also	debates	 the	 revised	definition	of	a	hurting	 stalemate	
proposed	by	this	thesis	in	light	of	the	empirical	findings,	and	empirically	attests	to	the	
benefits	of	incorporating	insights	from	the	collaborative	governance	literature	into	the	
analysis	of	this	concept.	Finally,	section	7.6	explores	what	can	be	learnt	about	‘policy-
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oriented	learning’	from	the	analysis	of	the	case	studies.	The	main	remark	advanced	by	
this	 section	 relates	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 incorporating	 the	 role	 of	 ‘elite	 networking’	
and	 of	 elites	 as	 providers	 of	 technical	 information	 in	 the	 ACF’s	 conceptualisation	 of	
learning.	Section	7.7	concludes.	
	
7.2.	The	Time	for	Neo-Developmentalism?		
This	section	compares	the	composition	and	main	positions	of	the	coalitions	
identified	 in	the	case	studies	and	provides	an	analysis	of	which	coalitions	were	more	
and	 less	 successful	 in	 having	 their	 demands	 reflected	 in	 the	 final	 regulations	 of	 the	
subsystems	 analysed	 (i.e.	 winning	 and	 losing	 coalitions)	 between	 2005	 and	 2015.	 It	
provides	support	to	the	claim	made	in	chapter	3	(section	3.3)	about	the	dominance	of	
a	 neo-developmentalist	 discourse	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	 politics	 since	 at	 least	
2005	 (see	 figure	13	below,	which	 summarises	 the	dominance	of	different	discourses	
throughout	history,	as	debated	in	chapter	3).			
	
	
Figure	13	-	Dominance	of	discourses	in	Brazilian	environmental	politics	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
	
The	 comparison	 of	 coalitions	 active	 in	 the	 debates	 in	 each	 case	 study	
revealed	 that	 in	 each	 of	 them	 there	 were	 three	 active	 coalitions,	 some	 of	 which	
simultaneously	 incorporated	more	than	one	discourse	 in	 the	period	analysed	 (2005	-	
2015)	 (table	28,	below,	provides	a	 summary	of	 the	active	coalitions	 in	each	case).	 In	
the	 forest	 case,	 administrative	 economic	 rationalists	 and	 socio-environmentalists	
formed	 a	 single	 coalition,	 and	 the	 two	 other	 coalitions	 were	 formed	 by	 neo-
developmentalists	 and	 preservationists,	 respectively.	 In	 the	 pesticide	 case,	
preservationists	 and	 socio-environmentalists	 were	 in	 the	 same	 coalition,	 while	
administrative	 economic	 rationalists	 and	 neo-developmentalists	 comprised,	
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separately,	the	other	two.	In	the	ABS	case,	administrative	economic	rationalists,	socio-
environmentalists	 and	 neo-developmentalists	 formed	 three	 separate	 coalitions	 and	
the	preservationist	discourse	was	not	used	in	the	debate.		
	
Table	28	-	Summary	of	the	coalitions	
	 Active	coalitions	 Main	actors	in	each	
coalition	
Winning	
coalition(s)	
Losing	
coalition(s)	
Forests	 Administrative	
economic	rationalists	
and	Socio-
environmentalists	
Workers’	Party,	forest	
industry,	executive	
power	
Neo-
developmentalist	and	
of	the	administrative	
economic	
rationalist/socio-
environmentalist	
Preservationists	
Neo-developmentalists	 Rural	caucus,	agri-
business	
Preservationists	 NGOs,	environmentalist	
caucus	
Pesticides	 Preservationist	and	
Socio-environmentalists	
Civil	society,	social	
movements,	Ministry	of	
Agrarian	Development	
Neo-
developmentalists	
Preservationist/so
cio-
environmentalists	
and	
administrative	
economic	
rationalists	
Administrative	
economic	rationalists	
Executive	government	
ministries	(agriculture,	
health,	environment)	
Neo-developmentalists	 National	Confederation	
of	Agriculture,	pesticide	
industry,	MPs	from	the	
rural	caucus	
ABS	 Socio-environmentalists	
	
Traditional	and	
indigenous	
communities,	NGOs,	
FUNAI	
Administrative	
economic	rationalists	
and	neo-
developmentalists	
Socio-
environmentalists	
Neo-developmentalists	 Rural	caucus,	ministry	
of	agriculture,	agri-
business	
Administrative	
economic	rationalists	
Bio-industry	and	
executive	government	
(ministry	of	
environment,	science	
technology	and	
innovation,	Casa	Civil)	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
	
An	 implication	 of	 these	 findings	 for	 the	 ACF	 is	 that	 actors	with	 different	
core	 beliefs	 (as	 manifested	 by	 their	 narratives)	 can	 be	 part	 of	 the	 same	 coalition	
(meaning	 that	 they	 can	 adopt	 the	 same	positions	 in	 the	 debate)	when	 it	 is	 deemed	
convenient	 for	 the	advancement	of	 their	 interests.	This	 finding	contradicts	 the	ACF’s	
claim	 that	 “actors	 within	 an	 advocacy	 coalition	 will	 show	 substantial	 consensus	 on	
issues	pertaining	to	the	policy	core	[beliefs]”	(Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith	1999,	p.	124).	
Additionally,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 same	 actors	 adopted	 different	 discourses	 across	 the	
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different	 case	 studies87	 provides	 support	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 actors	 are	 strategic	 in	
selecting	 their	positions	and	 that	 it	might	be	misleading	 to	 take	actors’	narratives	as	
representative	of	their	true	beliefs.	These	two	points	highlight	the	 importance	of	the	
incorporation	 of	 ‘interests’	 as	 a	 relevant	 factor,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 coalition	
formation	but	also	in	the	analysis	of	narratives.	
The	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 three	 cases	 highlights,	 in	 addition,	 the	
recurrent	success	of	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition	in	having	its	positions	adopted	
in	new	regulations	between	2005	and	2015.	In	the	debate	about	the	new	Forest	Code,	
for	 instance,	 the	 results	of	 the	 regulatory	change	 reflected	 the	demands	of	 the	neo-
developmentalist	 and	 of	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist/socio-
environmentalist	 coalitions	 and	 for	 this	 reason	 both	 were	 considered	 as	 winning	
coalitions.	 The	 neo-developmentalists	 were,	 however,	 those	 that	 had	 demanded	
regulatory	 reforms	 in	 the	 first	place,	and	succeeded	both	 in	putting	 the	 issue	on	 the	
agenda	and	 in	having	several	of	 their	demands	met.	The	other	 two	coalitions	mostly	
responded,	to	the	neo-developmentalists’	demands	to	debate	the	topic.	Some	tried	to	
oppose	any	 changes	 (preservationists)	 and	others	 tried	 to	prevent	 the	 changes	 from	
being	 as	 drastic	 as	 the	 neo-developmentalists	 initially	 intended	 (administrative	
economic	rationalist/socio-environmentalist	coalition)	the	latter	having	success.		
In	 the	 pesticide	 case	 study,	 the	 neo-developmentalists	 were	 also	
responsible	 for	 proposing	 the	 regulatory	 and	 institutional	 changes	 in	 question	 (i.e.	
setting	 the	 agenda)	 and,	 although	 the	 decision	 about	 reforming	 the	 institutional	
apparatus	of	pesticide	registration	had	not	been	yet	approved	at	the	time	of	writing,	
the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition	 had	 had	 several	 victories	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
flexibilisation	of	pesticide	control	in	previous	regulations	and	were	also	found	to	have	
high	chances	of	being	the	winning	coalition	in	relation	to	the	proposal	of	reformulating	
the	 registration	 institutions.	 Due	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 previous	 and	 potential	 victories,	
therefore,	they	were	considered	the	winning	coalition	in	this	case.	
	Lastly,	 in	 the	 ABS	 case	 study,	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalists	
(composed	mainly	of	the	bio-industry	and	the	Ministry	of	the	Environment)	proposed	
the	 regulation,	 which	 was	 later	 altered	 according	 to	 the	 demands	 of	 the	 neo-
																																								 																				
87	For	instance,	the	executive	power	adopted	an	administrative	economic	rationalist	discourse	most	of	
the	time,	but	in	the	forest	case	they	also	used	socio-environmentalist	arguments	about	the	importance	
of	protecting	small	farmers.	
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developmentalist	group.	Both	coalitions	were	considered	to	have	succeeded	in	having	
their	 demands	 included	 in	 the	 new	 regulation	 (and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 were	
considered	winning	coalitions),	while	the	socio-environmentalists	had	practically	none	
of	their	demands	reflected	in	the	final	regulation.	The	coalitions	considered	most	and	
least	 successful	 in	 having	 their	 demands	 reflected	 by	 regulatory	 change	 (i.e.	 the	
winning	and	losing	coalitions)	are	summarised	in	table	28	(above).	
Considering	 the	 three	 cases	 in	 conjunction,	 therefore,	 the	most	 frequent	
winner	 in	 achieving	 its	 regulatory	 objectives	 in	 the	 time	 period	 analysed	 was	
indisputably	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition,	while	the	socio-environmentalists	and	
preservationists	tended	to	lose	most	often.	The	socio-environmentalists	only	had	one	
victory,	 in	 the	 forest	 case,	 when	 they	 were	 part	 of	 the	 administrative	 economic	
rationalist	coalition.	This	evidence	provides	support	to	the	claim,	made	in	chapter	3,	of	
the	existence	of	a	 rupture	after	 the	mid-2000s	 in	 the	historical	predominance	of	 the	
socio-environmentalist	coalition	that	characterised	the	90s	and	early	2000s.	This	claim	
is,	in	addition,	largely	supported	by	the	secondary	literature	on	related	topics,	such	as	
by	 studies	 on	 the	 flexibilisation	 of	 policies	 of	 environmental	 licensing	 for	 the	
construction	 of	 large	 infrastructure	 projects	 (see	 Fearnside,	 2016;	 Boratti,	
forthcoming),	 on	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	 bio-ethanol	 in	 the	 Brazilian	
cerrado	 despite	 environmental	 concerns	 (see	 Freitas,	 2016),	 and	 on	 changes	 in	 the	
types	of	protected	areas	preferred	by	the	government	and	in	the	speed	of	the	creation	
of	 new	 areas	 during	 Rousseff’s	 government	 (see	 Shalynn,	 M.,	 et	 al.,	 2016),88	 all	 of	
which	also	point	(even	though	not	using	the	same	terminology)	to	an	 increase	 in	the	
influence	of	a	neo-developmentalist	mentality	in	Brazilian	environmental	policies.		
As	argued	in	chapter	4	(part	4.3,	section	4.3.2),	external	events	related	to	
the	increasing	economic	and	political	power	of	the	agri-business	sector	were	crucial	to	
these	 results.	 These	 were,	 however,	 accompanied	 and	 legitimised	 by	 a	 strategic	
narrative	 of	 development	 for	 social	 inclusion	 that	 has	 been	 embodied	 in	 the	
governments	of	the	Workers’	Party	since	at	least	Lula’s	second	mandate	(which	began	
in	 2006).	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 narrative	 that	 contributed	 for	 the	 upsurge	 of	 the	 neo-
developmentalist	coalition	is	provided	in	the	next	section.	
																																								 																				
88	For	further	details	on	protected	area	policy	changes	you	may	also	see	the	author’s	conference	paper	
available	at:	http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/conference/file/reponse/1434991108.pdf		
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7.3.	External	Events	and	the	Legitimising	Power	of	a	Strategic	Narrative	
	 	 The	analysis	of	external	events	provided	in	chapter	4	(part	4.3,	section	
4.3.2)	identifies	the	increase	in	the	material	(political	and	economic)	power	of	the	agri-
business	sector	as	a	crucial	factor	underpinning	the	regulatory	changes	investigated	by	
this	thesis.	As	maintained	in	that	chapter,	changes	in	socioeconomic	conditions	and	in	
the	governing	coalition	were	particularly	impactful	to	regulatory	changes	occurring	in	
Brazilian	environmental	policies	between	2005	and	2010.	Favoured	by	the	upsurge	in	
the	 prices	 and	 quantities	 of	 commodities	 exported	 between	 2008	 and	 2013,	 by	 the	
marked	growth	of	the	rural	caucus	in	the	composition	of	the	National	Congress,	and	by	
the	 increase	 in	 its	 share	 of	 campaign	 donations	 to	 presidential	 elections,	 the	 agri-
business	 sector	 clearly	 gained	 in	 importance	 in	 Brazilian	 policy-making	 in	 the	 period	
analysed	 by	 this	 thesis.	 This	 section	 intends	 to	 complement	 these	 findings	 with	 an	
analysis	of	the	main	legitimising	narratives	that	accompanied	and	contributed	to	these	
changes	 in	material	power.	 I	argue	that,	although	they	do	not	necessarily	 reflect	 the	
beliefs	 of	 members	 of	 the	 government	 (which	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 more	 akin	 to	 an	
administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 perspective,	 as	 supported	 in	 chapter	 3),	 a	
legitimising	 narrative	 of	 development	 for	 poverty	 reduction	 used	 by	 the	 Workers’	
Party,	contributed	to	the	political	predominance	of	the	neo-developmentalist	coalition.	
This	 analysis	 underpins,	 in	 this	 manner,	 the	 importance	 of	 ideas,	 even	 if	 they	 are	
strategically	used	to	advance	political	interests	(such	as	electoral	support).	
The	Workers’	Party	is	a	left-wing	party	traditionally	associated	with	equity-
enhancing	policies	as	their	signature	initiatives.	President	Rousseff	(2011–2016)	(of	the	
Workers’	Party)	is	frequently	seen	as	a	custodian	of	‘lulismo’	–	a	social	contract	built	on	
upward	social	mobility	for	the	lower	classes	(Power,	2014).	Peixoto	and	Rennó	(2011)	
shows	 that,	 although	 lower	 educational	 and	 income	 levels	 are	 reliable	 indicators	 of	
belonging	 to	 Rousseff’s	 electorate,	 multivariate	 analysis	 points	 to	 the	 greater	
importance	of	perceptions	of	upward	social	mobility	as	the	key	determinant	of	voting	
for	 her.	 In	 other	 words,	 her	 electorate	 was	 largely	 influenced	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 a	
celebrated	 ‘new	 middle	 class’	 during	 Lula’s	 government	 and	 to	 programmes	 of	
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conditional	 cash	 transference	 (such	 as	Bolsa	 Familia	or	 ‘family	 stipend’89)	 that	were	
often	 associated	 with	 a	 ‘pro-poor’	 government,	 used	 for	 electoral	 purposes	 (Hall,	
2012)	and	seen	as	one	of	the	most	remarked-upon	‘signatures’	of	the	Workers’	Party	
while	in	power.90	
Between	 2003	 and	 2008,	 while	 Marina	 Silva	 was	 Lula’s	 Minister	 of	 the	
Environment,	 the	 Workers’	 Party	 was	 a	 close	 ally	 of	 groups	 such	 as	 indigenous	
communities	and	extractivists	and	actively	promoted	a	socio-environmentalist	agenda	
in	 environmental	 policies,	 which	 was	 representative	 of	 Silva’s	 political	 base.91	
Disagreements	about	environmental	licenses	for	the	construction	of	large	dams	in	the	
Amazon	forest	between	the	then	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Presidency,	Dilma	Rousseff,	and	
Minister	Silva	resulted,	however,	in	Silva’s	resignation	as	Minister	of	the	Environment	
in	2008	and	her	departure	from	the	Workers’	Party.	This	event	has	been	described	as	a	
watershed	 event	 between	 the	 historical	 alliance	 of	 the	 Worker’s	 Party	 with	 socio-
environmentalist	 groups	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 marked	 contradictions	 between	 the	
demands	of	the	two	groups	(Castro,	2014).	As	observed	by	Castro	(2014,	p.	249),	 for	
example,	 “the	 institutional	 arrangements	 of	 environmental	 policy	 has	 changed	
radically	 during	 both	 Lula	 terms,	 from	 close	 association	 with	 socio-environmental	
movements	 and	 a	 solid	 sustainable	 approach92,	 through	 integration	 with	 other	
ministries,	 to	 a	 developmentalist,	 pragmatic,	 perspective	 characterized	by	 a	 national	
discourse	of	sustainability	under	deepened	socio-environmental	conflicts”.		
President	 Rousseff	 (2011–2016)	 inherited	 these	 contradictions	 and	 the	
evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 strategy	 for	 avoiding	 the	 electoral	 costs	 associated	 with	
them	has	been	 to	change	 the	 focus	of	 the	debate	 from	environmental	damages	and	
contradictions	to	the	importance	of	this	development	strategy	for	the	continuation	of	
																																								 																				
89	Although	Bolsa	Familia	has	benefited	more	than	12	million	families	and	reduced	absolute	poverty	it	
has	been	criticised	for	being	used	for	electoral	purposes,	for	encouraging	the	adoption	of	short-term	
perspectives	in	social	policies	(Hall,	2012)	
90	The	Workers’	Party	held	the	Brazilian	presidency	from	2003	until	2016.	Lula	da	Silva	was	the	president	
between	2003	and	2010,	and	Dilma	Rousseff	commanded	the	post	between	2011	and	2016,	when	she	
was	impeached.	
91	Marina	Silva	started	her	political	career	in	Acre,	in	the	Amazon	region.	She	was	part	of	the	movement	
of	 Amazonian	 extractivists	 created	 by	 Chico	 Mendes,	 which	 was	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 socio-
environmentalist	movement.	The	Workers’	Party	and	Mendes’	Rubber	Tappers’	movement	have	been	
allied	since	the	80s,	when	Mendes	was	among	the	founders	of	the	Workers’	Party	 in	Acre.	(Fox,	1994,	
p.32)	
92	 By	 using	 the	 expression	 ‘solid	 sustainable	 approach’	 the	 author	 referred	 to	 environmental	 policies	
that	were	coherent	with	a	discourse	of	sustainability.	
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the	inclusion	of	more	vulnerable	groups.	This	strategy	became	clear	in	the	analysis	of	
the	 forest	 case,	 in	which	 the	 establishment	 of	 different	 protection	 requirements	 for	
large	and	small	 farmers	 (known	as	escadinha	or	small	 scale)	was	a	demand	that	was	
particularly	 strongly	 advanced	 by	 the	 executive	 government	 as	 a	 condition	 for	
changing	 the	 Forest	 Code.	 Rousseff’s	Minister	 of	 the	 Environment,	 Izabella	 Teixeira,	
emphatically	 supported	 this	 argument,	 advancing	 for	 instance	 that	 the	 regulatory	
changes	were	necessary	to	make	the	law	less	burdensome	to	small	farmers.	Table	29	
provides	specific	citations	that	support	this	argument.	
Table	29	-	Example	of	the	argument	of	social	inclusion	being	used	in	debates	about	the	new	Forest	
Code	
Code	 Actor	 Quotation	
Small	
farmers/social	
argument	
Teixeira,	Izabella	
21/06/2012	–	
youtube	video	
Rio+20	UN	
Conference	
“I’m	not	talking	about	big	loggers,	I'm	talking	about	people	
who	have	been	planting	since	the	last	century	in	this	
country	and	who	are	illegal	according	to	the	current	
law”.93	
	
“And	we	have	to	seek	the	inclusion	of	all	and	not	the	
exclusion	of	people.	And	a	policy	of	inclusion	is	a	solution-
building	policy”.94	
	
“We	observed	income	and	size	of	the	properties,	in	order	
not	to	have	to	remove	people	from	the	fields.”95	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	with	data	from	YouTube	(2012)	
	
Similarly,	 and	 although	 not	 selected	 as	 a	 case	 study	 for	 this	 thesis,	 the	
government’s	justification	for	large	infrastructure	projects	in	environmentally	sensitive	
areas	often	relied	on	the	social	inclusion	argument.	Although	more	analysis	and	data	is	
required	to	make	this	argument	more	forcefully,	a	speech	made	by	the	president	on	
the	 occasion	 of	 the	 inauguration	 of	 one	 of	 the	 Amazon	 dams	 (which	 were	 at	 the	
epicentre	 of	 the	 dissent	 with	 former	 Minister	 of	 the	 Environment,	 Marina	 Silva),	
emphasised	that	those	kinds	of	projects	were	a	result	of	a	“type	of	development”	that	
promoted	 development	 generating	 employment	 and	 distributing	 income	 (Rousseff,	
2011).96		
																																								 																				
93	Eu	não	to	falando	dos	grandes	desmatadores	não,	eu	estou	falando	de	gente	que	planta	nesse	pais	
desde	o	século	passado	e	que	estão	ilegais	perante	a	lei.	
94	E	a	gente	tem	que	buscar	a	inclusão	de	todos	e	não	a	exclusão	dos	outros.	E	uma	politica	de	inclusão,	
‘e	uma	politica	de	construção	de	soluções	
95	nos	olhamos	o	critério	social	para	não	tirar	o	povo	do	campo,		
96	“We	had	stopped	investing	in	large	hydroelectric	power	plants	in	Brazil	and	recently	resumed.	Santo	
Antonio	 and	 Jirau	 reflect,	 precisely,	 the	 moment	 in	 Brazil	 when	 we	 started	 to	 think	 again	 about	 our	
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	I	therefore	hypothesise	that	PT’s	signature	policy	of	income	redistribution	
seems	 to	 have	 been	 used	 by	 the	 Workers’	 Party	 as	 an	 ideological	 legitimation	 for	
decisions	 with	 negative	 environmental	 impacts.	 Although	more	 data	 and	 analysis	 is	
certainly	required	in	order	to	turn	this	into	more	than	an	initial	speculation,	the	logic	of	
this	 narrative	 would	 be	 that	 the	 protection	 of	 agribusiness	 and	 other	 big	 business	
(such	 as	 construction	 companies)	 has	 been	 related	 by	 PT	 to	 the	 continuation	 and	
success	 of	 income	 redistribution.	 Some	 evidence	 for	 this	 reasoning	 was	 found	 in	
speeches	by	President	Rousseff	or	her	Minister	for	the	Environment	on	the	decisions	
mentioned	 above,	 which	 have	 significant	 environmental	 impact,	 and	 also	 in	
declarations	 by	 representatives	 of	 the	 agribusiness	 in	 debates	 about	 pesticides.	
Senator	Gilberto	Goellner	(DEM-MT)	from	the	rural	caucus,	for	example,	has	argued	in	
the	context	of	pesticide	regulation	debates	that	expenditure	on	food	represented	65%	
of	 low-income	 family	 budgets	 in	 large	 metropolitan	 areas,	 and	 that	 anything	 that	
might	result	in	the	increase	of	food	prices	would	directly	affect	these	groups.	(Senate	
News	Agency,	03/09/2009).	
Thus,	 a	 possible	 interpretation	 of	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 government	was	
able	 to	 abandon	 socio-environmentalist	 claims	 without	 incurring	 in	 major	 electoral	
effects	was	 through	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 neo-developmentalist	 policy	
decisions	 for	 social	 inclusion.	 This	 way,	 the	 government	 was	 capable	 to	 maintain	
popular	 support	 and	win	 the	 presidential	 elections	 of	 2014,	 despite	 the	 roll-back	 in	
environmental	 regulations,	 also	 contributing	 to	 the	 dominance	 of	 the	 neo-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
development	and	to	see	that	this	development	is	not	just	any	kind	of	development	but	development	that	
will	 lead	 to	economic	growth,	our	gross	domestic	product	will	grow.	But	 it	 is	also	development	 that	 is	
based	on	the	view	that	we	have	to	create	jobs	in	Brazil,	that	we	have	to	have	a	strong	economy	in	Brazil,	
and	that	this	process	will	only	be	truly	great	and	consistent	if	it	includes	the	Brazilian	population	in	the	
share	of	 its	 fruits.	We	can	 say	 that,	 in	 the	past,	Brazil	has	grown,	 it	 is	 true,	but	Brazil	has	grown	very	
unevenly.	Many	people	were	 very	 poor	 and	a	 few	people	were	 very	 rich.	We	want	a	different	 kind	of	
development.	And	it	is	from	this	kind	of	development	that	this	project	results,	it	is	a	project	in	which	we	
promoted	 development	 that	 generates	 employment	 and	 distributes	 income.	 Our	 country	 today	 is	
different	than	in	the	past,	and	it	is	different	also	from	countries	such	as	China,	India,	Russia,	and	the	so-
called	 BRICS.	We	 are	 different	 because	 we	 are	 a	 country	 where	 growth	 has	 been	 accompanied	 by	 a	
significant	 improvement	 in	 income	distribution.	For	you	 to	have	a	better	 idea	 the	 latest	data	 from	the	
Getulio	Vargas	Foundation	show	that	Brazil	had	39.5	million	people	reaching	the	middle	class.	So	we	can	
have	an	 idea,	 it	means	 that	 from	2003	 to	May	2011,	 an	 entire	Argentina	 reached	 the	middle	 class	 in	
Brazil,	 because	 Argentina	 has	 41	 million	 inhabitants,	 then	 the	 39.5	 million	 increase	 is	 almost	 an	
Argentina,	or	two-and-a-half	or	so	Chiles.	This	is	very	important	and	Santo	Antonio	has	everything	to	do	
with	it,	because	a	project	of	these	dimensions	is	a	project	that	will	ensure	the	energy	for	our	country	to	
continue	 growing	 and	 include	 people”.	 (Dilma	 Rousseff,	 05/07/2011	 -	 speech	 available	 at	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=myYUykz-j10.	Translation	and	emphasis	by	the	author).	
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developmentalist	 coalition	 in	 the	 process	 of	 regulatory	 change	 investigated	 in	 this	
thesis.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 remark,	 however,	 that	 the	 confirmation	 of	 this	 initial	
speculation	would	require	more	data	and	analysis	than	what	is	within	the	scope	of	this	
thesis,	 particularly	 regarding	 the	 position	 and	 perceptions	 of	 PT’s	 electorate	 on	 the	
ground.	Additionally,	alternative	interpretations	of	environmental	concerns	simply	not	
being	particularly	relevant	for	PT’s	electorate	would	have	to	be	assessed.	
	
7.4.	Internal	Events	and	Changes	to	the	cost/benefit	Calculation	
This	 section	 describes	 and	 compares	 the	 internal	 events	 identified	 as	
drivers	 of	 regulatory	 change	 in	 the	 three	 case	 studies.	 According	 to	 this	 thesis’s	
revision	of	the	causal	mechanisms	through	which	they	operate	(see	chapter	2),	one	of	
the	 causal	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 internal	 events	 motivate	 policy	 change	 is	
through	changes	in	the	incentives	(cost	and	benefit	calculations)	of	actors.	This	section	
provides	support	to	this	claim	by	showing	how	different	categories	of	 internal	events	
affected	actors’	cost	and	benefit	calculations	and	motivated	mobilisation	for	regulatory	
change	in	each	of	the	cases.		
Four	 categories	 of	 prominent	 internal	 events	 leading	 to	 the	 regulatory	
changes	were	identified	across	the	cases	and	were	found	to	recur	in	at	least	two	of	the	
cases:	media	scandals,	 the	strengthening	of	 the	enforcement	of	previous	 regulations,	
the	 exposure	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 administrative	 capacity	 of	 the	 state	 to	 properly	
enforce	 previous	 regulations	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 international	 regulations	 or	
negotiations	on	national	regulatory	debates.	Each	of	these	four	kinds	of	internal	events	
and	their	occurrences	in	the	case	studies	are	summarised	in	table	30	and	described	in	
the	 rest	 of	 this	 section.	 Cells	 were	 left	 blank	 when	 the	 internal	 event	 under	
consideration	was	not	identified	as	relevant	in	relation	to	a	particular	case	study.		
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Table	30	-	Summary	of	relevant	internal	events	
	 Strengthening	of	the	
enforcement	of	
previous	regulations	
Limits	of	the	
administrative	
capacity	of	
the	state		
International	
regulations/	
context	
Historic	public	scandals		
Forests	 Executive	Decree	
7.029/09	published	in	
December	2009	fixed	a	
deadline	for	farmers	to	
comply	with	Legal	
Reserves	regulation	
-	 UN	1992	Rio	
Conference	
	
The	murder	of	Chico	Mendes	
–	Amazonian	rubber	tapper	
and	environmental	activist	–	
in	1988	
ABS	 Fines	applied	by	IBAMA	
in	2010	to	the	bio-
industry	and	researchers	
who	have	not	complied	
with	the	2001	
Provisional	Measure	
	
Delays	in	the	
process	of	
genetic	access	
authorisation	by	
Cen		
Entry	into	force	
of	the	Nagoya	
Protocol	(2014)	
Novartis	scandal	–	when	the	
Swiss	pharmaceutical	
company	Novartis	signed	an	
agreement	for	the	collection	
and	remittance	of	genetic	
samples	by	a	Brazilian	NGO		
Pesticides	 -	 Delays	in	the	
registration	of	
new	pesticides	
by	ANVISA	
-	 Contamination	of	River	Guiana	
(RS)	by	organochlorine	
products	used	as	pesticides	in	
1982	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
There	were	two	instances	in	which	the	strengthening	of	the	enforcement	of	
previous	 regulations	 was	 found	 to	 be	 significant	 for	 regulatory	 changes	 in	 the	 case	
studies.	The	first	relates	to	the	forest	case	study	and	involved	the	determination,	by	a	
presidential	 decree	 issued	 in	 2009,	 of	 2011	 as	 the	 year	 in	 which	 monitoring	 and	
punishment	 for	 non-compliance	 with	 Legal	 Reserve	 forest	 regulations	 should	 begin.	
This	decision	was	frequently	mentioned	in	the	Lower	Chamber	debates	about	the	new	
Forest	 Code	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 the	 proposed	 changes	 to	 the	 previous	 code	 and	 it	was	
suggested	 that	 the	 date	 established	 by	 the	 decree	 be	 postponed	 in	 order	 to	 allow	
more	 time	 for	 debate	 about	 the	 new	 code	 (Lower	 Chamber	News	Agency,	 2011,	 25	
April)	 	 The	 second	 instance	 relates	 to	 the	 ABS	 case	 study	 and	 regards	 the	 onset	 of	
fines,	 in	2010,	 for	members	of	 the	bio-industry	and	scientists	 for	not	complying	with	
the	 2001	 ABS	 regulation	 (Provisional	 Measure	 2.186/2001).	 Members	 of	 the	 bio-
industry	 have	 explicitly	 identified	 the	 first	 fines	 as	 a	 milestone	 prompting	 the	
mobilisation	of	the	bio-industry	to	work	towards	altering	the	law	(interview	6,	8).	Thus,	
although	the	previous	regulation	had	been	in	place	since	2001,	it	was	the	beginning	of	
its	 enforcement	 by	 the	 government’s	 environmental	 agency	 (IBAMA)	 in	 2010	 that	
raised	 the	 awareness,	 and	 catalysed	 the	 reaction,	 of	 the	 bio-industry	 against	 the	
regulation.	Both	examples,	therefore,	point	to	an	association	between	the	beginning	of	
(or	the	plan	to	begin)	the	enforcement	of	previously	non-enforced	regulations	and	the	
beginning	of	 the	mobilisation	of	 affected	 groups	 to	 promote	 regulatory	 change.	 The	
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increase	 in	 the	 costs	 to	 particular	 groups	 associated	 with	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	
enforcement	 of	 previous	 regulations	 had,	 therefore,	 an	 important	 effect	 in	 sparking	
the	processes	that	led	to	regulatory	change.		
The	 second	 important	 internal	 event	 found	 to	 motivate	 the	 regulatory	
changes	in	question	was	the	exposure	of	the	limits	of	the	administrative	capacity	of	the	
state	 to	 properly	 enforce	 previous	 regulations.	 The	 exposure	 of	 these	 limits	 led	 to	
pressures	 for	 regulatory	 change	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 members	 of	 the	
government	 affected	 by	 administrative	 delays	 and	 inefficiencies.	 These	 events	 were	
observed	in	the	cases	of	extremely	long	processing	times	for	pesticide	registration	and	
biodiversity	access	requests.	In	the	pesticide	case,	for	instance,	a	list	of	1207	products	
was	 awaiting	 toxicological	 evaluation	 by	 the	 health	 agency	 (ANVISA)	 on	 23rd	 June,	
2015,	 and	 the	 average	 waiting	 time	 for	 registration	 was	 approximately	 40	 months	
(ANVISA	 website,	 2015;	 Oeco,	 2016).97	 This	 situation	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 by	 the	
pesticide	industry	as	a	“collapse	of	the	Brazilian	pesticide	regulatory	system”	and	has	
motivated	members	of	ANVISA,	the	Ministry	of	Environment	and	the	pesticide	industry	
to	 remark	 on	 the	 unsustainability	 of	 the	 situation	 and	 the	 need	 for	 change	 (public	
hearing	in	the	Lower	Chamber,	2015,	2nd	July).		A	similar	issue	was	observed	in	the	ABS	
case.	 Actors	 reported	 that	 until	 2013	 (when	 Cgen,	 the	 institution	 in	 charge	 of	 the	
authorisation	 of	 access	 to	 genetic	 resources	 was	 reorganised),	 access	 authorisation	
would	take	up	to	one-and-a-half	years	 to	be	 issued,	and	researchers	could	not	begin	
their	research	until	authorisation	had	been	given	(Natura	representative,	Folha	de	Sao	
Paulo,	10/03/15).	Additionally,	the	requirement	that	companies	or	researchers	obtain	
proof	 of	 prior	 and	 informed	 consent	 from	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 communities	
before	 they	 submit	 an	 authorisation	 request	 increased	 the	 costs	 associated	 with	
genetic	 resource	 access	 as	many	 companies	 or	 researchers	 did	 not	 have	 specialised	
know-how	 for	 interacting	 and	 negotiating	 with	 these	 communities.	 In	 both	 cases,	
therefore,	 the	 reduced	 administrative	 capacity	 of	 the	 state	 to	 enforce	 previous	
																																								 																				
97	In	addition,	companies	started	to	ask	for	toxicological	evaluations	of	products	that	they	did	not	intend	
to	 commercialise	 just	 to	 ‘save	 a	 place’	 in	 the	 evaluation	 queue	 in	 case	 other	 companies	 tried	 to	
commercialise	similar	products,	exacerbating	the	problem	(CONASQ	meeting,	26/11/2014).	Additionally,	
ANVISA	officials	complained	of	further	delays	generated	by	constant	judicial	requests	companies	for	the	
re-evaluation	of	products	that	had	previously	been	rejected	(public	hearing	in	the	Lower	Chamber,	2015,	
2nd	July).	
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regulations	 was	 an	 important	 driver	 of	 demands	 for	 regulatory	 change	 due	 to	 the	
increased	costs	it	generated	for	specific	groups.98	
Another	 category	of	 internal	events	 leading	 to	policy	 change	 through	 the	
alteration	 of	 actors’	 cost	 and	 benefit	 calculations	 was	 related	 to	 international	
regulations	 and	 negotiations.	 In	 the	 forest	 case,	 the	 occurrence	 of	 the	 1992	 UN	
Conference	 in	Rio	 raised	 international	attention	around	 the	 issue	of	deforestation	 in	
the	 Amazonian	 rainforest	 and	 provided	 Brazilian	 NGOs	 with	 important	 connections	
and	resources.	This	fact	directed	governmental	attention	to	the	issue,	which	resulted	
in	 the	 government	 starting	 to	 issue	 stricter	 forest	 laws	 and	 pursue	 more	 effective	
enforcement	during	the	1990s	and	2000s.	Those	changes	contributed	to	the	increase	
in	 the	costs	of	 land	 intensive	activities	such	as	agriculture	and	 fostered	agri-business	
discontent	that	 led	to	the	new	Forest	Code	in	2012.	Similarly,	 in	the	case	of	ABS,	the	
entry	 into	 force	of	 the	Nagoya	Protocol	 in	2014	 led	to	alterations	 in	actors’	 strategic	
calculations	of	 the	 costs	 and	benefits	 of	 keeping	 the	previous	 regulation,	motivating	
regulatory	change.	It	did	this	in	two	ways.	First,	the	international	context	increased	the	
costs	of	non-negotiation	for	 the	agribusiness	sector,	due	to	the	uncertainties	 for	 this	
group	 about	 the	 potential	 consequences	 of	 the	 Nagoya	 Protocol	 for	 the	 prices	 of	
commodity	exports.	The	protocol,	 in	this	way,	made	this	group	more	open	to	debate	
on	domestic	regulation	that	would	protect	them	against	potential	costs	(interview	40).	
The	second	way	was	 through	promoting	 fear	of	 international	 regulatory	competition	
within	the	bio-industry	and	the	Brazilian	government.	This	fear	emerged	in	the	context	
of	 WTO	 TRIPS99	 negotiations,	 at	 which	 developed	 countries	 refused	 to	 consider	
requirements	 of	 ‘prior	 and	 informed	 consent’	 for	 the	 use	 of	 traditional	 knowledge	
from	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	 groups	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 patents	 (see	 Carvalho,	
2000).100,101	
																																								 																				
98	Eventually,	 the	mobilisation	of	 industry	 resulted	 in	 less	bureaucratic	 regulation	 in	 the	ABS	case.	For	
instance,	 it	was	no	 longer	 required	 that	authorisation	be	obtained	before	access	 to	genetic	 resources	
could	 be	 granted	 but	 only	 that	 an	 online	 registration	 be	 completed	 by	 those	 seeking	 access.	 In	 the	
pesticide	case,	facilitating	mechanisms	(or	the	proposition	of	facilitating	mechanisms)	for	pesticide	use	
and	 registration	 were	 introduced,	 such	 as	 the	 authorisation	 of	 the	 use	 of	 unregistered	 pesticides	 in	
phytosanitary	emergencies	and	debate	about	reforming	the	tripartite	institutional	structure	of	pesticide	
authorisation	 to	 exclude	 the	 Ministry	 of	 the	 Environment	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 and	 centralise	
registration	procedures	under	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture.	
99	Agreement	on	Trade-related	Aspects	of	Intellectual	Property	Rights	(TRIPS	Agreement)	
100	 As	 explained	 by	 Eimer	 and	 Donadelli	 (2016),	 the	 international	 community	 did	 not	 accept	 this	
requirement	of	the	Nagoya	Protocol	regarding	the	regulation	of	patent	applications	for	pharmaceutical	
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Lastly,	 historic	 public	 scandals	 generated	 costs	 for	 specific	 groups,	which	
later	 reacted	 by	 demanding	 the	 regulatory	 changes	 under	 investigation.	 In	 the	 ABS	
case,	 for	 example,	 the	 Novartis	 scandal	 motivated	 the	 drafting	 of	 a	 law	 that	 was	
focused	 on	 avoiding	 ‘biopiracy’.	 Therefore,	 rather	 than	 promoting	 access	 to	 genetic	
resources,	the	law	acted	as	an	impediment	to	it,	which	generated	a	reaction	from	the	
bio-industry	and	researchers.	Similarly,	in	the	case	of	pesticides,	the	pollution	of	River	
Guaíba	 in	 Rio	 Grande	 do	 Sul	 by	 organochlorine	 products	 that	 had	 been	 used	 as	
pesticides	 in	 1982	 raised	 public	 awareness	 of	 the	 topic	 and	 led	 to	 the	 passing	 of	 a	
pesticide	 law	 in	 1989	 that	 was	 restrictive	 in	 terms	 of	 environmental	 and	 health	
requirements	and	assessment	procedures.	 Lastly,	 in	 the	 forest	case	study,	 the	public	
outcry	resulting	from	the	murder	of	the	Amazonian	rubber	tapper	and	environmental	
activist	Chico	Mendes	by	a	rancher	 in	1988,	 in	combination	with	the	emergence	of	a	
local	 civil	 society	 demanding	 stricter	 environmental	 regulations	 and	 increased	
international	 visibility	 of	 the	 deforestation	 of	 the	 Amazon,	 led	 to	 stricter	 forest	
regulations	 being	 approved	 in	 2001	 as	 an	 addendum	 to	 the	 1965	 Forest	 Code.	 The	
murder	of	Chico	Mendes,	which	was	widely	publicised	by	 the	 international	media102,	
served	in	this	way	to	strengthen	the	power	of	the	socio-environmentalist	coalition103	in	
the	 90s	 and	 2000s,	 nurturing	 the	 resentments	 of	 the	 agriculture	 sector	 against	
regulations	approved	during	these	two	decades.104		
These	 three	 kinds	 of	 events	 therefore,	 have	 motivated	 the	 drafting	 of	
progressive	 laws	 in	 the	 history	 of	 each	 subsystem,	 which,	 later,	 when	 agribusiness	
gained	 more	 power,	 enforcement	 became	 stricter	 or	 the	 limits	 of	 administrative	
capacity	 became	 apparent,	 were	 changed.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 way	 that	 these	 events	 were	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
or	 other	 substances,	 engendering,	 in	 this	 way,	 a	 competitive	 disadvantage	 for	 Brazilian	 companies,	
which,	according	to	the	2001	Brazilian	regulation	had	to	comply	with	this	requirement.	
101	This	analysis	recalls	insights	from	the	‘Europeanisation	literature’,	according	to	which	decisions	taken	
in	 the	 international	 or	 supranational	 arena	 create	 pressures	 that	 interact	 with	 and	 alter	 domestic	
dynamics.	(Thatcher,	2007,	2009).		
102	See	for	example	the	New	York	Times	article	‘Why	They	Killed	Chico	Mendes’	by	James	Brooke.	August	
19,	1990.	Available	at:	http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/19/books/why-they-killed-chico-mendes.html	
Accessed	04/07/2016.	
103	 For	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 Chico	 Mendes’	 death	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 socio-
environmentalism	 in	 Brazil	 see	 Hochstetler	 and	 Keck,	 2007,	 Chapter	 3	 –	 also	 explored	 in	 the	 third	
chapter	of	this	thesis.	
104	 Although	 the	 event	 of	 Chico	 Mendes’	 murdering	 had	 its	 effects	 due	 to	 the	 mobilisation	 of	 both	
national	 and	 international	 communities,	 it	 has	 been	 characterised	 as	 an	 ‘internal	 event’	 in	 this	 thesis	
because	of	 the	ACF’s	 differentiation	of	 internal	 events	 as	 those	more	 closely	 associated	 to	 the	policy	
subsystem.	I	sustain,	therefore,	that	this	event	was	predominantly	related	to	forest	and	environmental	
debates	rather	than	to	more	systemic	changes.	
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indirectly	linked	to	the	three	regulatory	changes	investigated	by	this	thesis,	namely,	by	
determining	 the	previous	balance	of	power	 that	was	 later	 reversed.	The	 influence	of	
these	 events	 in	 the	 coalitions’	 calculations	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits	 was,	 therefore,	
evident	during	the	analysis	of	the	cases,	which	provides	support	for	the	claim	that	cost	
and	 benefit	 calculations	 should	 be	 included	 among	 the	 causal	 pathways	 that	 link	
internal	events	and	policy	change.	
	
7.5.	Negotiated	Agreement	and	the	Importance	of	a	Hurting	Stalemate	
Negotiated	agreements	happen	in	“situations	in	which	coalitions	that	have	
been	fighting	for	decades	come	to	a	negotiated	agreement	representing	a	substantial	
change	from	the	status	quo”	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	p.	205).	The	analysis	of	the	
three	cases	indicated	that	negotiated	agreement	occurred	only	in	the	ABS	case	and	the	
investigation	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 variance	 underpinned	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
existence	of	a	‘hurting	stalemate’	in	that	case.		Considered	by	the	ACF	to	be	“the	most	
important	 [element]	 for	 instigating	 negotiations	 between	 coalitions”	 (Weible	 and	
Nohrstedt,	2013,	p.	132;	Weible	and	Jenkins-Smith,	2016,	p.	24)	a	hurting	stalemate	is	
defined	as	a	situation	in	which	all	parties	agree	to	negotiate	seriously	because	they	see	
the	 continuation	of	 the	 status	quo	as	unacceptable.	 Three	 criteria	were	drawn	 from	
the	 literature	 on	 collaborative	 governance	 and	 incorporated	 into	 this	 definition	 to	
guide	 the	 empirical	 analysis,	 namely,	 1)	 consequential	 incentives	 –	 situations	 that	
present	issues	as	salient	to	participants	and	the	timing	and	pressure	for	their	solution	
as	ripe,	2)	 interdependence	among	actors	and,	3)	uncertainty	(Emerson,	Nabatchi	and	
Balogh,	2011).	The	analysis	of	these	three	criteria	has	proved	sufficient	to	explain	the	
occurrence	of	negotiated	agreement	in	the	ABS	case.	The	empirical	findings	evidence,	
therefore,	 that	 this	 qualified	 definition	 of	 a	 hurting	 stalemate	might	 be	 a	 sufficient	
predictor	 of	 the	 occurrence	 of	 negotiated	 agreement	 and	 that	 the	 list	 of	 nine	
elements105	that	foster	negotiated	agreement	provided	by	Sabatier	and	Weible	(2007,	
pp.	205–206)	can	be	narrowed	down.	The	results	of	 the	empirical	assessment	of	 the	
																																								 																				
105	 The	 nine	 elements	 are:	 a	 hurting	 stalemate,	 broad	 representation,	 leadership,	 consensus	 decision	
rules,	 funding,	 commitment	 by	 actors,	 the	 importance	 of	 empirical	 issues,	 trust,	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
alternative	venues	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	2007,	pp.	205–206).	
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three	elements	used	here	to	identify	a	hurting	stalemate	are	summarised	in	the	table	
below	and	explained	in	the	following	paragraphs.	
	
Table	31	-	Comparative	analysis	of	the	occurrence	of	a	hurting	stalemate	between	cases	
Hurting	stalemate	 Forest	 ABS	 Pesticides	
Consequential	incentives	 Low	 High	 Low	
Interdependence	among	actors	 Low	 High	 Low	
Uncertainty	 Low	 High	 Low	
NEGOTIATED	AGREEMENT	 NO	 YES	
(among	 two	 of	 the	 three	
coalitions)	
NO	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
	
As	 can	 be	 gleaned	 from	 table	 31,	 in	 two	 of	 the	 three	 cases	 (forests	 and	
pesticides)	 none	 of	 the	 three	 drivers	 of	 negotiated	 agreement	 investigated	 were	
present.	In	the	forest	case,	for	instance,	incentives	for	negotiation	were	not	perceived	
by	 all	 coalitions	 to	 be	 sufficiently	 pressing.	 Only	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition	
had	pressing	incentives	to	negotiate	due	to	the	effects	that	the	stricter	enforcement	of	
previous	 forest	 laws	 would	 have	 on	 farmers.	 For	 the	 preservationist	 coalition	 the	
previous	regulation	was	satisfactory	and	no	negotiation	in	order	to	change	it	was	seen	
as	 necessary.	 The	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalition,	 in	 turn,	 preferred	 to	
avoid	 negotiations	 due	 to	 the	 unpopular	 character	 of	 the	 topic,	 and	 due	 to	 the	
potential	 for	 negative	 electoral	 consequences	 for	 the	 government	 (interview	 42).	
Similarly,	uncertainty	around	the	outcomes	of	keeping	 the	previous	 forest	 regulation	
was	low	because	the	government	had	already	issued	a	decree	determining	a	date	for	
enforcement	 to	 begin.	 Interdependence	 among	 coalitions	was	 also	 low	 because	 the	
proposers	of	the	regulatory	change	(the	neo-developmentalist	coalition)	had	sufficient	
political	power	to	pass	the	regulation	without	negotiations	with	other	groups.		
A	 similar	 absence	 of	 a	 hurting	 stalemate	 was	 identified	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
pesticide	case.	Consequential	 incentives	were	not	identified	because	members	of	the	
socio-environmentalist/preservationist	 coalition	 never	 agreed	 that	 regulations	 and	
institutions	in	charge	of	the	registration	process	should	be	altered.	ANVISA	(the	health	
agency)	 and	 the	 members	 of	 the	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalition	 also	
opposed	 the	 reforms	 and	 pleaded	 simply	 for	 more	 staff	 and	 resources	 to	 make	
registration	quicker.	Thus,	only	the	neo-developmentalists	had	incentives	to	alter	the	
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regulation.	Interdependence	among	actors	was	also	low	in	this	case	because	the	neo-
developmentalist	 coalition	 (which	had	enough	political	 power	 to	pass	 the	 regulatory	
changes	without	negotiation)	was	the	proposer	of	the	changes.	Finally,	there	was	little	
uncertainty	 around	 the	 outcomes	 of	 continuing	 with	 the	 same	 regulations,	 as	 the	
consequences	were	already	very	clear	to	all	actors	(such	as	delays	in	the	registration	of	
new	products)	and	there	were	no	international	or	other	influences	that	could	change	
them.	
In	the	ABS	case,	on	the	other	hand,	the	three	elements	that	characterise	a	
hurting	 stalemate	were	present	or	at	 least	partially	present	among	 two	of	 the	 three	
coalitions	 (administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 and	 neo-developmentalist	 coalitions).	
The	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 Nagoya	 Protocol	 generated	 consequential	 incentives	 for	
both	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	and	the	neo-developmentalist	coalitions	
to	 negotiate	 a	 new	 law.	 For	 the	 former	 it	 accentuated	 the	 fear	 of	 increased	
international	 competition	 arising	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 other	 countries	 would	 start	 to	
regulate	 the	 issue	 (in	 a	 potentially	 less	 restrictive	 way	 than	 in	 Brazil)	 and	 also	
augmented,	by	increasing	international	visibility	to	the	issue,	business	uncertainty	for	
Brazilian	companies	who	were	not	compliant	with	 the	previous	 law	 (it	 increased,	 for	
instance,	the	risk	of	companies	to	be	called	illegal,	and	to	be	part	of	‘name	and	shame’	
strategies	 promoted	 by	 international	 NGOs).	 For	 the	 latter	 coalition,	 consequential	
incentives	 increased	 because	 of	 the	 concern	 about	 the	 need	 to	 share	 benefits	 with	
other	 countries	 for	 the	 use	 of	 genetic	 resources	 of	 foreign	 origin	 in	 agricultural	
products.	The	uncertainties	generated	by	these	possibilities	were	also	high	for	the	two	
groups.	 Finally,	 each	 group	 depended	 on	 the	 other	 to	 have	 the	 new	 law	 approved,	
what	 made	 them	 interdependent.	 The	 administrative	 economic	 rationalist	 coalition	
depended	on	 the	majority	of	 the	Congress’s	 rural	 caucus	voting	 to	approve	 the	new	
law,	 while	 the	 neo-developmentalist	 group	 depended	 on	 the	 bill	 elaborated	 by	 the	
administrative	economics	rationalists	to	regulate	the	issue	before	the	Nagoya	Protocol	
was	 ratified	 by	 Brazil	 (and	 could	 generate	 any	 negative	 effects	 for	 the	 agri-business	
sector).	There	were,	therefore,	high	uncertainties	and	interdependence	between	these	
two	 coalitions,	 which	 were	 also	 attributed	 to	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 Nagoya	
Protocol	 one	 year	 earlier.	 This	 analysis,	 therefore,	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 importance	 of	
international	 regulations	 and	 context	 for	 the	 alteration	 of	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	
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domestic	 actors,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 led	 to	 negotiated	 agreement.	 Also	 in	 this	 case,	
cost/benefit	 calculations	 were	 a	 relevant	 causal	 pathway	 through	 which	 negotiated	
agreement	led	to	regulatory	change.		
	
7.6.	Learning	through	‘Elite	Networking’		
According	to	Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith	(1988,	p.	155)	the	first	condition	for	
policy-oriented	learning	to	occur	is	that	“both	sides	have	sufficient	technical	resources	
to	 be	 able	 to	 criticize	 the	 other’s	 causal	model	 and	 data”.	 Although	 the	 framework	
does	not	consider	external	researchers	(i.e.	university	scientists,	consultants	and	policy	
analysts)	 to	 be	 the	 only	 sources	 of	 technical	 information	 in	 debates,	 it	 gives	 a	
privileged	role	to	the	contribution	of	these	actors	in	the	analysis	of	processes	of	policy	
change	 (Sabatier	 and	Weible,	 2007,	 p.	 192).	 This	 thesis	 qualifies	 this	 conception	 of	
policy-oriented	learning	by	calling	attention	to	the	role	of	elites	and	‘elite	networking’	
as	 important	 sources	 of	 technical	 information	 and	 motivators	 of	 learning.	 Elite	
networking	 is	 defined	 by	 Bennett	 (1991,	 p.	 224)	 as	 “an	 identifiable	 elite	 bound	 by	
knowledge	 and	 expertise	 of	 a	 common	 policy	 problem	 and	 a	 shared	 concern	 for	 its	
resolution”.		
The	role	of	communities	of	experts	(or	epistemic	communities)	in	learning	has	
been	 extensively	 debated	 from	 a	 transnational	 perspective	 in	 the	 literature	 about	
epistemic	 communities	 (Haas,	 1992),	 but	 less	 attention	 has	 been	 dedicated	 to	 the	
experts	who	are	explicit	parts	of	the	coalitions	debating	issues	in	domestic	contexts.	I	
maintain	 that	 these	 actors	 might	 be	 particularly	 relevant	 in	 contexts	 such	 as	 the	
Brazilian	one,	in	which	the	political	system	is	relatively	closed	to	the	participation	and	
influence	 of	 external	 actors	 due	 to	 a	 deep-seated	 tradition	 of	 log-rolling	 and	
clientelism	as	the	main	routes	of	access	to	political	decision-making	processes.	This	is	a	
crucial	 contribution	 of	 this	 thesis	 to	 the	 ACF,	 to	which	 I	 return	 to	 in	 the	 concluding	
chapter	(chapter	8).	
	As	demonstrated	by	the	ABS	case	(which	was	the	only	case	in	which	learning	
occurred	 among	 the	 case	 studies	 analysed),	 learning	may	 also	 be	 promoted	 by	 the	
interaction	 of	 members	 of	 the	 coalitions	 themselves,	 insofar	 as	 they	 have	 enough	
technical	 knowledge	 and	 incentives	 to	 share	 and	 learn	 from	 each	 other.	 In	 this	
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particular	case,	 the	 interactions	between	 the	bio-industry	and	representatives	of	 the	
agribusiness	led	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	and	the	neo-developmentalist	
coalitions	 to	 learn	 about	 each	 other’s	 business	 models	 and	 converge	 towards	 a	
consensual	alteration	of	 the	bill.	 This	was	made	possible	by	 the	 shared	 incentives	of	
both	coalitions	 to	agree	on	a	new	regulation	and	by	 their	expertise	about	 their	own	
business	areas	(Bennett,	1991,	p.	224).	
	This	 proposal	 for	 a	 reformulated	 definition	 of	 policy-oriented	 learning	
resonates	with	the	view	of	learning	advanced	by	McBeth,	Jones	and	Shanahan	(2014,	
e-book,	56%)	according	to	which	“the	acceptance	of	a	new	policy	narrative	in	a	policy	
subsystem	might	 equate	 to	 a	 form	of	 policy	 learning,	 even	when	 scientific	 evidence	
remains	constant.	Thus,	changes	in	underlying	narratives	not	necessarily	linked	to	the	
arguments	 of	 scientists	 or	 external	 policy	 analysts	 may	 prompt	 policy	 learning	 and	
change”.	This	qualification	of	the	concept	of	learning	is,	thus,	supported	by	this	thesis’s	
empirical	analysis	and	contributes	to	the	development	of	the	ACF.	Therefore,	although	
the	 importance	 of	 analytic	 debate	 based	 on	 neutral	 technical	 information	 is	 not	
discarded,	 emphasis	 should	 also	 be	 given	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 learning	 through	 elite	
networking.	 Table	 4	 below	 provides	 a	 summary	 of	 the	 results	 of	 the	 analysis	 of	
learning	in	the	three	cases,	which	is	briefly	described	in	the	subsequent	paragraphs.	
	
Table	32	-	Summary	of	findings	about	the	occurrence	of	learning	
Forestry	 No	learning	among	coalitions	
Pesticides	 No	learning	among	coalitions	
ABS	 Learning	through	‘elite	networking’	between	neo-developmentalists	and	administrative	
economic	rationalists.	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
	
As	demonstrated	by	 the	empirical	 analysis,	 policy	makers	did	not	 rely	on	
scientific	 information	 to	 advance	 their	 arguments	 in	 any	 of	 the	 case	 studies.	 As	 a	
consequence,	 policy-oriented	 learning	 as	 strictly	 defined	 by	 the	 ACF	 did	 not	 occur.	
Learning	through	‘elite	networking’	was,	however,	found	to	have	occurred	in	the	ABS	
case	due	to	interactions	between	the	administrative	economic	rationalist	and	the	neo-
developmentalist	 coalitions.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 production	 of	 scientific	 studies	 or	 the	
participation	 of	 scientists	 as	 providers	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 to	 support	 debates	was	
perceived	to	be	even	less	notable	than	in	the	other	two	cases.	Although	the	SBPC,	the	
CNPq	 (the	 National	 Council	 for	 Scientific	 and	 Technological	 Development	 in	 the	
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Ministry	 of	 Science	 and	 Technology)	 and	 scientists	 from	 EMBRAPA	 (the	 agricultural	
research	agency	 from	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture)	were	 involved	 in	 the	debate,	 they	
participated	as	coalition	actors	and	not	as	providers	of	technical	information.	Scientific	
analysis	was	not	used	or	presented	in	public	debates	on	the	topic.	Despite	the	absence	
of	scientific	contributions	to	the	debates,	learning	and	convergence	of	policy	proposals	
occurred	through	‘elite	networking’.	
In	the	forest	case,	although	the	Brazilian	Society	for	the	Progress	of	Science	
(SBPC)	 directly	 contributed	 to	 the	 debates	 of	 the	 Lower	 Chamber	 through	 a	
systematised	 report	 with	 scientific	 evidence	 related	 to	 the	most	 contentious	 points	
being	 debated,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 types	 of	 arguments	 proffered	 by	 key	 coalition	
participants	 before	 and	 after	 this	 evidence	 was	 produced,	 revealed	 no	 significant	
impact	on	their	narratives	or	any	kinds	of	redefinitions	of	their	understandings	of	the	
issue.	Additionally,	a	scientist	who	participated	in	the	elaboration	of	the	report	further	
confirmed	 this	 evidence	 by	 observing	 that	 their	 efforts	 were	 not	 considered	 in	 the	
policy-making	 process	 of	 the	 new	 Forest	 Code,	 neither	 by	 legislators	 nor	 by	 the	
executive	government	(interview	30).	
The	 pesticide	 case	 revealed	 a	 similar	 picture	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 absence	 of	
policy-oriented	 learning	 (or	 any	 other	 type	 of	 learning)	 among	 coalitions.	 Although	
scientific	evidence	was	used	 in	 the	debates	of	 the	Lower	Chamber	 (such	as	evidence	
regarding	 the	high	 incidence	of	contamination	of	breast-milk	 in	women	of	Rio-Verde	
used	by	 the	preservationist/socio-environmentalist	 coalition	or	 that	 the	poisoning	of	
rural	workers	was	actually	very	infrequent,	as	argued	by	a	scientist	invited	by	the	neo-
developmentalist	coalition)	this	evidence	was	always	considered	to	be	biased	and	was	
dismissed	 by	 members	 of	 opposing	 coalitions.	 Actual	 analytical	 debate	 and	 the	
refinement	 of	 positions	 after	 scrutinising	 scientific	 evidence	 did	 not	 happen	 as	
participants	perceived	the	scientific	evidence	to	be	biased	and	unreliable.	
In	sum,	the	empirical	findings	revealed	that,	at	 least	 in	the	Brazilian	context,	
scientists	and	policy	analysts	had	very	few	of	its	contributions	adopted	in	the	process	
of	regulatory	change.	Even	the	impact	of	the	international	scientific	community,	which	
is	often	stronger	 than	the	 impact	of	national	 scientists	could	not	be	 identified	 in	 the	
data.	 In	 the	 only	 case	 in	 which	 learning	 was	 identified,	 the	 most	 crucial	 players	
involved	 in	 the	process	of	 learning	were	not	 found	to	be	scientists	or	policy	analysts	
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but	members	of	the	coalitions,	particularly	from	the	bio-industry	and	agri-business.	It	
is	argued,	therefore,	that	the	concept	of	‘policy-oriented	learning’	should	be	qualified	
to	consider	the	role	of	actors	who	are	part	of	the	coalitions	(and	not	only	of	allegedly	
independent	of	 external	 analysts),	 particularly	 in	 situation	 in	which	 there	are	 shared	
incentives	 for	 learning.	 This	 finding	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	 contexts	 such	 as	 the	
Brazilian	 one,	 in	 which	 the	 openness	 of	 the	 political	 system	 to	 the	 participation	 of	
external	actors	is	limited.		This	is,	moreover,	a	central	contribution	of	this	thesis	to	the	
ACF	as	it	expands	the	concept	of	‘policy	oriented	learning’	pointing	to	the	importance	
of	alternative	sources	of	information	as	potentially	relevant	for	learning,	as	far	as	these	
sources	 are	 considered	 legitimate	 by	 coalition	 actors	 (McBeth,	 Jones	 and	 Shanahan,	
2014,	e-book,	56%).	It	 is	sustained,	therefore,	that	as	far	as	actors	display	knowledge	
(scientific	 or	 not;	 independent	 or	 not)	 and	 a	 shared	 concern	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 a	
problem,	there	is	potential	for	learning	to	occur.	In	the	particular	context	of	Brazil	(in	
which	there	is	low	political	openness)	the	role	of	elites	taking	part	in	the	coalitions	was	
found	to	be	fundamental	for	learning	to	occur.	
	
7.7.	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	compared	 the	 three	case	studies	 in	 relation	 to	 the	main	
analytic	parameters	investigated	by	this	thesis	and	reinforced	the	main	implications	of	
this	 comparison	 to	 the	 ACF	 and	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 Brazilian	 environmental	 policy	
change.	It	has	advanced	five	main	claims.	First,	it	maintains	that	the	predominance	of	
the	 neo-developmentalist	 coalition	 across	 cases	 characterises	 a	 pattern	 that	
represents	 a	 rupture	with	 the	 two	 previous	 decades	 that	were	 characterised	 by	 the	
predominance	 of	 socio-environmentalist	 perspectives	 in	 environmental	 regulations.	
This	finding	is	further	supported	by	secondary	literature	focused	on	related	areas	such	
as	the	environmental	licensing	of	large	infrastructure	projects,	mining,	and	sugar	cane	
production	 in	 the	 cerrado	 biome.	 Second,	 the	 chapter	 has	 advanced	 that	 the	
predominance	 of	 neo-developmentalist	 discourse	 between	 2005	 and	 2015	 was	
motivated	and	accompanied	by	not	only	external	events	that	increased	the	economic	
and	political	power	of	 large	economic	 sectors	of	 the	 country	 (such	as	agri-business),	
but	 also	 by	 a	 legitimising	 narrative	 from	 the	Workers’	 Party,	 which	 emphasises	 the	
importance	of	 these	 sectors	and	of	developmentalist	policies	 for	 the	continuation	of	
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social	inclusion	programmes.	This	narrative	was	used	to	avoid	electoral	consequences	
of	 the	 environmental	 contradictions	 associated	 with	 recent	 regulatory	 and	 policy	
changes,	moving	the	focus	away	from	them	and	towards	income	redistribution.	These	
findings	advance,	moreover,	the	notion	that	both	interests	and	ideas	matter	for	policy	
change.		
Third,	 this	 chapter	 has	 noted	 that	 internal	 events	 identified	 as	 relevant	
sources	 of	 regulatory	 change	 across	 the	 case	 studies	 pointed	 consistently	 to	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 changes	 in	 incentives	 as	 a	 cause	 of	 actors’	 mobilisation	 for	
regulatory	change.	The	four	categories	of	internal	events	identified	shared	a	common	
role	in	altering	actors’	costs	and	benefit	calculations	in	relation	to	previous	regulations.	
Fourth,	 the	 implications	of	 the	comparison	of	 the	three	case	studies	 for	 the	study	of	
negotiated	agreement	were	 that	 the	analysis	of	 the	existence	of	a	hurting	stalemate	
might	provide	a	more	parsimonious	alternative	 for	explaining	negotiated	agreement.	
Inputs	 from	 the	 literature	 on	 collaborative	 governance	 were	 used	 to	 qualify	 the	
definition	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 hurting	 stalemate	 with	 three	 criteria,	 namely,	
consequential	 incentives,	 uncertainty	 and	 interdependence	 among	 actors,	 the	
relevance	 of	 which	 was	 confirmed	 through	 the	 empirical	 analysis	 of	 the	 cases.	
Additionally,	the	analysis	has	shown	that	international	regulations	and	negotiations	are	
particularly	 important	 for	 the	generation	of	a	hurting	stalemate,	as	demonstrated	by	
the	case	of	the	Nagoya	Protocol.		
Fifth,	 the	 empirical	 findings	 revealed	 that	 the	 contribution	 of	 external	
scientists	or	policy	analysts	might	not	be	necessary	for	learning	between	coalitions	to	
take	place,	and	highlighted	the	role	of	elites	which	are	part	of	the	coalitions	and	share	
technical	 information.	 A	 claim	 for	 the	 broadening	 of	 the	 focus	 of	 policy-oriented	
learning	to	a	larger	category	of	actors	and	types	of	information	was	made,	therefore,	
advancing	McBeth,	Jones	and	Shanahan	(2014	e-book,	56%)	view	of	learning	according	
to	which	“changes	in	underlying	narratives	not	necessarily	linked	to	the	arguments	of	
scientists	 or	 external	 policy	 analysts	 may	 prompt	 policy	 learning	 and	 change”.	 The	
chapter	 has	 emphasised,	 in	 this	manner,	 the	 need	 to	 qualify	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘policy-
oriented	 learning’	 in	 order	 to	 allow	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 ‘elite	 networking’	 as	 a	
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considered	 to	 be	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 countries	 with	 fairly	 inaccessible	 political	
systems	such	as	Brazil,	a	crucial	point	to	which	the	concluding	chapter	will	return.	
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CHAPTER	8	-	CONCLUSION	
	
	
8.1.	Introduction	
This	concluding	chapter	intends	to	draw	the	main	implications	of	this	thesis	
for	wider	theoretical	and	empirical	debates	and	qualify	them	in	relation	to	the	specific	
social	 and	 political	 context	 of	 Brazil.	 Additionally,	 it	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 limits	 of	 the	
conclusions	 reached,	 and	 illuminates	 potential	 paths	 for	 continuing	 inquiry.	 The	
chapter	starts	by	presenting	the	results	of	the	thesis	in	terms	of	the	assessment	of	the	
ACF	hypothesis	about	the	sufficiency	and	necessity	of	the	four	sources	of	policy	change	
(internal	events,	external	events,	negotiated	agreement	and	learning)	(section	8.2.1).	It	
maintains	 that	unless	 there	 is	 a	hurting	 stalemate,	only	 internal	 and	external	 events	
are	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	 among	 the	 four	 sources	
investigated.	Section	8.2.2,	in	turn,	emphasises	the	importance	of	a	hurting	stalemate	
for	 both	 learning	 and	 negotiated	 agreement	 to	 occur.	 It	 supports	 that	 the	 fact	 that	
these	 phenomena	occurred	 despite	 the	 unfavourable	 opportunity	 structure	 of	 Brazil	
strengthens	the	case	for	the	 importance	of	the	effect	of	a	hurting	stalemate.	Section	
8.3	 is	 dedicated	 to	 summarising	 this	 thesis’s	 contributions	 to	 wider	 theoretical	 and	
empirical	debates.	Regarding	theoretical	debates,	the	first	part	of	section	8.3	reflects	
on	the	potential	of	the	ACF	to	incorporate	both	interests	and	normative	values	among	
its	 explanatory	 factors.	 It	 assesses	 criticisms	 that	 have	 been	 directed	 to	 the	 ACF	 by	
both	 argumentativist	 and	 positivist	 scholars,	 and	 emphasises	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	
thesis	addresses	these	criticisms.	This	section	concludes	that	both	interests	and	ideas	
have	a	place	in	applications	of	the	ACF	and	that	the	methodological	difficulties	of	the	
framework	can	be	addressed	through	the	use	of	narrative	analysis.	The	second	part	of	
section	 8.3	 debates	 interpretations	 of	 what	 claims	 about	 the	 ‘roll-back’	 in	 Brazilian	
environmental	standards	mean.	It	problematizes,	moreover,	whether	these	claims	are	
not	 a	 misinterpretation	 of	 an	 alternative	 regulatory	 logic	 being	 advanced	 by	 the	
government.	 Finally,	 section	 8.4	 concludes,	 summarising	 the	 answers	 to	 the	 four	
research	questions	posed	in	the	first	section	of	the	introductory	chapter.	
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8.2.	Results:	What	Explains	Regulatory	Change	in	the	Brazilian	Case?	
8.2.1.	Sources	of	Policy	Change:	What	is	Sufficient?	What	is	Necessary?		
This	thesis	investigated	the	four	sources	of	policy	change	advanced	by	the	
ACF	in	relation	to	three	cases	of	Brazilian	regulatory	changes	–	forestry,	pesticides,	and	
access	 to	 genetic	 resources	 and	 benefit	 sharing.	 The	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	
investigated	 were:	 1)	 external	 (i.e.	 systemic)	 events,	 which	 refer	 to	 changes	 in	
socioeconomic	 conditions,	 changes	 in	 public	 opinion,	 changes	 in	 the	 systemic	
governing	 coalition	 and	 changes	 in	 other	 policy	 subsystems	 (Sabatier	 and	 Weible,	
2007,	pp.	198–199);	2)	internal	events,	meaning	events	that	are	directly	related	to	the	
policy	sector	under	investigation	(policy	proximate	events);	3)	policy-oriented	learning,	
defined	as	“relatively	enduring	alternations	of	thought	or	behavioural	 intentions	that	
result	 from	 experience	 and/or	 new	 information	 and	 that	 are	 concerned	 with	 the	
attainment	 or	 revision	 of	 policy	 objectives”	 and	 is	 achieved	 through	 analytical	 or	
informed	debate	between	coalitions	 	(Sabatier	and	Jenkins-Smith,	1999,	p.	123;	1988	
p.	155)	and	4)	negotiated	agreement,	consisting	 in	“agreements	 involving	policy	core	
changes	[that]	are	crafted	among	previously	warring	coalitions”	(Sabatier	and	Weible,	
2007,	p.	205).	According	to	the	ACF,	these	four	sources	of	change	or	some	combination	
of	them	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient	for	policy	change	to	occur.106	The	tracing	of	any	
of	these	paths	(or	combination	of	them)	from	its	manifestation	to	actual	policy	change	
has	 been	 highlighted	 in	 the	 ACF	 literature	 as	 an	 underdeveloped	 area	 of	 the	
framework	 (Weible	 &	 Nohrstedt,	 2012,	 p.	 133)	 to	 which	 this	 thesis	 aimed	 to	
contribute.		
The	 empirical	 findings	 indicate	 that	 of	 the	 four	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	
investigated,	 internal	 and	 external	 events	 were	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 sources	 of	
regulatory	 change	 in	 two	of	 the	 three	 cases.	 This	qualifies	 the	ACF’s	hypothesis	 that	
the	 four	 sources,	 or	 some	 combination	 of	 them,	 are	 necessary,	 but	 not	 sufficient,	
sources	 of	 policy	 change.	 In	 the	 forestry	 and	 pesticide	 cases,	 regulatory	 change	
																																								 																				
106	 The	ACF’s	hypothesis	 states	 that	 “significant	perturbations	 external	 to	 the	 subsystem,	a	 significant	
perturbation	 internal	 to	 the	 subsystem,	 policy-oriented	 learning,	 negotiated	 agreement	 or	 some	
combination	thereof,	are	necessary,	but	not	sufficient	sources	of	change	in	the	policy	core	attributes	of	a	
governmental	programme”	(Weible	and	Nohrstedt,	2013,	p.	133).	
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occurred	despite	 the	absence	of	 learning	and	negotiated	agreement	between	actors	
from	different	coalitions.	Nevertheless,	the	findings	 imply	that	negotiated	agreement	
and	 learning	might	 be	 necessary	 for	 policy	 change	 in	 situations	 in	 which	 there	 is	 a	
hurting	stalemate.	The	analysis	of	the	ABS	case	revealed	a	situation	in	which	learning	
and	 negotiated	 agreement	 were	 crucial	 for	 the	 resulting	 regulatory	 change,	 even	
though	 these	 were	 intervening	 variables	 activated	 by	 internal	 and	 external	 events,	
rather	than	the	original	causes	of	regulatory	change.	The	comparison	of	this	latter	case	
with	the	first	two	pointed	to	the	importance	of	three	main	factors	that	were	used	to	
qualify	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 ‘hurting	 stalemate’,	 namely,	 high	 interdependency	 among	
coalitions	 to	 achieve	 their	 regulatory	 or	 policy	 objectives,	 uncertainty	 about	 the	
consequences	 of	 non-negotiation,	 and	 consequential	 incentives,	 the	 perception	 or	
prediction	 of	 future	 negative	 consequences	 as	 a	 result	 of	 non-negotiation.	 In	 short,	
negotiated	 agreement	 and	 learning	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 necessary	 intermediate	
variables	that	link	events	(external	and	internal)	and	policy	change	in	situations	of	high	
uncertainty,	 interdependence	and	with	consequential	 incentives.	The	resulting	causal	
pathway	identified	in	this	analysis	is	summarised	in	line	3	of	figure	14,	which	has	also	
been	explained	in	chapter	2	(section	2.3.5):	
	
	
Figure	14	-	Summary	of	the	causal	pathways	to	policy	change	
Source:	produced	by	the	author	
	
	
8.2.2	What	is	the	Impact	of	Opportunity	Structures?	
Although	 revealing	 about	 the	 pathways	 of	 policy	 change	 in	 Brazil,	 the	
generalisation	of	this	causal	pathway	to	other	contexts	should	be	cautiously	pursued.	A	
common	 criticism	 addressed	 to	 the	 ACF	 is	 that,	 in	 its	 aim	 to	 produce	 generalisable	
hypotheses,	it	does	not	properly	consider	the	role	of	the	social	and	historical	contexts	
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(Hajer,	1995,	p.	5;	Fischer,	2003,	p.	101).	Taking	this	criticism	into	account,	chapter	2	
developed	a	debate	about	the	‘opportunity	structures’	of	Brazil,	or,	in	other	words,	the	
“relatively	 enduring	 features	 of	 a	 polity	 that	 affect	 the	 resources	 and	 constraints	 of	
subsystem	actors”	(Sabatier	and	Weible	2007,	p.	200).	The	analysis	pursued	in	chapter	
2	maintained	 that	Brazil	 has	 low	 levels	 of	 political	 openness	 and	 requires	 a	medium	
degree	 of	 consensus	 for	 decisions	 to	 take	 place.	 I	 now	 provide	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
implications	of	this	particular	opportunity	structure	on	the	analysis	of	the	four	sources	
of	policy	change	pursued	by	this	thesis	and	well	as	an	elaboration	of	its	impacts	for	the	
within-case	comparison.	
	
Table	33	-	Summary	of	Brazilian	opportunity	structure	
Openness	of	
political	system	
Degree	of	consensus	needed	for	major	policy	change	
High	 Medium	 Low	
High	 Pluralist	 Pluralist	 	
Medium	 Recent	corporatist	 Westminster	 	
Low	 Traditional	corporatist	 Brazil	 Authoritarian	executive	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	with	inspiration	from	Sabatier	and	Weible	(2007,	p.	201)	
	
Regarding	 internal	 and	 external	 events,	 the	 analysis	 has	 shown	 that	 the	
way	 in	which	 they	 redistribute	 resources	 and	 alter	 the	 costs	 to	 different	 actors	 has	
been	proven	to	be	an	effective	trigger	of	mobilisation	for	regulatory	change	in	Brazil.	
Because	 of	 the	 country’s	 low	 political	 system’s	 openness,	 however,	 the	 groups	with	
direct	access	to	political	power	(i.e.	those	that	had	representatives	in	the	executive	or	
in	 the	 National	 Congress)	 were	 those	 most	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 decisive	 influence	 on	
regulatory	 decisions.	 Interest	 groups	 who	 participated	 in	 the	 debates,	 but	 had	 less	
official	 representation	 in	 the	 government	 (such	 as	 indigenous	 and	 traditional	
communities	 in	 the	ABS	 case,	 of	 preservationist	 scientists	 in	 the	 forestry	 case)	were	
found	to	have	less	impact	on	the	final	regulatory	changes,	even	if	their	demands	were	
often	visible	and	supported	by	 the	media.	The	medium	degree	of	 consensus	needed	
for	 the	 regulatory	 changes	 to	 take	 place	 often	 led	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 these	 groups	
from	 final	 decisions.	 Policy	 decisions	 could	 be	 made	 by	 the	 National	 Congress	 and	
executive	power	alone,	even	if	extremely	unpopular	among	specific	groups	(as	was	the	
case	 with	 the	 Forest	 code	 and	 the	 preservationist	 coalition)	 and	 even	 if	 these	 two	
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institutions	had	not	reached	an	agreement	(as	they	could	use	vetoes	and	amendments	
on	each	other’s	proposals	–	as	also	epitomised	by	the	forestry	case).	
The	 impact	of	Brazil’s	opportunity	 structure	was	also	 relevant	 to	 learning	
and	negotiated	agreement.	As	observed	in	the	previous	chapter,	these	two	sources	of	
policy	 change	 were	 not	 identified	 in	 two	 out	 of	 the	 three	 cases	 investigated.	 It	 is	
argued	that	this	result	was	affected	by	the	opportunity	structure	of	the	country	 in	at	
least	 two	 ways.	 First,	 in	 a	 context	 of	 low	 political	 openness,	 the	 opinions	 of	
independent	 experts,	 scientists	 or	 analysts	 have	 more	 difficulty	 reaching	 and	 being	
considered	 in	 political	 debates.	 Even	 if	 they	 are	 requested	 by	 the	 policy	 makers	
themselves	–	as	was	the	case	in	the	forestry	and	pesticide	case	–	they	might	simply	be	
ignored	 in	 actual	 decision	 making	 without	 any	 severe	 consequences.	 This	 is	 also	
related	to	the	medium	degree	of	consensus	needed	for	major	policy	change	to	occur,	
which	naturally	reduces	the	necessity	of	negotiation	with	groups	that	are	not	decisive	
in	the	voting	process.	The	ample	opportunities	for	the	executive	and	legislative	powers	
to	use	regulatory-changing	mechanisms	that	are	not	dependent	on	negotiations,	such	
as	 vetoes	 and	 amendments,	 although	 useful	 for	 avoiding	 deadlocks	 and	 approving	
contentious	 bills,	 reduced	 the	 necessity	 of	 negotiation	 with	 external	 actors	 or	 even	
between	these	two	branches	of	the	government	themselves.	 In	a	context	of	reduced	
political	openness	and	medium	consensus	requirements	 for	major	policy	change,	 the	
occurrence	 of	 these	 two	 more	 interaction-based	 types	 of	 drivers	 –	 learning	 and	
negotiated	agreement	–	 is,	 thus,	hampered.	Their	 ‘necessity’	 for	policy	change	 in	the	
Brazilian	context,	might,	therefore,	not	be	comparable	to	their	necessity	in	other	more	
consensual	 and	 open	 political	 systems,	 which	 is	 a	 crucial	 impact	 of	 Brazilian	
opportunity	structure	for	this	analysis.		
The	 low	 political	 openness	 and	 medium	 level	 of	 consensus	 required	 for	
decisions	to	take	place	also	contributed	decisively	to	the	differences	identified	among	
the	three	cases	in	terms	of	the	occurrence	of	learning	and	negotiated	agreement.		The	
fact	 that	 there	was	 a	 politically	 powerful	 coalition	 that	was	 not	 directly	 part	 of	 the	
government	 in	 the	ABS	 case	 (the	business	or	 administrative	 rationalist	 coalition)	but	
not	 in	 the	other	 two	cases	 is	 found	to	be	a	crucial	determinant	of	 the	occurrence	of	
negotiation	 and	 learning	 in	 this	 case	 but	 not	 in	 the	 other	 two.	 Because	 of	 the	 low	
political	 openness	 of	 the	 system,	 less	 powerful	 actors	 such	 as	 environmentalist	 and	
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indigenous	groups	–	active	 in	 the	 three	 cases	analysed	 -	did	not	have	 the	 chance	 to	
fully	 interfere	with	the	results	of	policy	changes	 in	any	of	the	cases.	Additionally,	the	
medium	level	of	consensus	requires	allowed	members	of	the	executive	and	legislative	
powers	 to	 push	 the	 approval	 of	 reforms,	 even	 without	 much	 negotiation	 in	 the	
pesticides	 and	 forestry	 cases	 because	 none	 of	 the	 opposing	 groups	 had	 enough	
political	 power	 to	 avoid	 it.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 a	 crucial	 implication	 arising	 from	 this	
within	case	comparison	regarding	the	impacts	of	Brazilian	opportunity	structure	on	the	
occurrence	of	learning	and	negotiated	agreement	is	that	the	political	power	of	actors	
involved	 in	 each	 debate	 is	 a	 crucial	 variable	 to	 be	 considered.	 The	 involvement	 of	
powerful	 actors	 might	 drive	 negotiated	 agreements	 and	 learning	 despite	 the	
limitations	 imposed	by	the	contextual	variables,	what	makes	these	actors	even	more	
powerful	in	comparison	to	others.	In	other	words,	the	institutional	context	reinforces	
the	power	of	 very	 specific	 authors	who	are	already	powerful	 enough	 to	be	heard	 in	
negotiations	while	preventing	others	from	decisive	intervention.	
8.2.3.	Observing	Variation:	What	Motivates	Learning	and	Negotiated	Agreement?	
Despite	the	fact	that	the	above-described	contextual	characteristics	are	not	
conducive	to	negotiated	agreement	and	learning	in	Brazil,	negotiated	agreement	and	
learning	 still	 occurred	 in	 one	 of	 the	 cases	 (the	 ABS	 case).	 This	 unexpected	 variation	
among	 cases	 originally	 assumed	 to	 be	 ‘most-similar’	 opened	 the	 possibility	 for	 the	
investigation	of	 factors	conducive	to	 learning	and	negotiated	agreement,	or,	 in	other	
words,	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 what	 was	 different	 about	 the	 ABS	 case	 that	 motivated	
learning	and	negotiated	agreement	to	occur	in	that	case	but	not	in	the	others.		
Regarding	learning,	the	empirical	analysis	revealed	that	‘elite	networking’,	
defined	as	“an	identifiable	elite	bound	by	knowledge	and	expertise	of	a	common	policy	
problem	and	a	shared	concern	for	its	resolution”	(Bennett,	1991	p.	224)	led	two	of	the	
three	active	coalitions	in	the	ABS	case	to	learn	about	each	other’s	business	models	and	
logics	in	service	of	their	different	demands	and	priorities	in	the	process	of	amending	of	
the	 law.	 Members	 of	 the	 bio-industry	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	 agri-business	
gathered	behind	closed	doors	 to	 share	 technical	 knowledge	 (e.g.	 about	 reproductive	
material,	production	chains,	the	potential	impacts	of	different	options)	and	agreed	on	
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an	alternative	bill	that	was	acceptable	to	both	parties.	This	was,	therefore,	a	clear	case	
of	learning,	which	occurred	without	the	involvement	of	scientists	or	external	analysts.			
The	analysis	revealed	that	what	motivated	these	actors	to	learn	from	each	
other	was	 the	 same	 factor	 that	 led	 them	 to	negotiate,	 namely,	 a	 hurting	 stalemate.	
Defined	as	a	situation	in	which	consequential	incentives	(meaning	those	incentives	that	
make	 issues	 salient	 to	 participants	 and	 the	 timing	 and	 pressure	 for	 solutions	 ripe),	
uncertainty	 and	 interdependence	 among	actors	are	present,	 a	hurting	 stalemate	was	
only	 identified	 in	the	ABS	case	(as	debated	in	the	previous	chapter).	This	finding	has,	
therefore,	provided	 support	 for	 the	 identification	of	 this	 as	a	 crucial	 variable	 for	 the	
occurrence	of	 learning	and	negotiation,	even	 in	contexts	 less	prone	to	them,	such	as	
the	 Brazilian	 one.	 It	 is	 acknowledged,	 nonetheless,	 that	 the	 low	 number	 of	 cases	
investigated	by	this	thesis	and	the	fact	that	the	analysis	was	restricted	to	the	context	
of	 only	 one	 country	 reduces	 the	 strength	 of	 this	 finding,	 which	 should	 be	 further	
investigated.		
Finally,	 it	 is	 important	to	remark	that	these	findings	could	be	used	to	qualify	
the	ACF	hypothesis	about	policy	change,	thereby	producing	the	following	hypothesis:		
	
Significant	 perturbations	 external	 to	 the	 subsystem,	 a	 significant	 perturbation	
internal	to	the	subsystem,	policy-oriented	learning,	and	negotiated	agreement	are	
necessary	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	 insofar	 as	 a	 hurting	 stalemate	 exists.	 In	 the	
absence	 of	 a	 hurting	 stalemate,	 policy-oriented	 learning	 and	 negotiated	
agreement	are	not	necessary	sources	of	policy	change.	
	
	
This	 qualification	 adds	 further	 elements	 to	 the	 finding	 that	 negotiated	
agreement	and	policy-oriented	learning	are	not	necessary	sources	of	policy	change.	At	
last,	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 phenomena	 occurred	 despite	 the	 unfavourable	 opportunity	
structure	 of	 the	 country	 strengthens	 the	 case	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 a	
hurting	stalemate	in	motivating	learning	and	negotiation.	A	note	of	caution	should	be	
made,	however,	that	this	might	be	only	valid	in	countries	with	opportunity	structures	
similar	 to	 Brazil.	 The	 need	 for	 further	 examination	 of	 this	 qualified	 hypothesis	 in	
different	contexts	is	therefore	acknowledged.	
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8.3.	Contributions	to	Wider	Debates	
8.3.1.	Contributions	to	Theoretical	Debates	
8.3.1.1.	Can	the	ACF	incorporate	both	interests	and	normative	values	as	explanations	
of	policy	change?	
One	of	the	crucial	theoretical	debates	with	which	this	thesis	engages	is	the	
consideration	of	interests	in	the	development	of	the	ACF.	The	ACF	originally	emerged	
from	 efforts	 to	 incorporate	 beliefs	 into	 the	 analysis	 of	 public	 policies	 in	 a	 way	 that	
allowed	 for	 hypothesis	 testing,	 generalisation	 and	 theory	 development.	 The	
framework	 distanced	 itself,	 in	 this	 manner,	 from	 post-positivist	 or	 interpretivist	
approaches	 that	 traditionally	 emphasised	 the	 role	 of	 beliefs	 but	 were	 averse	 to	
attempts	at	generalisation.	One	of	the	main	innovations	of	the	ACF,	therefore,	was	to	
propose	 the	 assessment	 and	 use	 of	 beliefs	 through	 positivistic	 lenses	 that	 allow	 for	
generalisations	and	take	reality	as	given	and	not	socially	constructed.	Criticisms	of	the	
ACF	emerged,	however,	both	 from	positivist	 scholars	 (e.g.	Szarka,	2010;	Hann,	1995;	
Ladi,	 2005;	 Schlager,	 1995;	 Nohrstedt,	 2010;	 Parsons,	 1995),	 who	 perceived	 the	
framework	 to	 be	 insufficient	 in	 its	 consideration	 of	 material	 interests,	 and	 by	
argumentativists,	who	found	the	framework’s	assumptions	excessively	instrumentalist	
and	insufficiently	attentive	to	the	transformative	role	of	normative	values	(i.e.	Fischer,	
2003;	 Hajer,	 1995,	 McBeth,	 Jones	 and	 Shanahan,	 2014).	 In	 this	 section,	 the	 main	
criticisms	of	the	ACF	by	representatives	of	both	research	traditions	are	presented	and	
the	way	in	which	this	thesis	addresses	them	is	reinforced.		
From	an	interpretivist	perspective,	the	ACF	has	been	commonly	criticised	for	
its	positivist	nature	and	technocratic	bias	(Fisher,	2003;	McBeth,	Jones	and	Shanahan,	
2014;	 Hajer,	 1995).	 Fischer	 (2003),	 for	 instance,	 points	 to	 the	 framework’s	 limited	
consideration	 of	 ‘interpretive	 schemes’	 or	 normative	 values	 that	 actors	 use	 to	
interpret	facts.	As	observed	by	this	author,	the	ACF	improperly	considers	these	factors	
to	be	 ‘secondary’	or	 submissive	 to	 technical	 knowledge	and	empirical	 information	 in	
debates	 about	 policy-oriented	 learning.	 They	 neglect,	 thereby,	 “social	 and	 political	
aspects	 of	 learning”	 (Fischer,	 2003,	 pp.	 104–109).	 The	 framework	 is,	 moreover,	
accused	 of	 resting	 on	 “an	 outdated	 understanding	 of	 how	 science	 works”	 in	 which	
science	 is	 based	 on	 objective	 realities	 and	 ignores	 the	 social	 and	 historical	 context	
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from	which	 policy	 problems	 and	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	 generated	 (Fischer,	 2003,	 p.	
108–109)	A	similar	criticism	of	the	ACF’s	excessive	emphasis	on	the	role	of	technical	or	
scientific	 information	 in	 learning	 is	 also	 advanced	 by	 McBeth,	 Jones	 and	 Shanahan	
(2014,	 e-book,	 Section	 title	 ‘Policy	 Narrative	 and	 Policy	 Narrative	 Learning’,	 second	
paragraph,	56%)	According	to	these	authors	“the	acceptance	of	a	new	policy	narrative	
in	a	policy	subsystem	might	equate	to	a	form	of	policy	 learning,	even	when	scientific	
evidence	 remains	 constant”.	 Thus,	 changes	 in	 narratives	 not	 necessarily	 linked	 to	
scientific	arguments	might	also	promote	policy	 learning.	 	Finally,	the	ACF’s	treatment	
of	 ‘learning’	 is	 also	 criticised	 for	 its	 non-consideration	 of	 trust,	 credibility	 and	
acceptability	among	actors	as	factors	important	for	the	occurrence	of	learning	(Hajer,	
1995,	 p.	 8).	 Thus	 Hajer	 (1995,	 p.	 8)	 raises	 awareness	 of,	 and	 opposes,	 the	 “purely	
cognitivist	 criteria	 of	 persuasion”	 identified	 by	 the	 ACF	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 learning	
process.		
These	 criticisms	 have	 been	 addressed	 in	 this	 thesis	 through	 a	 detailed	
historical	 analysis	 of	 each	 of	 the	 policy	 subsystems	 under	 investigation,	 by	 tracing	
actors’	definitions	of	policy	problems	and	by	assessing	the	position	and	use	of	scientific	
information	within	broader	discursive	strategies.	Although	pre-determined	categories	
of	 discourses	 were	 used	 to	 allow	 for	 comparability	 between	 different	
conceptualisations	of	policy	problems,	these	categories	were	drawn	from	the	analysis	
of	 Brazilian	 environmental	 policy	 and	 are,	 thus,	 specifically	 tailored	 to	 the	 Brazilian	
context	and	history.	They	provide,	moreover,	a	comprehensive	analysis	of	‘interpretive	
schemes’	 and	 normative	 values	 historically	 associated	 with	 Brazilian	 environmental	
policy.	 The	 consideration	 of	 the	 role	 of	 ‘elites’	 and	 of	 ‘elite	 networking’107	 in	 the	
definition	 of	 learning	 proposed	 by	 this	 thesis	 tackles,	 moreover,	 both	 the	 criticism	
against	the	limits	of	the	information	considered	by	the	ACF	to	be	conducive	to	learning	
(which,	this	thesis	holds,	do	not	have	to	be	necessarily	scientific	or	technical),	as	well	
as	the	critique	against	the	“purely	cognitivist	criteria	of	persuasion”	(by	acknowledging,	
in	 the	 definition	 of	 elite	 networking,	 bonds	 of	 trust	 and	 mutual	 recognition	 arising	
from	similar	identities	in	the	negotiation,	e.g.	elites,	business	groups).	
																																								 																				
107	“An	identifiable	elite	bound	by	knowledge	and	expertise	of	a	common	policy	problem	and	a	shared	
concern	for	its	resolution”	(Bennett,	1991,	p.	224).	
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On	the	other	hand,	the	ACF	has	been	criticised	by	positivist	scholars	for	not	
adequately	 incorporating	 the	 role	 of	 either	 material	 interests	 or	 the	 interactions	
between	 ideas	 and	 interests	 in	 its	 hypotheses	 about	 coalition	 formation	 and	 policy	
change	 (Szarka,	 2010;	 Hann,	 1995;	 Ladi,	 2005;	 Schlager,	 1995;	Nohrstedt,	 2010).	On	
this	 issue,	 even	 Sabatier	 and	 Jenkins-Smith	 (1999,	 p.	 135)	 themselves	 have	
acknowledged	 ACF’s	 “failure	 to	 recognize	 the	 role	 of	 individual/organizational	 self-
interest”	 in	 the	 formation	of	 coalitions.	 Schlager	 (1995,	 p.	 204)	 notes	 that,	 although	
the	 framework	 provides	 a	 “sophisticated	 explanation	 of	 the	 role	 that	 beliefs,	
information	 and	policy	 learning	 play	 in	 affecting	 policy	 choices,	 it	 lacks	 an	 adequate	
explanation	of	policy	action”.	In	other	words,	the	display	of	similar	belief	systems	is	not	
perceived	by	the	author	to	be	sufficient	explanation	for	why	actors	coordinate	to	form	
coalitions	and	why	 they	maintain	 these	coalitions.	 Strategic	 calculations	and	political	
compromises	 are,	 thus,	 highlighted	 as	 necessary	 complements	 to	 explanations	 of	
action	(Schlager,	1995).		
Another	 criticism	 raised	 against	 the	 framework	 consists	 in	 its	 inability	 to	
properly	account	for	the	‘strange	bedfellows’	situation,	in	which	coalitions	are	formed	
by	actors	sharing	similar	interests	and	aims	but	not	similar	beliefs	(Hann,	1995,	pp.	23–
4;	 Szarka,	 2010).	 Szarka	 (2010),	 for	 instance,	 provides	 a	 relevant	 example	 of	 these	
types	of	situations	in	European	wind	policies,	in	which	coalitions	were	formed	by	NGOs	
and	 by	 the	 industry	 of	 green	 technologies,	 both	 with	 different	 normative	 goals	 but	
similar	 interests	 in	 promoting	 renewable	 energy.	 Also	 related	 to	 the	 importance	 of	
considering	 interest-based	 explanations	 within	 the	 ACF,	 Parsons	 (1995,	 p.	 202),	
emphasises	the	need	to	consider	core	interests	as	motivations	for	learning,	instead	of	
relying	 exclusively	 on	 cognitive	 rational	 learning	 processes	 based	 on	 new	 technical	
information,	as	proposed	by	the	ACF.	
In	 order	 to	 address	 these	 criticisms,	 this	 thesis	 has	 explicitly	 incorporated	
the	analysis	of	 changes	 in	 incentives	 (costs	and	benefits)	and	 resource	 redistribution	
among	the	main	causal	pathways	of	policy	change	investigated.	It	has	thus	provided	a	
theoretical	 revision	 of	 the	 four	 analytical	 parameters	 and	 observable	 implications	
proposed	by	the	ACF	to	explain	policy	change,	with	the	explicit	intent	of	incorporating	
interest-based	 explanations	 (see	 chapter	 2,	 section	 2.3,	 table	 3).	 Moreover,	 the	
qualified	 definition	 of	 policy-oriented	 learning,	 including	 elite	 networking,	 clearly	
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emphasises	the	necessity	of	a	‘shared	concern’	for	the	resolution	of	a	policy	problem	
as	 one	 of	 the	 motivators	 of	 learning.	 Finally,	 to	 account	 for	 the	 identification	 of	
coalitions	 of	 ‘strange	 bedfellows’,	 the	 narratives	 of	 actors	 were	 associated	 with	
broader	 discursive	 frameworks,	 but	 coalitions	were	 identified	 according	 to	 the	main	
empirically	 identifiable	 positions	 (or	 ‘policy	 core	 policy	 preferences’)	 of	 actors	 in	
relation	 to	 policy	 problems/regulatory	 change.	 Because	 of	 the	 non-consideration	 of	
normative	beliefs	as	a	basis	for	the	identification	of	coalitions,	coalitions	of	members	
departing	 from	 different	 ideological	 standpoints	 (the	 strange	 bed-fellows’	 situation)	
could,	 therefore,	 be	 successfully	 considered,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	
preservationist/socio-environmentalist	 coalition	 that	 formed	 to	 oppose	 regulatory	
changes	in	the	pesticide	case.		
Finally,	 on	 the	 methodological	 side,	 the	 ACF	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	 the	
difficulties	 involved	 in	empirically	 identifying	and	comparing	belief	systems	(Schlager,	
1995,	p.	24;	Hann,	1995;	McBeth,	Jones	and	Shanahan,	2014).	This	difficulty	has	been	
demonstrated	 in	 at	 least	 four	 ways	 during	 this	 research.	 First,	 individuals	 were	 not	
necessarily	 willing	 to	 reveal	 their	 normative	 beliefs	 in	 interviews	 and	 public	
statements,	and	it	was	impossible	to	assess	whether	what	they	said	represented	their	
normative	 beliefs	 or	 not.	 Second,	 the	 formulation	 of	 questionnaires	 and	 interview	
questions	 had	 clear	 limits	 in	 validly	 assessing	 normative	 beliefs	 due	 to	 their	 level	 of	
abstraction	and	their	instability.	Finally,	even	if	individuals	could	be	identified	as	having	
particular	empirical	beliefs	(‘policy	core	policy	preferences’)	they	could	still	find	it	more	
beneficial	 to	 act	 against	 their	 normative	 beliefs,	 depending	 on	 their	 political	 and	
professional	 circumstances.	 A	 politician	 from	 a	 left-wing	 party,	 for	 example,	 might	
have	to	prioritise	big	businesses	in	tax	policies	for	electoral	reasons	even	if	this	is	not	
part	of	his	or	her	normative	beliefs.	It	was	concluded,	therefore,	that	normative	beliefs	
might	not	 always	be	 adequate	 indicators	 of	 coalition	 formation	 and	of	 the	positions	
adopted	by	actors	and	therefore	only	the	empirical	aspect	of	‘policy	core	beliefs’	was	
utilised	for	the	identification	of	coalitions.		
This	 thesis	 has,	 thus,	 addressed	 this	methodological	 difficulty	 by	 analysing	
‘policy	core	policy	preferences’	instead	of	including	both	the	normative	and	empirical	
elements	 that	 characterise	 ‘policy	 core	 beliefs’	 and	 by	 linking	 these	 empirical	 policy	
preferences	 to	 specific	 discursive	 categories	 that	 are	 representative	 of	 shared	
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interpretive	schemes	(but	that	does	not	necessarily	 imply	that	actors	actually	believe	
in	 these	 more	 normative	 shared	 interpretations	 –	 the	 assessment	 of	 that	 would	
require	 a	more	 in	depth/comprehensive	 kind	of	data	 than	public	 statements).	 It	 has	
not	been	attempted,	 in	 this	manner,	 to	 identify	 the	actual	normative	beliefs	held	by	
actors	 but	 simply	 to	 locate	 their	 narratives	 in	 a	 broader	 interpretive	 framework.	
Additionally,	this	thesis	proposed	an	alternative	definition	of	policy	change,	distancing	
itself	 from	 the	 definition	 of	 policy	 change	 provided	 by	 the	 ACF,	 according	 to	 which	
policy	 change	 is	 a	 result	of	belief	 change108.	 In	 this	 thesis,	policy	 changes	have	been	
defined	 as	 noticeable	 changes	 in	 the	 content	 of	 regulations,	 facilitating	 their	
identification	and	also	allowing	for	the	consideration	of	various	factors	(in	addition	to	
beliefs)	in	the	causal	process	that	leads	to	policy	change.		
In	short,	one	of	the	main	theoretical	debates	to	which	this	thesis	contributes	
is	related	to	the	ACF’s	incorporation	of	material	interests	among	its	causal	mechanisms	
and	to	the	investigation	of	the	ways	in	which	they	lead	to	policy	or	regulatory	change.	
It	 does	 so,	 however,	 without	 losing	 sight	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 shared	 interpretive	
schemes,	epitomised	by	the	analysis	of	Brazilian	environmental	discourses	(chapter	3)	
and	relied	upon	for	the	categorisation	of	narratives	during	the	analysis	of	debates.109	
But	apart	 from	its	role	 in	aiding	 in	the	 identification	of	coalitions,	 the	 implications	of	
changes	 in	 normative	 values	 for	 policy	 change	 acknowledged	 by	 this	 thesis	 are	
recognisably	 limited.	 In	this	sense,	this	thesis	could	be	subjected	to	the	same	kind	of	
criticisms	 of	 the	 ACF	 that	 are	 advanced	 by	 interpretivist	 scholars,	 namely,	 that	
normative	 values	 are	 not	 properly	 considered	 in	 the	 investigation	 of	 policy	 change.	
This	 limitation	is,	however,	 justified	by	the	methodological	difficulties	encountered	in	
identifying	 and	 attributing	 normative	 values/beliefs	 to	 actors	 during	 the	 empirical	
analysis	of	public	statements.110		
	
																																								 																				
108	According	to	the	ACF,	policies	are	“translations”	of	beliefs	and	“can	be	conceptualized	and	measured	
hierarchically	like	belief	systems”	(Jenkins-Smith,	Nohrstedt,	Weible	and	Sabatier,	2014,	e-book	48%).	In	
the	ACF,	therefore,	changes	in	beliefs	lead	to	changes	in	policies.	
109	 The	 ideological	 framework	 described	 in	 chapter	 3	 provided	 a	 systematisation	 tool	 in	 a	 way	 that	
allowed	for	the	comparison	of	coalitions	across	cases.	It	was	not	meant	to	imply,	however,	that	actors	
held	 the	 specific	 normative	 values	 associated	 with	 each	 of	 the	 discourses,	 but	 simply	 that	 their	
narratives	could	be	associated	with	these	shared	interpretive	schemes.	
110	A	complementary	collection	of	more	in-depth	interviews	can	potentially	address	that	limitation	
in	the	future.	
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8.3.2.	Contributions	to	Empirical	Debates	
	8.3.2.1.	Is	there	an	actual	‘roll-back’	in	Brazilian	environmental	standards?		
As	debated	in	chapter	1	(section	1.2),	the	occurrence	of	an	environmental	
roll-back	 (‘retrocesso	ambiental’)	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	 regulations	has	 become,	
since	 at	 least	 2009,	 almost	 a	 ‘mantra’	 repeated	ad	 nauseum	 by	 the	 national	media,	
scholars	and	environmental	activists.	This	roll-back	has	been	defined	 in	the	 literature	
as	 a	 “real	 tendency	 of	 diminishing,	 adulteration	 and	 elimination	 of	 environmental	
protection	 standards”	 (Lima	 and	 Garcia,	 2014,	 p.	 273).	 The	 term	 could,	 however,	
certainly	 benefit	 from	 further	 qualification	 and	 analysis.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 section,	
therefore	 is	 to	 assess	 the	 roll-back	 claim,	 assessing	 whether	 regulatory	 changes	
actually	point	to	an	alteration	of	standards	in	the	three	policy	subsystems	investigated,	
and	reflecting	on	the	actual	nature	and	practical	impacts	of	this	alleged	“elimination	of	
environmental	protection	standards”.		
	The	 results	 obtained	 with	 this	 analysis	 support	 claims	 of	 a	 ‘roll-back’	
regarding	environmental	standards.	In	at	least	two	of	the	three	areas	investigated,	the	
regulatory	 changes	 advanced	 actually	 represented	 the	 diminishing	 of	 environmental	
protection	 requirements	 through	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 strictness	 of	 standards.	 In	 the	
forestry	subsystem,	for	instance,	the	new	2012	Forest	Code	resulted	in	the	weakening	
of	 the	 preservation	 requirements	 of	 forested	 areas	 in	 riparian	 zones	 and	 as	 a	
percentage	of	private	properties	 (legal	 reserves).	 In	 the	pesticide	 case,	 authorisation	
for	 the	 import	 and	use	of	 unregistered	products	 in	 cases	of	 zoo-	 and	phyto-sanitary	
emergencies	as	well	as	the	suggestion	of	a	restructuration	of	the	institutions	in	charge	
of	 the	 registration	 of	 new	 products	 (to	 exclude	 the	 environmental	 and	 health	
ministries)	also	represented	a	decrease	in	environmental	controls.	Lastly,	the	ABS	case	
did	not	reveal	an	environmental	 roll-back	 in	 terms	of	making	environmental	controls	
less	 strict,	 but	 did	 reveal	 a	 roll-back	 in	 the	 rights	 of	 prior	 and	 informed	 consent	 of	
indigenous	 and	 traditional	 communities.	 Because	 these	 groups	 are	 traditionally	
associated	 with	 the	 sustainable	 use	 of	 natural	 resources	 this	 might	 have	 indirect	
environmental	impacts.	
These	 findings,	 however,	 can	 still	 be	 put	 to	 further	 tests.	 First,	 the	
possibility	that	these	apparently	‘less	strict’	standards	are	not	simply	a	reflection	of	a	
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different	 regulatory	 logic	 aiming	 to	 substitute	 a	 harsh	 deterrence/	 ‘command	 and	
control’	 approach	 with	 a	 more	 hands-off	 approach	 characteristic	 of	 ‘responsive	
regulation’	 (Ayres	 and	 Braithwaite,	 1992)	 or	 ‘smart	 regulation’	 approaches	
(Gunningham	and	Grabosky,	 1998)	 has	 to	 be	 considered.	 These	 extensively	 debated	
regulatory	approaches	propose	a	stronger	reliance	on	the	self-regulatory	power	of	the	
private	 sector	 and	 a	 pyramidal	 approach	 to	 enforcement,	 intended	 to	 focus	 limited	
state	resources	on	actors	 less	 likely	to	adhere	to	regulations,	allowing	more	freedom	
for	actors	that	are	usual	compliant.	Although	this	is	not	a	dominant	interpretation,	(see	
Gunningham	and	Grabosky,	1998;	Baldwin,	2005),	 some	have	 interpreted	 these	new	
regulatory	rationales	as	a	simple	disguise	for	actual	de-regulation	(Tombs	and	Whyte,	
2013;	 Tombs,	 2015).	 In	 other	 words,	 according	 to	 this	 view,	 this	 new	 regulatory	
rationale	 of	 responsive/smart	 regulation	 would	 not	 actually	 alter	 the	 logic	 of	
deterrence,	 but	 simply	 substitute	 it	 by	 something	 less	 strict	 and	 demanding	 to	 the	
regulated	sectors.	
Departing	 from	 evidence	 of	 this	 potential	 interpretation,	 it	 becomes	
necessary	 to	 inquire	 into	 whether	 allegations	 of	 the	 ‘elimination	 of	 environmental	
standards’	 related	 to	 Brazilian	 ‘roll-back’	 claims	 are	 not	 simply	 the	 result	 of	 the	
adoption	 of	 a	 new	 regulatory	 rationale	 akin	 to	 the	 ‘responsive	 regulation’	 rationale	
discussed	 above.	 This	would	moreover,	 reflect	 an	 economic	 rationalist	 discourse,	 as	
explained	 in	 chapter	 3.	 As	 observed	 in	 that	 same	 chapter,	 however,	 the	 economic	
rationalist	mentality	has	not	been	fully	manifested	in	Brazilian	environmental	debates	
but	 exists	 in	 an	 altered	 state,	 which	 has	 been	 called	 the	 administrative	 economic	
rationalist	 discourse.	 It	 cannot	 be	 stated,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 that	 the	 claims	 of	
environmental	roll-back	are	a	simple	reflection	of	a	particular	interpretation	of	a	new	
regulatory	 logic	 (more	 responsive	 and	 less	 based	 on	 ‘command	 and	 control’)	 by	 the	
government.	 Although	 the	 narrative	 of	 stronger	 reliance	 on	 the	 private	 sector’s	
capacity	to	self-regulate	and	preserve	the	environment	was	at	times	used,	a	reduction	
in	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 government’s	 centralised	 controls	 has	 not	materialised	 in	
practice.		
An	 enlightening	 example	 of	 this	 absence	 of	 economic	 rationalism	 and	
actual	 change	 in	 regulatory	 rationale	was	 the	attempt	 to	develop	a	 system	of	 forest	
credits,	according	to	which	farmers	would	be	able	to	buy	stocks	of	preserved	forests	
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from	 other	 farmers	 (who	 were	 preserving	 more)	 through	 a	 digital	 platform.	 This	
system	would	facilitate	forest	preservation	and	compliance	with	the	forest	regulations	
through	a	voluntary	market	mechanism,	and	would	also	serve	to	economically	reward	
those	 farmers	 that	 were	 maintaining	 more	 forested	 areas,	 incentivising	 them	 to	
maintain	 them.	Although	 forest	 regulations	 provided	 for	 the	 development	 of	 such	 a	
‘forest	exchange’	system	(both	before	and	after	the	2012	changes),	it	had	not	yet	been	
implemented	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 (September	 2016).	 Interviews	 have	 revealed,	
moreover,	pessimistic	perspectives	from	the	private	sector	regarding	the	actual	intent	
of	 the	government	to	rely	more	decisively	on	forestry	regulatory	strategies	based	on	
self-regulation	by	the	private	sector	and	such	market-based	strategies	(interview	53).	
Similarly,	the	changes	allowing	unregistered	pesticides	to	be	imported	in	cases	of	zoo-	
or	 phyto-sanitary	 emergencies	 did	 not	 include	 any	 exceptional	 requests	 from	 the	
importers,	nor	alternative	methods	for	monitoring	the	use	of	these	products	(i.e.	self-
monitoring).	 This	 also	 supports,	 therefore,	 that	 no	 actual	 change	 took	 place	 in	 the	
regulatory	 rationale	 of	 environmental	 regulations	 in	 Brazil,	 and	 that	 the	 ‘roll-back’	
allegations	were	not	a	 simple	misinterpretation	of	 a	different	 trend	 (i.e.	 a	 change	 in	
regulatory	rationale).	
Regarding,	the	ABS	case,	however,	the	possibility	of	a	change	in	regulatory	
rationale	(instead	of	an	actual	 ‘roll-back’)	could	not	be	discarded.	 	As	opposed	to	the	
other	two	cases,	the	new	regulations	in	ABS	clearly	 indicated	a	more	explicit	reliance	
on	the	self-regulatory	capacity	of	the	private	sector.	The	greater	freedom	provided	for	
industries	and	researchers	to	access	genetic	resources	without	the	need	for	previous	
authorisation	 from	 the	 government,	 and	 to	 use	 self-declaratory	 requests	 to	 gain	
genetic	 access,	 point	 to	 a	 rationale	 more	 akin	 to	 smart	 and	 responsive	 regulation	
logics.	 Whether	 the	 actual	 implementation	 of	 the	 law	 will	 reflect	 these	 original	
intentions	remains,	however,	to	be	seen.		
In	 sum,	 from	 the	 evidence	 of	 implementation	 available	 at	 the	 time	 this	
thesis	was	finalised	(September	2016),	the	reduction	in	the	strictness	of	environmental	
standards	 had	 not	 been	 decisively	 accompanied	 by	 a	 consistent	 alteration	 in	 the	
rationale	of	enforcement	proposed.	The	possibility	that	the	phenomenon	investigated	
by	 this	 thesis	was	 not	 an	 actual	 ‘roll-back’	 (in	 the	 deregulatory	 sense),	 but	 simply	 a	
change	 in	 the	 rationale	 of	 regulations	 proposed	 is,	 under	 further	 scrutiny,	 not	
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supported.	 At	 least	 two	 of	 the	 three	 cases	 investigated	 (forest	 and	 pesticide)	
demonstrated	an	actual	relaxation	of	environmental	controls	or	requirements,	with	no	
offsetting	in	terms	of	a	stronger	emphasis	on	self-regulation	or	alternative	methods	of	
monitoring	or	enforcement.	
	
8.4.	Conclusion		
This	analysis	could	not	be	concluded	without	a	return	to	the	questions	that	
motivated	it	in	the	first	place.	In	what	follows,	I	provide	summarised	answers	to	each	
of	 the	 four	questions	 that	were	posed	 in	 the	 introductory	chapter	 (chapter	1).	 I	also	
point	to	the	limits	on	the	external	validity	of	these	claims	that	the	research	design	of	
this	thesis	entailed.		
The	 first	 question	 inquired	whether	 the	 regulatory	 changes	 investigated	
actually	point	to	a	 ‘roll-back’	 in	Brazilian	environmental	standards.	As	debated	 in	the	
previous	section,	in	at	least	two	of	the	three	cases	investigated	standards	have	actually	
become	 less	 strict	 in	 terms	 of	 environmental	 demands.	 The	 possibility	 that	 the	 roll-
back	 claims	 refer	 not	 to	 an	 actual	 process	 of	 deregulation,	 but	 to	 a	 change	 in	 the	
regulatory	rationale	adopted	by	the	government	towards	a	more	‘hands-off’	approach,	
has	also	been	assessed	and	rejected	for	two	of	the	three	cases.	This	was	not	found	to	
be	the	case	due	to	the	 lack	of	evidence	of	alternatives	 (such	as	market	mechanisms,	
self-regulatory	 principles	 and	 so	 on)	 being	 put	 in	 place	 to	 off-set	 the	 reduction	 in	
environmental	 requirements.	 This	 thesis,	 has,	 thus,	 provided	 support	 to	 roll-back	
allegations	as	an	actual	diminishing	of	standards	of	environmental	protection,	at	least	
in	the	forest	and	pesticide	case	studies.	
The	 second	 question	 was	 whether	 the	 four	 sources	 of	 policy	 change	
advanced	by	the	ACF	(or	some	combination	of	them)	are	sufficient	motivators	of	policy	
change.	This	thesis	found	that	a	combination	of	internal	and	external	events	might	be	
sufficient	motivators	of	policy	change	in	the	absence	of	a	hurting	stalemate.	Therefore,	
in	situations	in	which	there	are	not	consequential	incentives,	interdependence	among	
coalitions	and	uncertainty	 involved	 in	 the	outputs	of	 the	policy	change,	only	 internal	
and	external	events	were	found	to	be	sufficient	sources	of	policy	change.	If	these	three	
later	 criteria	 are	 present,	 external	 and	 internal	 events	 are	 not	 sufficient	 and	 policy-
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oriented	 learning	and/or	negotiation	also	have	to	occur	 in	order	for	policy	change	to	
happen.		
An	acknowledged	 limitation	of	 this	answer	concerns	 the	small	number	of	
cases	 investigated,	 which	 did	 not	 allow	 for	 the	 observation	 of	 much	 variability.	 For	
instance,	 in	 all	 the	 three	 cases	 investigated,	 external	 and	 internal	 events	 happened	
simultaneously,	so	the	identification	of	the	specific	causal	influences	of	each	of	them	in	
the	process	of	regulatory	change	was	not	possible.	Therefore,	the	specific	role	of	each	
of	 them	 (individually)	 could	 not	 be	 assessed.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 fact	 that	
negotiated	 agreement	 and	 learning	 occurred	 in	 only	 one	 of	 the	 cases,	 allowed	 for	
verification	of	 the	 factors	 that	are	conducive	 to	 them.	 In	other	words,	 it	 allowed	 for	
the	analysis	of	the	differences	between	the	ABS	case	and	the	other	two,	which	pointed	
to	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 hurting	 stalemate	 and	 was	 one	 of	 the	 contributions	 of	 this	
thesis	to	the	development	of	the	ACF.	
The	third	question	posed	in	the	introductory	chapter	was	whether	the	four	
sources	 of	 policy	 change	 advanced	 by	 the	 ACF	 (or	 some	 combination	 of	 them)	 are	
necessary	motivators	 of	 policy	 change.	 The	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 is	 that	 the	 four	
sources	 of	 policy	 change	 are	 not	 necessary	 for	 policy	 change	 to	 occur	 in	 every	
situation,	 but	 internal	 and	 external	 events	were	 always	 found	 to	 be.	 In	 situations	 in	
which	 there	 are	 consequential	 incentives,	 interdependence	 among	 coalitions	 and	
uncertainty	 involved	 in	 the	 outputs	 of	 the	 policy	 change	 (i.e.	 a	 hurting	 stalemate),	
however,	learning	and	negotiated	agreement	might	also	be	necessary.	Similarly	to	the	
answer	provided	to	the	previous	question,	the	limits	of	this	answer	are	related	to	the	
small	 number	 of	 cases	 investigated	 by	 this	 thesis.	 Further	 research	 with	 other	 case	
studies	is,	therefore,	deemed	necessary	to	strengthen	this	and	the	other	claims	made	
by	this	thesis.	
Finally,	 the	 initial	 chapter	 proposed	 an	 investigation	 of	 what	 factors	
favoured	the	occurrence	of	learning	and	negotiated	agreement	among	coalitions,	when	
they	 occurred.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 analysis	 pursued	 by	 this	
thesis	point	to	the	existence	of	a	‘hurting	stalemate’	as	the	most	important	factor,	and	
redefined	 this	 concept	 according	 to	 the	 high	 incidence	 of	 three	 criteria,	 namely,	
consequential	incentives,	uncertainty	and	interdependence.	The	hurting	stalemate	was	
particularly	 high	 in	 the	ABS	 case,	 and	mostly	 attributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Nagoya	
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Protocol	increased	the	costs	and	uncertainty	for	two	highly	interdependent	coalitions	
(the	neo-developmentalists	and	the	administrative	economic	rationalists)	of	not	having	
a	national	law	on	access	to	genetic	resources	and	benefit	sharing.	These	latter	factors	
(costs,	 uncertainty	 and	 interdependence),	 therefore,	 rely	 on	 internal	 and	 external	
events,	which	bring	them	about.	They	are,	thus,	intervening	variables	between	events	
and	 policy	 change.	 The	 limitations	 identified	 in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 analysis	 were	 also	
related	 to	 the	 small	 number	 of	 cases.	 Additionally,	 the	 fact	 that	 learning	 and	
negotiated	agreement	occurred	simultaneously	did	not	allow	for	the	disentanglement	
of	their	individual	causal	influences,	as	with	external	and	internal	events.	Finding	cases	
that	more	clearly	allow	for	this	disentanglement	is	a	desirable	goal	for	future	analysis.		
		Hence,	 the	 main	 theoretical	 contribution	 of	 this	 thesis	 consists	 in	 the	
qualification	of	the	ACF’s	hypothesis	about	policy	change	and	the	investigation	of	the	
causal	pathways	leading	to	it.	The	thesis	has	maintained	that	not	all	the	four	sources	of	
policy	change	 identified	by	the	ACF	are	necessary	for	policy	change	and	that	 internal	
and	 external	 events	might	 be	 the	 only	 necessary	 ones,	 depending	 on	 the	 case.	 The	
main	difference	between	 the	 two	cases	 in	which	negotiated	agreement	and	 learning	
did	not	occur	and	the	one	in	which	it	occurred	refers	to	the	type	of	the	actors	involved.	
In	 the	ABS	 case,	 two	 coalitions	 of	 politically	 and	 economically	 powerful	 actors	were	
involved	 (bio-industry	 and	 agri-business).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 ‘hurting	 stalemate’	
that	 characterised	 their	 disagreements	 had	 to	 be	 solved,	 leading	 to	 learning	 and	
negotiation.	 This	 thesis	 has	 shown,	 therefore,	 that	 internal	 and	 external	 events	
combined	might	be	sufficient	motivators	of	policy	change	particularly	 in	situations	 in	
which	 the	 coalitions	 of	 actors	 are	 more	 heterogeneous	 in	 terms	 of	 political	 and	
economic	power.	 The	 application	of	 the	ACF	 to	 the	Brazilian	 context	 of	 low	political	
openness	 and	medium	degree	 of	 consensus	 required	 for	 decision-making	 reveals,	 in	
this	manner,	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 highly	 relevant	 criteria	 in	 general	 political	 science	
debates	(see	for	example	Wilson,	1989)	which	has	not	been	sufficiently	emphasised	by	
the	ACF,	namely	the	distribution	of	power	among	coalitions.	This	finding	points	to	the	
importance	of	considering	the	characteristics	of	the	coalitions	involved	when	applying	
the	ACF	 to	countries	with	opportunity	 structures	 similar	 to	 the	Brazilian	one.	Finally,	
another	 theoretical	 contribution	of	 this	 thesis	has	been	 to	qualify	 the	definition	of	a	
few	 of	 the	 ACF’s	 concepts	 (such	 as	 learning	 and	 negotiated	 agreement)	 and	 also	 to	
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apply	 it	 to	 a	 context	 to	 which	 it	 has	 not	 been	 traditionally	 applied.	 It	 has	 also	
addressed	 many	 of	 the	 criticisms	 the	 ACF	 has	 received,	 both	 from	 positivists	 and	
interpretivist	scholars.			
In	 empirical	 terms,	 the	 thesis	 has	 provided	 support	 for	 the	 alleged	
occurrence	 of	 an	 environmental	 roll-back	 in	 Brazilian	 environmental	 regulations	 and	
contrasted	 this	 claim	with	 alternative	 explanations	 related	 to	 a	 change	 in	 regulatory	
rationale.	 Finally,	 the	 thesis	 has	 also	 contributed	 with	 an	 original	 theoretical	 and	
historical	 framework	 of	 Brazilian	 environmental	 discourses	 that	 can	 be	 applied	 to	
future	studies	of	Brazilian	environmental	regulations	and	policies.		
The	 next	 steps	 of	 this	 journey	 shall	 follow	 at	 least	 three	main	 pathways.	
First,	they	shall	strengthen	the	proposed	qualifications	to	the	ACF	through	the	analysis	
of	a	larger	set	of	cases	both	in	Brazil	and	in	other	contexts.	They	would,	in	this	manner,	
clarify	whether	these	propositions	shall	be	restricted	to	contexts	with	an	opportunity	
structure	 similar	 to	 the	 Brazilian	 one,	 or	 whether	 they	 can	 be	 safely	 generalised.	
Second,	they	shall,	through	the	analysis	of	more	cases,	answer	whether	the	causal	role	
of	 internal	 and	 external	 events	 on	 one	 hand,	 and	 of	 negotiated	 agreement	 and	
learning	on	the	other,	can	be	more	clearly	discernible	 in	relation	to	policy	change.	 In	
other	words,	a	larger	set	of	cases	might	help	to	isolate	the	effect	of	each	of	these	two	
sources	 of	 policy	 change,	 in	 situations	 in	 which	 there	 is	 no	 stalemate.	 Similarly,	 a	
clearer	 differentiation	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 learning	 and	 negotiations	 for	 policy	 change	
might	 be	 achieved	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 cases	 in	 which	 only	 one	 of	 both	 occur.	
Finally,	 the	 next	 steps	 shall	 involve	 additional	 efforts	 to	 overcome	 difficulties	 in	
assessing	 the	 role	 of	 normative	 values’	 in	 policy	 change,	without	 losing	 sight	 of	 the	
attested	importance	of	interests.	
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APPENDIX	I	
List	of	Interviewees	(anonymised)	
Interview	No.	 Interviewee	affiliation	 Date	 Location	
Interview	2	 Representative	of	bio-industry		 Conducted	on	03/09/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	3	
Academic	from	University	of	Sao	
Paulo	focused	on	the	study	of	
forest	policies		
Conducted	on	04/09/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	4	
Scholar	from	Getulio	Vargas	
Foundation	(GVCes)	focused	on	
environmental	and	agriculture	
policies	
Conducted	on	10/09/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	5	 Consultant	for	an	NGO	focused	on	Amazonian	indigenous	groups	 Conducted	on	10/09/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	6	 Representative	of	bio-industry	(association	of	cleaning	products)	 Conducted	on	16/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	7	 Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Science	and	Technology	 Conducted	on	18/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	8	 Representative	of	the	bio-industry	 Conducted	on	01/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	9	 Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Environment	 Conducted	on	27/11/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	10	
Former	Secretary	of	Environment	
and	former	Secretary	of	State	for	
Science	and	Technology	
Conducted	on	08/10/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	12	
Representative	of	the	federation	
of	Agro-industries	from	the	state	
of	São	Paulo	(FIESPAgro)	
Conducted	on	26/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	13	
Representative	of	the	NGO	
Institute	for	Society,	Nature	and	
Population	(ISPN)	
Conducted	on	18/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	14	
Representative	of	the	Brazilian	
forum	on	NGOs	and	Social	
Movements	(FBOMS)	
Conducted	on	06/09/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	15	 Representative	of	the	Foreign	Affairs	Ministry	 Conducted	on	13/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	16	
Former	representative	of	the	
Brazilian	Forestry	Service.	Former	
member	of	the	Institute	for	
Environmental	Research	in	the	
Amazonia	(IPAM)	
Conducted	on	13/10/2014	 Brasília	
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Interview	17	 Representative	of	Conservation	International	 Conducted	on	01/10/2014	 Rio	de	Janeiro	
Interview	18	 Lawyer	of	the	Lower	Chamber	 Conducted	on	23/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	19	
Representative	of	the	Department	
of	Biodiversity	and	Forests	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment	
Conducted	on	25/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	20	
Representative	of	the	Department	
of	Genetic	Resources	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment	
Conducted	on	26/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	21	
Former	representative	of	the	
genetic	resources	department.	
Representative	of	the	department	
of	forestry	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment	
Conducted	on	26/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	22	 Representative	of	USAID	-	involved	with	biodiversity	policies	 Conducted	on	16/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	23	
Representative	of	the	Climate	
Change	division	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment	
Conducted	on	30/09/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	24	
Representative	of	the	protected	
areas	department	of	the	Ministry	
of	Environment	
Conducted	on	02/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	25	
Former	Secretary	for	Science	and	
Technology	Policy	in	the	Ministry	
of	Science	and	Technology,	co-
chair	of	the	IPCC	Science	Working	
Group		
Conducted	on	09/10/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	26	
Representative	of	the	Department	
of	Biodiversity	and	Forests	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment	
Conducted	on	09/11/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	27	
Former	Federal	Deputy/	Former	
executive	secretary	of	the	climate	
change	Brazilian	forum	
Conducted	on	11/10/2014	 São	Paulo	
Interview	28	
Representative	of	the	department	
of	forests	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment	
Conducted	on	02/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	29	 Representative	of	agri-business	(soy	production)	 Conducted	on	05/09/2014	 Tupã	-	SP	
Interview	30	
Academic	from	University	of	
Campinas/	Leading	scientist	of	the	
scientific	assessment	of	the	forest	
code	
Conducted	on	07/10/2014	 Campinas	-	SP	
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Interview	31	
Representative	of	Department	of	
Biodiversity	and	Forests	(Caatinga	
Biome)	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment	
Conducted	on	02/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	32	
Representative	of	the	Department	
for	the	prevention	of	
deforestation	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment	
Conducted	on	16/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	33	
Representative	of	the	NGO	
Institute	for	Environmental	
Research	in	the	Amazonia	(IPAM)	
Conducted	on	20/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	34	
Representative	of	the	Department	
of	Biodiversity	Conservation	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment/	Former	
representative	of	World	Wildlife	
Fund	(WWF)	
Conducted	on	24/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	35	
Former	Secretary	of	Biodiversity	
and	Forests	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment/	Deputy	Secretary	of	
WWF	
Conducted	on	10/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	36	 Member	of	the	Brazilian	Academy	of	Science	/	Member	of	the	IPCC	 Conducted	on	14/11/2014	 Rio	de	Janeiro	
Interview	37	
Former	member	of	the	Brazilian	
Institute	of	Forestry	Development	
(IBDF)	
Conducted	on	08/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	38	
Representative	of	the	Secretary	of	
Strategic	Affairs	of	the	
Government	
Conducted	on	04/11/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	39	 Representative	of	Global	Environmental	Facility	(GEF)	 Conducted	on	22/10/2014	
New	York	
(by	phone)	
Interview	40	 Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	 Conducted	on	23/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	41	
Consultant	for	Conservation	
International	about	Forest	
Policies/	Former	director	of	the	
department	of	prevention	of	
deforestation	
Conducted	on	08/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	42	 Minister	of	the	Environment	 Conducted	on	30/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	43	 Representative	of	the	NGO	Socio-Environmental	Institute	(ISA)	 Conducted	on	28/10/2014	 Brasilia	
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Interview	44	
Representative	from	IBAMA	
(environmental	enforcement	
agency	of	the	ministry	of	the	
environment)	
Conducted	on	04/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	45	 Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	 Conducted	on	24/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	46	 Representative	of	the	NGO	Socio-Environmental	Institute	(ISA)	 Conducted	on	05/11/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	47	
Representative	of	the	department	
of	biodiversity	conservation	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment	
Conducted	on	31/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	48	 Representative	of	the	Brazilian	Forest	Service	 Conducted	on	31/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	49	 Representatives	of	the	Laboratory	of	the	Brazilian	Forest	Service	 Conducted	on	31/10/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	50	
Representative	of	the	Secretary	of	
Strategic	Affairs	of	the	
Government	(planted	forests	
department)	
Conducted	on	07/11/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	51	
Representative	of	the	Secretary	of	
Strategic	Affairs	of	the	
Government	(planted	forests	
department)	
Conducted	on	07/11/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	52	
Representative	of	the	Chico	
Mendes	Institute	of	the	Ministry	
of	Environment	
Conducted	on	12/11/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	53	
Representative	of	the	BVRio	(in	
charge	of	the	development	of	a	
forest	stock	market	system)	
Conducted	on	13/11/2014	 Rio	de	Janeiro	
Interview	54	
Representative	of	the	department	
of	genetic	resources	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment	
Conducted	on	03/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	55	 Representative	of	the	Brazilian	Association	of	Anthropology	 Conducted	on	04/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	56	 Representative	of	Amazonian	Indigenous	Communities	 Conducted	on	04/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	57	
Representative	of	the	Secretary	of	
pesticides	(agricultural	defence)	of	
the	Ministry	of	Agriculture		
Conducted	on	05/12/2014	 Brasília	(by	phone)	
Interview	58	
Representative	of	the	Industrial	
Environmental	Safety	of	the	
Ministry	of	Environment	
Conducted	on	08/12/2014	 Brasília	
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Interview	59	 Representative	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	(juridical	consultant)	 Conducted	on	05/12/2014	 Brasília	
Interview	60	 Academic	focused	on	pesticides'	regulations	 Conducted	on	23/07/2015	
London	
(via	Skype)	
*	Interviews	1	and	11	were	excluded	from	the	list	because	they	were	not	considered	relevant.	
	
Chapter	4	
Appendix	I	
Actor	 Appearances	 Affiliation/party/role	 Position	in	terms	of	regulatory	changes	
1. Aldo	Rebelo	 389	 Federal	Deputy/PCdoB-SP/rapporteur	of	the	bill	 Extensive	changes	
2. Marco	Maia	 224	 Federal	Deputy/PT-RS/President	of	the	Deputies'	Chamber	2010-2012	 No	clear	position	
3. Sarney	Filho	 165	 Federal	Deputy/PV-MA/coordinator	of	the	environmental	caucus	 No	changes	
4. Dilma	Rousseff	 146	 President	of	Brazil/PT	 Partial	changes	
5. Paulo	Piau	 143	 Federal	Deputy/PMBD-MG	 Extensive	changes	
6. Valdir	Colatto	 122	 Federal	Deputy/PMDB-SC	 Extensive	changes	
7. Cândido	Vaccarezza	 93	 Federal	Deputy/PT-SP	 Partial	changes	
8. Luis	Carlos	Heinze	 70	 Federal	Deputy/PP-RS	 Extensive	changes	
9. Ivan	Valente	 71	 Federal	Deputy/Psol-SP	 No	changes	
10. Izabella	Teixeira	 68	 Minister	of	the	Environment	after	2010	 Partial	changes	
11. Reinhold	
Stephanes	 60	 Minister	of	Agriculture	(2007–2010)	 Extensive	changes	
12. Moacir	
Micheletto	 58	 Federal	Deputy/PMDB-PR	 Extensive	changes	
13. Ronaldo	Caiado	 54	 Federal	Deputy/DEM-GO	 Extensive	changes	
14. Luiz	Henrique	 50	 Senator/PMDB-SC	 Partial	changes	
15. Arlindo	Chinaglia	 46	 Federal	Deputy/PT-SP	 Partial	changes	
16. Homero	Pereira	 41	 Federal	Deputy/PSD-MT/	coordinator	of	the	rural	caucus	 Extensive	changes	
17. Antonio	Carlos	
Magalhães	 40	 Federal	Deputy/DEM-BA	 Extensive	changes	
18. Sérgio	Carvalho	 39	 Federal	Deputy/PSDB-RO	 Extensive	changes	
19. Antonio	Carlos	
Mendes	Thame	 38	 Federal	Deputy/PSDB-SP	 No	clear	position	
20. Henrique	
Eduardo	Alves	 37	 Federal	Deputy/PMDB-RN	 Extensive	changes	
21. André	Lima	 31	
NGOs	–	SOS	Mata	Atlântica/Instituto	Socio-Ambiental	
(ISA)	/Instituto	de	Pesquisa	Ambiental	da	Amazônia	
(Ipam)	
No	changes	
22. Edson	Duarte	 30	 Federal	Deputy/PV-BA	 No	changes	
23. CONTAG	(No	
name	mentioned)	 30	 Rural	Workers	 Partial	Changes	
24. Jilmar	Tatto	 29	 Federal	Deputy/PT-SP	 Partial	changes	
25. Paulo	Teixeira	 28	 Federal	Deputy/PT-SP	 Partial	changes	
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26. Michel	Temer	 28	 Vice-president/Federal	deputy	until	2011/PMDB-SP	 No	clear	position	
27. Jorge	Khoury	 25	 Federal	Deputy/DEM-BA	 Partial	changes	
28. Mendes	Ribeiro	
Filho	 24	 Minister	of	Agriculture	(2011–2013)	 Partial	changes	
29. Kátia	Abreu	 24	
Senator	(PMDB-TO)	until	2014/Minister	of	Agriculture	
after	2014/Representative	of	the	National	
Confederation	of	Agricultura	(CNA)	–	Industry	
Extensive	changes	
30. Wagner	Rossi	 23	 Minister	of	Agriculture	between	(2010–2011)	 Partial	changes	
31. Carlos	Minc	 22	 Minister	of	Environment	(2008–2010)	 No	changes	
32. Alfredo	Sirkis	 22	 Federal	Deputy/PV-RJ	 No	changes	
33. José	Sarney	 22	 Senator/PMDB-AP	 No	clear	position	
34. Márcio	Macêdo	 21	 Federal	Deputy/PT-SE	 Partial	changes	
35. Rodrigo	
Rollemberg	 18	 Senator/PSB-DF	 No	changes	
36. Eduardo	Gomes	 17	 Federal	Deputy/PSDB-TO	 No	clear	position	
37. Marina	Silva	 17	 Minister	of	Environment	(2003–2008)/Senator	PT	and	PV-AC	(1995–2003/2003–2011)	 No	changes	
38. Afonso	Florence	 16	 Federal	Deputy/PT-BA	 Partial	changes	
39. Luiz	Sérgio	 16	 Federal	Deputy	/	PT	-	RJ	/	Minister	of	Institutional	Relations	(Jan-Jun	2011)	 Partial	changes	
40. Abelardo	Lupion	 15	 Federal	Deputy/DEM-PR	 Extensive	changes	
41. Jorge	Viana	 14	 Senator	(PT	-	AC)	 Partial	changes	
42. Darcísio	Perondi	 14	 Federal	Deputy/PMDB-RS)	 Extensive	changes	
43. Celso	Maldaner	 14	 Federal	Deputy/PMDB-SC	 Extensive	changes	
44. Pepe	Vargas	 13	
Federal	Deputy/PT-RS	(2007–2012/2014–
present)/Minister	of	Agrarian	Development	(2012–
2014)		
Partial	changes	
45. Giovani	Cherini	 13	 Federal	Deputy/PDT-RS	 No	clear	position	
46. Rodrigo	Justus	 13	 Industry	(Agribusiness)	CNA	 Extensive	Changes	
47. Giovanni	Queiroz	 11	 Federal	Deputy/PDT-PA	 Extensive	changes	
48. Sérgio	Leitão	 11	 NGO	–	Greenpeace	 No	changes	
49. Julio	Semeghini	 9	 Federal	Deputy/PSDB-SP	 Partial	changes	
50. Alceu	Moreira	 9	 Federal	Deputy/PMDB-RS	 Extensive	changes	
51. Fernando	
Gabeira	 8	 Federal	Deputy/PV-RJ	 No	changes	
52. Wandenkolk	
Gonçalves	 8	 Federal	Deputy/PSDB-PA	 Extensive	changes	
53. Roberto	Rocha	 8	 Federal	Deputy/PSDB-MA	 No	changes	
54. Roberto	Klabin	 8	 NGO	–	SOS	Mata	Atlântica	 No	changes	
55. Edinho	Araújo	 8	 Federal	Deputy/PMDB-SP	 Extensive	changes	
56. Mario	Mantovani	 8	 NGO	–	SOS	Mata	Atlântica	 No	changes	
57. Fernando	
Henrique	da	Fonseca	 6	
Industry	–	President	of	the	Brazilian	Association	of	
Planted	Forests	 Extensive	Changes	
58. Gerd	Sparovek	 6	 Scientist	–	University	of	Sao	Paulo	 No	changes	
59. Helena	Nader	 5	 Scientist	–	President	of	SBPC	 No	changes	
60. Celso	Moretti	 5	 Scientist	(EMBRAPA)	 Partial	changes	
61. Jean	Paul	
Metzger	 3	 Scientist	–	University	of	Sao	Paulo	 No	changes	
62. Raul	Krauser	 3	 Rural	Workers	–	Via	Campesina	 No	changes	
63. Maria	Tereza	
Piedade	 3	 Scientist	(Inpa)	 No	changes	
64. José	Antônio	
Aleixo	da	Silva	 2	 Scientist	–	Secretary	of	SBPC	 No	changes	
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65. Ricardo	
Rodrigues	 2	 Scientist	–	University	of	São	Paulo	(Esalq)	 No	changes	
66. Carlos	Alfredo	
Joly	 2	 Scientist	 No	changes	
67. João	de	Deus	
Medeiros	 2	 Scientist	(Federal	University	of	Santa	Catarina)		 Partial	changes	
68. Cezar	Augusto	
dos	Reis	 2	
Industry	(Brazilian	Association	of	Planted	Forests	
Producers)	 Partial	Changes	
69. José	Luciano	
Penido	 1	 Industry	–	Fibria		 Partial	Changes	
70. Elisabeth	
Carvalhaes	 1	
Industy	–	Associação	Brasileira	de	Papel	e	Celulose	
(Abracelpa)	 Partial	Changes	
71. Neveraldo	
Oliboni	 1	
Rural	Workers	–	Federation	of	Agriculture	Workers	
from	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	 Partial	Changes	
72. Walfrido	Tomaz	 1	 Scientist	(EMBRAPA)	 Partial	changes	
73. Luis	Carlos	
Moraes	 1	 Scientist	–	Centro	Universitário	do	Oeste	Paulista	 Extensive	Changes	
74.	Vicente	Almeida	 1	 Sindicato	Nacional	dos	Trabalhadores	de	Pesquisa	e	Desenvolvimento	Agropecuário,		 No	changes	
	
	
Appendix	II	
Number	of	actors	with	an	identifiable	position	separated	per	party	or	social	group	
Party/Social	group	
Total	number	of	actors	
(people)	with	an	identifiable	
position		
PV	 4	
Psol	 1	
PSB	 1	
NGOs	 4	
Scientists	 13	
Industry	(Planted	Forests)	 4		
PSDB	 3	
PT	 8	
Rural	Workers	 4	
DEM	 3	
PMDB	 11	
PP	 1	
PCdoB	 1	
PDT	 1	
Industry	(Agribusiness)	 2	
Executive	Power	 7	
Total	 68	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	(please	refer	to	appendix	I	for	more	details)	
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Appendix	III	-	Codification	of	the	arguments	of	those	promoting	extensive	changes	
Code	 Author/date/source	 Quotes	coded	
(1)	Agribusiness	–
contribution	to	the	
economy	
Abreu,	Katia	-	20/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
	
“[they]	ignore	the	economic	and	social	benefits	that	rural	production	
has	brought	to	Brazil”111	
	
“…several	year	of	surplus	in	the	trade	balance…”112	
	
(2)	Food	Security	 Abreu,	Katia	-	20/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
	
“FAO	has	affirmed,	repeatedly,	that	the	world	needs	to	increase	food	
production	by	40%	and	that	Brazil	is	one	of	the	qualified	countries	to	
make	this	contribution”113	
	
“The	expenditures	of	Brazilians	with	food	were	reduced	from	48%	to	
13%”114	
	
(3)	Nationalist	
Argument	
Abreu,	Katia	-	20/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
	
“It	is	good	to	bear	in	mind	that	the	term	"legal	reserve"	exists	only	in	
Brazilian	legislation.	The	same	applies	to	Areas	of	Permanent	
Preservation	(APPs),	which	do	not	exist	in	the	countries	which	are	
pressuring	us	to	have	them”115	
	
“Brazil	is	the	only	country	in	the	world	that	produces	its	food	in	less	
than	a	third	of	the	territory	--27%.	It	is	also	the	only	one	to	keep	
untouched	no	less	than	61%	of	its	biomes”116	
	
‘We	proposed	at	the	recent	Rio	+	20	and	other	multilateral	fora,	that	the	
APPs	should	be	adopted	worldwide.	Why	must	rivers	be	defended	only	
here	if	the	water	issue	is	global?’117	
	
(4)	Legal	Security	 Abreu,	Katia	-	20/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
	
”The	first	and	foremost	[benefit	of	the	new	code]	is	legal	security	for	
producers”118	
	
“The	new	Forest	Code	replaces	the	one	from	1965	and	is	a	patchwork	of	
provisional	measures,	decrees,	ordinances	and	regulations,	imposed,	for	
years,	without	any	public	debate,	by	bureaucrats	of	the	Ministry	of	
Environment.	It	had	never	been	voted	on	by	Congress”119	
	
Source:	Translated	by	the	author	based	on	the	articles	mentioned.	
																																								 																				
111	Ignora	os	benefícios	econômicos	e	sociais	que	a	produção	rural	tem	trazido	ao	Brasil		
112	anos	de	superávit	da	balança	comercial	
113	A	FAO	tem	afirmado,	reiteradas	vezes,	que	o	mundo	precisa	aumentar	em	40%	a	produção	de	
alimentos	e	que	o	Brasil	é	um	dos	países	mais	qualificados	a	dar	essa	contribuição.	
114	o	gasto	do	brasileiro	com	alimentos	foi	reduzido	de	48%	para	13%.		
115	É bom lembrar que	o	termo	"reserva	legal"	só	existe	na	legislação	brasileira.	O	mesmo	se	dá	com	as	
áreas	de	preservação	permanente	(APPs),	que	também	não	existem	nos	países	que	nos	pressionam	a	tê-
las.	
116	O	Brasil	é	o	único	país	do	mundo	que	produz	o	seu	alimento	em	menos	de	um	terço	do	território	--
27%.	É,	também,	o	único	a	manter	intocados	nada	menos	que	61%	dos	seus	biomas.	
117	...’propusemos,	na	recente	Rio+20	e	em	outros	fóruns	multilaterais,	que	as	APPs	sejam	adotadas	em	
todo	o	mundo.	Por	que	só	aqui	os	rios	devem	ser	defendidos	se	a	questão	da	água	é	mundial?	
118	O	primeiro	e	mais	importante--	é	a	segurança	jurídica	para	os	produtores.	
119	 O	 novo	 Código	 Florestal	 substitui	 o	 de	 1965	 e	 uma	 colcha	 de	 retalhos	 de	 medidas	 provisórias,	
decretos,	 portarias	 e	 regulamentos,	 impostos,	 durante	 anos,	 sem	 nenhum	 debate	 público,	 por	
burocratas	do	Ministério	do	Meio	Ambiente.	Nunca	havia	sido	votado	pelo	Congresso	Nacional. 	
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Appendix	IV	-	Codification	of	the	arguments	of	those	opposing	changes	
	
Code	 Author/	date/source	 Quotes	coded	
(1)	Capture	 Silva,	Marina	–	26/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
“…the	reforms	of	the	code	are	not	justified	by	the	defense	of	small	farmers	and,	in	fact,	
serve	the	interests	of	large	companies”120	
(2)	Amnesty	 Silva,	Marina	–	26/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
“Art.	67	waivers	properties	smaller	than	four	fiscal	modules	to	restore	Legal	Reserves	
cleared	before	July	2008.	This	is	amnesty.	The	IPEA	estimates	that	3.9	million	hectares	
will	no	longer	be	recovered”121	
“Art.	 63	 opens	 several	 exceptions	 that	 amnesty	 illegal	 deforestation	 on	 hilltops	 and	
slopes,	and	art.	61-A	offers	the	same	kindness,	depending	on	the	property	size,	to	those	
who	illegally	deforested	banks	of	rivers,	water	springs,	lakes	and	trails”122	
Silva,	Marina	12/10/12	–	
Folha	de	São	Paulo		
“They	 say	 it	 is	 because	 of	 soybeans,	 cattle,	 gold.	 But	 it	 is	 the	 certainty	 of	 impunity	 –	
allowed	by	the	amnesty	between	the	government	and	the	majority	–	which	drags	the	
backwardness	chain	in	the	Congress”123	
	
	 Telles,	Raul;	Lima,	André	
and	Pinto,	Luís	Fernando	-	
27/05/2014	–	Folha	de	São	
Paulo	
“Having	as	its	main	objective	the	amnesty	to	deforestation	carried	out	before	July	2008,	
the	 new	 law	 resulted	 in	 waiving	 the	 environmental	 recovery	 of	 at	 least	 29	 million	
hectares	 that	 should	 have	 been	 protected	 by	 the	 earlier	 law,	 as	 pointed	 by	 a	 study	
published	by	"Science"	magazine”124	
(3)	Environmental	
losses		
Silva,	Marina	–	26/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
“In	 the	mangroves	and	swamps,	degraded	areas	will	not	be	 recovered	and	new	areas	
can	 be	 occupied	 with	 shrimp	 farming	 and	 urban	 settlements	 (Art.	 11a).	 The	 riparian	
forest	ceases	to	be	measured	considering	the	margin	of	the	river	when	the	water	level	
is	higher	and	the	definition	of	"hilltop"	is	changed,	reducing	in	some	cases,	up	to	90%	of	
the	protected	area”125	
“Whoever	has	not	been	amnestied,	 can	 still	 use	50%	of	exotic	plants	 (commercial)	 to	
recover	degraded	areas	(Articles	61-A	13	and	66,	paragraph	3)”126	
(4)	 Agribusiness	
does	 not	 feed	
Brazilians	
Silva,	Marina	–	26/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
“Isn’t	it	a	fact	that	agribusiness	(which	importance	in	macroeconomics	and	international	
trade	no	one	denies)	is	not	placing	"food	on	the	table"	of	the	Brazilian	people,	and	that	
60%	of	basic	food	is	guaranteed	by	family	farmers,	also	responsible	for	7	out	of	10	jobs	
in	the	field?”127	
(5)	 Productivity	
can	 be	 improved	
through	 the	 use	
of	 more	
technology	
Silva,	Marina	–	26/10/2012	
–	Folha	de	São	Paulo	
“Isn’t	 it	a	 fact	 that	there	are	more	than	140	million	hectares	of	degraded	areas	which	
are	 unproductive	 or	which	 have	 extremely	 low	 productivity	 and	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
double	agricultural	production	and	the	herd	of	cattle	without	clearing	new	areas,	just	by	
adding	simple	and	affordable	technology?”128	
Source:	Provided	by	the	author	based	on	the	articles	mentioned.	
	
																																								 																				
120	 as	 reformas	 no	 código	 perdem	 a	 justificativa	 de	 defender	 os	 pequenos	 agricultores	 e,	 de	 fato,	
atendem	ao	interesse	de	grandes	empresas.		
121	O	art.	67	dispensa	imóveis	menores	que	quatro	módulos	fiscais	de	recuperar	reserva	legal	desmatada	
até	julho	de	2008.	Isso	é	anistia.	O	Ipea	calcula	que	3,9	milhões	de	hectares	deixarão	de	ser	recuperados.	
122	O	art.	63	abre	várias	exceções	que	anistiam	desmatamento	ilegal	em	topos	de	morro	e	encostas,	e	o	
art.	 61-A	 oferece	 as	 mesmas	 bondades,	 dependendo	 do	 tamanho	 do	 imóvel,	 a	 quem	 desmatou	
ilegalmente	margens	de	rios,	nascentes,	olhos	d'água,	lagos	e	veredas.		
123	Dizem	que	é	a	soja,	o	gado,	o	ouro.	Mas	é	pela	certeza	da	impunidade	-propiciada	pela	anistia	feita	
entre	governo	e	maioria-	que	arrasta	o	correntão	do	atraso	no	Congresso	
124	 Tendo	 como	 objetivo	 central	 a	 anistia	 a	 desmatamentos	 realizados	 até	 julho	 de	 2008,	 a	 nova	 lei	
resultou	em	dispensar	a	recuperação	ambiental	de	pelo	menos	29	milhões	de	hectares	que	deveriam	ter	
sido	protegidos	pela	lei	anterior,	conforme	apontou	um	estudo	publicado	pela	revista	"Science". 	
125	 Nos	 mangues	 e	 apicuns,	 as	 áreas	 degradadas	 não	 serão	 recuperadas	 e	 novas	 áreas	 podem	 ser	
ocupadas	 com	 criação	 de	 camarões	 e	 loteamentos	 urbanos	 (art.	 11-A).	 A	 mata	 ciliar	 deixa	 de	 ser	
contada	a	partir	do	ponto	de	cheia	do	rio	e	muda	a	definição	de	"topo	de	morro",	reduzindo,	em	alguns	
casos,	até	90%	da	área	protegida.  
	
126	Quem	não	foi	anistiado,	ainda	pode	usar	50%	de	plantas	exóticas	(comerciais)	para	recuperar	áreas	
degradadas	(artigos	61-A	13	e	66,	parágrafo	3º).		
127	 1)	 É	 fato	 que	 o	 agronegócio	 (cuja	 importância	 na	 macroeconomia	 e	 no	 comércio	 internacional	
ninguém	 nega)	 não	 é	 que	 coloca	 "comida	 na	 mesa"	 do	 povo	 brasileiro,	 que	 60%	 da	 cesta	 básica	 é	
garantida	pela	agricultura	familiar,	também	responsável	por	7	em	cada	10	empregos	no	campo?	
128	 É	 fato	 que	 existem	mais	 de	 140	 milhões	 de	 hectares	 de	 áreas	 degradadas,	 improdutivas	 ou	 com	
baixíssima	produtividade	e	que	é	possível	dobrar	a	produção	agrícola	e	o	rebanho	bovino	sem	desmatar	
novas	áreas,	bastando	agregar	tecnologia	simples	e	disponível?	
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Appendix	V	-	Codification	of	the	arguments	of	those	promoting	partial	changes	
Code	 Author/	date/	source	 Quotes	
(1)	Food	security	 Teixeira,	Izabella	
09/11/2012	–	youtube	
video	Rio+20	UN	
Conference	
“And	we	have	to	seek	the	inclusion	of	all	and	not	the	exclusion	of	
people.	And	a	policy	of	inclusion	is	a	solutions-building	policy”129	
	
“We	observed	a	social	criterion	in	order	not	to	remove	people	
from	the	countryside”130	
(2)	Small	farmers	
are	economically	
vulnerable	and	
cannot	invest	in	
technology	
Teixeira,	Izabella	
09/11/2012	–	youtube	
video	Rio+20	UN	
Conference	
“And	we	have	to	seek	the	inclusion	of	all	and	not	the	exclusion	of	
people.	And	a	policy	of	inclusion	is	a	solutions-building	policy”131	
	
“We	observed	a	social	criterion	in	order	not	to	remove	people	
from	the	countryside”132	
(3)	Ecological	
protection	based	
on	the	size	of	the	
property	is	fair	
Teixeira,	Izabella	
09/11/2012	–	youtube	
video	Rio+20	UN	
Conference	
“90%	of	rural	properties	in	this	country	belong	to	small	farmers	
and	they	represent	24%	of	the	country’s	territory.	10%	[of	
properties]	correspond	to	76%	of	the	agriculture	territory	of	this	
country,	so	we	asked	this	10%	to	restore	everything”133	
(4)	Legal	Security	 Teixeira,	Izabella	
09/11/2012	–	youtube	
video	Rio+20	UN	
Conference	
“I’m	not	talking	about	big	loggers;	I'm	talking	about	people	who	
plant	since	the	last	century	in	this	country	and	who	are	illegal	
according	to	the	current	law”134	
	
“We	have	at	least	90%	of	farmers	in	an	illegal	situation	according	
to	the	current	code”135	
	
“Do	you	think	that	a	farmer	of	the	Amazon,	who	arrived	there	in	
1970	and	who	was	instructed	by	the	government	to	deforest,	do	
you	think	this	farmer	is	equal		-	he	who	followed	the	law	-	to	a	
farmer	arriving	now	and	deforesting	illegally?	Is	that	what	you	
think?	I	don’t	think	so.	This	is	called	inter-temporal	law”136	
	
Source:	Translated	by	the	author	based	on	a	video	available	at	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecDq_sY1C_4	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
129	E	a	gente	tem	que	buscar	a	inclusão	de	todos	e	não	a	exclusão	dos	outros.	E	uma	politica	de	inclusão,	
‘e	uma	politica	de	construção	de	soluções	
130	nos	olhamos	o	critério	social	para	não	tirar	o	povo	do	campo,		
131	E	a	gente	tem	que	buscar	a	inclusão	de	todos	e	não	a	exclusão	dos	outros.	E	uma	politica	de	inclusão,	
‘e	uma	politica	de	construção	de	soluções	
132	nos	olhamos	o	critério	social	para	não	tirar	o	povo	do	campo,		
133	“	90%	das	propriedades	rurais	desse	pais	são	de	pequenos	agricultores	e	representam	24%	do	
território	agrícola	desse	país.	10%	[das	propriedades]	representam	76%	do	território	agrícola	desse	pais	
e	nós	mandamos	que	os	10%	recuperem	tudo.	
134	Eu	não	to	falando	dos	grandes	desmatadores	não,	eu	estou	falando	de	gente	que	planta	nesse	pais	
desde	o	século	passado	e	que	estão	ilegais	perante	a	lei.	
135	nos	temos	90%	de	agricultores	familiares	ilegais	pelo	atual	código	brasileiro	…	
136	A	senhora	acha	que	um	agricultor	da	Amazônia,	que	chegou	 la	em	1970	e	que	o	governo	mandou	
desmatar,	 que	esse	agricultor	 ‘e	 igual	 (ele	 cumpriu	a	 lei)	 a	um	agricultor	que	 chega	agora	e	desmata	
ilegalmente?	A	senhora	acha	isso?	Eu	não	acho.	Isso	se	chama	direito	intertemporal	
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Chapter	5	
Appendix	I	-	Outputs	from	the	narrative	analysis	pursued	with	(Atlat.ti)	
List	of	all	objects	
______________________________________________________________________	
HU:	 Pesticides_7	
File:	 	[H:\Atlasti\TextBank\Pesticides_7.hpr7]	
Edited	by:	 Super	
Date/Time:	 2016-08-11	19:50:20	
______________________________________________________________________	
HU	
______________________________________________________________________	
Pesticides_7	
	
Primary	Documents	
______________________________________________________________________	
P	1:	Agencia	Senado	_de	01_01_08	ate	08_07_15.docx	{191}	
P	2:	Alberto	da	Rocha	Neto_com	transcricao.docx	{3}	
P	3:	Audiência	Pública	_comissao	de	agricultura	e	reforma	agraria	02_07_15.docx	{36}	
P	4:	CÂMARA	DOS	DEPUTADOS.docx	{253}	
P	5:	DossieAbrasco_2015_web.pdf	{0}	
P	6:	Entrevista	Meirelles_Galileo.docx	{0}	
P	7:	Entrevista_Luiz_carlos_Meirelles_10_10_14.docx	{12}	
P	8:	Folha_05_06_15_Guedes_LuisFernando.docx	{0}	
P	9:	Folha_12_04_2014_Katia_Abreu_Glifosato	D-2,4.docx	{0}	
P10:	Folha_30_11_2013_Katia_Abreu_Burocracia	e	pirotecnia.docx	{0}	
P11:	Júlio	Sérgio	de	Britto_com	transcricao.docx	{7}	
P12:	Le	Monde_Brasil	envenenado_Abril_2010.docx	{0}	
P13:	Le	Monde_Katia_Abreu_na	europa.docx	{0}	
P14:	O	veneno	esta	na	mesa	1	e	2.docx	{0}	
	
Quotations	
______________________________________________________________________	
1:1				O	que	é	que	iria	acontecer?..	(75:75)	
1:2	Comissão	aprova	redução	de	imp..	(229:242)	
1:3	A	política	nacional	de	apoio	a..	(40:57)	
1:4	proposta	tem	o	objetivo	de	inc..	(40:41)	
1:5	De	iniciativa	da	senadora	Ana	..	(41:41)	
1:6	ainda	um	aumento	no	preço	dos	..	(75:75)	
1:7	A	senadora	Kátia	Abreu	(PMDB-T..	(73:79)	
1:8	A	senadora	também	destacou	o	p..	(78:78)	
1:9	Kátia	Abreu	pôs	em	dúvida	os	m..	(76:77)	
1:10	A	senadora	também	destacou	o	p..	(78:78)	
1:11	Em	outubro	de	2013,	a	Agência	..	(103:103)	
1:12	36%	das	amostras	analisadas	de..	(103:103)	
1:13	O	substitutivo	aprovado	pela	C..	(106:107)	
1:14	O	substitutivo	aprovado	pela	C..	(106:107)	
1:15	Propôs	também,	que,	em	vez	da	..	(107:107)	
1:16	A	política	nacional	de	apoio	a..	(97:110)	
1:17	CMA	pode	votar	limites	para	pu..	(122:132)	
1:18	A	autora	do	projeto	(PLS	HYPER..	(128:128)	
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1:19	CMA	pode	votar	limites	para	pu..	(122:128)	
1:20	O	coordenador	da	Campanha	Perm..	(143:144)	
1:21	A	presidente	da	Comissão	de	Di..	(139:148)	
1:22	–		Apenas	30%	do	que	é	pulveri..	(144:144)	
1:23	Apenas	30%	do	que	é	pulverizad..	(144:144)	
1:24	não	se	trata	de	um	caso	isolad..	(143:144)	
1:25	De	acordo	com	o	representante	..	(145:148)	
1:26	De	acordo	com	o	representante	..	(145:147)	
1:27	O	representante	da	Abrasco	men..	(148:148)	
1:28	Segundo	Carneiro,	pesquisas	re..	(146:148)	
1:29	Problemas	na	Anvisa	Cleber	Fol..	(149:154)	
1:30	Problemas	na	Anvisa	Cleber	Fol..	(149:150)	
1:31	O	diretor	de	Coordenação	e	Art..	(151:152)	
1:32	–	Não	é	segredo	para	ninguém	q..	(152:152)	
1:33	Porque	a	estrutura	institucion..	(152:152)	
1:34	Já	Fernando	Carneiro,	da	Abras..	(153:153)	
1:35	Para	o		procurador	da	Repúblic..	(154:154)	
1:36	Assis	também	é	de	opinião	que	..	(154:154)	
1:37	O	representante	da	Associação	..	(174:176)	
1:38	O	representante	da	Associação	..	(174:174)	
1:39	O	representante	da	Associação	..	(174:174)	
1:40	-	Nós	temos	o	ônus	de	ter	que	..	(176:176)	
1:41	O	representante	da	Associação	..	(174:175)	
1:42	—			O	que	é	que	iria	acontecer..	(75:75)	
1:43	Nós	temos	o	ônus	de	ter	que	us..	(176:176)	
1:44	Os	agrotóxicos	“são	problema	e..	(198:200)	
1:45	Os	agrotóxicos	“são	problema	e..	(198:199)	
1:46	Controle	toxicológico	O	direto..	(201:203)	
1:47	Venda	Casada	O	professor	e	pes..	(204:207)	
1:48	Saúde	A	professora	e	pesquisad..	(211:214)	
1:49	Produtividade	Por	sua	vez,	o	d..	(208:210)	
1:50	Jorge	Agenor	garantiu	que	os	i..	(203:203)	
1:51	O	diretor	da	Agência	Nacional	..	(202:203)	
1:52	.	Segundo	ele,	considerando-se..	(203:203)	
1:53	O	professor	e	pesquisador	da	U..	(205:207)	
1:54	O	professor	e	pesquisador	da	U..	(205:206)	
1:55	Por	sua	vez,	o	diretor-executi..	(209:209)	
1:56	A	professora	e	pesquisadora	da..	(212:213)	
1:57	Anamaria	Tambellini	considera	..	(214:214)	
1:58	Ela	destacou	que	as	substância..	(213:213)	
1:59	De	acordo	com	o	projeto	(HYPER..	(235:237)	
1:60	A	proposta	vista	aumentar	a	co..	(259:259)	
1:61	Por	meio	de	emenda	da	Câmara	d..	(264:264)	
1:62	Senadores	pedem	apoio	para	que..	(283:296)	
1:63	O	senador	Antônio	Carlos	Valad..	(289:289)	
1:64	O	senador	Antônio	Carlos	Valad..	(289:291)	
1:65	Valadares	informou	que	o	Brasi..	(290:290)	
1:66	Valadares	informou	que	o	Brasi..	(290:291)	
1:67	O	senador	Blairo	Maggi	(PR-MT)..	(292:294)	
1:68	Também	o	senador	Waldemir	Moka..	(295:296)	
1:69	Também	o	senador	Waldemir	Moka..	(295:295)	
1:70	O	senador	Blairo	Maggi	(PR-MT)..	(292:296)	
1:71	-	Não	tem	como	o	Brasil	defend..	(294:294)	
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1:73	Porém,	segundo	ele,	ainda	não	..	(292:292)	
1:74	Título			Especialistas	defende..	(308:317)	
1:75	Políticas	Na	avaliação	do	repr..	(318:320)	
1:76	Para	o	representante	da	Agênci..	(321:323)	
1:77	Consumo	O	aumento	do	consumo	d..	(324:326)	
1:78	Título			Especialistas	defende..	(308:327)	
1:81	Em	curto	prazo,	disse	Morandi,..	(315:316)	
1:82	Em	curto	prazo,	disse	Morandi,..	(315:315)	
1:83	Marcelo	Morandi	recomendou	ain..	(316:316)	
1:84	Na	avaliação	do	representante	..	(320:320)	
1:85	Já	existem	tecnologias	para	pr..	(314:314)	
1:86	Na	avaliação	do	representante	..	(320:320)	
1:87	Ele	informou	que	são	80	técnic..	(321:321)	
1:89	bem	como	a	admissão	de	mais	pr..	(321:321)	
1:91	Para	ele,	o	clima	tropical	do	..	(325:325)	
1:92	A	Comissão	de	Meio	Ambiente,	D..	(344:348)	
1:93	A	Comissão	de	Meio	Ambiente,	D..	(344:344)	
1:94	Ao	justificar	o	debate,	Pedro	..	(345:345)	
1:96	A	Comissão	de	Meio	Ambiente,	D..	(344:347)	
1:97	Em	muitos	casos,	lembrou,	as	c..	(347:347)	
1:98	Em	muitos	casos,	lembrou,	as	c..	(347:347)	
1:99	A	política	nacional	de	apoio	a..	(97:111)	
1:100	A	presidente	da	Comissão	de	Di..	(139:154)	
1:101	Os	agrotóxicos	“são	problema	e..	(198:214)	
1:102	Aprovada	criação	de	fundo	de	f..	(254:271)	
1:103	Título		(ARGUMENTOS	MODERADOS)..	(282:296)	
1:104	Título			Impactos	dos	agrotóxi..	(339:348)	
1:105	Aprovadas	normas	para	produção..	(351:366)	
1:106	Proposta	que	regulamenta	a	pro..	(356:356)	
1:107	Ao	manifestar	seu	voto	favoráv..	(360:360)	
1:108	Quando	da	discussão	da	matéria..	(361:362)	
1:109	A	senadora	observou	que	melhor..	(362:362)	
1:110	-	Não	é	justo	deixar	nosso	agr..	(362:362)	
1:111	-	Não	é	justo	deixar	nosso	agr..	(362:362)	
1:112	Proposta	que	regulamenta	a	pro..	(356:363)	
1:113	Título			Normas	para	agrotóxic..	(378:393)	
1:114	Título		(ARGUMENTO	MODERADO)	V..	(405:420)	
1:115	Título		(ARGUMENTO	DESENVOLVIM..	(429:442)	
1:116	Valadares	apoia	campanha	de	co..	(406:415)	
1:117	Para	o	senador,	a	simples	inst..	(412:415)	
1:118	Para	o	senador,	a	simples	inst..	(412:414)	
1:119	O	senador	Blairo	Maggi	(PR-MT)..	(416:416)	
1:120	O	senador	Blairo	Maggi	(PR-MT)..	(416:416)	
1:121	Ele	disse	que	hoje	já	é	possív..	(416:416)	
1:122	Segundo	Blairo	Maggi,	sem	os	a..	(416:416)	
1:123	O	diretor	da	Agência	Nacional	..	(435:435)	
1:124	em	que	teria	afirmado	estarem	..	(435:435)	
1:125	A	convocação	foi	aprovada	pelo..	(436:440)	
1:126	-	Isto	está	dando	um	prejuízo	..	(438:438)	
1:127	Segundo	a	senadora,	seria	ótim..	(439:439)	
1:128	-	Isto	está	dando	um	prejuízo	..	(438:439)	
1:129	Título			Demora	na	liberação	d..	(453:474)	
1:130	O	professor	e	doutor	da	Univer..	(460:463)	
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1:131	A	mesma	opinião	tem	o	senador	..	(464:466)	
1:132	A	senadora	Kátia	Abreu	(DEM-TO..	(467:469)	
1:133	Anvisa	Em	sua	exposição,	o	ger..	(470:472)	
1:134	Em	sua	exposição,	o	gerente	ge..	(471:472)	
1:135	A	demora	na	regulamentação	e	n..	(459:472)	
1:136	O	professor	e	doutor	da	Univer..	(460:461)	
1:137	-	Escuto	muita	reclamação	dos	..	(463:463)	
1:138	A	mesma	opinião	tem	o	senador	..	(464:464)	
1:139	Ele	denunciou	a	suposta	falta	..	(466:466)	
1:140	-	Existe	um	decreto	que	estipu..	(465:468)	
1:141	A	senadora	Kátia	Abreu	(DEM-TO..	(467:467)	
1:142	Para	Kátia	Abreu,	a	falta	de	p..	(469:469)	
1:143	Meirelles	frisou	que	a	demora	..	(472:472)	
1:144	HYPERLINK	"http://www12hml:100..	(484:507)	
1:145	Na	opinião	de	Heráclito	Fortes..	(495:496)	
1:146	Na	opinião	de	Heráclito	Fortes..	(495:495)	
1:147	Título			Defensivos	e	fertiliz..	(517:532)	
1:148	rata-se,	segundo	explicou	Káti..	(524:527)	
1:149	"Com	essa	isenção,	estaremos	d..	(525:525)	
1:150	Título			Heráclito	quer	instit..	(541:555)	
1:151	O	senador	lembrou	que	há	proje..	(548:548)	
1:152	O	senador	Heráclito	Fortes	(DE..	(547:550)	
1:153	Heráclito	quer	instituir	o	def..	(542:555)	
1:154	A	proposta,	continuou,	irá	inc..	(549:549)	
1:155	Fertilizantes:	Stephanes	propõ..	(565:596)	
1:156	Em	audiência	pública	realizada..	(570:575)	
1:157	O	ministro	descartou	a	ideia	d..	(571:571)	
1:158	Na	opinião	de	Heráclito	Fortes..	(495:495)	
1:159	O	senador	Gilberto	Goellner	(D..	(592:592)	
1:160	Título			Senadores	sugerem	pro..	(607:628)	
1:161	Referências			HYPERLINK	"http:..	(637:717)	
1:162	Referências			HYPERLINK	"http:..	(637:669)	
1:163	senador	Gilberto	Goellner	(DEM..	(614:617)	
1:164	Neuto	de	Conto	(PMDB-SC)	obser..	(619:620)	
1:165	Já	o	senador	Valter	Pereira	(P..	(621:622)	
1:167	,	disse	que	a	falta	de	defensi..	(621:622)	
1:168	Título		(A	VÍTIMA	DESSA	NARRAT..	(676:703)	
1:169	O	alto	endividamento	do	setor	..	(685:691)	
1:170	Gilberto	Goellner	diz	que	endi..	(677:694)	
1:171	As	ações	do	governo,	conforme	..	(687:687)	
1:172	O	alto	endividamento	do	setor	..	(685:685)	
1:173	Conforme	explicações	do	senado..	(689:689)	
1:174	Na	opinião	de	Gilberto	Goellne..	(691:691)	
1:175	Na	opinião	de	Gilberto	Goellne..	(691:694)	
1:176	Nota			"Em	um	clima	tropical,	..	(716:719)	
1:177	Nota			"Em	um	clima	tropical,	..	(716:717)	
1:178	Título			Goellner	alerta	o	gov..	(732:755)	
1:179	O	senador	Gilberto	Goellner	(D..	(741:745)	
1:180	O	senador	lembrou	que	os	traba..	(743:743)	
1:181	Diante	da	situação	de	desesper..	(743:743)	
1:182	O	senador	lembrou	que	os	traba..	(743:743)	
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4:128	Já	o	representante	do	Ministér..	(152:153)	
4:129	A	representante	do	Sindicato	N..	(154:155)	
4:130	O	presidente	da	Comissão	de	Me..	(145:151)	
4:131	Eu	não	vejo	razão	alguma	para	..	(151:151)	
4:132	Ele	informou	que	o	ministério	..	(152:152)	
4:133	A	representante	do	Sindicato	N..	(154:154)	
4:134	"Só	em	defensivos	há	hoje	cerc..	(163:163)	
4:135	O	deputado	Padre	João	(PT-MG)	..	(167:167)	
4:136	O	deputado	Padre	João	(PT-MG)	..	(167:169)	
4:137	De	acordo	com	o	deputado,	o	us..	(169:169)	
4:138	Uma	linha	de	produzir	alimento..	(168:168)	
4:139	Agricultura	rejeita	controle	s..	(174:180)	
4:140	Valdir	Colatto	ressalta	que	o	..	(178:180)	
4:141	mas	recebeu	parecer	pela	rejei..	(180:183)	
4:142	Colatto	considerou	a	medida	de..	(181:182)	
4:143	O	deputado	argumentou	ainda	qu..	(183:183)	
4:144	O	projeto,	disse	ainda	o	relat..	(184:184)	
4:145	Colatto	considerou	a	medida	de..	(181:184)	
4:146	A	Comissão	de	Agricultura,	Pec..	(196:196)	
4:147	Relator	na	comissão,	o	deputad..	(197:197)	
4:148	Zé	Silva:	mau	uso	de	agrotóxic..	(207:212)	
4:149	“As	autoridades	brasileiras	nã..	(209:209)	
4:150	“As	autoridades	brasileiras	nã..	(209:212)	
4:152	De	acordo	com	o	deputado,	o	de..	(212:212)	
4:154	Representantes	dos	apicultores..	(226:227)	
4:155	Representantes	dos	apicultores..	(226:226)	
4:156	Um	desafio	se	impõe	a	produtor..	(225:225)	
4:158	O	coordenador-geral	de	Avaliaç..	(234:235)	
4:159	“Não	temos	nada	contra	a	aplic..	(235:235)	
4:160	Apicultores	apontam	agrotóxico..	(220:227)	
4:161	Proibição	
No	ano	passado,	o	Br..	(231:236)	
4:162	No	ano	passado,	o	Brasil,	de	f..	(232:232)	
4:163	A	cultura	de	grãos	depende	de	..	(247:252)	
4:164	ressaltou	que	não	há	como	pres..	(251:251)	
4:165	Ele	lembrou	que	uma	conjunção	..	(252:252)	
4:166	Na	audiência	sobre	o	uso	de	ag..	(251:261)	
4:167	O	argumento	foi	reforçado	pela..	(252:255)	
4:168	Apesar	de	reconhecer	que	a	cul..	(257:257)	
4:169	Proteção	
O	deputado	Antônio	Ro..	(259:260)	
4:170	A	proposta	obriga	os	apicultor..	(260:260)	
4:171	eliminação	dos	produtos	mais	t..	(257:257)	
4:172	o	desenvolvimento	de	tecnologi..	(257:257)	
4:173	Ela	também	ressaltou	a	importâ..	(254:254)	
4:174	Ela	disse	que	não	se	devem	com..	(253:253)	
4:175	Audiência	debate	proibição	do	..	(272:274)	
4:176	A	proibição	foi	determinada	pe..	(274:274)	
4:177	Em	debate	realizado	nesta	terç..	(291:292)	
4:178	Na	audiência,	o	presidente	da	..	(293:293)	
4:179	Relator	quer	fortalecer	monito..	(287:300)	
4:180	Assim	como	o	representante	da	..	(297:299)	
255	
	
4:181	Agronegócio	
O	secretário	de	Po..	(295:296)	
4:182	A	representante	da	Via	Campesi..	(300:300)	
4:183	Ao	defender	a	agricultura	orgâ..	(300:300)	
4:184	A	representante	da	Via	Campesi..	(300:300)	
4:185	Assim	como	o	representante	da	..	(297:298)	
4:186	ssim	como	o	representante	da	C..	(297:297)	
4:187	o	Brasil	precisa	começar	a	tra..	(297:297)	
4:188	Esse	modelo,	segundo	afirmou,	..	(296:296)	
4:189	Especialistas	presentes	à	audi..	(294:294)	
4:190	“Precisamos	avançar	na	questão..	(291:291)	
4:191	Médico	e	coordenador	do	estudo..	(311:319)	
4:192	Em	audiência	pública	nesta	ter..	(310:316)	
4:193	Médico	e	coordenador	do	estudo..	(311:311)	
4:194	Câncer,	aborto	e	danos	cardior..	(314:314)	
4:195	Para	reverter	esse	quadro,	Pig..	(316:316)	
4:196	Críticas	ao	estudo	
Já	a	Associ..	(317:319)	
4:197	O	gerente	de	regulamentação	da..	(318:318)	
4:198	Valdir	Colatto	afirmou	que	a	A..	(327:328)	
4:199	Comissão	debate	presença	de	re..	(336:339)	
4:200	A	iniciativa	do	debate	é	do	de..	(339:339)	
4:201	100%	de	agrotóxico	em	lactante..	(341:346)	
4:202	Comissão	debate	presença	de	re..	(336:344)	
4:203	Freitas	defendeu	uma	agricultu..	(344:344)	
4:204	reitas	destacou	que	os	pequeno..	(344:344)	
4:205	pequenos	agricultores,	segundo..	(344:344)	
4:206	e	100%	das	mulheres	em	fase	de..	(342:342)	
4:207	Brasil	teve	8	mil	casos	de	int..	(361:377)	
4:208	O	Ministério	da	Saúde	registro..	(365:366)	
4:209	Uso	com	precaução	
Médica	e	int..	(368:371)	
4:210	Proibição	total	
Já	para	o	enge..	(372:375)	
4:212	mas	informou	que	já	foi	compro..	(369:369)	
4:213	Para	Anamaria	Tambellini,	esse..	(370:371)	
4:214	Já	para	o	engenheiro	agrônomo	..	(373:373)	
4:215	e	100%	das	mulheres	em	fase	de..	(374:374)	
4:216	Vinícius	Freitas	defendeu	uma	..	(375:375)	
4:217	Segundo	ele,	para	que	esse	tip..	(375:375)	
4:218	O	Ministério	da	Saúde	registro..	(365:365)	
4:219	Jesus	Rodrigues	afirmou	que	pr..	(367:367)	
4:220	e	garante	a	segurança	alimenta..	(402:402)	
4:221	o	uso	de	químicos	sustenta	a	p..	(402:402)	
4:222	Fabricantes	reclamam	de	preocu..	(398:403)	
4:223	A	mesma	avaliação	foi	feita	pe..	(404:408)	
4:224	O	relator	da	subcomissão	sobre..	(409:409)	
4:225	Legislação	rígida	
Para	o	vice-..	(410:412)	
4:226	Legislação	rígida	
Para	o	vice-..	(410:411)	
4:228	Representantes	do	setor	empres..	(402:402)	
4:229	Para	ele,	o	próprio	uso	da	pal..	(404:404)	
256	
	
4:230	ara	ele,	o	próprio	uso	da	pala..	(404:404)	
4:231	Haradom	disse	que	há	uma	avali..	(405:405)	
4:232	Em	relação	aos	produtos	orgâni..	(407:407)	
4:233	necessidade	de	alimentos	do	Br..	(407:407)	
4:234	Comissão	rejeita	agravamento	d..	(437:441)	
4:235	A	rejeição	foi	recomendada	pel..	(442:444)	
4:237	A	rejeição	foi	recomendada	pel..	(442:443)	
4:238	Azambuja	disse	ainda	que	trans..	(443:443)	
4:239	Trapé:apesar	do	aumento	no	uso..	(457:460)	
4:240	Representantes	de	empresas	da	..	(458:459)	
4:241	O	vice-presidente	do	Sindicato..	(461:461)	
4:242	Os	defensivos	agrícolas	estão	..	(461:461)	
4:243	O	vice-presidente	do	Sindicato..	(461:461)	
4:244	Sem	tranquilidade	
Os	parlament..	(462:463)	
4:245	José	Roberto	da	Ros	rebateu	as..	(465:465)	
4:246	Amaury	Teixeira	disse	não	acre..	(469:469)	
4:247	A	gerente	de	Comunicação,	Educ..	(467:468)	
4:248	Juliana	Hosken,	afirmou	que	94..	(467:468)	
4:252	O	relator	da	proposta,	deputad..	(481:481)	
4:253	Consequências	neurotóxicas	
De	..	(506:508)	
4:254	Fim	dos	agrotóxicos	
O	represen..	(511:513)	
4:255	Modernização	do	Uso	
Já	o	repre..	(514:516)	
4:256	Consequências	neurotóxicas	
De	..	(506:508)	
4:257	Um	estudo	divulgado	no	mês	pas..	(510:510)	
4:258	Já	o	representante	da	Confeder..	(515:516)	
4:259	Ele	ressaltou	que	é	possível	p..	(513:513)	
4:260	Comissão	aprova	isenção	de	imp..	(524:533)	
4:261	O	relator	acrescentou	ainda	qu..	(534:534)	
4:262	Comissão	aprova	isenção	de	imp..	(524:535)	
4:263	Comissão	aprova	isenção	de	imp..	(524:534)	
4:264	O	relator	acrescentou	ainda	qu..	(534:534)	
4:265	Lista	positiva	de	componentes	..	(545:553)	
4:266	A	falta	de	uma	classificação	d..	(548:549)	
4:267	Lista	positiva	de	componentes	..	(545:547)	
4:268	A	evolução	do	SIC	também	poder..	(552:552)	
4:269	Atualmente,	a	Anvisa	possui	o	..	(551:551)	
4:270	A	coordenadora	de	Avaliação	Am..	(603:605)	
4:271	Kênia	Godoy,	no	entanto,	disse..	(605:605)	
4:272	Entre	esses	direitos,	Stédile	..	(624:624)	
4:273	Relatório	pede	mais	crédito	e	..	(647:669)	
4:274	Divergência		
O	parecer	de	Lupi..	(666:669)	
4:275	Outro	a	reforçar	a	importância..	(664:664)	
4:276	A	comissão	especial	criada	par..	(648:654)	
4:277	"Os	urbanoides	devem	abrir	os	..	(648:648)	
4:278	Parte	das	sugestões	da	comissã..	(652:654)	
4:279	O	texto	aprovado	divide	as	açõ..	(650:650)	
4:280	Fundo		
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Segundo	o	deputado	Luis..	(661:662)	
4:281	A	comissão	especial	criada	par..	(648:648)	
4:282	João	Dado	destaca	que	os	cient..	(699:699)	
4:283	Abelhas	polinizadoras	podem	te..	(692:708)	
4:284	Abelhas	polinizadoras	podem	te..	(692:708)	
4:285	"prestam	um	serviço	ambiental	..	(693:693)	
4:286	O	deputado	adverte	que	as	abel..	(695:695)	
4:287	Banco	de	dados	
O	projeto	obrig..	(701:708)	
7:1	Aqui	no	Brasil	temos	uma	press..	(21:21)	
7:2	Poderia	haver	um	mecanismo	mai..	(21:21)	
7:3	Um	caminho	seria	o	re-registro..	(22:22)	
7:4	Porque	quem	vem	propondo	a	cri..	(24:24)	
7:5	http://dssbr.org/site/entrevis..	(1:26)	
7:6	1.	Qual	é	o	papel	da	Agência	N..	(10:26)	
7:7	E	mais	recentemente,	frente	a	..	(15:15)	
7:9	Quando	você	fala	de	prazo	tem	..	(19:19)	
7:10	Aqui	no	Brasil	temos	uma	press..	(21:21)	
7:11	O	Brasil	proíbe	alguns	compost..	(21:22)	
7:12	5.	Como	você	vê	a	proposta	da	..	(23:24)	
7:13	Essa	proposta	nasce	ali	no	boj..	(24:24)	
11:1	05/12/14	–	por	telefone	–	grav..	(1:35)	
11:2	.	O	melhor	dos	mundos	é	centra..	(5:5)	
11:3	Todos	os	três	órgãos	têm	consc..	(18:18)	
11:4	O	melhor	dos	mundos	é	centrali..	(5:5)	
11:5	O	MAPA	é	favorável	à	desburocr..	(20:20)	
11:6	Porque	iria	desburocratizar,	n..	(22:24)	
11:7	mas	o	nosso	grande	problema	ho..	(33:33)	
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______________________________________________________________________	
ACTOR:	Acir	Gurgaz	(PDT-RO)	President	of	the	Commission	for	Agriculture	and	Agrarian	
Settlement	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Alceu	Moreira	(PMDB-RS)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Alessio	Marostica	(National	Confederation	of	Agriculture)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Alexandre	Jose	Cattelan	(EMBRAPA)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Ana	Maria	Vekic	(ANVISA)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	ANDEF	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Angelo	Trape	(UNICAMP)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	ANVISA	{5-1}	
ACTOR:	Brazilian	Agroecological	Association	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Cesar	Koppe	Grisolia	(Universidade	de	Brasilia)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Cleber	Folgado	(Coordinator	of	the	Permanent	Campaing	against	Pesticides	and	for	
Life)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	CNA	{3-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputado	Beto	Faro	(PT-PA)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Abelardo	Lupion	(DEM-PR)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Alfredo	Kaefer	(PSDB-PR)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Amaury	Teixeira	(PT-MG)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Amaury	Teixeira	(PT-MG)Ou	(PT-BA)?	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Antonio	Roberto	(PV-MG)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Arnaldo	Jordy	(PPS-PA)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Celia	Rocha	(PTB-AL)	{1-1}	
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ACTOR:	Deputy	Dirceu	Sperafico	(PP-PR)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Jesus	Rodrigues	(PT-PI)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Joao	Dado	(PDT-SP)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Joao	Daniel	(PT-SE)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Luis	Carlos	Heinze	(PP-RS)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Marcos	Montes	(PSD-MG)	(DEM-MG)	{3-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Moacir	Micheletto	(PMDB-PR)	{2-1}	
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ACTOR:	Deputy	Reinaldo	Azambuja	(PSDB-MS)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Roberto	Balestra	(PP-GO)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Sarney	Filho	(PV-MA)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Stefano	Aguiar	(PSC-MG)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Valdir	Colatto	(PMDB-SC)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Ze	Silva	(PDT-MG)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Eduardo	Daher	(National	Association	for	the	diffusion	of	fertilizers	-	ANDA	e	National	
Association	of	Vegetable	Defence	-	ANDEF)	{4-1}	
ACTOR:	Eduardo	Guimaraes	(National	Association	of	Vegetal	Defense	-	ANDEF)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Federal	University	of	Mato	Grosso	and	Fundacao	Oswaldo	Cruz	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Fernando	Carneiro	(ABRASCO)	{2-1}	
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ACTOR:	Guilherme	Franco	(Ministry	of	Health)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Hetel	dos	Santos	(National	Secretariat	of	Food	and	Nutritional	Security	-	SESAN)	{1-1}	
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ACTOR:	Inacio	Kroetz	(MAPA)	{1-1}	
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ACTOR:	Jose	Agenor	Alvares	da	Silva	(ANVISA)	{4-1}	
ACTOR:	Jose	Cunha	(Brazilian	Apiculture	Confederation)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Jose	Roberto	Ros	(National	Union	of	Agricultural	Defense)	{2-1}	
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ACTOR:	Luiz	Carlos	Meireles	(ANVISA)	{3-1}	
ACTOR:	Marcelo	Goncalves	(National	Council	of	Nutritional	and	Food	Security	-	CONSEA)	{1-1}	
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Comment:	
Code:	ACTOR:	Marcelo	Morandi	(EMBRAPA)	
Created:	27/07/2015	13:18:51	by	Super	
Modified:	29/07/2015	17:19:00	
Families	(2):	ACTORS,	EMBRAPA	
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Comment:	
Code:	ACTOR:	MMA	
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ACTOR:	Permanent	Campaing	against	Pesticides	and	for	Life	{1-1}	
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Code:	ACTOR:	Senator	Katia	Abreu	(PMDB-TO)	In	2010	(DEM-TO)	and	president	of	CNA	
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Modified:	29/07/2015	17:42:40	
Families	(4):	ACTORS,	CNA,	DEM,	PMDB	
Quotations:	10	
ACTOR:	Senator	Neuto	de	Conto	(PMDB-SC)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Senator	Pedro	Taques	(PDT-MT)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	Senator	Valter	Pereira	(PMDB-MS)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Senator	Waldemir	Moka	(PMDB-MS)	{3-1}	
ACTOR:	Silvia	Fagnani	(National	Union	of	the	Industry	of	Vegetable	Defense	Products	-	
SINDIVEG)	{3-1}	
ACTOR:	Tarciso	Bonachela	(Brazilian	Association	of	chemicals	and	biotechnology	-	ABIFINA)	{1-
1}	
ACTOR:	Valter	Bianchini	(MDA)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Valter	Israel	(National	Secretariat	of	the	Movement	of	Small	Producers)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Vicente	Eduardo	Soares	e	Almeida	(EMBRAPA	and	Permanent	Campaing	Against	
Pesticides	and	for	life)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Vinicius	Freitas	(Brazilian	Association	of	Agroecology)	{2-1}	
ACTOR:	Waldir	Stumpf	Junior	(EMBRAPA)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Wanderley	Pignati	(Researcher	University	of	Mato	Grosso)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Willian	da	Silva	(National	Confederation	of	Agricultural	Workers	-	CONTAG)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Wilson	Assis	(Procurador	da	Republica	de	Rio	Verde)	{1-1}	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Beto	Faro	(PT-PA)	{2-1}	
ACTORS	{0-91}	
Environmental	Commission	of	the	Deputies	Chamber	{1-1}	
HEROE:	Agroecology	{7-0}	
HEROE:	GMO's	{1-0}	
HEROE:	Monitoring,	control,	punishment	{2-0}	
HEROE:	New	technologies	for	agricultural	defense	{1-0}	
HEROE:	New	unified	agency	{2-0}	
HEROE:	Pesticides	{8-0}	
HEROES:	Agricultural	Producers	{4-0}	
HEROES:	Small	family	producers	{3-0}	
PLOT:	94%	of	pesticides	packages	are	being	recycled	in	Brazil,	we	are	doing	very	well	{1-0}	
PLOT:	A	careful	toxicological	evaluation	takes	time	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Aerial	spraying	is	an	irresponsible	and	inefficient	method	{1-0}	
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PLOT:	Aerial	spraying	is	already	sufficiently	regulated	{1-0}	
PLOT:	aerial	spraying	needs	clearer	regulations	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Agribusiness	is	bad	for	the	environment	and	for	rural	workers	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Agricultural	high	productivity	requires	the	use	of	pesticides	{16-0}	
PLOT:	Agriculture	is	an	issue	of	national	security	{1-0}	
PLOT:	ANVISA	is	inefficient	{1-0}	
PLOT:	ANVISA	is	not	transparent	{1-0}	
PLOT:	ANVISA/IBAMA	are	under	pressure/no	staff	or	resources	for	efficiency	{6-0}	
PLOT:	Big	business	is	capturing	regulations	{3-0}	
PLOT:	Brazilian	bee	is	different	it	is	more	resistant	{1-0}	
PLOT:	breast	milk	is	contamined	by	pesticides	{4-0}	
PLOT:	Companies	are	entering	the	line	to	protect	themselves	{1-0}	
PLOT:	crisis	shall	not	be	used	to	justify	previous	structural	problems	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Economic	benefits	of	pesticides	{7-0}	
PLOT:	Economic	crisis	has	put	agricultural	production	under	pressure	{3-0}	
PLOT:	Extinction	of	bees	is	bad	for	agriculture	{2-0}	
PLOT:	illegal	use	is	justified	by	the	lack	of	authorised	products	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Imported	products	are	too	expensive	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Irregular	use	of	pesticides	are	a	consequence	of	red	tape	{4-0}	
PLOT:	Irresponsible	approval	of	pesticides	put	economic	competitiveness	at	risk	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Lack	of	pesticides	control	generates	trade	barriers	which	are	bad	for	agricultural	
producers	{1-0}	
PLOT:	New	Agency	will	favour	only	agribusiness	and	harm	society	{1-0}~	
Comment:	
ANVISA	
PLOT:	New	pesticides	make	plagues	resistant	{1-0}	
PLOT:	New	plagues	are	emerging	and	we	have	no	products	to	deal	with	them	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Not	only	pesticides	causes	the	extinction	of	bees	{1-0}	
PLOT:	People	drink	water	in	pesticides	packages	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Pesticides	are	necessary	for	food	security	{7-0}	
PLOT:	Pesticides	are	not	necessary	for	food	security	and	high	agricultural	productivity	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Pesticides	are	not	so	bad	for	health	and	environment/	not	too	many	cases	of	
intoxication	{2-0}	
PLOT:	Pesticides	cause	extinction	of	bees	{1-0}	
PLOT:	Pesticides	forbidden	abroad	are	allowed	here	{4-0}	
PLOT:	Red	tape	hinders	market	efficiency/competitiveness	{6-0}	
PLOT:	Red	tape	is	promoted	by	the	industry	{2-0}	
PLOT:	Regulation	of	pesticides	in	Brazil	is	already	very	strict	{4-0}	
PLOT:	Small	producers	use	less	pesticides	{1-0}	
PLOT:	the	majority	of	pesticide	application	is	not	aerial	{1-0}	
PLOT:	There	is	no	such	a	thing	as	a	safe	level	of	pesticides	use	{1-0}	
PLOT:	There	is	no	way	to	produce	without	pesticides	{1-0}	
PLOT:	There	is	prejudice	against	pesticide	use	in	Brazil	{2-0}	
PLOT:	Tropical	countries	require	more	use	of	pesticides	{4-0}	
PLOT:	unified	agency	is	a	regulatory	rollback	{1-0}	
PLOT:	US	and	Canada	have	unified	agencies	for	registration	of	pesticides	{1-0}	
PLOT:	We	have	technologies	available	to	reduce	the	use	of	pesticides	{3-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Aerial	spraying	{11-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Amount	of	pesticides	used	in	the	country	{12-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Excessive	taxation	of	pesticides	or	need	of	further	incentives	for	unbranded	
products	{15-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Extinction	of	bees	{4-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Illegal	production,	use	and	disposal	of	pesticides	{4-0}	
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POLICY	PROBLEM:	Lack	of	reliable	information	about	pesticides	use	{1-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	National	industry	is	not	internationally	competitive	{2-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Pesticides	are	toxic	and	bad	for	the	environment	{16-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Registered	products	are	outdated	{9-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Registration	red	tape/takes	too	long	{17-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	Tax	exemptions	to	pesticides	{5-0}	
POLICY	PROBLEM:	We	are	too	dependent	on	imports	of	pesticides	{3-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:		more	coordination	between	IBAMA,	ANVISA,	and	MAPA	{4-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	Allowance	of	unbranded	pesticides	to	be	registered	after	patents	expire	{5-
0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	Exemption	of	taxes/more	incentives	for	pesticides	{5-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	Government	should	subsidise	national	industry	of	pesticides	{1-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	More	investment	in	Agroecology	{8-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	More	investment	in	control	and	qualification	of	staff	{9-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	More	investments	in	ANVISA	{3-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	More	severe	punishment	for	irregular	use	{1-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	National	policy	of	incentive	to	natural	pesticides	or	agroecology	{4-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	New	Unified	Agency	{8-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	New	Unified	Agency	but	with	every	agency	properly	represented	{1-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	Pesticides	forbidden	abroad	should	be	forbidden	{1-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	Pesticides	in	food	labels	{1-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	Re-evaluations	should	be	quicker	{1-0}	
POLICY	PROPOSAL:	Registrations	should	expire/or	cancelation	of	registrations	should	be	faster	
{4-0}	
SETTING:	Administrative	rationalism	{7-0}	
SETTING:	Developmentalist	{5-0}	
SETTING:	Preservationist	(Deep	green)	{10-0}	
VICTIM:	Agricultural	Producers	{16-0}	
VICTIM:	Bees	{1-0}	
VICTIM:	Brazilian	pesticide	industry	{1-0}	
VICTIM:	Brazilian	population	{10-0}	
VICTIM:	IBAMA	{2-0}	
VICTIM:	Pesticides	industry	{2-0}	
VICTIM:	Regulatory	Agencies	{10-0}	
VICTIM:	rural	workers	{4-0}~	
Comment:	
Le	Monde	
VICTIM:	Small	organic	producers	{1-0}	
VILLAIN:	Agricultural	producers	(pesticide	users/agribusiness)	{5-0}	
VILLAIN:	ANVISA	{4-0}	
VILLAIN:	Pesticides	{7-0}	
VILLAIN:	pesticides	industry	{6-0}	
VILLAIN:	Red	tape	{4-0}	
YEAR:	2008	{6-0}	
YEAR:	2009	{4-0}	
YEAR:	2010	{11-0}	
YEAR:	2011	{12-0}	
YEAR:	2012	{9-0}	
YEAR:	2013	{6-0}	
YEAR:	2014	{12-0}	
YEAR:	2015	{2-0}	
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______________________________________________________________________	
ACTORS	(90)	
ANVISA/Ministry	of	Health	(5)	
CNA	(4)	
DEM	(4)	
EMBRAPA	(4)	
HEROES	(8)	
IBAMA/Ministry	of	Environment	(5)	
Judicial	Power	(1)	
MDA	and	MDS	(3)	
Ministry	of	Agriculture	(3)	
PDT	(5)	
PESTICIDES	INDUSTRY	(8)	
PLOTS	(46)	
PMDB	(8)	
POLICY	PROBLEMS	(12)	
POLICY	PROPOSAL	(15)	
PP	(3)	
PPS	(1)	
PR	(1)	
PSC	(1)	
PSD	(1)	
PSDB	(2)	
PT	(11)	
PTB	(1)	
PV	(2)	
SCIENTISTS	(10)	
SETTINGS	(3)	
Social	Movements	and	Civil	Society	(7)	
VICTIMS	(9)	
VILLAINS	(5)	
YEAR	(8)	
	
Code-Links	
______________________________________________________________________	
ACTOR:	Acir	Gurgaz	(PDT-RO)	President	of..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Alceu	Moreira	(PMDB-RS)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Alessio	Marostica	(National	Confe..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Alexandre	Jose	Cattelan	(EMBRAPA)..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Ana	Maria	Vekic	(ANVISA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	ANDEF	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Angelo	Trape	(UNICAMP)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	ANVISA	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Brazilian	Agroecological	Associat..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Cesar	Koppe	Grisolia	(Universidad..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Cleber	Folgado	(Coordinator	of	th..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	CNA	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputado	Beto	Faro	(PT-PA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Abelardo	Lupion	(DEM-PR)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Alfredo	Kaefer	(PSDB-PR)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
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ACTOR:	Deputy	Amaury	Teixeira	(PT-MG)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Amaury	Teixeira	(PT-MG)Ou	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Antonio	Roberto	(PV-MG)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Arnaldo	Jordy	(PPS-PA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Celia	Rocha	(PTB-AL)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Dirceu	Sperafico	(PP-PR)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Jesus	Rodrigues	(PT-PI)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Joao	Dado	(PDT-SP)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Joao	Daniel	(PT-SE)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Luis	Carlos	Heinze	(PP-RS)..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Marcos	Montes	(PSD-MG)	(DE..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Moacir	Micheletto	(PMDB-PR..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Padre	Joao	(PT-MG)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Reinaldo	Azambuja	(PSDB-MS..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Roberto	Balestra	(PP-GO)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Sarney	Filho	(PV-MA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Stefano	Aguiar	(PSC-MG)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Valdir	Colatto	(PMDB-SC)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Deputy	Ze	Silva	(PDT-MG)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Eduardo	Daher	(National	Associati..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Eduardo	Guimaraes	(National	Assoc..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Federal	University	of	Mato	Grosso..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Fernando	Carneiro	(ABRASCO)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Geraldo	Papa	(Professor	UNESP)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Guilherme	Franco	(Ministry	of	Hea..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Hetel	dos	Santos	(National	Secret..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	IBAMA	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Inacio	Kroetz	(MAPA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Joao	Pedro	Stedile	(Movement	of	L..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Jose	Agenor	Alvares	da	Silva	(ANV..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Jose	Cunha	(Brazilian	Apiculture	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Jose	Roberto	Ros	(National	Union	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Juliana	Hosken	(National	Institut..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Julio	Sergio	de	Britto	(MAPA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Kenia	Godoy	(IBAMA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Luiz	Carlos	Lima	(National	Union	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Luiz	Carlos	Meireles	(ANVISA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Marcelo	Goncalves	(National	Counc..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Marcelo	Morandi	(EMBRAPA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Marcio	Freitas	(IBAMA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Michael	Haradom	(National	Associa..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Minister	of	Agriculture	Reinhold	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	MMA	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Nazareno	Fonteles	(PT-PI)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Permanent	Campaing	against	Pestic..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Professor	Anamaria	Tambellini	(Br..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Professor	Victor	Pelaez	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Reginaldo	Minare	(National	Confed..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Roberto	Brandao	(MMA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Rosangela	Cordeiro	(Via	Campesina..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Acir	Gurgacz	(PDT-RO)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Ana	Rita(PT-ES)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Antonio	Carlos	Valadares	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
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ACTOR:	Senator	Blairo	Maggi	(PR-MT)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Casildo	Maldaner	(PMDB-SC..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Donizete	Nogueira	(PT-TO)..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Gilberto	Goellner	(DEM-MT..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Gleisi	Hoffmann	(PT-PR)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Heraclito	Fortes	(DEM-PI)..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Katia	Abreu	(PMDB-TO)	In	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Neuto	de	Conto	(PMDB-SC)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Pedro	Taques	(PDT-MT)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Valter	Pereira	(PMDB-MS)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Senator	Waldemir	Moka	(PMDB-MS)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Silvia	Fagnani	(National	Union	of..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Tarciso	Bonachela	(Brazilian	Asso..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Valter	Bianchini	(MDA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Valter	Israel	(National	Secretari..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Vicente	Eduardo	Soares	e	Almeida	..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Vinicius	Freitas	(Brazilian	Assoc..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Waldir	Stumpf	Junior	(EMBRAPA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Wanderley	Pignati	(Researcher	Uni..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Willian	da	Silva	(National	Confed..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:	Wilson	Assis	(Procurador	da	Repub..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
ACTOR:Deputy	Beto	Faro	(PT-PA)	<is	a>	ACTORS	
Environmental	Commission	of	the	Deputies..	<is	a>	ACTORS	
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Chapter	6	
Appendix	I	-	Codes-quotations	list	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
HU:	 ABS_09_06_15	
File:	 	[H:\Atlasti\TextBank\ABS_09_06_15.hpr7]	
Edited	by:	 Super	
Date/Time:	 2015-06-12	15:59:12	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Allowance	of	no	prior	informed	consent	{5-0}	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:6	[A	carta	pede	o	veto	de	inciso	..]		(16:16)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Allowance	of	no	prior	informed	consent]		
No	memos	
	
A	carta	pede	o	veto	de	inciso	que	prevê	a	avaliação	de	consentimento	prévio	para	acesso	ao	
conhecimento	tradicional	feita	por	órgãos	oficiais	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:7	[seu	acesso	não	dependeria	do	c..]		(18:18)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Allowance	of	no	prior	informed	consent]		
No	memos	
	
seu	 acesso	 não	 dependeria	 do	 consentimento	 prévio	 de	 comunidades	 tradicionais	 ou	 povos	
indígenas.		
	
P13:	Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	-	13:9	[O	inciso	III,	que	prevê	a	poss..]		(3:1310-3:1658)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Allowance	of	no	prior	informed	consent]		
No	memos	
	
O	 inciso	 III,	 que	 prevê	 	 a	 possibilidade	 de	 comprovação	mediante	 “parecer	 do	 órgão	 oficial	
competente”,	não	pode	ser	mantido.	Nenhum	órgão	público	pode	falar	em	nome	de	qualquer	
povo	indígena,	comunidade	tradicional		ou	agricultor	familiar		no	ato	de	conceder	ou	negar	o	
consentimento	prévio	para	acesso	ao	conhecimento	tradicional	destes.	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:4	 [Cerca	 de	 10	 pontos	 específicos..]	 	 (14:14)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Allowance	of	no	prior	informed	consent]		
No	memos	
	
Cerca	 de	 10	 pontos	 específicos	 são	 contestados,	 entre	 eles	 os	 artigos	 que	 tratam	 do	
consentimento	prévio	às	empresas	interessadas	no	conhecimento	tradicional	
	
P32:	Interview	26_Com	transcrição.docx	-	32:4	[Então	seria	uma	das	reclamações..]	 	(52:52)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Allowance	of	no	prior	informed	consent]		
No	memos	
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Então	seria	uma	das	 reclamações	deles	sim,	que	o	acesso	é	 facilitado,	é	muito	 facilitado,	vai	
pagar,	mas	o	acesso	é	facilitado,	vc	tem	o	conhecimento	que	é	ancestral,	que	veio	do	seu	avô,	
que	é	uma	 relação	afetiva,	emocional,	 aí	 chega	uma	pessoa	 faz	o	acesso	 facilitado,	 inclusive	
pode	ser	um	acesso	mal-educado	que	não	contemple	aquela	forma,	aquele	hábito	de	ver	das	
pessoas...e	o	que	recebe	de	volta	é	um	pagamento.	Que	liberou	geral,	que	tem	pouco	pudor,	
não	tem	critérios.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Amnesty	{5-0}	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:8	[Anistia	aos	biopiratas	A	isenç..]		(24:25)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Amnesty]		
No	memos	
	
Anistia	aos	biopiratas	
A	 isenção	 da	 repartição	 de	 benefícios	 sobre	 exploração	 econômica	 de	 produtos	 cujo	
patrimônio	 genético	 tenha	 sido	 acessado	 antes	 de	 2000	 é	 outro	 problema	 do	 projeto.	 Isso	
significa	 que	 os	 exploradores	 que	 tenham	 acessado	 produtos	 antes	 desse	 ano	 e	 estejam	
lucrando	com	ele	agora	não	precisam	repartir	os	benefícios	com	as	comunidades	de	origem.	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:1	[texto	final	permite	anistia	de..]		(6:6)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Amnesty]		
No	memos	
	
texto	final	permite	anistia	de	multas	de	empresas	que	tenham	cometido	infrações	no	acesso	e	
exploração	do	patrimônio	genético	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:3	[Das	14	propostas	de	alteração	..]		(11:11)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Amnesty]		
No	memos	
	
	Das	 14	 propostas	 de	 alteração	 apresentadas	 (destaques)	 ontem,	 só	 foi	 aprovada	mais	 uma	
flexibilização	em	benefício	do	setor	privado:	a	possibilidade	de	anistiar	empresas	que	tenham	
sido	multadas	 antes	 da	 entrada	 em	 vigor	 da	 nova	 lei	 por	 infrações	 no	 acesso	 aos	 recursos	
genéticos.	
	
P	5:	ISA_19_03_15.docx	-	5:4	[a	série	de	anistias	para	empre..]		(17:17)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Amnesty]		
No	memos	
	
a	série	de	anistias	para	empresas	que	cometeram	irregularidades	e	as	isenções	à	repartição	de	
benefícios	pelo	uso	desses	recursos	e	de	conhecimentos	tradicionais,	previstas	no	projeto.	
	
P17:	 Folha_15_04_15_Senado	 aprova	 marco	 legal	 da	 biodiversidade_Gabriela	
Guerreiro.docx	-	17:5	[Pela	proposta	aprovada,	as	mul..]		(17:17)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Amnesty]		
No	memos	
	
Pela	 proposta	 aprovada,	 as	 multas	 aplicadas	 a	 pesquisadores	 ou	 empresas	 que	 não	
respeitaram	a	legislação	em	vigor	no	acesso	ao	patrimônio	genético	do	país	serão	anistiadas.	
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Elas	 somam	 R$	 214	milhões.	 O	 texto	 prevê	 a	 anistia	 para	 aqueles	 que	 assinarem	 termo	 de	
compromisso	para	se	adequarem	às	novas	regras.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Biodiversity	is	not	treated	as	an	opportunity	but	as	a	curse	{1-0}	
	
P	4:	ISA_12_05_15_Nurit.docx	-	4:3	[Trata-se	de	uma	nova	lei	que	c..]		(14:14)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Biodiversity	is	not	treated	as	an	opportunity	but	as	a	curse]		
No	memos	
	
	Trata-se	 de	 uma	 nova	 lei	 que	 confirma	 a	 dificuldade	 que	 o	 Brasil	 tem	 em	 perceber	 sua	
biodiversidade	como	oportunidade,	como	passaporte	para	o	futuro,	e	não	como	maldição	da	
qual	quer	se	livrar.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	BS	became	an	exception	{4-0}	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:4	[Ele	avaliou	que,	do	jeito	que	..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [BS	became	an	exception]		
No	memos	
	
Ele	avaliou	que,	do	jeito	que	o	projeto	está,	a	repartição	de	benefícios	será	uma	exceção,	e	não	
a	regra.		
	
P	4:	ISA_12_05_15_Nurit.docx	-	4:5	[A	repartição	de	benefícios	pas..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [BS	became	an	exception]		
No	memos	
	
A	repartição	de	benefícios	passará	a	ser	uma	exceção	ao	invés	da	regra	
	
P	6:	ISA_22_04_15_Nurit.docx	-	6:1	[fazendo	com	que	a	repartição	d..]		(18:18)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [BS	became	an	exception]		
No	memos	
	
fazendo	com	que	a	repartição	de	benefícios	não	se	torne	sempre	uma	exceção	
	
P17:	 Folha_15_04_15_Senado	 aprova	 marco	 legal	 da	 biodiversidade_Gabriela	
Guerreiro.docx	-	17:3	["Qual	o	produto	principal	da	g..]		(10:10)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [BS	became	an	exception]		
No	memos	
	
"Qual	o	produto	principal	da	gravata?	É	o	tecido.	E	o	produto	que	dá	o	brilho?	É	outro,	nosso,	
vindo	 da	 nossa	 biodiversidade.	 Mas	 não	 é	 o	 principal.	 E	 aí	 não	 paga?	 Não	 vai	 fazer	 a	
repartição?	Então	é	uma	biopirataria	oficial	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	BS	will	happen	through	public	policies	{3-0}	
	
P20:	 Interview	 54_com_transcricao.docx	 -	 20:5	 [Então	 a	 idéia	 da	 repartição	 de..]	 	 (46:46)			
(Super)	
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Codes:	 [BS	will	happen	through	public	policies]		
No	memos	
	
Então	a	 idéia	da	 repartição	de	benefícios	ela	é	muito	mais	 via	política	pública	de	estímulo	a	
conservação	e	a	proteção	de	conhecimentos	tradicionais	do	que	o	pagamento	direto.	
	
P31:	 Interview	 6_com	 transcricao.docx	 -	 31:3	 [Mas	 e	 se	 eu	 não	 identificar,	 a..]	 	 (50:50)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [BS	will	happen	through	public	policies]		
No	memos	
	
	Mas	e	se	eu	não	identificar,	aí	falaram,	não,	realmente	o	fundo	é	o	melhor	caminho,	e	isso	foi	
mais	 pra	 criar	 segurança	 jurídica,	 porque	 nesse	 caso,	 se	 alguma	 comunidade	 reclamar,	 o	
dinheiro	 foi	destinado	para	um	 fundo,	e	aí	o	governo	vai	 se	virar	 com	aquelas	 comunidades	
que	 estão	 reclamando	 esse	 direito	 porque	 a	 empresa	 declarou	 que	 era	 um	 conhecimento	
tradicional	difuso.	
	
P32:	 Interview	 26_Com	 transcrição.docx	 -	 32:3	 [Então	 esssa	 nova	 lei	 ela	 tem	 u..]	 	 (43:43)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [BS	will	happen	through	public	policies]		
No	memos	
	
Então	 esssa	 nova	 lei	 ela	 tem	 uma	 estrutura	 de	 proteção	 aos	 interesses	 das	 comunidades	
tradicionais.	 Uma	 coisa	muito	 importante	 é	 a	 fixação	 do	 valor	 de	 RB.	 A	 fixação	 desse	 valor	
permite	 que	 se	 elimine	 o	 processo	 negociador,	 que	 pode	 ser	 muito	 negativo	 pras	
comunidades.	É	1%,	 sendo	que	0.5%	é	pra	um	fundo	que	vai	 reunir	 recursos	pra	 redistribuir	
pras	 comunidades.	Esse	 fundo	pode	 ser	pra	 tudo,	mas	a	parte	de	 repartição	de	benefícios	a	
metade	é	pro	fundo.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Bureaucratic	hurdle	shall	be	avoided	{2-0}	
	
P27:	MENSAGEM	de	veto.docx	-	27:3	[Além	disso,	da	forma	disposta,..]		(13:13)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Bureacratic	hurdle	shall	be	avoided]		
No	memos	
	
	Além	 disso,	 da	 forma	 disposta,	 tais	 procedimentos	 poderiam	 resultar	 em	 mero	 entrave	
burocrático,	contrariamente	à	lógica	da	medida.”	
	
P27:	MENSAGEM	de	veto.docx	-	27:4	[dificuldades	operacionais.]		(18:18)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Bureacratic	hurdle	shall	be	avoided]		
No	memos	
	
dificuldades	operacionais.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Criticism	of	the	previous	law	{32-0}	
	
P	8:	Adriana	Diaféria	 com	 transcricao.docx	 -	 8:1	 [Então	assim,	a	2.186,	 apesar	d..]	 	 (18:18)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
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No	memos	
	
Então	assim,	a	2.186,	apesar	de	ela	ter	tido	a	intenção	na	época	de	criar	um	marco	regulatório	
ela	veio	cheia	de	subjetividades,	ela	veio	com	problemas	jurídicos,	porque	tinha	que	ter	saído	
uma	 PEC	 que	 estabelecia	 como	 bem	 da	 União	 o	 patrimônio	 genético	 e	 não	 saiu,	 então	 ela	
tinha	previsões	que	davam	o	tratamento	como	bem	da	união	e	ficou	uma	coisa	manca,	tinha	
conceitos	abertos	que	aí	depois	precisou	ter	intruções,	orientações	técnicas,	um	conjunto	um	
emaranhado	de	medidas	pra	poder	viabilizar,	e	como	ela	foi	MP	ela	não	podia	ter	previsões	de	
sanções	 administrativas,	 porque	 era	 uma	 MP,	 então	 teve	 que	 ir	 via	 decreto,	 então	 pra	 vc	
operacionalizar	ficou	tudo...	Então	a	proposta	que	tava	na	2.186	ela	realmente	dificultou	muito	
a	operação	prática,	tanto	pro	estado	quanto	para	os	usuários	da	biodiversidade.	
	
P10:	 Interview	 2_com_transcrição.docx	 -	 10:1	 [Não,	 a	 lei	 é	 terrível.	 É	 uma	 d..]	 	 (10:10)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Não,	a	lei	é	terrível.	É	uma	das	leis	mais	complexas	que	eu	já	trabalhei	em	toda	a	minha	vida.	
Principalmente	entre	 as	 leis	 ambientais	 essa	é	muito	 complexa.	 Ela	não	é	boa	pra	ninguém.	
Não	 é	 boa	 pras	 empresas,	 pras	 comunidades	 tradicionais,	 para	 o	 governo,	 né	 que	 não	 sabe	
como	aplicar.	E	essa	é	uma	lei	que	tem	um	impacto	muito	grande	no	setor	industrial,	ela	tem	
uma	expectativa	grande	das	comunidades,	de	que	aquilo	vai	ser	a	solução	dos	problemas	e	a	
receita	de	tudo	que	elas	precisam	vai	derivar	dessa	lei	e	o	governo	ele	nunca	soube	aplicar	
	
P10:	Inverview	2_com_transcrição.docx	-	10:2	[a	lei	é	muito	confusa,]		(12:12)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
	a	lei	é	muito	confusa,	
	
P14:	 Editorial	 Folha_10_04_2015_apos_aprovacao	 no	 senado.docx	 -	 14:1	 [O	 debate	 sobre	
quem	pode	ter	a..]		(5:5)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
O	debate	 sobre	quem	pode	 ter	acesso	a	 tais	 recursos	genéticos	e	 sobre	o	 justo	princípio	de	
repartição	 de	 benefícios	 deles	 oriundos,	 até	 aqui,	 produziu	 mais	 burocracia	 do	 que	 efetiva	
proteção	de	direitos.	
	
P14:	 Editorial	 Folha_10_04_2015_apos_aprovacao	 no	 senado.docx	 -	 14:2	 [Com	 a	 paranoia	
disseminada	da	..]		(6:6)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Com	a	paranoia	disseminada	da	biopirataria,	medida	provisória	de	2000	criou	tantas	regras	e	
obstáculos	que	seu	principal	resultado	foi	desestimular	a	investigação	científica	e	empresarial	
para	aproveitamento	da	biodiversidade.	
	
P14:	 Editorial	 Folha_10_04_2015_apos_aprovacao	 no	 senado.docx	 -	 14:3	 [Exigia-se	
autorização	prévia	d..]		(7:7)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
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Exigia-se	 autorização	prévia	 das	 pesquisas	 pelo	Conselho	de	Gestão	do	Patrimônio	Genético	
(CGen),	 do	Ministério	 do	Meio	 Ambiente.	 A	 demora	 era	 da	 ordem	 de	 18	meses.	 Na	 lei	 em	
exame,	o	requisito	foi	substituído	por	um	cadastramento	voluntário.	É	o	principal	avanço.	
	
P15:	Editorial_folha_30_04_2015.docx	-	15:1	[A	legislação	em	vigor,	baixada..]		(4:4)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
A	 legislação	 em	 vigor,	 baixada	 por	 medida	 provisória	 há	 15	 anos,	 revelou-se	 por	 demais	
restritiva.	 O	 excesso	 de	 exigências	 desestimulava	 o	 acesso	 a	 recursos	 genéticos	 e	 saberes	
tradicionais	associados	–como	os	de	povos	indígenas–	com	potencial	para	originar	fármacos	e	
cosméticos,	por	exemplo.	
	
P16:	 Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	 -	 16:1	 [Ainda	 que	 a	
intenção	fosse	boa..]		(4:4)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
	Ainda	que	a	intenção	fosse	boa,	a	lei	causou	graves	transtornos	para	a	inovação	no	país.	
	
P16:	 Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	 -	 16:2	 [a	 lei	 causou	
graves	transtorno..]		(4:4)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
a	lei	causou	graves	transtornos	para	a	inovação	
	
P16:	Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	-	16:4	[Nesse	contexto,	
a	"soberania	n..]		(6:6)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Nesse	 contexto,	 a	 "soberania	 nacional"	 falou	 mais	 alto	 que	 a	 racionalidade	 científica	 e	
econômica	
	
P16:	Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	-	16:3	[Nesse	contexto,	
a	"soberania	n..]		(6:6)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Nesse	 contexto,	 a	 "soberania	 nacional"	 falou	 mais	 alto	 que	 a	 racionalidade	 científica	 e	
econômica.	
	
P16:	 Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	 -	 16:5	 [Até	 o	 final	 de	
2013,	a	respost..]		(7:7)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Até	o	final	de	2013,	a	resposta	do	CGEN	demorava,	em	média,	um	ano	e	meio.	
	
P16:	 Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	 -	 16:6	 [Esse	 cenário	
criou	um	ambiente..]		(8:8)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
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No	memos	
	
Esse	cenário	criou	um	ambiente	de	 insegurança	 institucional,	 inibindo	a	 investigação	sobre	a	
biodiversidade	brasileira	–tanto	no	meio	acadêmico	quanto	no	ambiente	empresarial.	
	
P16:	 Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	 -	 16:8	 [.	 O	 texto	
aprovado	pela	Câmara..]		(11:11)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
.	O	texto	aprovado	pela	Câmara,	ainda	que	não	tenha	obtido	consenso	no	plenário,	promove	
um	grande	avanço	em	relação	à	lei	vigente.	
	
P16:	 Folha_10_03_15_Cara_Da_Natura_faladacartaempresarial.docx	 -	 16:7	 [que,	 por	 vícios	
de	origem	e	de..]		(12:12)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
que,	 por	 vícios	 de	 origem	 e	 desvios	 ideológicos,	 paralisou	 a	 pesquisa	 sobre	 a	 nossa	 diversa	
biodiversidade	
	
P17:	 Folha_15_04_15_Senado	 aprova	 marco	 legal	 da	 biodiversidade_Gabriela	
Guerreiro.docx	-	17:1	[redução	de	exigências	burocrát..]		(5:5)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
	redução	de	exigências	burocráticas	previstas	atualmente	pela	legislação.	
	
P17:	 Folha_15_04_15_Senado	 aprova	 marco	 legal	 da	 biodiversidade_Gabriela	
Guerreiro.docx	-	17:4	[Para	o	governo,	no	entanto,	as..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Para	 o	 governo,	 no	 entanto,	 as	 normas	 atuais	 são	 restritivas	 à	 pesquisa	 e	 à	 atividade	
econômica	
	
P18:	 Folha_20_06_2014_Governo	 envia	 ao	 Congresso	 projeto.docx	 -	 18:1	 ["Saímos	 de	 um	
marco	legal	que	..]		(8:8)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
	"Saímos	de	um	marco	legal	que	só	foca	em	biopirataria	e	vamos	para	um	marco	que	estimula	
a	pesquisa,	a	tecnologia",	
	
P18:	 Folha_20_06_2014_Governo	 envia	 ao	 Congresso	 projeto.docx	 -	 18:7	 ["Saímos	 de	 um	
marco	legal	que	..]		(8:8)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
"Saímos	de	um	marco	legal	que	só	foca	em	biopirataria	
	
P18:	 Folha_20_06_2014_Governo	 envia	 ao	 Congresso	 projeto.docx	 -	 18:2	 [Teixeira	 disse	
ainda	que	o	tex..]		(9:9)			(Super)	
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Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Teixeira	disse	ainda	que	o	texto	prevê	regras	mais	claras	para	a	repartição	de	benefícios	sobre	
o	produto	final	(o	parâmetro	definido	é	de	até	1%	da	receita	líquida)	e	a	aplicação	mais	efetiva	
de	penalidades,	que	hoje	se	perdem	em	brigas	judiciais.	
	
P18:	 Folha_20_06_2014_Governo	 envia	 ao	 Congresso	 projeto.docx	 -	 18:3	 [extremamente	
confusas	e	comple..]		(10:10)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
extremamente	confusas	e	complexas".	
	
P18:	 Folha_20_06_2014_Governo	 envia	 ao	 Congresso	 projeto.docx	 -	 18:4	 [A	 proposta	
responde	à	demanda	..]		(13:13)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
A	proposta	responde	à	demanda	de	setores	farmacêuticos	e	de	cosméticos,	que	cobram	mais	
segurança	jurídica	para	uso	desses	recursos.	
	
P18:	Folha_20_06_2014_Governo	envia	ao	Congresso	projeto.docx	-	18:6	[segurança	jurídica	
para	uso	des..]		(13:13)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
segurança	jurídica	para	uso	desses	recursos.	
	
P18:	Folha_20_06_2014_Governo	envia	ao	Congresso	projeto.docx	-	18:5	[A	lei	vai	facilitar	a	
pesquisa..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
A	 lei	 vai	 facilitar	 a	 pesquisa,	 vai	 evitar	 a	 biopirataria	 (...)	 e	 permite	 aproveitar	 melhor	 o	
patrimônio	genético	de	interesses	econômico,	social,	estratégico,	político	e	geopolítico"	
	
P19:	 MMA	 leader_com	 transcrição.docx	 -	 19:1	 [Não	 adianta	 vc	 ter	 uma	 legisla..]	 	 (80:80)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Não	adianta	vc	ter	uma	legislação	inaplicável.	
	
P20:	 Interview	 54_com_transcricao.docx	 -	 20:1	 [Mas	 questões	 estruturais	 que	 s..]	 	 (30:30)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Mas	 questões	 estruturais	 que	 se	 referem	 a	 regime	 brasileiro	 de	 ABS	 mandam	 uma	 nova	
legislação,	que	vai	dar	um	novo	enfoque,	e	moderna,	no	sentido	que	não	tenha	esse	excesso	
de	comando	e	controle,	o	nosso	foco	agora	é	exatamente	rastreabilidade	e	monitoramento	ex	
post	
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P21:	 CARTA	 EMPRESARIAL	 PELA	 CONSERVAÇÃO	 E	 USO	 SUSTENTÁVEL	 DA	
BIODIVERSIDADE.docx	-	21:1	[para	aperfeiçoamento	do	marco	..]		(110:111)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
para	aperfeiçoamento	do	marco	legal	e	
regulatório	para	conservação	e	uso	sustentável	da	biodiversidade	
	
P31:	 Interview	 6_com	 transcricao.docx	 -	 31:1	 [Não	 só	 as	multas	mas	 a	MP	 fala..]	 	 (50:50)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Não	só	as	multas	mas	a	MP	fala	no	artigo	26	dela	de	uma	indenização.	E	na	verdade,	pra	gente	
pior	do	que	a	multa	era	o	valor	da	indenização.	Porque	ele	não	colocava	um	prazo,	então	era	
assim,	se	eu	desenvolvi	um	produto	com	biodiversidade	em	2001	e	eu	fui	multado	agora	em	
2014,	eu	ia	ter	que	pagar	a	indenização	em	cima	de	todo	esse	período	e	20%	do	faturamento	
bruto	do	meu	produto.	E	aí	quando	a	gente	começou	a	falar,	olha,	prestem	atenção	no	que	é	o	
faturamento	bruto,	porque	vc	teria	muitas	empresas	que	iriam	fechar	por	conta	disso.	Aí	entra	
toda	 a	 soma	 de	 impostos	 e	 tudo...e	 essa	 foi	 uma	 das	 coisas	 que	 a	 gente	 colocou,	 a	 gente	
conseguiu	 a	 revogação	 desse	 artigo,	 então	 mesmo	 com	 o	 PL	 não	 revogando	 a	 2.186	 por	
inteiro,	esse	artigo	a	gente	conseguiu	que	fosse	revogado	
	
P31:	 Interview	 6_com	 transcricao.docx	 -	 31:2	 [E	 outro	 ponto	 era	 como	 a	 indús..]	 	 (50:50)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
E	outro	ponto	era	como	a	 indústria	de	produto	 final	 vai	 localizar	uma	comunidade	pra	dizer	
que	acessou	a	biodiversidade	daquele	 lugar	entendeu.	Então,	porque	a	gente	compra	de	um	
fornecedor,	e	é	muito	difícil	você	localizar	um	fornecedor	seu	
	
P32:	Interview	26	
_Com	transcrição.docx	-	32:2	[Vc	conhece	a	legislação	atual?..]		(18:18)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Vc	conhece	a	legislação	atual?	É	uma	legislação	muito	de	comando	e	controle.	
	
P32:	 Interview	 26_Com	 transcrição.docx	 -	 32:7	 [A	 gente	 quer	 que	 isso	 seja	 vot..]	 	 (63:63)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
A	gente	quer	que	 isso	seja	votado	 logo	(o	ministério	do	meio	ambiente).	Porque	a	 legislação	
atual	não	funciona.	Entra	no	sistema	quem	quer.	
	
P32:	 Interview	 26_Com	 transcrição.docx	 -	 32:8	 [A	 legislação	 atual	 ela	 exige	 u..]	 	 (66:66)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
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A	 legislação	atual	ela	exige	um	monte	de	documentos,	ela	exige	um	mapa	do	 laboratório	de	
pesquisa	 dele,	 o	 equipamento	 que	 eles	 tem	 no	 laboratório,	 quantos	 pesquisadores	 tem	
lá...quer	 dizer,	 manda	 o	 CV	 Lattes	 do	 pesquisador...então	 é	 algo	 absurdo.	 Se	 for	 uma	
universidade	pede	declaração	do	reitor.	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:20	 [Com	 relação	 ao	 parágrafo	 único..]	 	 (9:1617-
9:1915)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticism	of	the	previous	law]		
No	memos	
	
Com	relação	ao	parágrafo	único,	tem-se	que	a	possibilidade		
e	não	a	obrigatoriedade	de	oitiva	de	órgãos	de	defesa	dos	direitos	dos		
detentores	é	um	retrocesso	em	relação	à	Medida	Provisória,	e	merece	ser		
objeto	de	veto	em	obediência	ao	princípio	da	vedação	constitucional	ao		
retrocesso	social.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Criticisms	are	due	to	ideological	fundamentalism	{1-0}	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:7	 [Já	 para	 o	 relator	 do	 projeto	 d..]	 	 (16:16)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Criticisms	are	due	to	ideological	fundamentalism]		
No	memos	
	
Já	para	o	relator	do	projeto	de	lei	na	Câmara,	as	críticas	ao	texto	são	"infundadas"	e	decorrem	
de	"preconceito	ideológico"	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Economic	use	favours	conservation	{1-0}	
	
P21:	 CARTA	 EMPRESARIAL	 PELA	 CONSERVAÇÃO	 E	 USO	 SUSTENTÁVEL	 DA	
BIODIVERSIDADE.docx	-	21:2	[Legitimamos	a	necessidade	de	m..]		(30:34)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Economic	use	favours	conservation]		
No	memos	
	
Legitimamos	a	
necessidade	de	mensurar	o	valor	econômico	dessa	conservação	por	meio	da	valoração	
dos	bens	e	serviços	provenientes	da	biodiversidade.	Entendemos	que	processos	
produtivos	de	menor	impacto	ambiental	e	soluções	inovadoras	para	a	conservação	da	
biodiversidade	geram	valor	positivo	para	a	sociedade	e	para	nossas	empresas.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	 Foreign	 institutions	 cannot	 be	 precluded	 from	 associating	 themselves	with	 national	
institutions	for	access	to	national	genetic	resources	{2-0}	
	
P24:	SPBC_Ressalvas	ao	PL.docx	-	24:3	[http://amazonia.org.br/2015/02..]		(3:3)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Foreign	 Institutions	 cannot	 be	 precluded	 from	 associating	 themselves	with	 national	
institutions	for	access	to	national	genetic	resources]		
No	memos	
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http://amazonia.org.br/2015/02/nota-sbpc-manifesta-ressalvas-ao-pl-77352014/	
	
P24:	SPBC_Ressalvas	ao	PL.docx	-	24:2	[Defende	que	toda	pessoa	jurídica..]		(19:19)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Foreign	 Institutions	 cannot	 be	 precluded	 from	 associating	 themselves	with	 national	
institutions	for	access	to	national	genetic	resources]		
No	memos	
	
Defende	que	toda	pessoa	 jurídica	estrangeira	que	quiser	acessar	componente	do	patrimônio	
genético	ou	conhecimento	tradicional	associado,	deve	se	associar	a	uma	ICT	nacional	e	assinar	
o	Acordo	de	Repartição	de	Benefícios	como	condição	para	obter	uma	autorização	de	acesso	ao	
patrimônio	genético	brasileiro.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Illegality	of	the	bill	{22-0}	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:2	[A	desconsideração	do	direito	à..]		(9:9)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
A	desconsideração	do	direito	à	consulta	livre,	prévia	e	informada	fere	tratados	internacionais	
ratificados	pelo	Brasil,	como	a	Convenção	169	da	Organização	Internacional	do	Trabalho	(OIT).	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:3	[“Ocorre	que	sem	as	emendas	der..]		(10:10)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
“Ocorre	que	sem	as	emendas	derrubadas	pela	Câmara	dos	Deputados	o	Projeto	de	Lei	padece	
de	inconstitucionalidades	e		
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:5	[A	aprovação	do	projeto	também	..]		(13:13)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
A	aprovação	do	projeto	também	fere	o	Protocolo	de	Nagoya.	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:7	[Por	outro	lado,	o	texto	aprova..]		(22:22)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Por	outro	lado,	o	texto	aprovado	ontem	falha	em	atender	diversos	dispositivos	do	tratado.	Por	
exemplo,	dificulta	o	estabelecimento	de	sistemas	internacionais	de	monitoramento	do	acesso	
aos	recursos	genéticos	que	assegurariam	sua	legalidade	em	escala	mundial.		
	
P	7:	ISA_29_04_15.docx	-	7:3	[O	texto	original	da	Câmara	pre..]		(17:17)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
O	 texto	 original	 da	 Câmara	 previa	 uma	 isenção	 para	 todo	 tipo	 de	 produto,	 o	 que	 fere	 a	
Convenção	da	Diversidade	Biológica	(veja	aqui)	(leia	mais	no	box	abaixo).		
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:2	 [em	 paralelo	 e	 em	 conflito	 com	 ..]	 	 (1:1785-
1:1902)			(Super)	
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Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
em	paralelo	e	em	conflito	com	o	Protocolo	de	Nagoya	
sobre	acesso	a	recursos	genéticos	e	repartição	justa	e	equitativa	
	
P13:	Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	-	13:4	[perda	dos	nossos	direitos	hist..]	 	(2:879-2:932)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
perda	dos	nossos	direitos	historicamente	conquistados,	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:6	 [Ocorre	 que	 sem	as	 emendas	 derr..]	 	 (2:2278-
2:2391)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Ocorre	que	sem	as	emendas	derrubadas	pela	Câmara	dos		
Deputados	o	Projeto	de	Lei	padece	de	inconstitucionalidades	
	
P13:	Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	-	13:8	[registramos	que	a	exclusão	del..]	 	(3:65-3:387)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
registramos	que	a	exclusão	deliberada	dos	detentores	de	conhecimentos		
tradicionais	representa	violação	direta	dos	artigos	1.º,	parágrafo	único,	e		
231	da	Constituição	Federal,	do	artigos	6.º,	“1”,	e	15,	“1”	da	Convenção		
169	da	OIT	e	do	artigo	31	da	Declaração	das	Nações	Unidas	sobre	os		
Direitos	dos	Povos	Indígenas.	
	
P13:	Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	-	13:11	[Este	parágrafo	merece	ser	veta..]		(5:1-5:416)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Este	parágrafo		merece	ser	vetado	por	inconstitucionalidade		
na	medida	em	que	ofende	diretamente	os	artigos	215,	§1º,	e	216	da		
Constituição	Federal,		pois	ignora	que	diversos		povos	indígenas,		
comunidades	quilombolas	e	demais	populações,	que	exercem	atividade		
agrícola,	desenvolvem	permanentemente	e	ao	longo	de	gerações,		
diferentes	modos	de	criar	e	fazer	relacionados	ao	patrimônio	genético		
agricultável.	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:12	 [de	 Lei	 sob	 análise	 é	 diferente..]	 	 (5:1481-
5:1613)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
de	Lei	sob	análise	é	diferente	do	conceito	existente	na	Lei	10.711/2003,	o		
que	cria	uma	incompatibilidade	lógica	entre	as	duas	leis	
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P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:14	 [Este	 dispositivo	 fere	 a	 isonomia..]	 	 (6:1234-
6:1564)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Este	dispositivo	fere	a	isonomia,	pois		estabelece	uma	regra		
diferenciada	para	dois	usuários	que	estão	realizando	a	mesma	atividade.		
Mesmo	que	ambos	estejam	explorando	economicamente	produto		
resultante	de	acesso,	aquele	que	disser	que	o	acesso	foi	realizado	antes	de		
29	de	junho	de	2000	poderá	deixar	de	repartir	benefícios	
	
P13:	Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	-	13:16	[Além	disso,	esse	dispositivo	p..]		(7:344-7:561)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Além	disso,	esse	dispositivo	pode	representar	entrave	à		
aprovação	do	Protocolo	de	Nagoya,	pois	confunde	o	acesso	com	a	efetiva		
exploração	econômica	do	patrimônio	genético	na	definição	de	um	marco		
legal	de	isenção	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:17	 [Ressalte-se,	 ademais,	 que	 o	 re..]	 	 (7:565-
7:830)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Ressalte-se,	ademais,	que	o	referido	dispositivo	ainda	viola	o		
princípio	constitucional	da	irretroatividade	da	lei,	uma	vez	que	considera		
a	data	do	acesso,	e	não	a	data	da	exploração	econômica,	como	parâmetro		
para	a	referida	isenção	à	repartição	de	benefícios.	
	
P13:	Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:18	 [e	 isso	 também	viola	 frontalmente..]	 	 (8:640-
8:779)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
e	isso	também	viola		
frontalmente	as	disposições	do		Protocolo	de	Nagoya,	especialmente	no		
que	se	refere	aos	termos	mutuamente	acordados.	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:19	 [Garantir	 a	 possibilidade	 de	 re..]	 	 (9:1088-
9:1415)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Garantir	a	possibilidade	de	reduzir	o	percentual	da	repartição		
de	benefícios	para	0,1%	da	receita	líquida	anual	representa	grave	violação		
à	Convenção	da	Diversidade	Biológica,	pois	impõe	excessivo	ônus	a	uma		
das	partes	da	relação,	violando	os	princípios	de	justiça	e	equidade	que		
devem	nortear	a	repartição	de	benefícios	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:22	 [Em	 especial,	 tal	 dispositivo	 a..]	 	 (10:1295-
10:1656)			(Super)	
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Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Em	especial,	tal	dispositivo	acaba	por	retirar	a	competência		
do	IBAMA	para	exercer	o	poder	de	polícia	em	matéria	ambiental,	o	que		
afronta	o	artigo	225,	§	1.º,	II,	da	Constituição	Federal,	além	da	Política		
Nacional	de	Meio	Ambiente	e		a	Lei	n.º	7.735/1989,	que	preveem	a		
referida	autarquia	federal	como	órgão	executor	das	políticas	ambientais		
no	Brasil.	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:23	 [Está-se,	 novamente,	 diante	 de	 ..]	 	 (11:354-
11:1359)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Está-se,	novamente,	diante	de	dispositivo	que	viola	os		
princípios	da	justiça	e	equidade	na	repartição	de	benefícios,	pois	garante		
ao	usuário	a	opção	pelo	regime	de	repartição	de	benefícios,	além	de	criar		
obstáculo,	desnecessário,	à	ratificação	do	Protocolo	de	Nagoya,		
especialmente	no	que	se	refere	aos	termos	mutuamente	acordados.		
Na	prática	esse	dispositivo	cria	uma	quebra	de	isonomia	e		
coloca	em	contraposição	os	interesses	do	usuário	e	do	provedor,	e	dá	ao		
usuário	a	possibilidade	de	escolher	o	melhor	regime,	condenando	o		
provedor	invariavelmente	ao	pior	regime.	
Não	se	poderia	permitir	a	aplicação	de	norma	já	revogada;		
mais	ainda	por	se	tratar	de	benefício	destinado	apenas	ao	usuário,	e	não		
ao	detentor	do	conhecimento	tradicional,	o	que	afronta	o	princípio		
constitucional	da	igualdade.		
Ademais	a	Medida	Provisória	não	contém	previsão		
relacionada	aos	Conhecimentos	Tradicionais	de	origem	não	identificável,		
logo	a	regularização	deve	se	dar	sempre	com	base	na	nova	lei.	
	
P14:	Editorial	Folha_10_04_2015_apos_aprovacao	no	senado.docx	-	14:4	[Há	quem	diga	que	
a	lei,	se	apr..]		(9:9)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
Há	 quem	diga	 que	 a	 lei,	 se	 aprovada,	 entrará	 em	 conflito	 com	 a	 Convenção	 da	Diversidade	
Biológica.	Não	é	improvável	que	venha	a	ser	questionada	na	Justiça,	
	
P24:	 SPBC_Ressalvas	 ao	 PL.docx	 -	 24:1	 [A	 SBPC	 também	 não	 concorda	 com..]	 	 (21:21)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
A	 SBPC	 também	 não	 concorda	 com	 diversos	 dispositivos	 relacionados	 aos	 conhecimentos	
tradicionais	 associados	 e	 aos	 direitos	 dos	 povos	 indígenas	 e	 conhecimentos	 tradicionais,	
detentores	 de	 tais	 conhecimentos,	 pois	 ferem	 direitos	 assegurados	 pela	 Convenção	 sobre	
Diversidade	Biológica	 (CDB)	e	pela	Convenção	169	da	Organização	 Internacional	do	Trabalho	
(OIT),	 convenções	 essas	 ratificadas	 pelo	 Brasil,	 e	 reconhecidos	 pela	 Declaração	 das	 Nações	
Unidas	sobre	os	Direitos	dos	Povos	Indígenas.	
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P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:1	 [O	 argumento	 é	 que	 o	 texto	 é	 in..]	 	 (9:9)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
O	 argumento	 é	 que	 o	 texto	 é	 inconstitucional	 por	 falta	 de	 consulta	 prévia	 aos	 povos	
tradicionais,	como	indígenas,	quilombolas	e	ribeirinhos,	conforme	determina	a	Convenção	169	
da	Organização	Internacional	do	Trabalho.	
	
P27:	MENSAGEM	de	veto.docx	-	27:2	[inconstitucionalidade]		(3:3)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Illegality	of	the	bill]		
No	memos	
	
inconstitucionalidade	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	 Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)	{7-0}	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:9	 [O	 que	 eles	 estão	 querendo,	 na	 ..]	 	 (18:18)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/	 no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)]		
No	memos	
	
O	que	eles	estão	querendo,	na	verdade,	é	transformar	o	projeto	em	impraticável:	se,	em	cada	
decisão	 a	 ser	 tomada,	 todas	 essas	 instituições	 tiverem	 de	 ser	 chamadas	 para	 ser	 ouvidas,	
teremos	 uma	 lei	 que	 não	 será	 instrumento	 de	 acesso	 ao	 patrimônio	 genético	 em	 lugar	
nenhum.	
	
P30:	Henrique	Dolabella	e	Eliana	Fontes.docx	-	30:1	[e	também	não	foi	capaz	de	nos	prov..]		
(14:14)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/	 no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)]		
No	memos	
	
	e	também	não	foi	capaz	de	nos	prover	com	informações.	
	
P30:	Henrique	Dolabella	 e	 Eliana	 Fontes.docx	 -	 30:2	 [Foi	 o	que	deu	pra	 ser	 feito.]	 	 (14:14)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/	 no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)]		
No	memos	
	
Foi	o	que	deu	pra	ser	feito.	
	
P30:	Henrique	Dolabella	e	Eliana	Fontes.docx	-	30:3	[A	sociedade	civil	não	estava	s..]		(15:15)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/	 no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)]		
No	memos	
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A	sociedade	civil	não	estava	suficientemente	articulada	
	
P31:	 Interview	6_com	transcricao.docx	-	31:4	[Teve	um	momento	que	a	CNI	tent..]	 	 (52:52)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/	 no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)]		
No	memos	
	
Teve	um	momento	que	a	CNI	 tentou	 trazer	as	comunidades	para	a	discussão,	a	gente	como	
coalizão	 apresentou	 qual	 era	 a	 proposta	 de	 texto,	 as	 comunidades	 não	 se	 sentiram	
representadas	e	aí	o	que	a	gente	falou,	ah,	vocês	têm	que	procurar	o	MMA	porque	são	eles	
que	 estão	 construindo.	 A	 gente	 tá	 só	 dando	 quais	 são	 os	 inputs	 do	 setor	 privado,	 mas	 aí	
realmente	tem	que	ser	uma	conversa	entre	ministério	e	comunidades.	Mas	o	Ministério	não	
abriu,	pelo	que	a	gente	sabe	eles	não	abriram	a	conversa	porque	eles	sabiam	que	ia	demorar	
muito	mais	pra	sair.		
	
P32:	 Interview	26_Com	transcrição.docx	 -	 32:9	 [O	Henrique	era	aquele	 cara	que..]	 	 (28:28)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/	 no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)]		
No	memos	
	
O	H.	era	aquele	cara	que	não	permitia	que	a	legislação	fosse	progressista,	saísse	progressista.	
O	 G.	 tem	 uma	 posição	 muito	 próxima	 das	 empresas,	 ele	 não	 tem	 sensibilidade	 pras	
comunidades		
	
P32:	 Interview	26_Com	transcrição.docx	 -	32:5	 [Mas	não	pode	ser	considerado	c..]	 	 (60:60)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Managerialist	 argument	 (Public	 consultation	 ossifies	 the	 process/	 no	 technical	
contribution	could	come	from	traditional	communities	in	a	short	time)]		
No	memos	
	
	Mas	 não	pode	 ser	 considerado	 consulta,	 não	pode.	 Consulta	 seria	 algo	 que	 seria	 caríssimo,	
nós	não	teríamos	condição	de	fazer,	seria	algo	que	ia	durar	o	que?	10	anos?	5	anos?	3	anos?	
Não	sei.	Seria	algo	caríssimo,	teria	que	se	 ir	pra	cada	região,	e	eu	não	digo	estado,	mas	uma	
região,	 um	 conjunto	 de	 municípios	 para	 trabalhar	 comunidades	 tradicionais,	 lideranças,	
representantes	delas,	para	discutir	e	 fazer	uma	deliberação	 sobre	uma	pauta	extremamente	
técnica.		
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	More	BS	would	make	the	law	once	again	impossible	to	implement	{1-0}	
	
P15:	Editorial_folha_30_04_2015.docx	-	15:2	[Faz	sentido	que	assim	seja,	po..]		(9:9)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [More	BS	would	make	the	law	once	again	impossible	to	implement]		
No	memos	
	
Faz	sentido	que	assim	seja,	pois	aí	se	localiza	a	geração	do	valor	que	se	pretende	redistribuir	
aos	 detentores	 do	 conhecimento	 original,	 como	 é	 justo.	 Caso	 contrário,	 a	 nova	 norma	
incorreria	 no	 pecado	maior	 da	 anterior,	 o	 de	 pretender	 tudo	 regular	 e	 onerar,	 apenas	 para	
terminar	impedindo	a	própria	geração	de	benefícios.		
	
______________________________________________________________________	
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Code:	National	development	{3-0}	
	
P19:	MMA	Leader_com	transcrição.docx	 -	19:2	 [Agora,	nenhum	país	 renuncia	as..]	 	 (80:80)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [National	development]		
No	memos	
	
	Agora,	nenhum	país	renuncia	as	suas	possibilidades	de	crescimento.		
	
P20:	 Interview	 54_com_transcricao.docx	 -	 20:6	 [no	 lugar	 de	 eu	 ter	 que	 levanta..]	 	 (50:50)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [National	development]		
No	memos	
	
no	 lugar	 de	 eu	 ter	 que	 levantar	 toda	 uma	 papelada	 pra	 pedir	 uma	 autorização	 pra	 ter	 lá	 o	
conselho	aprovando,	se	eu	simplesmente	registro	num	cadastro	minhas	pesquisas,	o	que	eu	tô	
fazendo,	 o	 mínimo	 que	 vai	 ser	 exigido,	 isso	 vai	 dar	 muito	 mais	 segurança	 e	 celeridade	 ao	
processo	de	desenvolvimento.	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:10	 [viabilização	 de	 investimentos	 ..]	 	 (19:19)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [National	development]		
No	memos	
	
viabilização	de	 investimentos	 em	pesquisa	 com	 capacidade	de	 gerar	mais	 emprego,	 renda	e	
oportunidades	para	o	País.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	new	law	officialised	biopiracy	{2-0}	
	
P17:	 Folha_15_04_15_Senado	 aprova	 marco	 legal	 da	 biodiversidade_Gabriela	
Guerreiro.docx	-	17:2	["Qual	o	produto	principal	da	g..]		(10:10)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [new	law	officialised	biopiracy]		
No	memos	
	
"Qual	o	produto	principal	da	gravata?	É	o	tecido.	E	o	produto	que	dá	o	brilho?	É	outro,	nosso,	
vindo	 da	 nossa	 biodiversidade.	 Mas	 não	 é	 o	 principal.	 E	 aí	 não	 paga?	 Não	 vai	 fazer	 a	
repartição?	Então	é	uma	biopirataria	oficial"	
	
P26:	Agencia	Camara	de	Noticias.docx	-	26:5	["legalizam	a	biopirataria".]		(14:14)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [new	law	officialised	biopiracy]		
No	memos	
	
"legalizam	a	biopirataria".	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Procedural	criticism	{20-0}	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:1	[uma	vez	que	os	principais	ator..]		(9:9)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
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No	memos	
	
uma	 vez	 que	 os	 principais	 atores	 envolvidos	 –	 camponeses,	 pequenos	 agricultores,	 povos	 e	
comunidades	tradicionais	–	foram	impedidos	de	participar	da	elaboração	do	PL	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:5	[Povos	indígenas	e	tradicionais..]		(16:16)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
	Povos	 indígenas	 e	 tradicionais	 manifestaram-se	 contra	 o	 regime	 de	 urgência,	 que	 não	
permitiu	 ampla	 discussão	 do	 projeto,	 e	 não	 participaram	 das	 tratativas	 –	 o	 que	 governo	 e	
representantes	de	empresários	admitem.	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:6	[“Ou	o	Governo	altera	sua	postu..]		(18:18)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
	“Ou	o	Governo	altera	sua	postura	adotada	desde	o	início	do	processo	legislativo	de	defender	
interesses	empresariais	e	negar-se	a	atender	às	demandas	das	comunidades	tradicionais		
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:8	[regulamentação	apressada,	equi..]		(23:23)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
regulamentação	apressada,	equivocada	
	
P	4:	ISA_12_05_15_Nurit.docx	-	4:1	[O	que	se	viu,	então,	foi	uma	t..]		(13:13)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
O	 que	 se	 viu,	 então,	 foi	 uma	 tramitação	 apressada,	 e	 nada	 democrática,	 de	 um	 assunto	
complexo	
	
P	4:	ISA_12_05_15_Nurit.docx	-	4:2	[Os	detentores	do	conhecimento	..]		(13:13)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Os	 detentores	 do	 conhecimento	 tradicional,	 povos	 indígenas	 e	 comunidades	 locais,	 os	
pesquisadores	 e	 os	 ambientalistas	 foram	 alijados	 do	 debate	 e	 o	 texto	 refletiu	 apenas	 os	
interesses	 das	 empresas	 que	 usam	 componentes	 da	 nossa	 biodiversidade	 e	 conhecimentos	
tradicionais	a	ela	associados.		
	
P	4:	ISA_12_05_15_Nurit.docx	-	4:7	[Depois	de	quase	20	anos	de	deb..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Depois	de	quase	20	anos	de	debates	sobre	esse	assunto,	como	podemos	acabar	com	uma	lei,	
aprovada	apressadamente	
	
P	5:	ISA_19_03_15.docx	-	5:1	[O	manifesto	afirma	que	a	exclu..]		(10:10)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
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O	 manifesto	 afirma	 que	 a	 exclusão	 dessas	 populações	 do	 debate	 sobre	 o	 projeto	 foi	 uma	
“decisão	 consciente	 e	 deliberada”	 do	 governo	 federal	 e	 dos	 representantes	 das	 empresas	 e	
classifica-a	como	um	“rompimento	na	relação	de	confiança”	entre	essas	mesmas	populações	e	
empresas	(leia	o	manifesto).	
	
P	5:	ISA_19_03_15.docx	-	5:2	[“Há	um	acordo	entre	Legislativo..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
“Há	 um	 acordo	 entre	 Legislativo	 e	 Executivo	 para	 aprovar	 o	 texto	 como	 está.	 Infelizmente,	
esse	acordo	se	deu	com	pressão	do	setor	empresarial”	
	
P	5:	ISA_19_03_15.docx	-	5:3	[“É	claro	que	há	consenso	sobre..]		(17:17)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
“É	 claro	 que	 há	 consenso	 sobre	 o	 PL	 entre	 o	 governo	 e	 o	 setor	 empresarial.	 O	 projeto	 foi	
debatido	e	elaborado	por	eles,	com	a	exclusão	de	povos	e	comunidades	tradicionais”	
	
P	7:	ISA_29_04_15.docx	-	7:2	[Ele	voltou	a	negar	que	povos	i..]		(16:16)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
	Ele	 voltou	 a	 negar	 que	 povos	 indígenas	 e	 tradicionais	 foram	 excluídos	 do	 debate	 sobre	 o	
processo,	 como	 denunciam	 organizações	 da	 sociedade	 civil	 e	 movimentos	 sociais	 e	 já	 foi	
reconhecido	pelo	governo.		
	
P	7:	ISA_29_04_15.docx	-	7:6	[Representantes	das	grandes	ind..]		(21:21)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Representantes	 das	 grandes	 indústrias	 e	 do	 agronegócio	 conduziram	 diretamente	 as	
negociações	que	resultaram	no	parecer	de	Alceu	Moreira.	
	
P	7:	ISA_29_04_15.docx	-	7:7	[Mais	uma	vez,	lobistas	da	indú..]		(23:23)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Mais	uma	vez,	lobistas	da	indústria	tiveram	acesso	privilegiado	ao	plenário	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:1	 [reiteramos	 nosso	 repúdio	 com	 a..]	 	 (1:1395-
1:1703)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
reiteramos		
nosso	repúdio	com	a	forma	ilegal	e	antidemocrática	que	um	assunto	tão		
importante	para	a	sociedade	brasileira,	que	regerá,	daqui	para	as	futuras		
gerações,	a	sistemática	de	exploração	da	agro	e	da	biodiversidade		
nacionais,	foi	tratado	tanto	pelo	Poder	Executivo	quanto	pelo	Poder		
Legislativo	
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P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:3	 [Reiteramos	 nosso	 repúdio	 acerc..]	 	 (2:304-
2:744)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Reiteramos	nosso	repúdio	acerca	da	assimetria	na	amplitude		
das	discussões	realizadas	com	os	setores	privados	interessados,		
especialmente,	na	exploração	econômica	do	patrimônio	genético	nacional,		
com	os	quais	foi	noticiada	a	realização	de	mais	de	trezentas	reuniões,	em		
detrimento	dos	poucos	espaços	que	tiveram	que	ser	conquistados	por	nós,		
guardiões	da	agro	e	biodiversidade	e	detentores	dos	saberes		
(conhecimentos)	tradicionais	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:5	 [Em	 nenhum	 momento	 nos	 negamos	 ..]		
(2:1271-2:1357)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Em	nenhum	momento	nos	negamos	a	dialogar	e	a	propor		
melhorias	no	Projeto	apresentado,	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:10	 [Importa	 destacar	 que	 o	 antepro..]	 	 (4:837-
4:1164)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Importa	destacar	que		o	anteprojeto	encaminhado	pelo		
Executivo	não	continha	qualquer	disposição	referente	ao	patrimônio		
genético	relacionado	à	alimentação	e	agricultura,	e	que	referidas		
disposições	foram	incluídas	a	partir	do	substitutivo	apresentado	pelo		
Relator	na	Câmara	dos	Deputados,	onde	o	projeto	não	foi	debatido	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:2	 ["Neste	 caso,	 o	 projeto	 foi	 ela..]	 	 (12:12)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
"Neste	caso,	o	projeto	foi	elaborado	pela	coalizão	empresarial	interessada	neste	assunto.	Não	
houve	 qualquer	 participação	 dos	 detentores	 de	 conhecimento	 tradicional,	 o	 que	 gerou	 um	
grande	desequilíbrio	no	projeto”,	
	
P31:	 Interview	 6_com	 transcricao.docx	 -	 31:5	 [Não	 teve	 uma	 participação	muit..]	 	 (52:52)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Não	teve	uma	participação	muito	ativa	das	comunidades	nesse	processo,	porque	em	nenhum	
momento	 eles	 foram	 convidados,	 a	 gente	 montou	 uma	 negociação	 nossa,	 a	 gente	 tava	
defendendo	 o	 nosso	 interesse.	 Até	 chegou	 o	MMA	 a	 ter	 uma	 ou	 duas	 negociações	 com	 as	
comunidades	mas	não	que	eles	tenham	construído	da	mesma	maneira	que	a	gente	construiu	
dentro	do	ministério.	Foi	mais	pra	dizer	o	que	eles	já	tinham	
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P32:	 Interview	 26_Com	 transcrição.docx	 -	 32:1	 [As	 comunidades	 tradicionais	 fo..]	 	 (15:16)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Procedural	criticism]		
No	memos	
	
Question	 -	 As	 comunidades	 tradicionais	 foram	 envolvidas	 nesse	 processo	 de	 discussão	 da	
nova	lei?	
Answer	-	Muito	pouco	e	de	forma	atrasada.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	The	bill	is	more	favourable	to	scientists	{2-0}	
	
P25:	 Presidente	 da	 SBPC	 elogia	 avanços	 do	 PL	 7735	 para	 CT.docx	 -	 25:1	 [Helena	Nader,	 o	
texto	enviado	..]		(7:7)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	bill	is	more	favourable	to	scientists]		
No	memos	
	
Helena	Nader,	o	texto	enviado	à	sanção	da	presidente	Dilma	Rousseff	é	bastante	satisfatório	
para	cientistas	e	pesquisadores	e	pode	abrir	um	novo	panorama	para	este	tipo	de	atividade.	
	
P27:	MENSAGEM	de	veto.docx	-	27:6	[A	atribuição	de	competências	i..]		(31:31)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	bill	is	more	favourable	to	scientists]		
No	memos	
	
A	atribuição	de	competências	internas	ao	Poder	Executivo	é	matéria	de	iniciativa	privativa	do	
Presidente	da	República,	nos	 termos	do	art.	61,	§	1o,	 inciso	 II,	da	Constituição,	não	podendo	
ser	alterada	por	medida	de	iniciativa	do	Legislativo,	em	respeito	ainda	ao	disposto	no	art.	63,	
inciso	I.”	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)	{12-0}	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:4	[colide	com	o	interesse	social]		(10:10)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
colide	com	o	interesse	social	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:2	[O	presidente	da	Câmara,	Eduard..]		(12:12)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
O	presidente	da	Câmara,	Eduardo	Cunha	(PMDB-RJ),	começou	a	cumprir	o	acordo	para	facilitar	
a	aprovação	de	projetos	de	interesse	dos	ruralistas	em	troca	do	apoio	à	sua	eleição.	
	
P	7:	ISA_29_04_15.docx	-	7:1	[acordo	fechado	entre	líderes	r..]		(10:10)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
	acordo	 fechado	 entre	 líderes	 ruralistas,	 o	 lobby	 do	 agronegócio	 e	 das	 indústrias	 de	
cosméticos,	medicamentos,	higiene	e	alimentação	
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P	7:	ISA_29_04_15.docx	-	7:4	[“O	que	está	sendo	discutido	ne..]		(18:18)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
“O	que	está	sendo	discutido	nesta	casa	é	como	ganhar	mais	dinheiro	e	abrir	o	país	ao	capital	
estrangeiro.	O	que	o	projeto	pretende	é	abrir	as	áreas	 indígenas	e	de	agricultores	 familiares	
aos	interesses	do	agronegócio.	O	projeto	é	para	grandes	negócios,	não	para	defender	direitos”	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:7	 [e	 colide	 com	 o	 interesse	 socia..]	 	 (2:2393-
2:2426)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
e	colide		
com	o	interesse	social,	
	
P13:	Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	-	13:13	[Portanto	a	razão	de	veto	tem	c..]		(6:1-6:325)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
Portanto	a	razão	de	veto	tem	como	escopo	manter	a		
harmonia	do	sistema	jurídico	nacional,	e	também	o	interesse	público,	pois	
o	direito	de	usar	e	vender	livremente	seus	produtos	já	é	garantido	aos	seus		
detentores	naturalmente	e	é	regulamentado	não	só	pelas	duas	leis	citadas,		
mas	por	todo	o	ordenamento	jurídico	nacional	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:15	 [Essa	 previsão	 fere	 o	 interesse..]	 	 (7:1-7:162)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
Essa	previsão		fere	o	interesse	público,		pois	deixa	mais		
onerosa	a	exploração	econômica	de	produtos	resultantes	de	inovações	a		
partir	de	29	de	junho	de	2000.	
	
P13:	 Carta_veta_dilma_-_pl_7735.pdf	 -	 13:21	 [Atribuir	 ao	 Ministério	 da	 Agri..]	 	 (10:763-
10:1291)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
Atribuir	ao	Ministério	da	Agricultura,	Pecuária	e		
Abastecimento	a	competência	para	fiscalizar	o	acesso	aos	conhecimentos	
tradicionais	associados	às	atividades	agrícolas,	fere	o	interesse	público	na		
medida	em	que	o	coloca	em	rota	de	colisão	com	as	competências	do		
Ministério	do	Meio	Ambiente	entre	outros,	especialmente	no	que	se		
refere	à	fiscalização	sobre	questões	que	podem	envolver	povos	indígenas		
e	comunidades	tradicionais	que	exercem	atividades	agrícolas,		
possibilitando	a	ocorrência	de	conflito	de	competência	
	
P25:	Presidente	da	SBPC	elogia	avanços	do	PL	7735	para	CT.docx	-	25:2	[“Para	mim,	que	sou	
biomédica,	..]		(10:10)			(Super)	
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Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
“Para	 mim,	 que	 sou	 biomédica,	 [a	 proposta]	 é	 excelente.	 Mas,	 como	 presidente	 de	 uma	
sociedade	 de	 todas	 as	 áreas	 do	 conhecimento,	 me	 preocupo	 com	 as	 questões	 das	
comunidades	tradicionais”,	disse	Nader.	
	
P27:	MENSAGEM	de	veto.docx	-	27:1	[por	contrariedade	ao	interesse..]		(3:3)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
por	contrariedade	ao	interesse	público	
	
P31:	 Interview	 6_com	 transcricao.docx	 -	 31:6	 [Mas	 tem	 umas	 questões	 política..]	 	 (54:54)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
Mas	tem	umas	questões	políticas	super	interessantes.	Se	vc	pensar	a	Dilma	nesse	último	ano	
ficou	péssima	com	o	setor	privado	porque	as	indústrias	começaram	a	ter	muito	prejuízo.	Então	
se	vc	pegar	os	relatórios	da	CNI	de	crescimento	da	indústria	foram	muito	ruins.	Então	foi	uma	
maneira	 que	 ela	 encontrou	 de	 apoiar	 o	 setor	 privado.	 E	 mandou	 inclusive	 com	 regime	 de	
urgência.	
	
P32:	Interview	26_Com	transcrição.docx	-	32:6	[Por	que	mandaram	lá	em	regime	..]		(61:62)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	law	is	a	result	of	capture	(often	associated	with	electoral	interests)]		
No	memos	
	
Por	que	mandaram	lá	em	regime	de	urgência?	Porque	que	teve	que	ser	tudo	feito	de	maneira	
tão	rápida?	
Eu	acho	que	por	conta	da	eleição,	isso	foi	uma	indicação	de	posicionamento	do	governo,	para	
o	setor	da	indústria,	relevante.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	The	new	bill	provides	no	legal	security	{5-0}	
	
P	3:	ISA_11_02_15.docx	-	3:9	[não	trará	segurança	jurídica	p..]		(23:23)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	new	bill	provides	no	legal	security]		
No	memos	
	
não	trará	segurança	jurídica	para	o	tema	
	
P	4:	ISA_12_05_15_Nurit.docx	-	4:6	[que	não	trará	nenhuma	segurança..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	new	bill	provides	no	legal	security]		
No	memos	
	
que	não	trará	nenhuma	segurança	jurídica	
	
P	7:	ISA_29_04_15.docx	-	7:5	[segurança	jurídica	para	esse	t..]		(19:19)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	new	bill	provides	no	legal	security]		
No	memos	
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	segurança	jurídica	para	esse	tema	no	país,	e	agora	concebem	e	apoiam	uma	nova	lei	que	trará	
muito	 mais	 insegurança	 jurídica	 e	 que	 já	 traz	 em	 seu	 bojo,	 por	 causa	 do	 seu	 processo	 de	
aprovação,	um	enorme	potencial	de	conflito	com	os	detentores	de	conhecimento	tradicional”,	
comenta.	
	
P14:	 Editorial	 Folha_10_04_2015_apos_aprovacao	 no	 senado.docx	 -	 14:5	 [prolongando	 a	
insegurança.]		(9:9)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	new	bill	provides	no	legal	security]		
No	memos	
	
prolongando	a	insegurança.	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:3	 [“Se	 o	 projeto	 visa	 trazer	 segu..]	 	 (13:13)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	new	bill	provides	no	legal	security]		
No	memos	
	
“Se	o	projeto	visa	trazer	segurança	jurídica,	a	gente	entende	que	a	presidente	tem	que	vetar	
alguns	dispositivos	principais,	porque	de	nada	vai	adiantar	uma	nova	lei	acabar	na	Justiça,	com	
ações	judiciais	longas,	de	10	ou	20	anos"	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	The	potential	benefits	of	biodiversity	use	are	wasted	{1-0}	
	
P	4:	ISA_12_05_15_Nurit.docx	-	4:4	[Nessa	nova	lei,	a	União,	guard..]		(15:15)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [The	potential	benefits	of	biodiversity	use	are	wasted]		
No	memos	
	
Nessa	nova	lei,	a	União,	guardiã	–	ao	menos	teoricamente	–	da	nossa	biodiversidade,	abre	mão	
de	quase	 todas	as	possibilidades	de	aferir	benefícios	 com	a	exploração	do	nosso	patrimônio	
genético.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Too	much	power	to	the	user	{2-0}	
	
P	2:	ISA_06_05_15.docx	-	2:9	[Outro	ponto	dúbio	do	projeto,	..]		(23:23)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [Too	much	power	to	the	user]		
No	memos	
	
Outro	 ponto	 dúbio	 do	 projeto,	 no	 qual	 a	 carta	 indica	 a	 necessidade	 de	 veto,	 é	 também	 a	
possibilidade	 de	 o	 usuário	 explorador	 escolher	 quem	 será	 beneficiário	 da	 repartição	 de	
benefícios.	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:6	 [conhecimento	 tradicional	 e	 da	 ..]	 	 (14:14)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Too	much	power	to	the	user]		
No	memos	
	
conhecimento	tradicional	e	da	divisão	dos	lucros	decorrentes	da	exploração	da	biodiversidade,	
além	de	outros	pontos	que,	segundo	os	movimentos	sociais,	
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______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Traditional	and	indigenous	communities	are	represented	in	the	CGEN	{1-0}	
	
P26:	 Agencia	 Camara	 de	 Noticias.docx	 -	 26:8	 [Além	 disso,	Moreira	 argumenta	 ..]	 	 (17:17)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Traditional	and	indigenous	communities	are	represented	in	the	CGEN]		
No	memos	
	
Além	disso,	Moreira	argumenta	que	essas	comunidades	estão	devidamente	representadas	no	
Conselho	 de	 Gestão	 do	 Patrimônio	 Genético	 (CGEN),	 responsável	 pela	 coordenação,	
elaboração	e	implementação	das	políticas	do	setor.	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	Union	as	provider	is	better	for	conservation	{2-0}	
	
P20:	 Interview	54_com_transcricao.docx	-	20:3	[agora	se	pressupõe	que	como	o	..]	 	 (42:42)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Union	as	provider	is	better	for	conservation]		
No	memos	
	
agora	se	pressupõe	que	como	o	patrimônio	genético	é	um	bem	comum	do	uso	do	povo	e	que	
a	sua	gestão	cabe	à	União,	a	União	fará	o	papel	de	provedor	do	recurso	genético	é	com	ela	que	
se	 fará	o	 contrato	de	 repartição	de	benefícios	 e	 a	 lei	 já	 pressupões	que	 todos	os	benefícios	
devem	ser	dirigidos	para	a	conservação	e	uso	sustentável.	
	
P20:	 Interview	54_com_transcricao.docx	 -	20:4	 [nunca	 foi	assegurado	que	o	ben..]	 	 (42:42)			
(Super)	
Codes:	 [Union	as	provider	is	better	for	conservation]		
No	memos	
	
nunca	 foi	 assegurado	 que	 o	 benefício	 gerado	 e	 repartido	 iria	 para	 a	 conservação	 da	
biodiversidade	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
	
Code:	we	opened	space	for	the	bioindustry	{1-0}	
	
P23:	 Interview	 Izabella	 Teixeira_com	 transcrição.docx	 -	 23:1	 [vc	 abriu	 o	 caminho	 pra	
bioindú..]		(48:48)			(Super)	
Codes:	 [we	opened	space	for	the	bioindustry]		
No	memos	
	
vc	abriu	o	caminho	pra	bioindústria	no	país	
	
______________________________________________________________________	
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APPENDIX	II	
	
Actor	
Appearances	
in	Lower	
Chamber	
news	
Affiliation/party/role	 Coalition	
1. Alceu	Moreira		 46	 Federal	Deputy	/	PMDB-RS	 Neo-developmentalist	
2. Dilma	Rousseff		
14	 President	
Administrative	economic	
rationalist	
3. Luciana	Santos	 13	 Federal	Deputy	/	PCdoB-PE	 Socio-environmentalist	
4. Henrique	Fontana		
10	 Federal	Deputy	/	PT-RS	
Administrative	economic	
rationalist	
5. Alessandro	Molon	 7	 Federal	Deputy	/	PT-RJ	 Socio-environmentalist	
6. Sibá	Machado	
7	 Federal	Deputy	/	PT-AC	
Administrative	economic	
rationalist	
7. Sarney	Filho	 7	 Federal	Deputy	/	PV-MA	 Socio-environmentalist	
8. Ivan	Valente	 5	 Federal	Deputy	/	Psol-SP	 Socio-environmentalist	
9. Jandira	Feghali		 4	 Federal	Deputy	/	PCdoB-RJ	 Socio-environmentalist	
10. Luis	Carlos	Heinze	 4	 Federal	Deputy	/	PP-RS	 Neo-developmentalist	
11. Chico	Alencar	 4	 Federal	Deputy	/	Psol-RJ	 Socio-environmentalist	
12. Nurit	Rachel	
Bensusan	 3	 Socio-environmental	Institute	(ISA)	-	NGO	 Socio-environmentalist	
13. Mauricio	Guetta	
2	 Socio-environmental	Institute	(ISA)	-	NGO	 Socio-environmentalist	
14. Zé	Silva	 2	 Federal	Deputy	/	SD-MG	 Socio-environmentalist	
15. Neri	Geller	 2	 Minister	of	Agriculture	 Neo-developmentalist	
16. Roberto	Cavalcanti	 2	
Ministry	of	the	Environment	-	Secretary	of	
Biodiversity	and	Forests	
Administrative	economic	
rationalist	
17. Helena	Nader	
2	
Brazilian	Society	for	Scientific	Progress	
(SBPC)	 Socio-environmentalist	
18. Luiz	Carlos	Heinze	 2	 Federal	Deputy	/	PP-RS	 Neo-developmentalist	
19. Bohn	Gass		 2	 Federal	Deputy	/	PT-RS	 Socio-environmentalist	
20. Valdir	Colatto	 2	 Federal	Deputy	/	PMDB-SC	 Neo-developmentalist	
21. José	Carlos	Aleluia	 1	 Federal	Deputy	/	DEM-BA	 Neo-developmentalist	
22. Juliana	Santilli	 1	 Public	Attorney	/	DF	 Socio-environmentalist	
23. Joaquim	Belo	 1	
	National	Council	of	Extractivist	Population	
(CNS)	 Socio-environmentalist	
24. Jose	Guimarães	 1	 Federal	Deputy	/	PT-CE	
Administrative	economic	
rationalist	
25. Paulo	Sérgio	Beirão	 1	
National	Council	of	Scientific	and	
Technologic	Development		(CNPq),	
Administrative	economic	
rationalist	
26. Erika	Kokay	 1	 Federal	Deputy	/	PT-DF	 Socio-environmentalist	
27. Emilson	Rodrigues	 1	 Federal	Deputy	/	Psol-PA	 Socio-environmentalist	
28. Padre	João	 1	 Federal	Deputy/	PT-MG	 Socio-environmentalist	
Source:	Produced	by	the	author	
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